Pete v. State

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Pete v. S tate, No. 19, Sept. Term 2004. Opinion by Harrell, J. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE- RESTITUTION AS PART OF SENTENCE OR AS CONDITION OF PROBATION Pete was convicted in the Circu it Court for D orchester C ounty of seco nd degre e assault, among other charges, and received probation in exchange for a suspended sentence, pursuant to § 6-221 of the Criminal Procedure Article. He also was convicted, under the same case number, for reckless driving (§ 21-901.1 of the Transportation Article) for an incident occurring approximately two hours after the assault. He was fined $250 for reckless driving. During the incident underlying the reckless driving conviction, a police cruiser was damaged as a direct result of Pete stopping his truck abruptly as the police cruiser followed it. One condition of the probation for the second degree assault included restitution to the Local Government Insurance Trust (LGIT) for damages to the police cruiser damaged as a direct result of the reckless driving incident. Because restitution under § 11-603 of the Criminal Procedure Article was unavailable for either the second degree assault conviction (the damage incurred by the LGIT was not a direct result of the second degree assault and the LGIT was not a victim of the assault) or the reckless driving conviction (§ 11 -603 does not perm it restitution for a reckless driving conviction), the restitution order as a condition of probation was an illegal sentence. Circuit Co urt for Dor chester Co unty Case # 11232 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 19 September Term, 2004 SCOTT ALAN PETE v. STATE OF MARYLAND Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Harrell, J. Filed: December 6, 2004 We issued a w rit of certiorari in this case to explore again the bounds of § 6-221 of the Maryland Criminal Procedure Article of the Maryland Code, which allows a sentencing court discretion to suspend a defendant s sentence and order probation on the conditions that the court considers proper. Md. Code (2001), § 6-221.1 Our exploration leads us to conclude that the restitution ordered in this case was an illegal senten ce and no t properly imposed as a condition of probation. Scott Alan Pete was convicted, after a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Dorchester Cou nty, of second degree assault and reckless driving, among other charges included in Case No. 11332.2 He was sentenced to eighteen months im prisonme nt for the ass ault, with all but two months suspended in favor of three years probation upon his release. He also was fined $250 for the r eckless driving convic tion. As one of the con ditions o f prob ation, Pete was ordered to make restitution in the amount of $355.06 to the victim of the assault and $6,490.53 to the Local Government Insurance Trust (LGIT) for repairs to Patrolman Michael Cheesman s police cruiser, which was damaged in the incident underlying the reckless driving conviction. 1 All Maryland code citations, unless otherwise noted, will be to the Criminal Procedu re Article (20 01) in effe ct at the time o f Pete s trial. 2 Pete also was convicted, under Case No. 11332, of attempting to elude Patrolman Michael Cheesman by failing to stop (Count 8), one count of failing to stop at the scene of an accident with bodily injury (Count 9), and one count of failing to return and remain at the scene of an accident (Count 10). Durin g the same trial, although n ot relevant to the issues raised in Pete s pe tition for writ of certiorari, he was convicted in Case No. 11333 of second degree assault of Deputy Sheriff Tim othy E berling, m alicious d estru ction of prope rty, attempting to elude Deputy Eberling by failing to stop, and attempting to elude Deputy Eberling b y fleeing on f oot. Pete appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, challenging, among other things, the Circuit Court s restitution order. The intermediate appellate court, in an unreported opinion, affirmed the trial court s judgment. We granted Pete s petition for writ of certiorari, 381 Md. 324, 849 A.2d 473 (2004), to consider the following questions: 1. Did the trial court have autho rity to order, as a condition of probation for assault, restitution for damages directly resulting from an unrelated act of reckless driving an offense other than the conviction on which the court suspended sentence and imposed probation? 2. Where a court orders restitution for damages resulting from the commission of a non-jailable offense, may the court order the restitution paid as a condition of probation for an unrelated offence which carries a maximum prison sentence o f ten years imp risonmen t? We conclude that the trial court s restitution order with regard to LGIT, as a condition of probation, is an illegal sentence. This is so because restitution to the LGIT was unavailable, as a matter of law , as a sentenc ing option f or either the se cond deg ree assault or reckless driving conviction s in this case.3 We shall vacate that portion of the restitution order, and the parallel condition of probation for the second degree assault conviction, requiring payment of $6,490.53 to the LGIT. 3 We need not, and do not, decide Pete s second question. 2 I. A. On 23 April 2002 Pete entered the Cambridge apartment of Susan Raickle and, during an argument, hit Ms. Raickle on the back of the head.4 Ms. Raickle called the police after Pete left the apartment and Officer Gilbert McCall responded to the police call at 3:59p.m. After a brief investigation, the police broadcast a lookout for Pete, alerting that, among other things, he may have a gun.5 At 4:45p.m. Patrolman First Class Michael Cheesman, while in his marked police car, heard a radio dispatch to be on the lookou t for Pete an d that he likely would b e driving a la te model, tan For d picku p truck . At approximately 5:45p.m, Patrolman Cheesman saw a man, resembling the broadcast description of Pete, in a truck (also matching the given description) stopped at a traffic light at the corner of Cedar Street and Academy Street in Cambridge. After driving past the person in the truck to confirm the apparent identification, Patrolman Cheesman turned his vehicle around and activated his ov erhead ligh ts in an attem pt to effectuate a traffic stop. Pete turned onto Hughlett Street after the police veh icle closed to within approximately twenty feet of the truck. 4 Ms. Raickle incurred $355.06 in costs associated with her trip to the emergency room fo llowing the incident. 5 Ms. Raickle testified that she told the police that, at the time of the assault, Pete had a handgun. The police later would discover that Pete had brandished a replica of a handgun in Ms. R aickle s apa rtment. 3 Patrolman Cheesman testified that Pete drove the truck away from his police cruiser at a very fast rate, characterizing his speed as well above 20 a lot of dust was thrown up off the roadway. He later testified on c ross-exam ination that, in his opinion, Pete was trying to get away from [him]. Neither Pete nor his passenger acknowledged seeing Patrolman Cheesman in pursuit with the cruiser s overhead lights activated. As Pete approached Washington Street on Hughlett Stre et, he stop ped abru ptly, slamming on his brakes, five feet beyond the intersection s stop line. Patrolman Cheesman testified that the truck s front end went down[,] [t]he back end went up when this stop took place. The police cruiser struck the rear of the truck, resulting in $6,490.53 in damage to the cruiser. Pete left the accident scene, headed towards Maryland Route 50.6 B. At Pete s se ntencing o n 22 Au gust 2002 , the trial judge sta ted: So, in Case No. 11332 the Court sentences you to 18 mo nths to the Dorchester County D etention C enter, and I m going to suspend the last six months of that sentence. Now, that s on only on Count 1, the second -degree as sault upon Susan Raickle. And you ll be on probation for a period of 3 years, subject to the standard conditions of probation, the special conditions of probation, the special co nditions that you avoid con tact with Susan Raickle and that you pay any fines ordered in this case, that is, Case No. 11332 and that you make restitution within 3 years in the amount of $6,845.59, and of that total $355.06 would be to Do rchester G eneral Ho spital, and $6,490.53 would be to the L ocal Gov ernment In surance T rust. 6 Pete later would be apprehended after assaulting a police officer, committing malicio us destr uction o f prop erty, and a ttemptin g to elud e police . See supra, note 2. 4 Now, as to the next count, reckless driving, the Court imposes a fine of $250. As to attempting to elude police in an official police vehicle by failing to stop, the court imposes a sentence of 4 months to the Dorchester County Detention C enter. That will be consecutive to the sentence imposed on Count 1. And on count, failure to stop vehicle at the scene of accident involving bodily injury, the Court sentences you to 6 months to the Dorchester County Detention Center and that ll be consecutive to the 4 months on attempting to elude police in an official police vehicle by failin g to stand an d also . . . [by] failing to stop, and also consecutive to the 18-month sentence on Count 1, that is, second-degree assault upon Susan Raickle, 16 months of which were suspended. On the tenth coun t, failure to return and return to and rem ain at the scene of accident involving attended vehicle, the Court sentences you to 6 months to the Dorchester County Detention Center, and that ll be concurrent to other sentences imposed in Case No. 11332. So that s a total to serve of 12 months. [7] The Court s order for probation, also signed on 22 August 2002, ordered three years of probation for the second degree assault on Ms. Raickle. The probation order listed several 7 Pete points out an apparent typographical error in the transcript, resulting in an inaccurate reflection of the actual sentence imposed. He suggests that the first sentence of the transcript excerpt quoted above should read, So, in Case No. 11332 the Court sentences you to 18 months to the Dorchester County Detention center, and I m going to suspend the last six[teen] month s of that sentence. (Emphasis added). The State contends that the sentencing proceeding transcript quoted in the text of this opinion accurately reflects the trial court s intent to address the total time of incarceration, the total term of probation, the total amount of restitution, and then the specific terms and fines for each of the five criminal counts in case number 11332." It offers no typographic triage, however, to resolve the arithmetical puzzle occasioned by its reading of the transcript that places Pete s unsuspended second degree assault sentence at ten months and his total unsuspended jail sentence at twenty-two months, rather than the two and twelve months, respectively, the court later specified. We resolve this conflict by looking to the terms and conditions of the probation order its elf, infra, at 6-7. Pete s view is the correct one. 5 conditions for Pete s supervised probation, including that he pay $355.06 to the Dorchester General Hospital for M s. Raickle s hospital visit and $6,490.53 to the LGIT.8 The probation order also included conditions a ttributable to specific counts: a $250 fine on the reckless driving conviction, and imprisonment for convictions under Counts 8, 9, and 10. Lastly, the order stated that he must pay his fine and the ordered restitution within three years. In its unreported opinion the Court of Special A ppeals addressed Pete s argument that the restitution order constituted error because the $6,490.53 to be paid to the LGIT had no nexus to the assault crime underlying the probation orde r. The intermediate appe llate court observed that restitution is g enerally available as part of a sentence for a criminal conviction under § 11-603 or a s a condition of probation under § 6-221. Contrary to Pete s assertion that restitution to a victim should be available only when the injury is a direct result of the criminal conviction from which it flo ws, the C ourt of Sp ecial App eals held that restitution was available as a condition of probation for related criminal conduct for which criminal liability has been a djudica ted. II. A. At the outset, we examine the probation order to determine its terms and conditions. Probatio n was ordered relative to Pete s second degree assault conviction. He received 8 The probation order also ordere d Pete to pay court co sts of $145 .00 and ord ered him to avoid contact with Ms. Raickle for three years. 6 probation for three years with explicit conditions that required completion within that period conditions that, if left uncompleted, would result in him serving the suspended sixteen months of his sentence for the second degree ass ault convic tion. He first h ad to com plete his effective total of twelve months incarceration under Case No. 11332 two months for the second degree assault, four months for Count 8 and six month s for Cou nt 9, consec utive to the assault senten ce, and six months for Count 10, concurrent to the assault and Counts 8 and 9. He also had to pay a fine of $250.00 as punishment for his reckless driving conviction. More important to this case, he h ad to mak e restitution of $6 ,490.53 to th e LGIT . This require ment w as inclu ded w ithout a s pecific referen ce to the reckles s driving count. B. Restitution under Maryland s Criminal Procedure Article is a criminal sanction, not a civil remedy. Grey v. A llstate Ins. Co., 363 Md. 445, 451, 769 A.2d 891, 895 (2001) (emphas is in original).9 It serves at least three distinct purposes. First, it is a form of punishment for criminal conduct. Songer v. State, 327 Md. 42, 46, 607 A.2d 557, 559 (1992). Secon d, it is inten ded to r ehabilita te the de fenda nt. Anne Arundel County v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 329 Md. 677, 685, 621 A.2d 427, 431 (1993) (citing Lee v. State, 307 Md. 74, 78, 512 A.2d 372, 374 (1986)). Lastly, it affords the aggrieved victim 9 The restitution provisio ns of § 11 -603 of M aryland s Crim inal Proced ure Article were re-codified from Article 27, § 807, without substantial change, by the Acts of 2001, chapter 10, § 1, e ffectiv e 1 Oc tober 2 001. For a thorough review of the history of restitution, see Judge Wilner s d iscussion in Grey v. Allstate Insurance Company, 363 Md. 445, 450-62, 769 A.2d 89 1, 894-900 (200 1). 7 recompense for monetary loss. Id. (quoting Lee v. State , 307 Md. 74, 78, 512 A.2d 372, 374 (1986 )). In Maryland, restitution may be orde red, with qualifications, as a direct sentence for a crim e or d elinq uent act, in ad ditio n to a ny other pena lty prescribed by the underlying sentencing or remedial statute. §11-603 (a). Sentencing courts also m ay order restitution under the broader powers of probation after conviction, the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation on the conditions that the court considers proper. §6-221. We previously commended the use of restitution as a condition of probation: [a] court which orders restitution does a certain solo monic justice for the agg rieved victim who is en titled to requittal of that unlawfully taken or reparation for injury criminally inflicted; thus , restitution as a probationary tool has an understan dable appeal. Coles v. Sta te, 290 Md. 296, 305, 429 A.2d 10 29, 1033 (1981). Y et, the broad power to order conditions of probat ion und er § 6-2 21 is no t bound less. See, e.g., Bailey v. Sta te, 355 Md. 287, 299, 734 A.2d 684, 690 (1999) (holding that home detention as a condition of probation under § 641A of Article 2710 is imprope r without ex plicit statutory authorization); Sheppa rd v. State, 344 Md. 143, 154, 685 A.2d 1176, 1181 (1996) (holding improper a probation order under § 641A of Article 27 forbidding a defendant from driving, eve n if the Marylan d Transit A uthority, which had spec ific regulatory power over 10 Section 6-221 of Maryland s Criminal Procedure Article was re-codified from Article 27, § 641 A, without substantive change, by the Acts of 2001, chapter 10, § 1, effect ive 1 O ctober 2 001. 8 driver s license suspensions under the Transportation Article, gives the defendant a license ); Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 433, 488 A.2d 949, 954 (1985) (holding that probation order under § 641A of Article 27 was an illegal sentence when it ordered restitution to be paid by a defendant to a victim of an alleged crime for which the defendant was not con victed). If a sentencing court exercises its discretion under §6-221, it may grant probation regardless of whether the defendant was convicted of a crime punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. § 6-225(b). We determine that restitution to the LG IT in this case was unavailable under § 11-603 for the reckless driving charge, the State s contention to the contrary notwithstanding. Even though the damage to Patrolman Cheesman s police cruiser, on these fa cts, was un doubtedly a direct result of the reckless driving, reckless driving is not a crime for which restitution may be ordered. Under § 11-603, restitution may be ordered to a victim as a direct result of the crim e . . . . § 11-603(a)(1). 11 A crime includes a violation of the Transportation Article that is punishable by a term of confinement. § 11-601(d)(2). Any person convicted 11 Section 11 -603 read s, in relevant p art, (a) Conditions for judgment of restitution. A court may enter judgment of restitution that orders a defend ant or child respondent to make restitution in add ition to any other penalty for the commission of a crime or delinquent act, if: (1) as a direct re sult of the crime or delinquent act, property of the victim was stolen, damaged, destroyed, converted, or unlaw fully obta ined, or its value substan tially decre ased . . . . 9 of reckless driving un der § 21-9 01.1 is guilty of a misdemeanor and only subject to a fine of not more than $1,000. Md. Code (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 21-101(g) of the Transportation Article.12 Here, Pete received a $250 fine and was not eligible for punishment by a term of confinement for his reckless driving conviction under § 21-901.1 of the Transportation Article; therefore, restitution was not available to the sentencing court as a direct sentence.13 We also conclude, upon further analysis, that restitution to the LGIT as part of a sentence for the second deg ree assault conviction wa s inappropriate under § 11-603 because the damage to Patrolman Cheesman s cruiser did not arise as a direct result of the second degree assault on M s. Raickle. T he term d irect result of the crime appeared first in the Restitution for Crimes Act of 1977. 1977 Md. Laws, Chap. 581 (H.B. 1680); Md. Code (1957, 1976 R epl. Vol., 197 7 Cum . Supp.), A rt. 27 § 640 (b). We rec ently observed , in determining whether daytime housebreaking, after it was abolished as a crime, nonetheless remained a crime of violence for purposes of sentencing for an il legal possession of a firearm co nviction, that: The chief goal of statutory interpretation is to discover the actual intent of the legislature in enacting the statute, and the legion of cases that suppo rt this proposition need not be repeated here. In 12 All citations to the Maryland Transportation Article will be to the 2002 Replacement Volume. 13 Probation with restitution might have been an appropriate sentence for a reckless driving conviction under § § 6-22 1 and 6 -225 o f the C riminal P rocedu re Artic le. See, infra, note 18, at 21 and 22. 10 fact, all statutory interpretation begins, and usua lly ends, with the statutory text itself for the legislative intent of a statute primarily reveals itself thro ugh the statute's v ery word s. A court may neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute; nor may it construe the statute with forc ed or subtle interpretations that limit or exte nd its application. In short, if the words of a statute clearly and unambiguously delineate the legislative intent, ours is an ephemeral enterprise. We need investig ate no f urther b ut simp ly apply the s tatute as it reads. In some cases, the statutory text reveals ambiguity, and then the job of this Court is to resolve that ambiguity in light of the legislative intent, using all the resources and tools of statuto ry construction at our d isposal. Howeve r, before judges may look to other sources for interpretation, first there must exist an ambiguity within the statute, i.e., two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute . Where th e statutory language is free from such am biguity, courts w ill neither look beyond the word s of the statute itself to determ ine legislative intent nor add to or delete words from the statute. Only when faced with amb iguity will courts consider both the literal or usual meaning of the word s as well as th eir meaning in light of the objectiv es and p urpose s of the enactm ent. As our predecessors noted, "We cannot assume authority to read into the Act wh at the Legis lature apparently de liberately left out. Judicial construction should only be resorted to when an ambiguity exists." Therefore, the strongly preferred norm of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the plain language of the statutory te xt . . . . Price v. State , 378 Md. 378 , 387-88, 835 A .2d 1221, 1226 (2 003) (citations omitted). 14 14 There is little in the legislative history of H.B. 1680 to suggest that direct result of the crime means anything other than that discerne d from the plain langu age. The history of H.B. 1680 shows that the Director of the Department of Legislative Reference of the General Assembly had sought, and received, the existing restitution statutes of the Colorado, Georgia, and Oklahoma code from their respective legislative bodies. O f these statute s, only the Oklaho ma statute p rovided sp ecifically that, Mon etary restitution sha ll mean the sum paid by the defendant to the victim of his criminal act to compensate that victim for the economic loss suffered as a direct result of the criminal act of the defender. 1976 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 160 , § 5 (emphasis adde d). 11 This is not the first time we have interpreted the restitutio n statute. In Grey, we resolved whether a restitution order was a civil judgment sufficient to allow the intended recipient victims of a vehicular manslaug hter crime to attach the proceeds of th e defendant s automob ile insuran ce polic y. 363 Md. at 449-50, 769 A.2d at 894. In concluding that restitution by itself was insufficient to allow the victims to attach the defendant s insurance proceeds based on civil liability for the accident, we explained, [a]n order of restitution entered under § 807 [c urrently § 11-60 3] estab lishes, at most, two things: (1) that the defendant was guilty of a crime; and (2) that, as a direct result of that crime, the persons or entities to whom the restitution is ultimately payable suffered losses (i) of a kind enumerated in the statu te and (ii ) at least in the am ount sta ted in the restitutio n order . Id. at 465-66, 769 A.2d a t 903. Pete alleges that the direct result of the crime of second degree assault on Ms. Raickle may not inclu de as victim s either Patrolman Cheesman or the LGIT because they were not victi ms of th e assau lt. Section 11-603, he urges, compels that conclusion by stating plainly that restitution may be ordered as as a direct result of the crime or delinquent act, property of the victim was stolen , damaged, destroyed, conv erted, or unlawfu lly obtained, or its value substantially decreased . . . . Furthermore, he asks us to read the statute s plain language and determ ine that a direc t result of a crime is limited to the victim of the qualifying crime and that victim s injuries and/or damages arising from that crime. In the alternative, he asks that we apply tort proximate cause analysis. Under this analysis, the intervening 12 event of the reckless driving incident occurring appro ximately two hours afte r the assault would break the chain of causation between the assault and the motor vehicle collision between Pete s truck and Patrolman C heesman s cruiser. The State believes that these assertions, if accepted, would limit too much the scope of §11-603. It urges us, like the reasonin g employed by the intermed iate appellate c ourt in this case, to adopt a b roader read ing of § 1 1-603 by inter preting the p retextual sen tence in paragraph (a) in light of the narrower language of subparagraph (a)(1): [a] court may enter a judgmen t of restitution . . . in ad dition to any oth er penalty for the commission of a crime or delinqu ent act . . . . § 11-603(a) (emp hasis added). As the Sta te sees it, if it can o btain a conviction for a crime where restitution may be had, but is not ordered, and another conviction of a related crime, then restitution may be orde red to the ap propriate victims as an appropriate sentence u nder the rela ted crime. S uch a read ing wou ld require sole ly a nexus between the defendant s criminal activity and the losses that form the basis for an order of re stitution. This nexus is justified by the Court of Special Appeals in its opinion in the present case as allowing restitution orders if the orders are related to losse s that were caused by conduct for which [Pete] had been convicted. The State also described its nexus theory as the S ingle Charging Document Doctrine. Under this doctrine, any count for which a defend ant is convic ted under th e same ch arging do cument would be sufficient to satisfy the statutory direct re sult test. 13 The standards governing restitution as a direct penalty for the second degree ass ault conviction in this case require a particular type of crime, a victim, and damages as a direct result of the crime. We need not engage in a tort causal relationship analysis,15 nor weigh the persuasion quotient of an attenuated nexus between the dam ages to Patrolman C heesman s police cruiser and the assault on Ms. Raickle. The General Assembly has required a direct 15 The dangers of relying on a type of tort causation analysis are almost too numerous too summarize. We already clearly have stated that restitution is a criminal sanction and not a civil rem edy, Grey, 363 Md. at 451, 769 A.2d at 895, and that there is a fundamental and clear separation of criminal and civil liability . . . Id. at 467, 769 A.2d 904. Tort law and criminal law m ust be re garded a very un reliable a nalogy . . . . Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts, 9 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984). One need look no further than the commo nly accepted definition of proximate cause to s ee the difficulty in utilizing a tort causation analysis when a direct result of a c rime is required: [t] he term, which many suspect is interpreted b y jurors to mean approxim ate cause, is no more than a showing by plaintiff of a reasonable connection between his/her injuries and the act or omission by the defen dant. Richard J . Gilbert and Paul T. G ilbert, Maryland Tort Law Handbook, § 11.7, at 127 (3d ed. 2000) (emphasis added). Using a tort causation theory is especially dangerous because tort scholars have described th e art of d etermining proximate cause as [ t]here is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion. William L. Pros ser, The Law of Torts, 240 (3rd ed . 1964). This is espe cially true when one cons iders that a crim e is a public wrong accepted as being against society gen erally, regardless of whe ther the wro ng is against the indiv idual vic tim or th e public . Gilbert, supra, at 1. Even with the advent of restitution statutes like § 11-603, the individual victim s role in the consideration of restitution is vastly different where he/she is the accuser and witness on behalf of the State, not the adv erse pa rty in a tort c laim. Prosser and Keeton, supra, at 7. To balance this, criminal prosecutions require a showing by the State of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt while tort claims may succeed on a prepon derance o f the evide nce show ing, or a mo re likely than not, pro of. Da n B. D obbs, The Law of Torts, 5 (2000); also Alan T . Harlan d, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime : Assessing the Role of the Crim inal Cour ts, 30 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. 52, 87, n. 206 (1982) (noting that criminal liability under restitution is generally less complete than civil liability and that neither the full principles nor procedures of civil liability damages claims h ave been adop ted for criminal restitution damag es). 14 result between the qualifying crime committed and the damages inflicted be fore restitution may be ordered. A ny attempt by a co urt to craft a proximate causation, m ere nexus , or single charging docume nt substitute w ould be cle arly contrary to the plainly-worded intent of § 11603. In this case, the collision with, and resultant dam age, to Patrolman Cheesman s cruiser are a direct result of Pete s reckless driving, not his assault on Ms. Raickle. The damage to the cruiser is a direct result of Pete stopping a bruptly, from a relatively high rate of speed, in the path of the cruiser. Reckless driving, by definition, is driving with a wanton or willful disregard for the safety of persons or property. § 21-901.1 of the Transportation Article. In this case, Pete s wanton or willful disregard was for the safety of Patrolman Cheesman, his police cruiser, and possibly any other person, vehicle, or property on the same roadway or placed at risk by Pete's driving. It is easy to see on this record that the damage to the police cruiser could not be a direct result of the assault on another individual that occurred approximately two hours earlier than the vehicle collision. C. We turn to the qu estion of w hether restitutio n as a con dition of probation for the second degree assault m ight be a pprop riate und er § 6-2 21. Pete argues that, because restitution to the LGIT would have been impossible as a direct result of either the second degree assault or the reckless driving conviction, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering restitution as a condition o f probation . Such a res ult, 15 he mainta ins, conflicts with the G eneral As sembly s obv ious intent to lim it the ordering of restitution to specific persons victimized by specific crimes as evidenced by the language in §§ 11-603 and 11-601. He urges us to resolve this conflict by vacating the condition of probation.16 The State simply asks us to agree with the courts below that Pete is responsible for the damages to the police cruiser caused by his reckless d riving. It alleges, w ithout refere nce to any specific sup port in the record, that the Circuit Court merely added the restitution to the LGIT as a condition of probation for the assault to grant Pete the opportunity to make the payments over a three-year period. Such a conclusion, it believes, would be harmonious with its belief that restitution to a victim may be ordered as a condition of probation for any loss from a criminal count for which a defen dant w as conv icted in th e same crimina l case. Under the State s analysis of including the broader language of § 11-603(a), the LGIT is a victim of a crime for which Pete was convicted under Case No. 11332, and because the second degree assault conviction occurred under Case No. 11332, restitution as a condition for pro bation is approp riate. Our analysis under § 6-221 begins with consideration of the scope of the trial court s power to order probation. The relevant portion of § 6-221 provides a trial court broad 16 Pete also alleg es that such a result wo uld align M aryland with other jurisdictions that hold similarly, an argument which the State claims to be able to distinguish. Because we resolve this case based on an analysis of Maryland s statutory language, we need not look to other jurisdictions that may base their restitution and probation statutes on different jurisprudential, economic, or societal theories. 16 discretion to suspend the enforcement of a sentence (or portion thereof), following a conviction, and orde r probation with such co ndition s as the court co nsiders proper . 17 We, have vacated, on occasion, ordered conditions of probation on the grounds that they were an illegal senten ce or oth erwise improp er. See Sheppard, 344 Md. at 154, 685 A.2d at 1181 (holding that a trial court improperly conditioned probation on the defendant not being able to drive where the Transportation Article enabled the Maryland Transit A uthority to regula te the suspension of drivers); Walczak, 302 Md. at 433, 488 A.2d at 954 (holding that probation order conditioned on restitution for a crime for which the defendant was not convicted violated the direct result of the crime provisions of the restitution statute under § 641A ). In contrast, we affirmed a probation order with a condition of restitution in Coles v. State, 290 M d. 296, 4 29 A.2 d 1029 (1981 ). In Coles, the defendant was convicted of violating §62(a) of Article 88A, making false or fraudulent statements in applications for public assistan ce ben efits. Id. at 298, 429 A.2d at 10 30. He w as subseq uently sentenc ed to serve seven, concurrent ten year sentences that were suspended in lieu of probation under § 17 Section 6-2 21 states, [o]n entering a judgment of conviction, the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation on the conditions that the cou rt considers p roper. Its ancestor, House Bill 551, was approved on 28 April 1970 and codified as § 641A of Article 27. While the text has undergone revision and re-ordering since its original enactment, the current statute preserves much of the original language, save a few clarifying provisions; [u]pon entering a judgment of conviction, the court having jurisdiction, may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation upon such terms and conditions as the courts deem proper. 1970 Md. Laws, C h. 480; see, e.g., § 6-221 (Revisor s Note explaining that terms is deleted in light of the reference to conditions. ); 1981 Md. Laws, Ch. 398 (changing original language from courts deem proper to court deems proper as clarifying language ). 17 641A. He app ealed, challen ging his pro bation orde r that was conditione d on mo nthly restitution payments of $200, w ith full restitution due within one year, because the restitution statute, then § 640, did not include Article 88A convictions as crimes for which restitution could be ordered as a direct penalty. Because the General Assembly, Coles argued, did not allow restitution as a direct penalty for his convictions, the trial court's order was an illegal sentence becau se it orde red pro bation c onditio ned up on his p aying fu ll restitutio n. Id. at 303 - 304, 429 A.2d at 1032-33. We disagreed with this argument and held that § 641A generally authorizes the type of action taken by [the trial judge] . . ., and, may include an order to pay restitution, whether entered for the purpose of furthering rehabilitation of the defendant or otherwise. Id. at 305, 4 29 A.2 d at 103 3 (citatio ns omi tted). Four years after Coles, we curtailed somewhat a trial court's broad discretion to order conditions for probation based on our further interpretation of the probation and restitution statutes. Walczak, 302 Md. at 427-33, 488 A.2d at 951-54. In Walczak, the defendant was charged with mu ltiple counts of assault, robbery, and robbery with a dangerous weapon, for his conduct in robbing two victims at gunpoint in their re sidenc e. Id. at 424, 488 A.2d at 94950. Walczak entered an agreement with the State to be tried solely for robbery with a dangerous weap on for one of the victim s. Id. at 424, 4 88 A.2 d at 950 . After his conviction at a benc h trial, the State no l prosse d the rem aining c harges . Id. At sentencing, the trial court ordered, as a condition of probation for a suspended sentence, that Walczak make restitution to both victims . Id. Walczak appe aled, claiming that restitution could not be 18 ordered properly under § 641A re garding a p erson wh o, although the victim of a crime, was not the victim of the crime for which the defendant was convicted. We agreed w ith Walczak and held that both § 641A and the restitution statute granted a court the authority to order the payment of restitution only upon a conviction. Id. at 430, 488 A.2d at 95 3. We ex plained tha t Coles held that § 641A vested additional power in the trial court beyond that conferred by § 640, to suspend Coles s sentence and impose conditions of probation. Id. At the same time, that additional power was limited by the plain statutory language of §§ 640 and 641A. As a result, we held that Walczak s probation order was illegal and remanded to the Circuit Court to remove the offending probation condition. While neither Walczak nor Coles, on their factual predicates, offer a dispositive solution for Pete, the probation orders dealt with in those cases, and their respective conditions, were measured by a common metric whether the result of the conditions of the probation order granted unde r the broad pow ers of § 6-22 1 could be read co nsistently with concurrent legislation addressing the same subject matter. Underlying Walczak, Coles, and, more importantly, this case, is the requirement under § 11-603 that a legal restitution order address the victim of the crime for which probation could be ordered. A probation order for a criminal conviction conditioned on restitution must meet the minimum requirements of: (1) a victim with property dam age of the type enume rated in § 11-603, and (2) the damage to the 19 victim be the direct result of the crime for which the defendant was convicted and for which it was directed. Such a conclusion is consistent with our interpreting a statute in full awareness of related statutes. State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 93, 581 A.2d 9, 12 (199 0) (citations omitted). Our harmonizing of the trial court s powers under § 6-221 and § 11-603 is a constant tenet of statutory interpretation: [t]herefore various consistent and related enactments, although made at different times and without reference to one another, nevertheless should be harmonized as much as possible. Id. at 93, 581 A .2d at 12 (citatio ns omitted). A fter all, it is presumed that the General Assembly acted with full knowledge of prior legislation and intended statutes that aff ect the sam e subject m atter to blend in to a consiste nt and harmonious body of law. Id. at 93, 581 A.2d at 12 (citations omitted). As a result, statutes on the same subject are to be read together and harmonized to the extent possible, reading them so as to avoid rendering either of them, or any portion, meaningless, surplusage, superfluous or nugatory. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 366 Md. 295, 303, 783 A.2d 667, 671 (2001) (quoting Gov t Emp loyees Ins. Co. v. Ins. Com m r, 332 Md. 124, 132, 630 A.2d 713, 717 (1993 )). In this case, we conclude that it was improper to order restitution as a condition for probation for the second degree assault conviction. As previously explained, the General Assemb ly crafted explicit statutory requirements allowing restitution under limited circumstances. It is quite clear tha t restitution to the L GIT w as unava ilable under § 11-603 20 for either the second degree assault or the reckless driving conviction. Whether the trial judge s action was well-intended (as the State asserts) in allowing Pete three years to make restitution or intended merely to clarify an earlier mistak en utterance (as evidenced in the transcript of the sente ncing pro ceeding), is o f no matte r; it was improper for the cou rt to order restitution as a condition of probation for the second degree assault conviction when Patrolman Cheesman and the police cruiser were neither the victim of the second degree assault nor were damaged as a direct result of that crime.18 JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFI RMING RESTI TUTI O N O R D ERED AS CONDITION OF PROBATION AS TO CO UNT 1 IN 18 As noted earlier, probation could have been ordered for the reckless driving convic tion. Supra, note 13. If probation, with a condition of restitution, had been ordered for the reckless d riving conv iction under § 6-221, however, the condition may have conflicted with the statutory definition of crime under § 11-601(d)(2) and also produced an unharm onious resu lt in light of § 11-60 3. Pete suggested at oral argument that probation conditioned on restitution should be controlled by the definition of judgment of restitution in § 11-601(g). This term is used in § 11-603 to define a trial court's power to order restitution. As the probation ordered here was clearly not for the reckless driving conviction, nor has Pete properly briefed this argument, the issue is not squarely before us and we decline Pete 's invitation to 1) rule on the legality of probation with a condition of restitution for a reckless driving charge and 2) reverse Coles in light of § 1 1-601(g). L astly, we note that, if a challeng e to a probation order conditioned on restitution were to occur in the future based on § 11-601(g) and the term judgment of restitution, it would have to overcome legislative history sugges ting that the G eneral As sembly did no t specifically intend to circumscribe, by this statutory definition, a court's probation power under § 6-221. 1992 Md. Laws, Chap. 23 6 (S.B. 22 1); see Floor Report S.B. 221, Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee (stating that S.B. 221 provides that an order to pay restitution which is included as a condition of probation in document that is entitled 'order of probation' must be recorded and indexed in the same fashion as a separate order of the court for the payment of restitution and that it also clarifies that an obligation to pay restitution which is included as a con dition o f prob ation w ill surviv e the term ination o f the pro bation o rder. ). 21 CASE NO. 11332 REVERSED IN THAT REGARD; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE THAT PART OF THE CONDITION OF PROBATION THAT REQUIRES PETITIONER TO PAY $6,490.53 IN RESTITUTION TO THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT INSURANCE TRUST; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY DORCHESTER COUNTY. 22

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