Davis v. Slater

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Jimmy L. Davis v. Patricia Ann Slater, No. 26, September Term, 2004. Constitutional Law. Entitlement to a jury trial Maryland Declaration of Rights Articles 5 and 23. Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights does not prohibit jury trials where the amount in controvers y is Ten Tho usand D ollars or less. Pa rties to civil cases at law in the Circuit Court are entitled to a jury trial, if properly demanded, regardless of the amount in co ntrovers y. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 26 September Term 2004 __________________________________ JIMMY L. DAV IS V. PATRICIA ANN SLATER __________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Battaglia, J. Filed: November 15, 2004 Petitioner, Jimmy L. Davis [hereinafter Davis ], comes before this Court to challenge the trial cou rt s deni al of his Motio n to Strik e Jury De mand . Davis argues that when he reduced his ad damnum clause from Tw enty-Five Thousand D ollars to Ten Thou sand Dollars by amendin g his complaint, the Respondent, Patricia Ann Slater [hereinafter Slater ], who had elected a jury trial, was no longer entitled to a jury trial. Because we do not interpret Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights or Section 4-402(e)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article as divesting parties in civil cases of their common law entitlement to a jury trial where the amount in controversy fails to exceed Ten Thousand D ollars, we affirm the den ial of the Motio n to Strik e Jury De mand . I. Facts and Procedural History On Mon day, July 26 , 1999, a t appro ximate ly 2:20 p.m ., Slater collided with a 1995 Plymouth Neon d riven by Da vis while it was stopped at a red light just beyond the off-ramp from I-695 on Moravia Road in Baltimore County, Maryland. An ambulance arrived at the scene and transported Davis to B ay View H ospital. On May 29, 2001, Davis filed a complaint in the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore County requesting twenty-five thousand dollars in damages and the costs of maintaining the action. One month later, Slater filed her Answer and properly elected a jury trial pursuant to Ma ryland Code (1974, 19 99 Repl. Vol.), Section 4-402(e)(1) of the Co urts and Judicial Proceedings Article.1 On July 12, 2001, the District Court transferred the action 1 Md. Code (1974 , 1999 R epl. Vol.), § 4-402(e)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides: (e) Jury trial. (1) In a civil action in which the amount in to the C ircuit Co urt for Baltim ore C ounty. For the next 18 months, both parties e ngaged in discov ery. On February 11, 2003, D avis filed an Amen ded Co mplaint red ucing his ad damnum demand to Ten Thousand Dollars. Davis then filed his Motion to Strike Jury Demand and Request for Hearing on August 13, 2003, relying upon Section 4-402(e)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.2 Slater s response, filed on August 25, 2003, also relied on Section 4-402(e)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceed ings Article and the provisions con tained in Maryland Ru le 2-325(f). 3 On October 20, Judge Ruth A. Jakubowski denied Davis s Motion to Strike Jury Demand without a hearing. At trial on December 10, 2003, Davis renewed his Motion to Strike Jury Trial, and Judge J. Norris Byrnes denied the Mo tion. The jury was selected and empaneled. At the controversy exceeds $10,00 0, exclusive of attorney s fees if attorney s fees are recoverable by law or contract, a party may demand a jury trial pursuant to the Maryland Rules. The language of Section 4-402(e)(1) remains unchanged in the 2002 Replacement Volume of the Co de. See Md. Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 4-402(e)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 2 Maryland Declaration of Rights Art. 23 provides: The right of trial by Jury of all issues of fact in civil proceedings in the several C ourts of Law in this State, w here the am ount in controversy exceeds the sum of $10,000, shall b e inviolably preserved. 3 Md. Rule 2-325(f) states: An election for trial by jury may be withdrawn only w ith the consent o f all parties no t in default. 2 close of evidence, Davis again renewed his Motion to Strike Jury Trial, which was denied. After closing arguments, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict in favor of Davis in the amou nt of $7 27.03 p lus intere st and c osts. Davis noted an appeal to th e Court of Special A ppeals, and this Court issu ed, on its own initiative , a writ o f certior ari, Davis v. Slater, 381 Md. 673, 851 A.2d 593 (2004), prior to any proc eeding s in the in termed iate app ellate co urt. Davis s brief presented the following question for our review: Did the Circuit Court e rroneously ord er that Petitione r s claim for $ 10,0 00 sh ould prop erly be hea rd by a jury? We conclude that the C ircuit Court w as correct an d affirm its d enial of D avis s Mo tion to Strike Jury Trial. II. Standard of Review The resolution of whether a jury trial was proper under the circumstances of this case requires us to construe the meaning of Articles 5 and 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, Section 4-402(e)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and Maryland Rule 2-325(f). B ecause ou r interpretation of the M aryland Declaration of Rights and Constitution, provisio ns of th e Mar yland Co de, and the Maryland Rule s are appro priately classified as questions of law, we review the issues de novo to determine if the trial court was legally correct in its rulin gs on th ese ma tters. See e.g ., J.L. M atthew s, Inc. v. MarylandNational Capital Park and Planning, 368 Md. 71, 93-94 , 792 A.2d 288, 301 (2002); Pickett v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 365 M d. 67, 77, 77 5 A.2d 1 218, 122 3 (2001); Calormis v. 3 Woods, 353 Md. 425 , 435, 727 A.2d 3 58, 363 (1999). When interpreting constitutional provisions, we generally employ the same rules of construction that are applicable to the construction of statutory langua ge. Fish Market Nominee Corp . v. G.A.A., Inc., 337 Md. 1, 8, 650 A.2d 705, 708 (1994); Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 277, 412 A .2d 396, 39 8 (1980); Kadan v. Bd. of Sup. of Elections, 273 Md. 406, 414, 329 A.2d 702, 707 (19 74); New Cent. Co. v. George s Creek Co., 37 Md. 538 (1873). Similarly, the princ iples applied to statutory interpretation are also used to interpret the Marylan d Rule s. Beyer v. Morg an State University ,369 Md. 335, 350, 800 A.2d 707, 715 (2002); Pickett v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 365 Md. 67, 78, 775 A.2d 1218, 1224 (2001); see generally J ohnson v . State, 360 Md. 250, 265, 757 A.2d 796, 804 (2000). Like construing a statute, to ascertain the meaning of a constitutional provision or rule of procedure we first look to the no rmal, pla in mea ning of the lang uage. Fish Market, 337 Md. at 8, 650 A.2d at 708; Luppino v. Gray, 336 Md. 194, 204 n.8, 647 A.2d 429, 434 n.8 (1994); Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 511, 374 A.2d 900, 902 (1970); Balto. Gas & Elect. Co. v. Board, 278 Md. 26, 31, 358 A.2d 241, 244 (197 6); Johnson, 360 Md. at 265, 757 A.2d at 804. If that language is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond th e provision s terms to inform our analysis, Fish Market, 337 Md. at 8, 650 A.2d at 708; Rand, 280 Md. at 511, 374 A.2d at 902; Johnson, 360 Md. at 265, 757 A.2d at 804; however, the goal of our ex amination is always to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional or part of the R ules. Morris 4 v. Prince G eorge s C ounty, 319 Md. 597, 603-04, 573 A.2d 1346, 1349 (1990), citing Dept. of the Enviro nment v. S howell, 316 M d. 259, 270 , 558 A.2d 391, 396 (1989); Harford County v. Edgewater, 316 M d. 389, 3 97, 558 A.2d 1219, 1223 (1989). To that end, we must consider the context in which the constitutional provision, statute, or rule appears, including related statutes o r rules, an d releva nt legisla tive histo ry. Mayor and City Counsel of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 129, 756 A.2d 987, 991-92 (2000), citing Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Counsel of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 6 28, 632 (1987); Johnson, 360 Md. at 265, 757 A.2d at 804. Also, where the language of the constitutional provision, statute, or rule is ambiguous, external evidence may be referred to for discerning the purpose of the legislature, including the bill s title or function paragraphs, relevant case law, and sec ondary s ources . Moore v. Miley, 372 Md. 663, 678, 814 A.2d 557, 567 (2003); Comptroller of the Treasury v. Clyde s of Chevy Chase, Inc., 377 Md. 471, 483, 833 A.2d 1014, 1021 (20 03); Johnson, 360 M d. at 265, 75 7 A.2d a t 804; Schuman, Kane, Felts & Everngam, Chartered v. Aluisi, 341 Md. 115, 119, 668 A.2d 929, 932 (1995); Kaczorowski, 309 M d. at 515 , 525 A .2d at 63 3. III. Background Davis contends that the Circu it Court erred as a matter of law when it held that Slater was still entitled to a jury trial despite the fact that the amount in controversy no longer exceeded Ten Thousand Dollars. He relies on the Court of Special Appeals s opinion in Cheek v. J.B.G. Properties, Inc., 28 Md. App. 29, 344 A .2d 180 (1 975), to sup port his 5 assertion that access to a jury trial is triggered solely by the amou nt in con troversy. Id. at 47, 344 A.2d at 1 91-9 2. Ultima tely, Davis argues that his amendment to the ad damnum clause, reducing the amount in controversy from Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars to Ten Thousand Dollar s, diveste d Slater of her e ntitleme nt to a jur y trial. Slater counters th at, pursuant to Rule 2-325(f), once a party has properly elected a jury trial in a civil case, a ll parties must consent to waive the entitlement to a jury trial for the case to be heard by the court rather than the jury. She interprets the language in Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights as guaranteeing an entitlement to a jury in suits whe re the amo unt in controversy exceeds Ten Thousand Dollars, and asserts, contrary to Davis s position, that the guarantee does not act to forbid a jury trial where th e amoun t in controversy does not exceed Ten Thousand Dollars. In reaching that conclusion, Slater reads the provisions of Articles 5 and 23 of the Declaratio n of Righ ts4 in tandem so that litigants still ha ve the entitlem ent to a jury trial where th e amoun t in controve rsy fails to excee d Ten T housand Dollars, bu t that, 4 Md. Const. Declaration of Rights Art.5 states: (a) That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law, and to the benefit of such English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and which, by ex perience, have bee n found applicable to their local and other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law or Eq uity; and also of a ll Acts of Assemb ly in force on the first day of June, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven; except such as may have since expired, or may be inconsistent with the provisions of this Constitution; subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of this State. 6 according to the language of Article 5, it is subject to regulation by the G ener al Assem bly. 5 Slater also analogizes the situation before this Court to that in Thomp son v. State , 278 Md. 41, 359 A.2d 2 03 (19 76), a criminal case in which a defendant properly demanded a jury trial, which was denied by the trial court when the State decided to nolle prosequi the charge that entitled the defendant to a jury trial. Slater reasons that because a defendant in a criminal case was entitled to a trial by jury at common law even where the major criminal violation was dismissed, this Court should reach a similar result in a civil case when the amount in controversy contained in Article 23 is no longer satisfied. To further emphasize the fundamental nature of the entitlement to trial by jury, Slater relies on this Court s decision in Pickett v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 365 Md. 67, 775 A.2d 1218 (2001), which analyzed the purpose of the Maryland Rules addressing the entitlement to a jury trial and the scope and application of those rules. Drawing on our prior opinion, Slater contends that the rules must be construed in a manner that recognizes the need to pres erve the c onst itutio nal e ntitle men t to a jury trial and simultaneously enable the reasonab le regulation of that entitlement in the public interest. She argues that interpreting the relevant rules in that way reinforces he r position that a party cannot unilaterally divest 5 Slater also asserts that there is no individual entitlement to a bench trial regardless of the amount in controvers y. We have previously he ld that where both parties elect a bench trial, they are afforded a constitutional entitlement to a trial w ithout a j ury. See Md. C onst. Art. IV, Sec. 8(a); Luppino, 336 Md. at 210, 647 A.2d at 437. Absent a greemen t by both parties, however, no suc h cons titutiona l entitlem ent attac hes. Luppino, 336 Md. at 210, 647 A.2d at 437. 7 all other parties to the litigat ion of th eir entitle ment to a prope rly elected trial by jury. Slater s major argument concerning the interpretation of the Maryland Rules focuses on Rule 2-325(f), prohibiting the withdrawal of an election for a trial by jury without the consent of all parties to the litigation. Sh e interprets this p rovision as p rohibiting on e party from unilaterally divesting another of the entitlement to a jury trial where the election has been properly made. Her analysis of the rule relies in large part on Judge Pau l V. Niemeyer s Maryland Rules Commentary, Second Edition, which state s: Once a jury trial is properly elected by a party, it becomes the right of any party thereafter to have the c ase tried befo re a ju ry. All parties may rely on the properly filed demand of any other party and need not file an additional demand on their own behalf....This rule evidences an intent to preserve and favor the jury trial right even if, to preserve it, a technical expansion might o ccur. Judge Paul V . Niem eyer, M ARYLAND R ULES C OMMENTARY, S ECOND E DITION, 207 (2d ed. 1992). Slater also discusses Maryland Rule 2-327(a)(2)6 , which req uires both p arties to 6 Maryland Rule 2-327(a)(2) provides: (2) If Circuit Court Has Jurisdiction Generally. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (a)(3) of this Ru le, the court may transfer an a ction within its jurisdiction to the District Court sitting in the same county if all parties to the action (A) consent to the transfer, (B) waive any right to a jury trial they currently may have and any right they may have to a jury trial following transfer to the D istrict Co urt, including on appeal from any judgment entered, and (C) make any amendments to the pleadings necessary to b ring the action within the jurisdiction of the Dis trict Cou rt. 8 consent to a transfer to District Court and to w aive any rights to a jury trial that they curren tly possess or may come to possess in the course of the litigation and appeals process, as a supporting argument. Slater, in her interpretation of the meaning of Rules 2-325(f) and 2327(a)(2), asserts that if Davis could divest Slater of her entitlement to a properly elected jury trial without her consent, Rules 2-325(f) and 2-327(a)(2) would be rendered mean ingless. Fina lly, Slater notes that Davis s citation of Cheek in support o f his position is inapposite. She argues that Cheek is not on point, because it addresses the jurisdictional limits of the Circuit and District Courts rather than the amount in controversy requirement for the entitlement to a jury trial under Article 23. III. Discussion To fully understan d, and thus properly analyze, th e entitlemen t to demand a jury trial under the common law and Articles 5(a) and 23 of the Declaration of Rights, we must trace its development from its inception, to the English common law in force in the colonies and Maryland s first Constitu tion, and fin ally, to the protection s presently in fo rce in Articles 5(a) and 23. A. Article 5(a) of the D eclaration of Righ ts The genesis of the common law jury trial has long been debated by scholars. Some trace its inception to the reign of Alfred th e Great (871-899 A.D.), and others to the period of the invasion by William the Conqu eror in 1066. H on. Ra ndy J. Ho lland, State Jury T rials and Federalism : Constitution alizing Co mmon Law C oncepts, 38 Val. U. L. Rev. 373, 376 9 (2004) [hereinafter Holland ]. Regardless of its birth date, the jury was w ell established in various criminal and civil cases during the eleventh and twelfth centuries throughout England. Id. The entitlement to a jury trial, however, was not recognized formally by statute, b ut rather , its use w as man dated b y custom . Id. The entitlement to a trial by jury was guaranteed in writing for the first time by the Magna Carta o n June 15, 121 5. Id. That document provided that no freeman would be disseized, dispossessed, or imprisoned except by judgment of his peers. Id. The opus further stated, [t]o none will we well, to none will we deny, to none will we delay right or justice. Id. at 376- 77. This language guaranteed the entitlement to a jury where freedom or property was at risk and applied to civil and criminal proceedin gs. During this time jury members were cho sen based on their personal k nowled ge of the e vents in disp ute or their particular expertise in a subject at issue, and a cted as a bo dy of witnes ses to assist the cou rt. The Civil Jury, 110 H arv. L. R ev. 140 8, 1416 (1997 ) [herei nafter The C ivil Jury ]. Eve ntua lly, howev er, the Eng lish jury evolved into the adju dicatory body that it is toda y. Id. The first jury trial resembling the modern incarnation occurred at the end of the fifteenth century, with the jury acting as an impartial fac t finder. The odore F.T . Plucknett, A C ONCISE H ISTORY OF THE C OMMON L AW 129-30 (Little, Brown & Co. 5th ed. 1956). At that time, as toda y, the entitleme nt to a jury trial only app lied in cases a t law as op posed to those in equity. See gene rally, Ellen E . Swar d, A History of the Civil Trial in the United States, 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 347 (2003) [h ereinafter S ward ]; The Civil Jury, supra; Holland, 10 supra. Furtherm ore, the right atta ched to all civ il cases at law regardless o f the amo unt in controversy. See 3 W ILLIAM B LACKSTONE, C OMMENTARIES, *352 (stating that when a party demands a jury trial in a common law civil action the court automatically awards a writ of venire facias com mand ing the s heriff to empa nel a jury o f twelv e). At least as early as 1642, the Provincial Court of M aryland was conduc ting civil jury trials in matte rs of law . See Maryland Provincial Court Records, 1637-1650, vol. 4, at 156; see also Mich ael C. T olley, S TATE C ONSTITUTIONALISM IN M ARYLAND, at 187 (1990). By 1776 juries played an increasin gly important role in the Colonies. Juries were more inclined to resist objection able laws imposed by England, which added to their increasing popularity. Charles A. W olfram , The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 639, 703-708 (1973). It was held in such high regard that the jury became the preeminent means of trying cases arising under the common law in the newly formed United States. Sward, supra, at 373. The first Sta te Constitution was adopted in Maryland in 1776 and did not exp licitly guarantee entitlement to a jury trial in civil proceedings. Rather, in Article 3 of the Declaration of Rights, the drafters stated that the inhabitants o f Maryland are entitled to the common law of England, and the trial by jury, according to the course of that law. Md. Const. Declaratio n of Righ ts Art. 3 (177 6); at the time , a trial by jury consisted of the 11 presentation of eviden ce to twelve landow ners fro m the vicinag e, 7 whose verdict was required to be un animo us. See Holland, supra, at 377. During the period in which the 1776 Maryland Constitution was in ef fect, from 1 776 to 1850, the Legislature did not regulate or enumerate the types of civil disputes in which parties may demand a jury trial, and no minimum amount in controversy was required for the entitlement to attach . See Debates and Proceedings of the 1850 Constitutional Convention, vol. 2 at 767.8 Article 3 of the 1776 Declaration of Rights be came A rticle 4 of the D eclaration of Rights in the 1864 Constitution, Md. Const. D eclaration of Rights A rt. 4 (1864), an d in 1867 , it was mov ed to Article 5 of the Declaration of Rights. Md. Const. Declaration of Rights Art. 5 (1867). In 1992, the original language of Article 5 was am ended to include two new subsections permitting juries of less than 12 members in any civil proceeding. 1992 Md. Laws, Chaps. 203 and 204. It is against this historical backdrop that we examine the plain meaning o f Article 5(a). The structure and plain meaning of the language of Article 5(a) of the D eclaration of Rights indicate that although the common law as a whole is subject to modification by the 7 Black s Law Dictionary defines vicinage as the place where a crime is committed or a trial is held; the place from wh ich jurors are to be drawn for trial; esp., the locale from which the accused is entitled to have juror s selected. BLACK S L AW D ICTIONARY, vicinage (8th ed. 2004). 8 Civil jury trials were commonplace in Maryland during the period between the first Constitution in 1776 and the first revision in 1851. See e.g., Kalkman v. Causten, 2 G. & J. 357 (Md. 18 30); Barroll v. Reading, 5 H. & J. 1 75 (Md . 1821); Hughes s Lessee v. Howard, 3 H. & J. 9 (M d. 1810); Boisneuf v. Lewis, 4 H. & M cH. 414 (Md. 17 99); Evans v. Bonner, 2 H. & McH. 377 (Md. 1789); Toogoo d v. Scott, 2 H. & McH. 26 (Md. 1780) for a sampling of cases th at reach ed this C ourt aft er being presen ted to a ju ry. There are, how ever, no statistics a vailable conce rning th e num ber of ju ry trials in this State du ring tha t period . 12 legislature, the trial by Jury is not. Article 5 of the Declaration of R ights provid es in its entir ety: (a) That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury, according to the course of that Law, an d to the ben efit of the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and seventy-six; and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and other circumstances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity; and also of all Acts of Assemb ly in force on the first day of June, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven; except such as may have since expired, or may be inconsistent with the pro visions of th is Constitution ; subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of this State. And the Inhabitants of Maryland are also entitled to all property derived to them from, or under the Charter granted by His Majesty Charles the First to Caecilius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore. (b) The parties to any civil proceeding in which the right to a jury trial is preserved are entitled to a jury of at least 6 jurors. (c) That notwithstanding the Common Law of England, nothing in this Constitution prohibits trial by jury less than 12 jurors in any civil proceed ing in wh ich the right to a jury trial is preserved. Md. Const. Declaration of Rights Art 5. Article 5(a) enumerates three bodies of law to which the people of M aryland are entitled: the English Common Law, the English statutes in effect as of July 4, 1776 that have been found useful by the local government and the courts, and the Acts of A ssembly in fo rce in 1867 th at are no t expired or rend ered un constitu tional. In examining the plain meaning an d structure of Article 5(a), it is apparent that the phrase subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of the 13 State applies to those three co llections of law . The clau se applies to the English common law in particular because, as we have held, the common law described in Article 5(a) is the common law in mass, a s it ex isted here , either po tenti ally, or pra ctica lly, and as it prevailed in England at the tim e, except such portions of it as are inconsistent with the spirit of that instrument [the Declaration of Rights], and the nature of our new political institutions. State v. Buchanan, 5 H. & J. 317, 358 (1821) (empha sis added). The commas surrounding the words ,and the trial by Jury, however, indicate that it should be viewed as a provision independent of the entitlement to the common law provision, although its language is a guarantee of its entitlement by the citizenry. Specifically, the use of the word the as op posed to a indicates that the phrase refers to the institution of trial by jury as opposed to merely a proc eedi ng befor e a ju ry. As such, the clause permitting the legislature to alter the com mon law or statutes in effect cannot be interpreted a s applying to the trial by Jury contain ed in Article 5(a), because the trial by Jury as an institution e xists indepe ndent o f the law govern ing its us e. Prior opinions by this Court are consistent with this plain meaning interpretation. We have invariably held that the provision concerning the jury trial denotes the historical trial by jury, as it existed when the constitution of the state was first adopted. Bryan v. S tate Roads Comm n of the State Highway Admin., 356 Md. 4, 9, 736 A.2d 1057,1060 (1999), 14 quoting Knee v. Baltimore City Passenger Railroad, 87 Md. 623, 624, 40 A. 890, 891;9 Luppino, 336 Md. at 201, 647 A.2d at 432, quoting Houston v. Lloyd s Consumer Acceptance Corp., 241 Md. 10, 20, 215 A.2d 192, 198 (1965). We have indicated that the fundamental aspects of the jury trial are not subject to change by the Gene ral Ass embly. See e.g., Bryan, 356 Md. at 9, 736 A.2d at 1060; Knee, 87 Md. at 627, 40 A. at 892; Higgins v. Barnes, 310 Md. 532, 542, 530 A.2d 724, 729 (1987). These fundamental aspects include the 12-man jury, the presence and superintendence of a judge having the power to instruct the jury on the law and to advise them upon the facts, and the unanimous verdict. State v. McKay, 280 Md. 558, 563, 375 A.2d 228, 231 (1977), citing Patton v, United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854 (1930). The General Assembly itself has recognized this limitation on its power to alter the fundamental aspects of the common law jury trial when it proposed legislation permitting six member juries in civil cases through ratification by constitutional amendment rather than by statute. See 1992 Md. Law s, Chap. 203 and 204; Bryan, 356 M d. at 9-1 4, 530 A .2d at 10 60-63 . The judicially created body of law known as the common law, however, is not insulated from a lteration by the G eneral A ssemb ly. This Court has continually observed that 9 In Bryan, we addressed, in an opinion by Judge Eldridge, the application of the constitutional amendments to Article 5, changing the jury set forth in that Article from a twelve person jury to th at of a six pe rson jury in all civil procee dings. Bryan, 356 Md. at 1314, 736 A.2d at 1062. Because Article 5 changed a fundamen tal aspect of the traditional jury with respect to all civil proceedings, we determined that it applied to condemnation proceedings governed by Article III, Sectio n 40 of the M aryland C onstitutio n as w ell. Id. at 14, 736 A.2d at 1062-63. 15 [a]lthough the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the common law, that law is subject to modification by legislative acts or by decisions of this Court. Baltimore Sun Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 359 Md. 653 , 662, 755 A.2d 1 130, 1135 (200 0); Jones v. State, 303 Md. 323, 337 n.10, 493 A.2d 1062, 1069 n.10 (1985) ( The common law rule may, within constitutional constraints, be changed or modified by legislative enactment or judicial decision where it is found to be a vestige of the past, no longer suitable to the circumstances of our people. ). The common law, which is subject to alteration, includes the law governing the entitlement to dema nd a jury trial in a p articular case. See McKay, 280 Md. at 568, 375 A.2 d at 234; Lickle v. Boone, 187 Md. 579 , 582, 51 A.2d 16 2, 163 (1947); Higgins, 310 Md. at 542, 530 A.2d at 729; Thompson v. State, 278 Md. 41, 52, 359 A.2d 203, 209 (1978) (stating it may be constitutional to limit access to a jury with respect to charges of petty offense s); Danner v. State, 89 Md. 220, 223 -24, 42 A . 965, 967 (1 899); In re Glenn, 54 Md. 572, 574 -76 (1880); M d. Rule 3-701 (prov iding for a small claim s docket w ith limited discovery and informa l proceedings). 10 In an opinion authored by Judge Eldridge, this Court interpreted the entitlement to a jury trial at comm on law in criminal cas es in Thomp son v. State , 278 Md. 41, 359 A.2d 203 (1976), which is instructive to our analysis here. In that case, the defendant, Thompson, was 10 We do not address the issue of w hether the e ntitlement to demand a jury trial exists in small claims cases because the amount in controversy in the present case exceeds the jurisdictional limit of the small cla ims do cket. See Md. Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.) §4-405 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 16 charged with three v iolations of the motor vehicles laws, only one of which carried a maximum penalty that entitled Thompson to demand a jury trial under Section 4-302(d) of the Courts and Ju dicial Pr oceed ings A rticle. Id. at 44, 359 A.2d 205. Thompson demanded a jury trial prior to trial in District Court, and the case was transferred to the Criminal Cou rt of Baltim ore. Id. When the case was called for trial, the State entered a n olle proseq ui with respect to the charge that entitled Thompson to demand the jury trial. Id. at 45, 359 A.2d at 205. Thomp son again demand ed a jury trial, or alternatively, for the remain ing charge s to be returne d to the D istrict Co urt. Id. The trial judge denied his demand for a jury trial and refuse d to tran sfer the case to th e Distric t Court . Id. Thom pson w as conv icted. Id. We determined that Section 4-302(d) did not remove the right to demand a jury trial in the Crim inal Co urt. Id. at 53, 359 A.2d at 209. We found n othing in the Maryland Code or the Maryland Rules that purported to remove the common law entitlement to a jury trial in the Crimin al Court. Id. at 53, 359 A.2d at 210. Therefore, we held that once Thompson made a timely dema nd for a jur y trial, and jurisdiction vested in the Criminal Court, he became entitled to a jury trial at common law regardless of whether the remaining offenses were petty ones, bec ause the G eneral A ssembly had not abrogated the common law providing access to a jury in the court o f general ju risdiction des pite its powe r to do so in petty cases. Id. Davis asse rts, never thele ss, th at the Gen eral A ssem bly ha s acted to take awa y the common law entitlement to trial by jury where the amount in controversy is Ten Thousand 17 Dollars or less through Section 4-402(e)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Section 4-402(e)(1) states: In a civil action in which the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000, exclusive of attorney s fees if attorney s fees are recoverab le by law or contract, a party may demand a jury trial pursuant to the Maryland Rules. Concerning the General Assembly s ability to change the common law, we have stated that statutes are not presumed to make any alterations in the commo n law fur ther than is expressly declare d . . . a statute, made in the affirmative without any negative expressed or implied, does not take away the common law. Lutz v. State, 167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354, 356 (1934); see Witte v. Azarian, 369 Md. 518, 533-34, 801 A.2d 160, 169-70 (2002); Board of County Commissioners of Garrett County, Maryland v. Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc., 346 Md. 160, 179, 695 A .2d 171, 178 (1997); Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Jalowsky, 306 M d. 257, 2 63, 508 A.2d 1 37, 140 (1986 ). The General Assemb ly, however, has not used express terms to abrogate the common law entit leme nt to a jury through Se ction 4-402 (e) in either the te xt of the sec tion or its legislative history. See 1973 M d. Laws , Chap. 2 (1 st Sp. Sess.). F or a stateme nt of this principle, see Lutz, supra; Witte, 369 Md. at 533-34, 8 01 A.2d at 169-70 ; Board o f County Commissioners of Garrett County, Maryland, 346 M d. at 179, 69 5 A.2d a t 178; Equitable Life Assuran ce Society o f the United States, 306 M d. at 263, 508 A.2d at 140. Thus, we conclude that Section 4-402(e)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article does not abrogate the common law entitlement to a jury trial when the amou nt in controv ersy fails to 18 excee d Ten Thou sand D ollars. As in Thompson, an extensive search of the Maryland Code has failed to produce an instance w here the G eneral As sembly has a cted to change the com mon law go verning jury trials in courts of general jurisdiction. Because there are no statutes, rules, or judicial opinions purporting to limit jury trials in civil a ctions arising under the common law, the common law recog nizing the e ntitlement to a jury trial in civil cases at law in courts of genera l jurisdict ion rem ains. B. Article 23 of the Declaration of R ights Because Davis s arg ument prin cipally rested on interpreting the language of Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights, we begin by examining the history of the provision to illuminate our analysis of Article 23's effect on the commo n law entitlem ent to a jury trial in civil cases at law. The Constitution drafted at the 1850 Conv ention was the first in M aryland history to insulate the common law entitlement to a jury trial, with respect to a subset of civil cases, from any infringement by the General Assembly interjecting an amount in controversy over which the entitlement to a jury trial was to be inviolably preserved. Article X, Section 4, provided: The trial by jury of all issues of fa ct in civil proceedings, in the several courts of law in this State, where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of five dollars, shall be inviolably 19 preserved.11 This amendment was introduced to remedy the absence of an explicit guarantee in the Constitution of Maryland for the trial by jury in civil cases. The Federal Government had a provision, but it was only applicable to the Federal courts. Proceedings and Debates of the 1850 Constitutional Convention, vol. 2, at 766.12 Although there is nothing in the surviving records from that Convention that provides a rationale for the inclusion of an amount in controversy requirement or the language of inviola bly preserved, we do know that the Conve ntion s deleg ates were c oncerned that Article 3 o f the Dec laration of R ights permitted the General Ass emb ly to encroach upon the availability of a jury trial under the comm on law , althoug h it had ye t to do so . Id. at 767. After its ratification, A rticle X, Section 6 continued, without alteration, as Article XII, Section 5 of the Constitution of 1864. The 1867 Constitution merely modified the language of the provision, without substantive change, and reenacted the guarantee as Section 6 of Article XV, Miscellaneous. That section contained the language that is currently contained in Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, with the exception of the dolla r amoun t, 11 To keep this amount in perspective, it would take approximately $117.06 in 2003 dollars to exercise the purchasing power that $5 had in 1850 . John J. M cCusk er, Comparing the Purcha sing Pow er of Mo ney in the United States (or Co lonies) from 1665 to Any Other Year Including the Present, Economic History Services, 2004, URL: http://w ww.e h.net/hm it/ppow erusd/. 12 As we noted in Bringe v. Collins, 274 Md. 338 , 341-42, 335 A .2d 670, 673 (197 5), even after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has consisten tly held that the Sev enth Am endmen t is not incorpo rated into the F ourteenth A mendm ent, and conseq uently is no t applica ble to sta te court p roceed ings. 20 and stated: The right of trial by jury of all issues of f act in civil proceedings in the severa l Courts of Law in this State, where the amou nt in controversy exceeds the sum of f ive dollars, sha ll be inviolably preserved. In 1970, Article XV, Section 6 was amended to raise the amo unt in contro versy to Five Hundred Dollars. 1969 Md. Laws, Chap. 789 (effective with the D istrict Court on July 5. 1971). In 1977, Article XV, Section 6 was recodified as Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights. 1977 Md. Laws, Chap. 681. The amount in controversy was then increased to Five Thousand Dollars in 1992. 1992 Md. Laws, Chaps. 205 and 206. The final modification of the requisite amount in controversy occurred in 1998 and increa sed the am ount in controversy to the present Ten Thousand Dollar requirement. 1998 Md. Laws, Chap. 322. Despite Davis s argument to the contrary, Article 23 cannot be interpreted as changing the entitlement to a jury trial at common law . Rather, Article 23 carves out a segment of the cases in whic h a trial b y jury can be elected withou t infring emen t by the Le gislature . See Proceedings and De bates of the 1850 C onstitutional C onventio n, vol. 2, at 766-67. Inviolable, from inviolably preserved, in its plain meaning, is defined as prohibiting violation; secure from destruction, violence, infringement, or desecration; incapable of being violated; incorruptable, unassailable. THE R ANDOM H OUSE D ICTIONARY OF THE E NGLISH L ANGUAGE, inviolable, (2d ed. Unab ridged, 198 7). As a resu lt, a jury trial in that class of cases over a statutory amount in controversy cannot be abrogated; below that amount the common law entitlement to demand a jury trial exists, although capable of abrogation by the 21 General Assembly, which has chosen not to do so. There is nothing in the ordinary meaning of inviolable or the imposition of an amount in controversy requirement that can reasonab ly be interpreted to divest the cases entitled to trial by jury under the common law of that e ntitleme nt in cou rts of ge neral jur isdiction . Davis s reliance on Cheek v. J.B.G. Properties, Inc., 28 Md. App. 29, 344 A.2d 180 (1975), is misplaced. Cheek arose out of an action for slander against the apartment manager and corpor ate land lord resp onsible for an a partme nt com plex. Id. at 30, 344 A.2d at 182. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the trial judge entered a judgment notwithstanding verdict (JNOV) after deciding that the jury wrongfully apportioned the punitive damages awards between the two defendants. Id. at 36, 344 A.2d at 185. Several weeks after entering a JNOV, the trial judge decided that the judgment that he had entered was below the jurisdiction of the court and ordered it to be vacated and replaced with a judgment of non-pros pursuant to what was then Maryland Rule 653.13 Id. at 36, 344 A.2d at 186. The Co urt of Special Appeals determined that the use of a JNOV to reduce the jury 13 Former Maryland Rule 653 provided: Where by reason of the verdict of a jury being below the jurisdiction of the court, a judgment of non pros is entered, the record of such judgment shall be a bar to any action founded upon the same cause of action in any court, the limit of whose jurisdiction shall be greater than the amount of such verdict; but the amount of such verdict less such costs as may be adjudged against the plaintiff, shall be a debt from the defendant to the plaintiff, reco verable in th e District Co urt. There are no e quivale nt prov isions in the reco dified R ules. 22 verdict was improper and that the entry of non-pros was without effect because the lower court h ad alrea dy been d ivested of jurisd iction. Id. at 43, 46 , 344 A .2d at 18 9-90, 1 91. Davis relies on the dicta from Cheek that [t]he availability of the constitutional guarantee [to a jury trial] and its C ode com panion rela ting to District Court jurisdiction, is obviously dependent not on the size of the verdict, but on the amount in controversy. Id. at 47, 344 A.2d at 192. Nevertheless, the Court of Special Appeals was referring to the amount in controversy requirement for an inviolable entitlement to a jury trial under former Article XV, Section 6 of the Maryland Constitution, a predecessor to Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights, to attach, in the context of whether the District Court had jurisdiction. Id. The Co urt of Spe cial Appe als did not address the scope of the entitlement to a jury trial under the common law. Its true focus w as attemptin g to reconc ile former Rule 653 and the jurisdictional limitations of the then ne wly-form ed Dis trict Cou rts. See Cheek, 28 Md. App. at 48-49, 34 A.2d at 192-93. The la nguage quoted by Davis, when analyzed in its proper context, does not affect our conclusion that Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights does not abrogate the common law entitlement to a trial by jury in civil cases at law. IV. Mary land Rule 2-3 25(f) It is undisputed that Slater made a timely demand for a jury trial in the Dis trict Court, which immediately vested the Circuit Court with jurisdiction.14 Because Davis did not divest 14 Slater cited our opinion in Pickett v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 365 Md. 67, 775 A.2d 1218 (2001), for the proposition that the M aryland Rule s regulating th e entitlemen t to a jury trial must be interprete d in such a way as to preserve the entitlement and regulate its exercise 23 Slater of her entitlement to a jury trial when he amended his ad damnum clause, Davis is subject to the Maryland Rule 2-325(f) governing withdrawal of jury trial demands. Where the election w as properly m ade, a jury dem and may on ly be withdrawn with the consent of all parties to the litigation not in default. Md. R ule 2-325(f). This rule secures the right of any party to rely on the properly filed demand of any party. Judge Paul V. Niemeyer, Maryland Rules C omm entary, 20 7 (2 ed. 1 992). A s a result , Davis was req uired to obta in Slater s consent to strike the request for a jury trial under R ule 2-325 (f). Becau se he did not, the Circ uit Cou rt prope rly denied his M otion to Strike Ju ry Dema nd. 15 in the public interest, id. at 90, 775 A.2d at 1231, which is an accurate statement of the principles involved in that case. W e do not ad dress the rea soning an d holding in Pickett at length because it addressed the issue of whether a jury demand was timely under Rules 3-131 and 3-325. In the present case, there is no d ispute that Slater made a timely dem and for a jury trial, an d theref ore, we have n o need to addr ess the is sue. 15 Davis also raised the issue of the Circuit Court s jurisdiction when he challenged Slater s demand for a jury trial. Although not properly before us on this Appeal because the parties are no longer contesting jurisdiction, we feel the issue of jurisdiction requires some explan ation du e to our reason ing. Davis asserted that because he lowered his ad damnum clause, he n ot only divested Slater of her entitlement to a jury trial, but also divested the Circuit Court of jurisdiction. He argued that his claim was now within the exclusive jurisdiction of the District Court under Courts and Judicial Proceedings section 4-401. Section 4-4 01(1) prov ides in releva nt part: (1) An action in contract or tort, if the debt or damages claimed do not exceed $25,000, exclusive of prejudgment or postjudgment interest, costs, and attorney s fees if attorney s fees are rec overable b y law or con tract. As we have held, the request for a jury trial immediately divests the District Court of jurisdiction and vests it in the Circuit Co urt. See Vogel v. Grant, 300 Md. 690, 696, 481 A.2d 18 6, 189 (19 84); Carroll v. Housing Opportunities Commission, 306 Md. 515, 518, 510 A.2d 540, 542 (1986); Martin v. H oward C ounty, 349 Md. 469, 476, 709 A.2d 125, 129 (1998). Therefo re, because Slater rema ined entitled to a jury trial when the amou nt in 24 V. Conclusion Under the comm on law, all p arties to all civil cases at law are entitled to a trial by jury subject to regu lation by th e Gen eral As sembly. The General Assembly has failed to limit the entitlement to a jury trial in Circuit Court civil cases where the amount in controversy is less than the Ten Thousand Dollar amount in controversy contained in Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights.16 Therefo re, Slater con tinued to be entitled to a jury trial af ter Davis reduced the ad damnum clause from Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars to Ten Thousand Dollar s. Because Slater continued to be entitled to trial by jury, Davis s Motion to Strike Jury controversy was redu ced to Te n Thou sand Do llars, the Circuit Court properly retained jurisdiction. When Davis wished to transfer this case back to District Court he was subject to the requirements of M aryland Rule 2-327(2). Absent Slater s consent to the transfer and waiver of any entitlement to a jury trial that both parties possessed at the time of transfer, Davis was n ot entitled to the tra nsfer to the Dis trict Cou rt. The Circuit Court properly denied his mo tion to d o so. 16 There is one anom aly in the law that is not applicable to the present case. Pursuant to Section 4-402 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, parties to a civil action where the amou nt in controv ersy exceeds $10,000 , properly filed in the District Court, may remove the case to C ircuit Court by properly demand ing a jury trial. Md. Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.) § 4-402 (e)(1) o f the C ourts an d Judic ial Proc eeding s Article . If the amou nt in controversy is $10,000 or less, the parties may not remove th e case to the Circuit Cou rt by dema nding a jury trial. The anomaly arises when the amount in controversy exceeds $2,500. Where the amount in controversy is $2,500 or less, an ap peal de novo may be taken to the Circu it Court, where the common law entitlement to a jury trial attaches. In the situation where the amount in controvers y exceeds $2 ,500, how ever, an ap peal from the District C ourt to the Circuit Court is on the record. Md. Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.) §12-401(f) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. We express no opin ion as to the validity of that statute and Rule to the extent that the y would pre clude a jury trial. 25 Demand was subject to Rule 2-325(f). Davis failed to obtain Slater s consent to withdraw the election as re quired by the R ule. Thus, th e Circuit Court properly denied Davis s Motion to Strike Jury Dem and. JUDGMENT OF TH E CIRCU IT COURT FOR BALTIM ORE COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER. 26

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