Yox v. Tru-Rol

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In the Circu it Court for B altimore C ounty Case No. C00-12965 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 31 September Term, 2003 ______________________________________ ARNOLD C. YOX v. TRU-ROL COMPANY, INC., ET AL. ______________________________________ Bell, C.J. *Eldridge Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Wilner, J. Bell, C.J., Eldridge and Battaglia, JJ., Dissent ______________________________________ Filed: March 15, 2004 *Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conf erence of this case wh ile an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Cons titution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. Maryland Code, § 9-711 of the Labor and Employment Ar ticle (LE) req uires that a claim for workers compensation benefits based on disablement resulting from an occupational disease be filed within two years after the date (1) of disablement, or (2) when the employee had actual knowledge that the disablement was caused b y the employm ent. The issue befo re us is wh at is meant b y disablement when the claim is for occupational deafness pursuant to LE §§ 9-505 and 9-649 through 9-652. We shall hold that an occupational deafness disablement occurs when the hearing loss is sufficient to become compensable under § 9-650. A claim for workers compensation benefits based on occupational deafness must therefore be filed within two years from the time the hearing loss reaches that level of compensability and the employee has actual knowledge that the loss was caused by his/her employment. As the evidence in this case reveals that, in 1987, petitioner, Arnold Yox, (1) suffered from a hearing loss that was compen sable under § 9-650, (2) knew that he suffered a hearing loss, and (3) knew that the hearing loss resulted from his employment, his claim, filed 13 years later, is time-barred under § 9-711. BACKGROUND Petitioner worked for respondent, Tru-Rol Company, Inc., for more than 47 years as a press operator. His duties included running the press, tearing down tractors with an air wrench, and using a jack hammer and a vibrator, which he described as a loud piece of machinery resembling a jackhammer. Throughout his employment, he was exposed to loud noise. At some point, perhaps around 1991, Mr. Yox was given earmuffs to wear. He w ore them w hen w orking the vibr ator bu t not oth erwise . In Septemb er, 1987, M r. Yox saw Dr. Rob ert Schwager, an ear, nose, and throat specialist, altho ugh there is so me d iscre pancy in th eir re colle ction s as to why. Dr. Schwag er, reading from notes he made at the time, recalled that Yox complained of a hearing loss and throat pain; he m ade no no te of any com plaint abou t a ringing in th e ears. Yo x said that he consulted Schwa ger becau se of a ring ing in his ears; he did not recall any throat pain and did not think at the time that he had a hearing loss, as he could hear the television at home. Dr. Schwager performed or had perfo rmed an a udiometric test, which revealed a 35.25% hearing loss in the right ear and a 37.75% loss in the lef t ear. That extent of loss, according to Dr. Schwager, would h ave amo unted to a b inaural impairme nt of 35.67%, which the parties agree is a compensable hearing loss under § 9-650. Because he was not asked to do so, Dr. Schwager did not calculate the binaural impairment in 1987. He told M r. Yox of the audiom etric test results an d had him fitted for hearing aids, which Yox said reduced the ringing in his ears when he wore them. Mr. Yox wore the hearing aids at hom e but did not wear them to work. He acknowledged that he was aware in 1987 that his h earing lo ss was directly rela ted to his emplo yment. Yox continued to work fo r Tru-Ro l until 1999, when the com pany closed and he ob tained similar work elsewhere. He d id no t rece ive a ny further medical attention until 2000, be cause his ears were still working. In deposition testimony, he indicated that it was not until 1998 that -2- my ears really left me . He said th at his hearing in 1987 was going down but wasn t as bad as i t is now . Mr. Yox retu rned to D r. Schwa ger in June, 2000, after he had begun work for his new employer. From his examination, Dr. Schwager concluded that Yox s actual hearing loss had worsened since 1987 (33% in the right ear and 38% in the left ear) but tha t, because in making the necessary calculations for workers compensation purposes he had to consider Yox s age, the binaural hearing impairment for compensation purposes had remained about the same, and, in fact, was a bit less. In July, 2000, though continuing to work for the ne w employer as a pre ss operator, Yox filed a wo rkers com pensation c laim agains t Tru-Rol f or occup ational diseas e due to years exposure to high levels of indus trial noise. To the question , O/D D ate Disab lemen t, he responded 0/00/0000. Tru-Rol raised a number of issues in defense, but proceeded only on the § 9-71 1 statute of limitations. T hrough c ounsel, Y ox respon ded that, in 1987, he did not know that he had a disablement that would entitle him to compensation benefits. The Comm ission determined that his knowledge of disablement was not the test that the statutory test was whether there was a disablement and whether he knew that he had a hearing los s that was a ttributable to his employment and that the record revealed an affirmative answ er to bo th. Accordingly, the Commission held that the claim was barred by limitations and denied it. Mr. Yox sought judicial review in the C ircuit Court for Baltimore County. After a de -3- novo evidentiary hearing, that cou rt entere d an ord er rever sing the Com mission . The court acknowledged that the 1987 testing demonstrated sufficient loss to have be en comp ensable under the standards utilized by the Com mission and that it was c lear from Dr. Schw ager s records that a co nnectio n betw een the hearing loss and Yox s emplo yment w as evid ent. The court nonetheless concluded that, because Yox had not lost any time from work and therefore suffered no wage loss or earning impairment, he had not suffered a disablem ent in 1987, or, indeed, in 2000, and that the § 9-711 statute of limitations had not even begun to run, much less expired: limitations does not even begin to run until the hearing loss gives rise to inc apacity to work , as set fo rth in LE §§ 9-7 11 and 9-502 . On Tru-Rol s appeal, the Court of Special A ppeals reversed the C ircuit Court judgmen t, holding that, in an occ upational d eafness ca se, limitations be gins to run when the hearing loss becomes compensable under Section 9-505, or when the employee first ha[s] actual knowledge that t he disability [i.e., the compensable hearing loss], was caused by the emplo yment. Tru-Rol v. Yox, 149 M d. App. 7 07, 718 , 818 A.2d 283, 290 (2003). The court noted that any other construction would be illogical, unreasonable, and inconsistent with common sense because it would allow a worker to be compensated for his or her hearing loss bef ore the s tatute of limitation s on the claim e ven be gan to r un. Id. We granted certiorari to review th e Court of Special A ppeals dec ision and, be cause w e believe tha t it is correct, shall af firm it. -4- DISCUSSION In Belschner v. Anchor Post, 227 Md. 89, 92, 175 A.2d 4 19, 420 (1961), we pointed out that, as first enacted in 1914, the Workers Compensation Law provided compensation only for disability or death of an employee from an accidental injury that arose out of and in the cou rse of e mploym ent. Under that statute, this Court had held, on a number of occasions, that an employee seeking compensation for a disability arising from an accidental injury did not need to show any loss o f wag es or ea rning c apacity. See Balto. Publishing Co. v. Hendricks, 156 M d. 74, 143 A . 654 (192 8); Balto. Tube Co. v. Dove, 164 Md. 87, 164 A. 161 (1933), both cited in Belschner, 227 M d. At 92 , 175 A .2d at 42 1. It was not until 1939 that the law was amended to provide compensation for injuries arising from o ccupa tional di sease. See 1939 Md. Laws, ch. 465. In clear contrast to the situation stemming from an a ccidental inju ry, however , the 1939 la w did no t permit compensation for occup ational diseas e unless an d until the employee was no longer able to work in the last occupation in which he/she was exposed to the hazards of the disease. That was evident from at least two provisions of the law one a substantive provision and one a definition. Section 32B, which the 1939 law added to art. 101 of the Code, provided compensation for an em ployee who suffered from a de fined occ upational disease and is thereby disabled from performing his work in the last occupation in which he was injurio usly exposed to the hazards of such disease . . . . (Empha sis added). In order to be e ntitled to compensation under that section, the employee had to be disabled from per forming h is -5- work . The 1939 law also added some new definitions to § 65 of art. 101, among which were definitions of disablement and disability. New § 65(15) define d disa bleme nt, for purposes of the newly enacted provisions dealing with occupational disease, as the event of an employee s becoming actually incapacitated, either partially o r tota lly, because of an occup ational d isease, from performing his work in the last occu pation in w hich expo sed to the hazards of such disease and it defined disability as the state of being so incapacitated. (Emph asis added). Because an injury arising from an occup ational diseas e was co mpensa ble only if the employee became incapacitated from performing his/her work, the law needed to provide, and did provide, a special statute of limitations for occupatio nal disease c laims. With respect to disabilities arising from accidental injury, the existing law required that a claim for compensation be ma de with in one year after th e begin ning of the disa bility. Under the judicial gloss we had given to the statute, such a claim could be filed while the employee was still working at his/her occupation. Failure to file the claim within that one year period constituted a complete bar unless the failure was induce d by frau d. See Maryland Code, art. 101, §§ 5 0, 51 (193 9). With respect to occupational disease claims, however, the 1939 Act specified, in § 32F, that a claim was barred if not filed within one year fro m the date of disablement or death. (Emph asis added). The bracket was thus clear: a non-fatal occupational disease claim could not be filed until the emp loyee was ac tually incapacitated from work, bu t it had to be filed within one year thereaf ter. -6- The 1939 law limited the righ t to recover c ompens ation for oc cupationa l disease to certain enumera ted diseases , mostly poisonings of one kind or another, and hearing loss was not among the listed maladies. It was not until 1951, with the enactment of 1951 Md. Law s, ch. 287, that coverage was provided for all occupational disease. At that point, hearing loss disability became compensable whether it resulted from an accidental injury (a sudden traumatic event) or an occupational disease (repeated exposure to loud noise). Hearing impairment was a scheduled loss, i.e., the law then provided for the amount of compensation to be paid for the total loss of hearing in one ear and in both ears. See Maryland C ode, art. 101, § 36(b) (1957 ). In Belschner, the claim was initially for hearing loss resulting from a ccidental injury a spark flying into one of Mr. Belschner s ears but it was amended to assert that the disability was the result of an env ironme nt of lou d noise s over a period of time . That made it an occupational disease claim. Belschner worked as a saw ope rator, and he continued to work at that job even after the claim was amended and while it was litigated. Notwithstanding a stipulation that Belschner suffered a 44% binaural loss of hearing due to industrial exposure, the Commission found that he did not sustain an occupational disease and therefo re denie d the cla im. The Circuit Court, on judicial review, affirmed, and so did we. We reached that conclusion by examining the two provisions noted above then § 22(a) of art. 101, allowing compensation for occupational disease only when the employee -7- was thereby disabled from performing his work in the last occupation in which he was injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease, and then § 67(15), defining disab lemen t, for purposes of § 22, as the e vent of an employee s b ecoming actually incapacitated . . . because of an occupational disease, from performing his work in the last occupation in which exposed to the hazards of the disease. Contrasting tho se statutory requireme nts for occupational diseases from our h oldings with regard to accidental injuries, we held that the word disability means one thing when used in providing compensation for injury caused b y an occupa tional disease but means something diffe rent whe n used in providing compensation for accidental injury. Belschner, supra, 227 Md. at 93, 175 A.2d at 421. Because Belschner s claim was for occupational disease and his hearing loss did not affect his continued employment as a saw operator, the Court held that the loss was not compensable. We treated Belschner s occupational hearing loss just like any other occupational disease non-compensable unless the employee was unable to continue working in the occupation that produced the disability. We noted at the end of the Opinion that [i]f there is a need to liberalize the law or change what we think it plainly means, that is a legislative, not a judicial function. Id. at 95, 175 A.2d at 422-23. The Governor s Commission to Study Maryland Workmen s Com pensation Laws, created in 1959 to monitor the workers compensation law and make recommendations for change, eventually responded to Belschner in its Seventh Report to th e Gove rnor, in -8- Februar y, 1967, with a recommendation that the law be amended to provide for occupational loss of hearing, i.e., a separate provision d ealing spec ifically with hearing loss. 1967 S EVENTH R EPORT O F T HE G OVERNOR S C OMMISSION T O S TUDY M ARYLAND W ORKMEN S C OMPENSATION L AWS, at 2. The Commission noted: [a]t the present time, an employee cannot recover for occupational loss of hearing until he shows a loss of wages, due to court interpretation of the law; and, in many cases, the time elapsed invokes limitations and the employee receives no comp ensatio n. Id. A bill recommended by the Commission was introduced into the 1967 session of the General Assembly and was enacted as 1967 M d. Laws, ch . 155. In a ne w § 25A (a) to art. 101, the Legislature provided that the condition it called occupational deafness would be compensated according to the terms and conditions of this section. Section 25A then set forth a technical set of criteria for when occupational deafness would be compensable. Essen tially, it stated that a hearing loss in excess of 15 decibels in three frequencies (500, 1,000, and 2000 cycles per s econd) would be com pensable. In § 25A (g), the Legislature provided that, notwithstanding any other provision of the article, a claim for scheduled income benefits could not be filed until the lapse of six full consecutive calendar month s after the termination of exposure to harmful noise in employment and that [t]he time limitation for the filing of claims for occupational deafness shall not begin to run earlier than -9- the day fo llowin g the term ination o f such six mo nths pe riod. 1 The wording of the 196 7 statute left something to be desired, but, in Crawley v. General Motors Corp., 70 Md. App. 100, 519 A.2d 1348, cert. denied, 310 Md. 147, 528 A.2d 473 (1987), the Court of Special Appea ls, after reviewing the legislative history of the statute, correctly concluded that which is now conceded that the legislative intent was not only to provide technical criteria for measuring occupational loss of hearin g but also to make such loss compensable without regard to inability to work or loss of wages. Id. at 107, 519 A.2d at 1352. The court thus held that an employee who suffers from a condition of impaired hearing resulted from protracted exposure to noise in the course of his occupation, but who has not yet experienced any disablement, i.e., loss of wages or cap acity to perform his regular w ork, is entitled to receive worker s compensation. Id. at 101, 519 A.2d at 1349. In 1991, as part of the general code revision process, art. 10 1 was rep ealed, and its provisions, constituting the workers compensation law, were recodified as title 9 of the Labor and E mploym ent Art icle. The new article split the former provisions between subtitles 1 That is not an unique provision with respect to hearing loss cases. Similar provisions are found in the workers compensation laws of Georgia (O.C.G.A. 34-9264(c) ), Misso uri (M o. Stat. 2 87.197 .7), and S outh D akota (S .D. Co dified L aws 6 2-9-12 ). In 1980, the six-month provision in § 25A(g) was repealed as part of a more general revision of the o ccupa tional di sease la ws. See 1980 M d. Laws , ch. 706. Th e only explanatio n found in the legislative files for the d eletion of the six-month provision is testimony from a Dr. Gra ce Ziem, w ho both p racticed occ upational m edicine and taught it at Johns Hopkins and Baltimore City Hospitals and at OSHA, to the effect that any increase in hearing following termination of exposure to harmful noise is temporary, that hearing retu rns to its perm anent am ount of los s within 24 hours, and that the six m onth delay is u nscien tific. -10- 5, dealing w ith the entitlem ent to compensation, and 6, dealing with benefits. Section 9-502 is the general provision requiring compensation for injuries due to occupational disease. It begins, in subsection (a) by defining disablement for purposes of that section ( In this section, disablement means . . . ). (Emphasis added). As in the predecessor statutes, the term is defined as the event of a covered employee becoming partially or totally incapacitated: (1) because of an occupatio nal disease; and (2) from performing the work of the covered e mployee in th e last occup ation in wh ich the cov ered emp loyee was inju riously exposed to the hazards of the occupational d isease. (Emphasis add ed). The defined term appears only twice in § 9-502, bo th times in the subsec tion that provides generally for compensation for injuries arising from occupational disease. As relevant here, § 9-502(c) and (d) require compensation to a covered employee of the employer for disability of the covered employee resulting from an o ccupation al disease b ut only if: (1) the occupational disease that caused the death or disability: (i) is due to the nature of an employment in which hazards of the occupational disease exist and the covered employee was employed before the date of disablement; or (ii) has manifestations that are con sistent with tho se know to result from exposure to a biological, chemical, or physical agen t that is attributable to the type of employment in which th e covered employee was employed before the date of disablement . . . . (Emphasis added). Section 9-505 deals specifically with occupational deafness hearing loss due to occupational disease rather th an acc idental in jury. The current version requires an employer -11- to provide compensation in accord ance with this title to a covered employee for loss of hearing due to industrial noise in the frequencies of 500, 1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 hertz. (Emphasis add ed). Section 9-50 5 says nothing about disablement. That is because disablement, as defined in § 9-502(a) for purposes of other occupational diseases, is not required as a condition to compensation for occupational deafness. If disablement, as so defined, applied to occupational hearing loss claims, as Yox argues and our dissenting colleagues seem to believe, the whole purpose of th e 1967 en actment, rep ealing the d ecision in Belschner and allowing compensation even when there is no wage loss or impa irment, wo uld be negated. As the Crawley court made clear, the Legislature intended to make occupational hearing loss compensable without regard to disablement as generally defined. Section 9-711(a) the general limitations provision applicable to occupational diseases provides that [i]f a covered employee suffers a disableme nt or death a s a result of an occupational disease, the covered employee or the dependents of the covered employee shall file a claim with the Commission within 2 years . . . after the date: (1) of disablement or death; or (2) when the covered employee or the dependents of the covered employee first had actual knowledge that the disablement was caused by the employment. Notwithstanding that § 9-502(a) expressly limits the definition of disablement to that section, which is not only consistent with, but required by, the objective of § 9-505, Yox and the dissent wo uld import that d efinition into § 9-711(a) a nd thus ap ply it as well to claims for -12- occupational hearing loss. What they overlook, however, is the fact that, in cases of occupational hearing loss, that defi nitio n of disable men t do es no t and cann ot ap ply, because it is wholly inconsistent with the substance and avowed purpose of § 9-505. That is not to say that there is no statute of limitations for occupational hearing loss claims. We try to read statutes in harmony, so that all provisions ca n be given reasonab le effect. See Balto. Gas & E lec. v. Public Serv. Com m n, 305 Md. 145, 157, 501 A.2d 1307, 1313 (1986) ( [A] provision contained within an integrated statutory scheme must be understood in that contex t and harm onized to th e extent po ssible with other provisions of the statutory scheme ); State v. Ghajari, 346 Md. 101, 115, 695 A.2d 143, 149 (1997) (quoting State v. Harris, 327 Md. 32, 39, 607 A.2d 55 2, 555 (1992)) ( W e presume that the legislature intends its enactm ents to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law. );Carter v. Maryland Management, 377 Md. 596, 613, 835 A.2d 158, 168 (2003) (same). We do not interpre t statutes in ways that produce absurd results that could never have b een inte nded b y the Leg islature. The 1967 statute, now spread between § 9-505 and §§ 9-649 through 9-652, provided a different, and entirely rational, definition of disablement in occupational hearing loss cases. In place of wage loss or impairment the objective standard applicable to other occupational diseases it substituted the specific objective criteria for measuring compen sable hearing loss. If a covered employee suffers that degree of hearing loss, he/she is, for purposes of comp ensation, disa bled. -13- That is w hat disable ment m eans in occupational hearing loss cases. That is all it could mean if § 9-505 itself is to have any mean ing. W hen rea d that w ay, § 9-711 m akes perfe ct and harm onious sen se. A claim for occupational hearing los s must be f iled within two years after the date when the employee (1) first suffered the requisite degree of hearing loss, and (2) first had actual knowledge that that disableme nt was ca used by the em ployment. In this case, Mr. Yox undisputably suffered that disablement and had actual knowledge that it was caused by his employment some 13 years before he filed his claim. That is w hy the clai m wa s prope rly rejected . JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS. -14- IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 31 September Term, 2003 __________________________________ ARNOLD C. YOX v. TRU-ROL COMPANY, INC., ET AL __________________________________ Bell, C.J. *Eldridge Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia, JJ. Dissenting Opinion by Battaglia, J. which Bell, C.J. and Eldridge, J., join. Filed: March 15, 2004 * Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. -16- I respectfully disse nt. Althoug h the majo rity concedes that Section 9-711(a) is the general limitations provision applicable to occupational diseases, it declines to apply that section as it is written to occupational hearing loss, an occupational disease, because it does not like the result. Instead, the majority creates its own statute of limitations period for occupational hearing loss claimants. In so doing, the majority ignores the plain language of the statute, declines to adhere to the canon of statutory con struction that a ny uncertainty in the Worker s Compensation Act should be resolved in favor of the claimant, and usurps the Gene ral Ass embly s r ole in cra fting w orkers comp ensatio n policy. As we have often said, when we construe statutes, our goal is to identify and effect uate the legislativ e intent u nderlying the statu te(s) at iss ue. Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 335, 748 A.2d 47 8, 483 (20 00); see also Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 444, 697 A.2d 45 5, 458 (19 97); Tucke r v. Fire man's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 73, 517 A.2d 730, 731 (1986). The best source of legislative intent is th e statute s plain la nguag e. Beyer v. M organ Sta te Univ., 369 Md. 335, 349, 800 A.2d 707, 715 (2002). When the language is clear and unambig uous, our in quiry ordinarily ends th ere. Id. This Co urt will "neithe r add nor d elete word s in order to give the statute a meaning not otherwise communicated by the language used." Harris v. Bd. of Educ., 375 Md. 21, 31, 825 A.2d 365, 371(2003)(quoting Blind Indus. & Servs. v. Maryland Dep't of Gen. Servs., 371 M d. 221, 231 , 808 A.2d 782, 788 (2002)); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Ins. Comm'r, 352 M d. 561, 573 , 723 A.2d 891, 896 (1999)(ex plaining that the Court w ill not, under the guise of construction, . . . supply omissions in the statute, . . . or . . . insert exceptions not made by the Legisla ture ); Amalgamated Casualty Ins. Co. v. Helms, 239 Md. 529, 535, 212 A.2d 311, 316 (1965)(opining that, as a general rule a court may not surmise a legislative inten tion contrary to th e plain language of a statute, nor inse rt or omit w ords to make the statute express an intention not evidenced in its original form ). Even when the statutory language is clear, we construe the p rovision at issue in light of the statutory scheme s overall purpose and in the context in which the words of the statute are used. Polomski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 344 Md. 70, 75-76, 684 A.2d 1338, 1340 (1996). We, thus, utilize a commonsensical approach to statutory interpretation so that we may best effe ctua te the Gen eral A ssem bly's intent. Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 346, 772 A.2d 1225, 12 35 (2001). In Maryland, o ccupational hearin g loss is a n occu pationa l disease . Belschner v. Anchor Post Products, Inc., 227 Md. 89, 91-92, 175 A.2d 419, 420-21 (1 961); Armco Steel Corp. v. Trafton, 35 Md. App. 658, 659 n.1 , 371 A .2d 112 8, 1129 n.1 (19 77), cert. denied, 281 Md. 733 (1977). The statute of limitations for occupational disease begins to run at disablement under Section 9-711 of the Worker s Compensation Act, codified under Maryland Code, Sections 9-101 - 9-1201 of the Labor and Employment Article (1991, 1999 Repl. Vol.). The trig ger of disable ment is not de fined in that pro vision. Section 9-502(a) of the Act defines disablement for occupational diseases: (a) "Disablement" defined. -- In this section, " disableme nt" means the event of a covered employee becoming partially or totally incapacitated : -2- (1) because of an occupational disease; and (2) from performing the work of the covered employee in the last occupation in which the covered employee w as injuriously ex posed to the hazard s of the occup ational d isease. In Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Schwing, 351 Md. 178, 717 A.2d 919 (1998), we determined that Section 9-502(a) s definition of disableme nt applies to the term disablement used in Sectio n 9-71 1. Id. at 181, 717 A.2d at 920 (accepting the Court of Special Appeals holding in Helinski v. C. & P. Telephone Co., 108 M d. App . 461, 67 2 A.2d 155, cert. denied, 342 Md. 5 82, 678 A.2d 1047 (19 96), that disab lement m eans incap acitation or ina bility to work for the purposes of Section 9-711 in a case where the claimant su ffered fro m contac tallergic dermatitis of the eyelid). The majority, thus, is incorrect in its assertion that Section 9-502(a) s definition o f disablem ent may not be import[ed] to Section 9-711(a). We concluded otherwise in Schwing. Our determina tion in that cas e should c ontrol here a s well. Although the majority does not discuss Schwing, it does undertake an analysis of Section 9-505 an analysis that I con clude is fau lty. The majority seem s to suppo rt its contention that occupational hearing loss claims are distinct from other occupational diseases with respect to the limitations period because Section 9-505 instructs that compensation should be provid ed in acco rdance w ith this title. The title, in this instance, is Title 9 of the Labor and Employment Article, which codifies the e ntire Worker s Co mpensation A ct. If anything, the fact that compensation for occupational hearing loss claimants should be provided in accordan ce with this title weakens the majority s argument, as the statute of -3- limitation s period for occ upation al diseas es is fou nd also in Title 9 . See Section 9-711. There is nothing unusual about this. For example, Section 9-709 is the statute of limitations period for claims for accidental injuries, although Section 9-501 contains the provisions requiring compensation for such injuries. Like Section 9-505, Section 9-501 also instructs that its provisions are to be read in accordance with this title. We have held that Section 9-709's statute of limitations pe riod ap plies to S ection 9 -501. DeBusk v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 342 Md. 432, 440, 677 A.2d 73, 76-77 (1996)(explaining that Section 9-709 provides a two-year statu te of limitations period for employees suffering accidental injuries to bring a claim ). Likewise , we shou ld hold that S ection 9-71 1(a) s statute of limitations period applies to Section 9-505. Asserting the unsurp rising fact tha t Section 9-5 05 should be read in accordance with Title 9, the majority then argues that, because Section 9-505 says nothing about disablement, disableme nt does no t trigger the statu te of limitations for occupational hearing loss cases. But while the majority is right to say that Section 9-505 says nothing about disableme nt, the majority ne glects to observe that the section says nothing about the statute of limita tions eith er. Rather, it instructs, as the majority points out, that compensation should be provided to claimants in accordance with this title. Section 9-711(a) is the statute of limitations period for occupational diseases in Title 9. The fact that it is triggered by disable ment d oes no t chang e how it applies . Nevertheless, the majority seems to suggest that, because Section 9-505 does not -4- define disablement, disablement simply cannot be part of the statute of limitations period for an occupational hearing loss claim. But, as the in termediate appellate court noted, there are instances when o ccupation al hearing lo ss prevents people from working,2 and surely these disabled claimants would have to meet the threshold h earing loss re quiremen ts pursuant to Section 9-505 to be compensated. As the majority rightly observes and as the Crawley court pointed out, Section 9-505 defines when occupational hearing loss is compe nsable regardless of whether or not the claimant was prevented by the injury from working. Crawley v. General Motors Corp., 70 Md. App. 100, 107, 519 A .2d 134 8, 1352 , cert. denied, 310 Md. 147, 528 A.2d 473 (1987). In this way, contrary to the majority s reading of the statute, some occupational hearing loss claimants may be disabled even though disablement is not mentioned in Section 9-505. Yet the trigger of dis ablemen t required by S ection 9-71 1 could and pre sum ably d oes still a pply. Furthermore, the fact that th e Genera l Assemb ly deemed it necessary to enact Section 9-505 to allow compensation to occur while the occupational hearing loss claimant continued working does not compel the conclusion that it intended to accelerate the statute of 2 See N UMBER OF N ONFATA L O CCUPAT IONAL INJURIES AND ILLNESSES INVOLVING D AYS A WAY FROM W ORK BY S ELECTED W ORKERS AND C ASE C HARACTERISTICS AND N ATURE OF INJURY OR ILLNESS, A LL U NITED S TATES, P RIVATE INDUSTRY, 2001, U.S. D EPARTMEN T OF L ABOR, B UREAU OF L ABOR S TATISTICS, available at http://www.bls.gov/data/home.htm (indicating 171 reported cases of employees missing work due to de afness, hearing loss or imp airment). -5- limitations for such c laims as w ell.3 Rather, such a result is consistent with the benevolent nature of the s tatute, see Harris, 375 Md. at 57, 825 A.2d at 387, and it is consistent with the fact that the Ge neral Asse mbly decide d to carve o ut a benef it for hearing loss claiman ts under Section 9-505. In addition, reviewing Section 9-505's legislative history does not reveal any intent on the General Assembly s part to provide an alternative statute of limitations for occupational hearing loss claimants. In 1967, when the General Assembly carved out an exception to the Belschner rule by enacting Section 25A of former A rticle 101, it did so in response to the Go vern or's 1967 Commission to Study Maryland Workmen's Compensation See 1967 Md. Laws, ch. 155; 1967 SEVENTH R EPORT OF THE G OVERNOR S Laws. C OMMISSION TO S TUDY M ARYLAND W ORKMEN S C OMPENSATION L AWS (hereinafter Commission Report ). W ith respect to occupational hearing loss, the G overnor s Comm ission noted that it made its recommendation because an employee cannot recover for occupational loss of hearing until he shows a loss of wages, due to court interpretation 3 The General Assembly might have provided more time for occupational hearing loss claimants who are able to continue working because, generally, hearing loss often begins with a s light imp airmen t and gr adually w orsens over tim e. See R ICHARD P. G ILBERT & R OBERT L. H UMPHREYS, J R., M ARYLAND W ORKERS C OMPENSATION H ANDBOOK § 8.13 (2d ed. 1993)(d escribing occupational h earing loss as a hybrid form of occup ational disea se becau se, although hearing los s ordinarily occu rs over time, it can be caused by an immediate injury as well); 3 ARTHUR L ARSON & L EX K. L ARSON, L ARSON S W ORKERS C OMPENSATION L AW § 52.05 (2003)(noting that, given the nature of the disease, in dividuals su ffering fro m occup ational hearin g loss often are able to continu e to wo rk and t o draw wage s). -6- of the law. Commission Report at 2. Concerned with the fact that the employee receive[d] no compensation in spite of suffering hearing loss, the Co mmission made its recommendation because it believed hearing loss claimants should be compensated irrespective of disa bleme nt. Id.; see also Crawley, 70 Md. App. at 107, 519 A.2d at 1352. When the General Assembly enacted Section 9-505, it clearly intended to provide a benefit to hearing loss claimants; I, however, discern no legislative intent to create a separate sta tute of limitations for hearing los s claims or th at the statute of limitations existing at that time, also trigg ered by dis able men t, did not a pply. For these re asons, I believe that a plain re ading o f the sta tutory pro visions at issue, a review of our cases regarding these provisions, and Section 9-505 's legislative history necessitates the conclusion that disablement triggers the statute of limitations for occupational hearing loss. Even if the majority believes the Act is uncertain or ambiguous on this point, however, I also believe we should read the Act s provisions in favor of the claimant, in conformance with our repeated assertion that "the Workers' Compensation Act . . . should be construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions w ill permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes. Any uncertainty in the law should be resolved in favor of the claimant. Harris, 375 Md. at 57, 825 A.2d at 387 (quoting Mayor of Baltimore v. Cassidy, 338 M d. 88, 97, 656 A.2d 757, 761-62 (1995)). We have also explained that all of the provisions of the W orkers Compe nsation Act must be read together, and this Court may neither stifle the plain meaning of the Act, or exceed its purposes, so that -7- the injured worker may prevail. Breitenbach v. N. B. Handy Co., 366 M d. 467, 4 73, 784 A.2d 569, 573 (2001)(quoting Philip Elecs. North America v. Wright, 348 Md. 209, 212, 703 A.2d 150, 151 (1997)( superceded by statute on other grounds)). While the Court may not create ambiguity or uncertainty in the Act's provisions where none exists so that a provision may be interpreted in favor of the injured claimant, any existing ambiguity or uncertainty should be reso lved in th e claim ant s fa vor. Id. "The W orkers' C ompe nsation Act . . . should be construed as liberally in favor of injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes. Harris, 375 Md. at 57, 825 A.2d at 387 (quoting Cassidy, 338 M d. at 97, 6 56 A.2 d at 761 -62). Th e majo rity ignore s these te aching s. The majority creates a separate statute of limitations period for occupational hearing loss claimants. While the majority s judicially-created statute of limitations may be reasonab le policy, it is up to the Legislature to develop workers compensation policy not this Court. Philip Elecs. North Am erica v. W right, 348 Md. 209, 229, 703 A.2d 150, 159 (1997)(superceded by statute)(explaining that the sensitive balancing of respective interests involved in workers compensation policy is appropriately within the province of the General Assembly). It is inappropriate for this Court to supply omitted words or remedy def ects in a statute when there is no eviden ce to sugg est we sho uld do as su ch in the tex t of the statute or in the legis lativ e history. See D yer v. O tis Warr en Rea l Estate C o., 371 Md. 576, 581, 810 A.2d 938, 941 (2002)(stating that [w]here the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, a court may neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in that -8- langua ge, nor may it construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application (citation om itted)); Amalgamated Cas. Ins., 239 Md. at 535, 212 A.2d at 316 (stating that as a general rule a court may not surmise a legislative intention contrary to the plain language of a statute, nor inse rt or omit w ords to ma ke the statute express an intention not evidenced in its original form ). The majority oversteps its role. In conclusion, when the General Assembly enacted Section 9-505, it did so to define when occupational hearing losses become compen sable, and it d id not chan ge the statute of limitations for such claims in any way. Perhaps it should have; perhaps it will. But that is the General A ssembly s prer ogative, no t ours. We s hould refr ain from imposing our concept of sound workers compensation policy in this arena and leave that task to the General Assemb ly, where it belon gs. I dissent. Chief Judge Bell and Judge Eldridge authorize me to sta te that they join in th is dissent. -9-

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