State v. Kevin Carroll

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 25 September Term, 2003 ______________________________________________ STATE OF MARYLAND v. KEVIN POWERS CARROLL ______________________________________________ Bell, C.J. *Eldridge Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia, JJ. Opinion by Bell, C.J. Filed: October 21, 2004 *Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conf erence of this case w hile an activ e member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, S ection 3A , he also particip ated in the decision and adoption fo this opinion. In Carroll v. Sta te, 149 Md. App. 598, 817 A.2d 927 (2003), the Court of Special Appea ls held that the failure of police officers in that case to knock-and-announce their presence prior to executing a search and seizure warrant was unreasonable. We granted the State s petition for a writ of certiorari, State v. Carro ll, 374 Md. 582, 824 A.2d 58 (2003), to decide the correctness of that ruling. The respondent, Kevin Powers Carroll, was arrested and charged with possessing a regulated firearm after having been convicted of a felony crime of violence, as proscribed by Md. Code (1957, 19 96 Rep l. Vol.), Article 2 7, § 445 (d )(1), presently codified a t Md. Code (2003), § 5-133 (c)(1) of the Public Safety Article, and possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. The evidence that formed the basis for the charges was obtained as a result of a search of the respondent s Columbia, Maryland home, pursuant to a search and seizure warrant issued by a judge of the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Howard County. In support of the search and seizure warrant, the applicant, Officer Verderaime, submitted an affidavit containing the following informatio n: Within the past seventy-two (72) hours your affiant ... w as co ntac ted b y a known and reliable source. T his source w ished to pro vide your aff iant with information regarding a person possessing marijuana and as well as illegally possessing several handguns. The source stated to your affiant that within the aforementioned time period the source was inside the residence of 5738 Margrave Mews, Columbia, Howard County, Maryland. The source continued th at Kevin Carroll lives at sa id reside nce. The source observed insid e of Carroll s residence and in Carroll s possession five handguns. The source described the handguns as one Ruger, one .45 cal, one 9mm and two 380 semiautomatics. In addition, the source observed Carroll in possession of a quantity of marijuana. The source described Carroll as a white male, 5-10" tall, 180 pounds, brown hair, and ap proximately 23 years old. Moreo ver, the source directed your affiant to Carroll s house and pointed Carroll out to your affian t. Your affiant ... says that this s ource is reliab le based on information and active coope ration b y this sourc e in othe r investig ation [s ic]. . . . The source has a basis of knowledge regarding handguns. The source explained to your affiant the differen ce betwe en a revolv er and a sem iautomatic handgun. * * * * Your affiant ... caused the records of the Howard County Police Department Central Records to be checked for Kevin Carroll. These records indicate that K evin Carro ll is a white m ale 5-10 tall, 170 pounds, brown hair and w ith a date of birth of 11-26-1978; and residing at 5738 Margrave Mews, Columbia, Howard County, Maryland. Your affiant ... caused the official records of the Maryland Justice Information System Data Base to be checked on any criminal convictions on Kevin P owers C arroll with a date of birth of 11-26-1978. The official records indicated tha t in the year on [sic] 1999 Kevin Carroll was convicted of third degree felony burg lary and given a sentence of five years of w hich fiv e years w as [sic] s uspen ded. The affiant did not request per mission fro m the wa rrant issuing ju dge for the police to enter the premises to be searched without knocking and announcing their presence; he did not ask, in other words, th at a clause be included in the warrant authorizing a noknock e ntry. . After the warrant was issued, the affiant sought the assistance of the Tactical Section of the Howard Coun ty Police Department in executing it. The Tactical Section 1 The affiant testified that he made no such request because he believed that noknock warrants were issued only in those cases in which there was the potential that the suspect w ould destro y evidence, an d destruction of eviden ce was n ot a conce rn in this case. 2 often assisted with the execution of warrants when there were concerns for officer safe ty. Sergeant Merritt Bender, the head of the Tactical Section, consistent with the practice of the Section, conducted an investigation of the respon dent s crimin al history, to determine whether Carroll had previously been arrested or convicted of a violent crime or a crime using a weapon. As a result, he learned that the respondent had been convicted of thirddegree burglary in 19 99 and tha t he had prior arrests for possession of marijuana and robb ery. Also as usual, Sergeant Bender investigated the location to be searched, including determining who occupied and frequ ented that location . With respe ct to this investigation, he learned from the affiant th at the respon dent was reputed to a ssociate with an individual, Gregory Daniel Price, with whom Bender was familiar. Price, who had prior arrests for first degree assault, a number of robberies and CDS offenses, was believed to be carrying a handgun. Notw ithstanding that there had been no request for a no-knock warrant, and thus, the warrant did not authorize entry without knocking and announcing, Sergeant Bender concluded that knocking and announcing before entry potentially would expose the officers to the danger of significant harm. This conclu sion was based on the respondent s criminal background, his known association with an individual with a history of viole nt crime , Sergeant Bend er s experien ce in execu ting betwe en five an d six hundred search warrants and consultations with his Captain, the affiant s Captain and the How ard Co unty State s Attor ney. 3 The responde nt moved , prior to trial, to sup press the ev idence seized during the search. The Circuit Court for Howard County denied that motion. Pointing to the affidavit in support of the warrant, the court concluded that the information at Sergeant Bender s disposal was of sufficient substance and reliability to rise to the level of reasonable suspicion based on particularized facts. It explained: Here, Sergeant Bender knew that Defe ndant, prev iously convicted of third degree burglary, was in possession of firearms and drugs, had a previous arrest for robbery (a crime of violence), and associated with individuals with extensive criminal records, including crim es of violen ce. The C ourt is convinced that Sergeant Bend er had a reasonable suspicion of danger sufficient to allow the Howard County Police officers to enter the house without a knock. The Court of Special Appeals reversed. It held that the no-knock entry was invalid where the police purposely did not seek a no-knock warrant, Carroll, 149 Md. App. at 602, 817 A.2d at 929, and, at the time of the entry, the information known to the police was the same as that which they had when they applied for the warrant. Id. at 611-13, 817 A. 2d at 935-36. In this Court, the State argues that the Court of Special Appeals erred in finding that the no-knock entry was unreasonable, and in creating a rule that a [ ]no-knock[ ] entry is rea sona ble o nly if a utho rized by the warrant itself, unless the exigency arises between the time the search warrant is issued and served. It maintains, moreover, that there is no basis for a rule requiring that m agistrate approval of a no-knock entry must be obtained a t the time the w arrant is issued, unless the facts establishing the exigency warranting a no-knock entry arise after the officer applies for, and obtains, the search 4 and seizure warrant. The State argues, in any event, that the facts known to the o fficers at the time of th eir en try jus tified a n o-kn ock ent ry. The respon dent do es not a gree. He disputes the State s contention th at the Court of Special Appeals announced a new rule, that no-kno ck entries a re inapprop riate when police officers do not seek a no-knock warrant and the circumstances pertinent to the execution of the wa rrant do no t change b etween th e issuance o f the warra nt and its execution. As the resp ondent se es it, the interme diate appella te court simply announced a preference for no -knock warran ts and, thus, for a neutral magistra te to conduct a pre-entry review of all facts bearing on the mode of entry, and disapproved of the way the officers, in th is case, circum vented this p referred pro cedure. T he respon dent subm its that the intermediate appellate court, fully cognizant of the facts known to the officers, made an independen t determination that the no-kn ock entry, in this case, was not based upon suf ficie nt pa rticu lariz ed fa cts, a s req uired by Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 11 7 S. Ct. 1 416, 13 7 L. Ed . 2d 615 (1997) and Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 11 5 S. Ct. 1 914, 13 1 L. Ed . 976 (1 995). I. When we consider the propriety of the denial of a motion to suppress under Maryland Rule 4-2 52, we rev iew on ly the reco rd of th e supp ression hearing . Rowe v. State, 363 M d. 424, 4 31, 769 A.2d 8 79, 883 (200 1). See also Gamb le v. State, 318 Md. 120, 125, 567 A.2d 95, 98 (19 89); Trusty v. State, 308 Md. 658, 670, 521 A. 2d 749, 755 (1987). In conducting that r eview, we give great deference to the h earing judge s 5 credibility determinations and first-level fact-find ing. Ferris v. State , 355 Md. 356, 368, 735 A.2d 49 1, 497 (19 99); Dash iell v. State, 374 Md. 85 , 93, 821 A.2d 37 2, 377 (2003). When, there is conf licting eviden ce, we are to consider it in the light mo st favorab le to the State, Rowe, 363 Md. at 432, 769 A.2d at 883, we accept the facts as found by the hearing judge u nless tho se find ings are clearly erro neous . Dashiell , 374 Md. at 93, 821 A.2d at 377; McM illian v. State, 325 M d. 272, 2 81-82 , 600 A.2d 430, 435 (1992); Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 183, 571 A.2d 1239, 1240 (1990). Legal conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo. Rowe, 363 M d. at 432 , 769 A.2d at 883; Cartnail v. State, 359 M d. 272, 282 , 753 A.2d 519, 525 ; Ferris, 355 Md. at 368, 735 A.2d at 497. Stated differently, we must make our own independent constitutional appraisal as to the ultimate conclusion, the proprie ty of the ru ling un der rev iew. Dashiell, 374 Md. at 93- 94, 821 A .2d at 377; Riddick, 319 Md. at 183, 571 A.2d at 1240. II In Davis v. State, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___ (2004), we considered an issue quite relevant to the resolution of the case sub judice, whethe r, where the re is no statute so providing, a judge is authorized to issue a no-knock search and seizure warrant, on the basis of which the police may make a no- knock entry to execute that warrant. Id. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 2 ]. We held that a Maryland judge had no such author ity. Id. at ___, ___ A.2d at _ __ [slip op. at 38-39 ]. In that case, tw o police of ficers, havin g condu cted an investigation, applied for a search and sei zure w arrant f or, inter alia, premises, in which, they had been informed by 6 a confid ential so urce, D avis an d his co -defen dant, A dams, kept a major supply of marijuana. Id. at __, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 2-3 n.5]. Listing their prior experience, which they said indicates that narcotic/drug dealers/users have, carry, and use Firearms to protect their o perations, th e officers affidavit informed the judge reviewing their applicatio n for wa rrant that they w ould attem pt to gain en try by the rush or No-Knock forced entry. Id. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 4]. The judge issued the warrant, incorp orating the aff idavit by re ferenc e. Id. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 5 ]. As they stated that they intended to do, the police gained entry to the premises without knocking and announcing and through the use of force. As a result of the search, Davis and Adams were arrested and various weapons, drug paraphernalia and marijua na we re recov ered. Id. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 5 ]. Davis and Adams moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search. They argued, inter alia,[2] that the facts alleged in the affidavit submitted in support of the search and seizure warrant were insufficient to justify a no-knock entry. Davis, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at __ _ [slip o p. at 5-6 ]. The Circ uit Court for B altimore C ity denied the motion, rea soning: Somewhat more vex ing is the con sideration w hether the w arrant itself provides say a sufficient basis for a no-knock forced entry. The cases, which have been discussed by the defense, and review ed by the Co urt, largely involve situations in which law enforcem ent officers were confronted with situations which post entry were determined either to rise 2 The petitioners also argued that the application did not establish probable cause for the search. The petitioners did not appeal the Circuit Court s denial of their motion on that basis, ho weve r. Cons equen tly, the issue was n ot cons idered o n appe al. 7 to the level of e xigency perm itting no-knock entry or failed to meet that standa rd, and t hus req uire sup pressio n. No cases were found in which the issue presented was, in this context, in which there was pre-raid approval for a no-knock entry on a set of facts which essentially recite the officers g eneral and specific experience in law enforcement, from which they extrapolate the need, as they perceive it, for a no -knock e ntry. It is, of course, w ell-settled in search and seizure law that the issuing judge is permitted to rely upon the experience of law enforc ement officers and the conclusions which reasonab ly flow from that experience in making the probable cause determ ination. I see no reason to depart from that pattern when the examination is not the presence or absence of probable cause, but is instead the existence of exigencies meriting a no -knock entry. It is, in a ny event , a close ques tion for the C ourt. Howev er, crediting the affiants experience which involves hundreds of narcotics arrests, extensive tra ining, and c onsiderab le experience in narcotics law enforcem ent, I canno t conclude that their conclusion with respect to the likeliness of firearms on the property is an irrational one. Id. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 6-7]. Thus, it was the po lice officers wealth of experience in narcotics law enforcement that tipped the scales in favor of finding a reasonable suspi cion for the n o-kn ock ent ry. Both petitioners timely, but unsuccessfully, appealed. Different panels of the Court of Specia l Appeals , in separate o pinions, affirmed the judg ments of th e Circuit Court. 3 Only on e of the opinio ns, Davis v. S tate, 144 Md. App. 144, 797 A.2d 84 (2002) 3 Both p anels h eld, citing cases f rom oth er jurisd ictions s o holdi ng, see State v. Van Beek, 591 N.W .2d 112, 11 8-19 (N.D . 1999); State v. Hughes, 589 N.W.2d 912, 915-16 (N. D. 1999); State v. Eason, 629 N.W .2d 625, 62 8 (Wis. 20 01); United S tates v. Tisda le, 195 F.3d 70, 73 (2 nd Cir. 1999) ; United States v. Carter, 999 F.2d 182, 18 4-87 (7 th Cir. 1993) ; 8 (Davis I), addressed the merits of the n o-knock w arrant issue. As to the merits, the court concluded that the affidavit in support of the warrant contained sufficient facts to establish reasonable suspicion of the then existence of exigent circumstances and, thus, to permit a judge to make a pre- entr y finding that a no-knock entry onto the premises was justified. Id. at 152, 797 A .2d at 89 . Lik e the warra nt issuing co urt, although it articulated additional rationale, the intermediate appellate court primarily relied on the experience of the affiant officers to credit their conclusion that those involved in the drug trade often are dangerous, carry weapons, and that drugs are easily and quickly destroyed when entry onto the prem ises is de layed or st alled. Id. at 158, 797 A.2d at 93 . Although the petitioners in Davis questioned, on appeal, only the sufficiency of the factual allegations o ffered to ju stify issuance o f a no-kn ock w arrant, assum ing, as it were, the authority of Maryland judges to issue such warrants, we surveyed other jurisdictions to determine how no-knock warrants are handled. ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 14-16 ]. That survey revealed that, although some states have enacted no-knock warran t statutes, expre ssly authorizing such wa rrants, there is a s plit of authority amo ng states w ithout such s tatutes with respect to the authority of judicial United States v. M oore, 956 F.2d 843, 851 (8 th Cir. 1992); United States v. Moland, 996 F.2d 259, 261 (10th Cir. 1993) ; United States v. Gonzalez, 164 F. Supp. 2d 119, 125 (D. Mass. 20 01); United States v. Rivera , 2000 U .S. Dist. Lex is 7997, *2 (D. Ma ine 2000) ; United States v. Brown, 69 F. Sup p. 2d 518 , 519 (S. D . N.Y. 199 9); United States v. Tavarez, 995 F. Su pp. 443, 44 8-49 (S. D . N.Y. 199 8), that the evid ence seize d pursuan t to the warrant should n ot be suppressed un der the good faith ex ception to the exclusionary rule. See Davis v. S tate, 144 Md. App. 144, 150, 797 A.2d 84, 87 (2002 ). 9 officers in those states to is sue no -knock warr ants. Id. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 23-26 ]. One line of cases, characterized by 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search A nd Seizur e: A Treatise On The Fourth Amendment § 4.8 (g) (1996), as [t]he prevailing but not unanimous view , an d exemp lified by Parsley v. Superior Court, 513 P.2d 611, 615 (Cal. 1973); State v. Bamber, 630 So.2d 1048, 105 0-51 (Fla. 1 994); State v. Eminowicz, 520 P.2d 330, 332 (Ariz. App.1974); State v. Acre, 730 P. 2d 1260 , 1262 (Or. App . 1987), holds that statutory authority is a prerequisite to the issuance of no-k nock warrants. The other line, exemplified by Commonw ealth v. Scalise, 439 N.E.2d 818, 822 (Mass. 1982); State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Minn. 1 978); State v. Henderson, 629 N.W.2d 613, 622 -23 (Wis. 2 001); Poole v. S tate, 596 S.E.2d 420, 422 (G a. App. 2004); White v. State, 746 So.2d 953, 95 6 (Miss. A pp. 1999 ); see State v. Johnson, 775 A.2d 1273 (N. J. 2001 ); United States v. Dupras, 980 F . Supp. 344, 348-49 (D. Mont. 199 7), reaches the opposite result, leaving the decision whether to issue such a warrant to the discretion of the judicial officer. Some of these latter courts, we discovered, require the police at the scene to make a threshold reappraisal of the threat, notwithstanding the fact that a no-knock warrant had been issued. ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 25-26], quoting Scalise, 439 N.E.2d at 823 and citing Lien, 265 N .W.2d at 839. Having conducted the survey, we o bserved th at the Cou rt of Specia l Appeals , in Davis I addressed, as a threshold matter, an issue not theretofore decided by a Maryland court, whether no-knock warrants are authorized by Maryland law and concluded that 10 they were. Davis, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at __ _ [slip o p. at 27 ] . To arrive at that conclusion, we no ted the c ourt s re liance o n the w arrant p referen ce, id. at __, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 27 ], citing and quoting Davis I, 144 Md. App. at 155-56, 797 A.2d at 9192, and its determination that [t]his preference should be equally applicable to noknock warrants. [3] Id. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 28 ], quoting Davis I, 144 Md. at 156, 797 A.2d at 92. We also took note of the interme diate appellate court s application o f the warra nt preferen ce in the no -knock warrant co ntext: If at the time he or she is applying for a search warrant, a law enforcement officer believes that the circumstance s under which the warrant will be executed justify dispensing with the knock and announce requirement, the officer should seek no-knock authorization from the warrant issuing judge. If the judge is satisfied that the request for a n o-knock entry is reasonable, the judge should include in the warrant a mandate that, in substantially the following form, provides: Good cause being shown therefor, the executing law enforcement officers are authorized to enter the premises to be searched without giving notice of their authority and purpose. 3 The Cou rt of Special A ppeals re ason ed, m ore s peci fica lly: Dispensing with the search scene case-specific particularized circumstances of exigency for law enforcement officers seeking no-knock authorization from a jud icial officer serves the public interest. It is more beneficial for law enforcement officers to seek no-knock authorization in a search warrant, rather than make their own independent on-the-scene determination of w hether to enter without kn ocking and ann ouncing. If law enforcement officers had to make an identical showing of exigency regardless of whether they received no-knock authorization in the search warrant, the re would be no ince ntive to seek judicial autho rization prior to entering withou t knock ing and annou ncing. Davis I, 144 Md. App. at 157 n. 7, 797 A.2d at 92 n. 7. 11 Moreove r, when they apply for no-kn ock authorization in a searc h warran t, law enforcem ent officers do not hav e to include in the affidavit the kind of search scene case-specific, particularized circumstances of exigency that they would have to establish during the suppression hearing if they did not have a no-knock provision in the warrant and made the no-knock entry determination on their own. Id. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 28 ], quoting Davis I, 144 Md. App. at 156-57, 797 A.2d at 92 (footnotes om itted). We reviewed two subsequent opinions of the intermed iate app ellate co urt, State v. Riley, 147 Md. App. 113, 807 A.2d 797 (2002) and Carroll v. Sta te, 149 Md. App. 598, 817 A.2d 927 (2003), the latter of which is the subject of review in the case sub judice. Those opinions confirmed the approach announced in Davis I. Id. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 29-32]. The issue in Riley, we chara cterized as in volv[ing] d etermining to what deference a decision by a warrant issuing judge is entitled to be given by a reviewing judge. Id. at ___, ___ A.2 d at ___ [s lip op. at 29-3 0]. Analog izing to the w arrant preference and concluding that, [t]he fundamental policy undergirding the warrant requirement is just as strong with respe ct to the no-k nock incre ment as it is w ith respect to the underlyin g entry into the home itself, Riley, 147 M d. App . at 120- 121, 80 7 A.2d at 802, t he court opined, [j]ust as the decision WHETHER to cross the threshold should be submitted to a neutral and detached judicial figure , so too shou ld the decisio n as to HOW to cross that thresho ld. Id. at 121 , 807 A.2d at 802. It was from this premise, we pointed out, that the Court of Specia l Appeals admon ished the ap plicants for s earch and seizure w arrants to 12 advise the issuing ju dge of all e xigencies that would justify a no-knock entry and admonished reviewing courts to give great deference to the no-knock determinations of the warrant issuing judge . ___ Md. at __ _, ___ A.2d at __ _ [slip op. at 30-31]. Carroll, we sum marized a s follows: The issue addressed in Carroll was whether the failure to seek a no-knock warrant foreclosed the right of the police to execute the warrant using a noknock entry. Building upon Davis and Riley, the intermed iate appellate court held that a no-knock entry to execute a search and seizure warrant was invalid wh ere the polic e purposely did n ot seek a no-k nock warra nt, Carroll, 149 M d. App. at 602, 817 A.2d at 92 9, an d, at the tim e of t he en try, the information known to the police was the same as that which they had when they applied for the w arrant. Id. at 611-14, 817 A. 2d at 935-36. The court explained: What is absent is the absolute lack of material change in the facts or circumstances surrounding the execution of the warrant between the time it was issued and served. In other words, the officers serving the warrant had no particularized know ledge. Sergeant Bender's testimony clearl y demonstrated that the particularized knowledge was already known at the time they secured the warrant. No additional facts giving rise to a sudden emergency were shown other than what they previously had learned from the officers who secured the warrant, namely Detective Verderaime. ... Moreover, the record in dicates that the officers did not witness any suspicious a ctivities or even ts while surv eilling C arro ll's residence that would le ad them to believe that the climate had changed and that would give rise to exigent circumstances. Thus, the officers serving the warrant based their decision not to knock an d annou nce on the information previo usly given to them by Detective Verderaime that was known at the time they secured the search warrant, rather than on exigent circumstances that may hav e arisen at the time they executed the warrant. ... Under these circumstances, there was no evidence of exigen t circumstan ces that could poss ibly eliminate the constitutional requirement to knock and announce. 13 Id. at ___, ___ A.2d at ____ [slip op. at 31-32 ], quoting 149 Md. App. at 611-13, 817 A2d at 935-36. Having conducted the foregoing analysis, [w]e rejected the rule implicitly, if not expressly, enunciated by the Court of Special Appeals in Davis, Rile y and Carroll, requiring applicants for search and seizure warran ts to obtain pre-entry authorization for a no-knock entry, to obtain judicial approval of the method of entry in addition to the authorization of the s earch. ___ M d. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 32 ]. Notwithstanding the recognition that there is a relationship between the propriety of a noknock entry and the propriety of the issuance of the search warrant itself, because [d]ifferent criteria inform the decision of the form of entry than inform the analysis of whether, or not, there is probable cause to search in the first place, id. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 32 ], the Court held: that a judicial officer in Maryland, under Maryland law, may not issue a no-knock warrant. Rather, the propriety of a no-knock entry will be reviewed and determined on the basis of the facts known to the officers at the time of entry, ra ther than at the tim e of the applica tion for the wa rrant. Id. at ___, _ __ A.2 d at ___ [slip op . at 38 ]. The rationale underlying this holding was set out as follows: The decision as to how entry is to be made balances, at the least, the privacy interest of the individual, the need to protect the safety of police officers and the need to preserv e evide nce. See Richards, 520 U.S. at 387, 117 S. Ct. at 1418, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 620. The probable cause analysis, on the other hand, while ultimately concerned with the privacy issue, is more fact based, it is concerned more specifically with the probability of the item or items that are the subject of the inquiry being in the place to be searched. Thus, what the Supreme Court pointed out in Johnson v. United States, 333 14 U.S. 10, 13, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369, 92 L. Ed. 436, 440 (1948), where the issue was probable cause, is entirely logical, absent exigent circumstances, deference to the determination of a detached warrant-issuing judge rather than a zealous officer engaged in the often-adrenaline charged task of ferreting out crime, is appropriate, because it supports the goal of encouraging officers to seek warrants. When the issue concerns the form of entry, however, probable cause for the search already having been established, the appropriate inquiry, and th us the decis ion to be rev iewed, is whether the form u sed was r easonab le in light of the facts as known to the officer at the tim e of the entry. Ker v. C alifornia, 374 U.S. 23, 40, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1633, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, 742 (1963) ( In addition to the officers' belief that Ker was in possessio n of narco tics, which c ould be qu ickly and easily destroyed, K er's furtive con duct in eluding them shortly before the arrest was ground for the belief that he mig ht well have been expec ting the police ); Parsley, 513 P.2d at 615 ( the key to permissible unannounced entry is the knowledge of exigent circumstances possessed by police officers at the time of entry. Thus, from the viewpoint of a court reviewing justification for an unannounced entry after the fa ct, a warran t authorizing such action adds nothing. ); Bamber, 630 So.2d at 10 50-51 . Moreover, the factors and circumstances bearing on the method of effecting entry to execute a search and seizure warran t may not be, an d often are not, static; the facts bearing on the p ropriety of a no-knock entry, known to the judicial officer when the warrant was issued m ay well change and be different, perhaps re ndering the judicial offic er s finding on the question of exigency inappropriate. This is so whatever the magistrate s decision, whether the search wa rrant authoriz ed a no-k nock en try or refused to authorize such an entr y. That deficiency of the no-knock warrant has been recognized and explained. In Parsley, explaining why the reasonableness of an entry to execute a search and seizure warrant must be judged at the time of the entry, itself, the court said: Facts existing at the time of obtaining a warrant may no longer exist at the time of entry. Such an emergency, therefore, can be judged only in light of circumstances of which the officer is aware at the latter moment. Previously obtained information may at that time be taken in to accoun t in determining the necessity of dispensing with ordinary announ cements (People v. Dumas (1973) Cal. 109 C al. Rptr. 304, 512 P.2d 1208, but a more significant f actor in this decision is perception and knowledge the officer acquires on the scene immediately prior to effecting entry. For this reason, 15 earlier judicial autho rization wo uld be large ly inappropriate in the context of unannounced entry and, thus, clearly cannot be consid ered a c onstitutio nal requ iremen t. 513 P .2d at 61 4. Id. at ___, _ __ A.2 d at ___ [slip op . at 35-3 7 ]. See Richards, 520 U .S. at 396 n. 7, 117 S. Ct. at 1422 n. 7, 137 L. Ed. 2d a t 625 n.7 (ca utioning tha t a magistra te's decision no t to authorize a no-knock entry should not be interpreted to remove the officers ' authority to exercise independent judgment concerning the wisdom of a no-knock entry at the time the warra nt is bein g exec uted ). We made clear, as courts autho rizing n o-kno ck w arrants r ecogn ize, see Scalise, 439 N.E.2d at 823; Lien, 265 N.W.2d at 839 , that whe ther the n eces sary exigency exists is not fixed in time by the fact that a judicial officer may have been p resented with, or have found, facts be aring o n the m ode of entry. Davis, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 37-38]. Like those courts, we recognized that the possibility of changed circumstances requires that there be a re-evaluation of the propriety of a no-knock e ntry at the time of the search. Id. at ___, _ __ A.2 d at ___ [slip op . at 38 ]. The question presented to the Court of Specia l Appeals for resolution in this case was: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN UPHOLDING A NO-KNOCK ENTRY WHEN THE PO LICE PURPOSELY DID NO T SEEK A NOKNOCK WARRANT BUT, IN STEAD , LATER DECID ED ON THEIR O WN TO FORCIBLY ENTER WITHOUT KNOCKING AND ANNOUNCING? 16 Carroll, 149 Md. App. at 601, 817 A.2d at 929. By answering yes to that question, that court implicitly, if not expressly, held that no-knock warrants are au thorized in Maryland and that such warrants must be sought, and presumably obtained, in advance of the entry, if the circumstances that would justify a no-knock entry are known when the warrant is sought. The latter point is made manife st by the intermediate appellate court s reliance on Davis I, 144 Md . App. at 156, 797 A.2d at 92, which anno unced that officers applying for a search and seizure warrant, w ho are aw are of circu mstances that would justify such an entry, should seek authorization for a no knock entry at that time, and Riley, 147 Md. App. at 120-121, 807 A.2d at 802, in which the court opined that [t]he fundamental policy undergirding the wa rrant requirement is just as strong with respect to the no k nock in creme nt as it is w ith respe ct to the u nderlying entry into th e hous e itself. As indicated, we rejected this analysis in Davis, when w e held that no-knock warrants are not authorized under Maryland law. ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ [slip op. at 38 ]. Acco rdingly, to the exte nt that, in determ ining the rea sonablen ess of the e ntry in this case, the decision of the Court of Special Appeals relied on the failure of the off icers to seek no knock entry authorization when they applied for the search and seizure warra nt, it is disa pprov ed. II. Turning to the question of w hether the no-knock entry in this case was reasonable, we conclude that the Co urt of Spe cial Appe als erred w hen it determ ined that it was not. The critical issue, on judicial review in this case, is whether there were sufficient 17 facts known to the officers executing the warrant, at the time of the entry, to establish a reasonab le suspicio n that the circum stances justified a stealth y entry. General a verments that, due to the nature of the crime, as, for example, narcotics cases, there is a propensity for the use of firearms and, consequently, officers are at a heightened risk of danger, and there is an increased danger of the d estructio n of ev idence are not s ufficie nt. See Richards, supra, 520 U .S. at 394 , 117 S . Ct. at 14 21, 137 L . Ed. 2d at 624 ; Davis; ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at __ _ [slip op. at 4 2 ]; State v.Lee, 374 M d. at 287 -88, 821 A.2d at 929. Rather, the factual a verments must be sp ecific as to the suspect and the situation. Richards, 520 U. S. at 394-95, 117 S. Ct. at 1421-22, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 621. The facts of Richards are instructive. In that case, police officers obtained a warrant to search Richard s hotel room, after surveillance had revealed that he was involved in drug activity. Richards, 520 U.S. at 388, 117 S. Ct. at 1418, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 621. Their requ est for adv ance auth orization to en ter the hotel ro om with out knock ing and announcing was denied by the magistrate, who deleted references to a no-knock entry from the warrant. Id. at 388, 117 S. Ct. at 1419, 13 7 L. Ed. 2d at 621 . When officers arrived at Richard s hotel room to execute the warrant, the team leader knocked on the door and announced that he was a mainte nance man. Id at 388, 117 S. Ct. at 1418-19, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 621. Although he opened the door, Richards kept the latch on, and when he saw the police officers, he slammed the door shut. The officers kicked the door numerous times to gain entr y, announcing simultaneously that they were the police. Once they gained entry, drug s and m oney w ere fou nd. Id. at 388-89, 117 S. Ct. at 1419, 137 L. Ed. 18 2d at 621. Richards moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that it was obtained as a result of an illega l no-k nock search . Id. at 389, 117 S. Ct. at 1419, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 621. The Wiscon sin Suprem e Court af firmed the denial of the supp ression motion. It held that, because nothing in Wilson s acknowledgment that the knock-and-announce rule was an element of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement would prohibit application of a per se exception to the rule in a category of cases, id. at 390, 117 S. Ct. at 1419 , 137 L. Ed. 2d at 621, police officers are never required to knock and announce their presence w hen ex ecuting a search warra nt in a fe lony drug investig ation. Id. at 387- 88, 117 S. Ct. at 1 418, 13 7 L. Ed . 2d at 62 0. The Un ited States Su preme C ourt disagre ed, holding that: In order to justify a no-knock entry, the police must have a reasonab le suspicion that knocking and announcing their presen ce, under the particular circumstances, would b e dangero us or futile, or that it wou ld inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence. . . .This showing is not high, bu t the police sh ould be required to mak e it whene ver the reaso nableness of a no-k nock entry is challen ged. Id. at 394-95, 117 S. Ct. at 1421-22, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 624. The Court, nevertheless, affirmed the drug conviction . Id. at 395, 117 S. Ct. at 142 2, 137 L. Ed. 2d a t 624. It concluded that, on that record, there were sufficient facts that the petitioner knew that the men who stood outside of his door were police, as evinced by his prompt slamming of the door. Therefore, given the disposable nature of the drugs and Richard s apparent intention to refuse the officers entry, the Court agreed that the officers were justified in using force 19 to enter the roo m, wh ile simu ltaneou sly annou ncing th at they w ere the p olice. Id. at 39596, 117 S. Ct. at 1422, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 625. In determining that the no-knock entry in this case was unreas onable, the Court of Special Appeals relied heavily on a comparis on of the f acts offere d to show exigency in some of its prior cases with those in the case sub judice. Carroll, 149 Md. App. at 609610, 817 A.2d at 933-34. One such case was Wynn v. S tate, 117 Md. App. 133, 699 A. 2d 512, (1 997), rev d on other grounds, 351 Md. App. 307, 718 A.2d 588 (1998). As to it, the intermediate appellate court concluded that, in this case, the officers relied on significantly fewer facts than did the officers executing the warrant in Wynn. To that end, the Court explained: Wynn had a long criminal background including drug convictions. . . . In addition, Wynn was on parole, and had pulled a concealed weapon on police, in the pas t, to avoid arrest. ... Anoth er factor the Court considered in reaching its decision was the presence of another dangerous criminal in the house, namely Wynn s wife, Angela Kenyon. . . . The Wynn court, affirming the lower court, h eld that sufficient particularized evidence existed to support the conclusion that the officers had an ob jectively reasona ble belief tha t their persona l safety was in danger because of appellant s and Kenyon s prior violent and criminal actions. Id. at 609-610, 817 A .2d at 933-34. (citations omitted). The court then juxtaposed the exigent facts in Wynn, with the significantly more meager facts present in Lee v. State , 139 Md. App. 79, 774 A.2d 118 3 (200 1), aff d , 374 Md. 275, 821 A.2d 922 (2003). Noting that [t]he other end of the sp ectrum is Lee, Carroll, 149 Md. App. at 610, 817 A.2d at 934, the court explained: 20 In Lee, we reached the conclusion that the record failed to show anything more than that Lee was a drug dealer whom the police observed on two previous occasions selling a small amount of a controlled dangerous substances. . . . and stated that [t]he record is bare of any evidence of exigent circumstances that could possibly eliminate the constitutional necessity to knock and announce. . . . The Lee Court held that the circuit court erred in ruling that there was justification for the police to enter without knocking and announcing. Id. (citation omitted). The intermediate appellate court held that, unlike the circumstances in Richards and Wynn, the facts kn own to th e officers in this case, did n ot support th e conclusion that an exigency existed to execute the w arrant without first knocking and announc ing. The court reasoned: In attempting to meet its burden, the State relied solely on the testimony of Sergeant Bender, a 15-year veteran, to establish that there were exigent circumstances that made it necessary to dispose of the knock and announce requireme nt. The me aning of e xigent circu mstances is that the polic e are confronted with an emergency - - circumstances so imminent that they present an urgent and compelling need for police action. Stackhouse v. State, 298 M d. 203, 2 20, 468 A.2d 3 33 (19 83) (em phasis s upplied ). Sergeant Bender testified that his concern about knocking and announcing was based on the criminal backgrounds of appellant and two known felons with whom he associate d and the f act that the sea rch was f or an unsp ecified amount of marijuana and five handguns. The criminal records of Carroll and his alleged cohorts did not create a reasonable suspicion that they would act in a dangerous manner toward the police as contemplated in Richards and Wynn. In addition, we have stated before that a reasonable belief that firearms may be within the residence, standing alone, is clearly insufficient to excuse a knock and announce requirement. Wynn, supra, 117 Md. App. at 167, 6 99 A.2 d 512. 149 M d. App . at 611, 8 17 A.2 d at 934 -35 (fo otnote o mitted). We disagree with the Court of Special Appeals. 21 As Richards indicates, the showing [of reasonable suspicion that an exigency exists to warran t a no-kno ck entry] is not h igh but the police should be required to make it whenever the reasonableness of a no-knock entry is challenged. Richards, at 394-95, 117 S. Ct. at 1422, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 624. In other words, the requirement that particularized circumstances establishing a reasonable suspicion of exigency be shown, does not mandate that officers show , to an absolu te certainty, that their sa fety is in jeopardy or that ev iden ce un question ably w ill be destroyed, but rather, that the police be able to point to some articulable reason why the preference for knocking and announcing their presence would not be appropriate in that case. To be sure, in Wynn, there were a plethora of facts that indicated that the defendants were dangerous to support the conclusion that a no-knock entry was re quired. Th at case, how ever, does n ot set a minimum requirement that must be met in order for a no-knock entry in a subsequent case to be found to be reasonable. To the contrary, as Richards dictates, the showing must be case by case and the reasonable suspicion standard is not high. What is required is that a reviewing court be satisfied that the officers have a reasonable suspicion, based on particular circumstance s, that an exig ency sufficien t to warrant a no-kno ck entry to execute the sear ch wa rrant ex ists in the case un der rev iew. See Richards, supra, 520 U.S. at 394, 1 17 S. C t. at 1421 -22, 13 7 L. Ed . 2d at 62 4. In this case , the aff iant ave rred tha t, in 199 9, the respondent had been convicted of third degree burglary, a crime of violence, see Md. C ode (195 7, 1996 R epl. Vol.), A rticle 27, § 44(e) , present Md. Code (2003) § 5-101(c)(4) of the Public Safety Article, and that 22 an inform ant had describ ed, in de tail, five h andgu ns, which the informant reported seeing in the respondent s prem ises, the premises to be searched . Subsequently, Sergeant B ender, who assisted in executing the warrant, learned that, in addition to his burglary conviction, the respondent also had marijuana and robbery arrests and was known to associate with an individual named Gre gory Daniel Price. That individual, Sergeant Bender was aware, had previous arrests for first degree assault, multiple robberies , CDS offenses and was known to carry a h andgu n. Although the facts in the case sub judice, may not be as substantial or as compelling as those in Wynn, it is worth repe ating that Wynn did not establish a threshold by which all other no-knock situations will be evaluated for reasonableness. In this case, w e are satisfied that the facts known to the officers at the time of the no-knock entry supported the trial court s conclusion that such an entry was reasonable. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT O F SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COUR T WITH DIREC TIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY. COST S IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENT. 23

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