State v. Brookins

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 19 September Term, 2003 _________________________________ State of Maryland v. Shirley R. Brookins, Steven P. Martin, and Rashida S. Hogg __________________________________ Bell, C.J. *Eldridge Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia JJ. ________________________________ Opinion by Bell, C.J. _________________________________ Filed: March 16, 2004 *Eldridge , J. now retired , participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption fo this opinion. The issue this case presents is whether the Maryland walk around services statute, codified during the relevant time period at Maryland Code (1957, 2002 Replacement Volume), Article 33, §13-209,1 which prohibits both a candidate and a candidate s campaign from paying for walk around services or any other services as a poll worker or distributor of sample ballots, performed on the day of election an d any person from rece iving payme nt in any form for such servic es, uncons titutionally violates the freedom of speech, as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.2 1 Maryland Code (1957, 2002 Replacemen t Volume), Article 33, § 13-209 was revised and recodified, as a part of the Code Revision process, without substantive change, by Acts of 2002, ch. 291, effective January 1, 2003. It now appears in the Maryland Code (2003) § 13-245 of the Election Law A rticle. Unless otherwise indicated, future references will be to Art. 33, the statute in effect when the alleged violations occurred. The criminal pena lty for a violation of §13-209 w as prescribed in § 13-60 3. It provided: (a) In general. - Except as provided in § 13-601 of this title, any person who kn owingly and willfully violates a ny of the prov isions of this title is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined not more than $25,000.00, or be imprisoned for not more than 1 year or both, in the discretion of the court. (b) Application of specific penalties. - If a differen t penalty is specific ally prescribed for violation of any section of this subtitle a nd expre ssly set forth therein, the specific penalty applies and the penalty set forth in this section does n ot apply. The indic tments refe r to both § 1 3-209 an d § 13-60 3. Becau se the latter sim ply prescribes the criminal penalty for violation of § 13-209, the former is the substantive provision. Therefore, hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, any reference to the applicable statute is to §13-209. 2 This is the question that the State presented in its petition for certiorari. The respon dents, h owev er, have argued that § 1 3-209 and ne w Ele ction L aw § 1 3-245 . . . violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 40 of the Md. Declaratio n of Righ ts. We ad opt the pos ition Judge E ldridge delin eated for th is Court in I. Facts As relevant, § 13-209 provided: 13-209. Walk Around Se rvices . (a) Prohibited. No candidate, slate of candidates, political committee, political party, or any person acting on behalf of any of the foregoing, may at any time, directly or indirectly pay, or incur any oblig ation to pay, nor may any person receive, directly or indirectly any sum of money or thing of value in return for a political endorsement or for walk around services or any other services as a poll worker or distributor of sample ballots performed on the day of election. (b) walk around services de fined For the pu rpose of this section w alk around services inc lude any of th e followin g activities when performed for money on the day of the election while the polls are open: (1) Distributing to any person any item enum erated in 13 -602 of th is title; (2) Comm unicating a voting prefe rence or choice in any ma nner; The Pac k Shack , Inc. v. How ard Cou nty, 377 M d. 55, 64, 82 3 A.2d 1 70, 176 (2 003): This Court has often treated Art. 40 [of the Maryland Declaration of Rights] as being in pari mater ia with the First Amendment and has stated that the legal effect of both pro visions is substantially the same, Sigma Delta Chi v. Speaker, 270 M d. 1, 4, 31 0 A.2d 156, 15 8 (197 3). See DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 43-44, 729 A.2d 354, 367-368 (1999 ). Nevertheless, we have also emphasized that, simply because a Maryland constitutional provision is in pari materia with the federal one . . . does not mean that the provision w ill always be interprete d or applied in the same manner a s its federal counterpart. Dua v. C omcast C able, 370 Md. 604, 621, 805 A.2d 1061, 1 071 (2 002). See also DiPino v . Davis, supra, 354 Md. at 43, 729 A.2d at 367 ( [I]n certain contexts the contours of the State Constitutional rights are not precisely those of the Federal ). In light of the facts and arguments in the case at bar, however, we shall regard the claimed violation of Article 4 0 and the c laimed vio lation of the F irst Amen dment as a single issue. 2 (3) Stationing any person or o bject in the path of any voter; or (4) Electioneering or canvassing within the meaning of §16-206 of this article. (C) Exceptions. This section does not apply to: (1) Meals, beverages, and refreshments served to campaign workers; (2) Salaries of regularly employed personnel in campaign headquarters; (3) Media advertising including but not limited to newspaper, radio, television, billboard, or aerial advertising; (4) Rent and regular office expense or (5) Cost of phoning voters or transporting voters to and from polling places. **** On November 5, 2002, Maryland held its gene ral electio n for, inter alia, the offices of Governor and Lieutenant Governor. Shirley R. Brookins, Steven P. Martin and Rashida S. Hogg, the respondents, were charged, by indictment, in the Circuit Court for Prince George s Cou nty, with violating § 13-209, respondent Brookins by paying for walk around services provided by third pa rties on election day, and respo ndents M artin and Ho gg by consp iring to violate the section and incurring an obligation to pay for walk around services provided on election day. M ore p artic ularly, the State of Maryland, by the State Prosecutor, the petitioner, alleged that respondent Brookins, the operator of a temporary employment agency in the District of Columbia, used campaign funds of the Republican nominees for Governor and Lieutenant Governor (hereinafter referred to as Ehrlich/Steele ) to hire and pay approxim ately 200 residents of a homeless shelte r located in the District to pro vide walk around services on the general election day; that she transported them to the polls, where those 3 walk around service s, i.e. accosting voters outside the polls, communicating a voting preference, and distributing Ehrlich/Steele campaign literature, were performed; and for which the respondent Brookins paid each worker the following day. The State alleged that responde nts Martin and H ogg, hired Maryland residents, mostly high school and college students, and offered them cash amounts ranging from $ 80.00 to $ 110.0 0 to render w alk around services on the day of the election, including distributing Ehrlich/Steele campaign materials, communicating to voters accosted outside the polls a voting preference and advocating for the election of Ro bert Ehrlich for Governor and Michael Steele for Lieutenant Gove rnor. The respondents filed in the C ircuit Court for Prince George s County, M otions to Dismiss the indictme nts on the g rounds tha t § 13-209 was unconstitutional in that it violated their First Ame ndment f ree speech rights both o n its face an d as applied in this case.3 The Circuit Court granted the respondents motions, holding § 13-209 is facially unconstitutio nal and, thus, violative of the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech. Specific ally, the court concluded that the State s enunciated interest in curtailing the appearance of undu e influenc e and vote buying w as not so co mpelling or of sufficient 3 The respondent Brookins, in both her motion to dismiss and the supporting memorandum, additionally argued that § 13-209 was both, unconstitutionally vague and over-broad, in violation of the First Amendment and Art. 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. In a separate motion, the respondent Martin moved to dismiss on the basis that the statute was unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him, citing both the United States Constitution and Art. 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The respondent Hogg adopte d the rea sons an d argum ents of her co- couns el and A mici. 4 magnitude to warrant the curtailment of the Defendants (and all others) freedom of speech ... . Pointing out that Maryland already has a statute that addresses vote b uying (§ 16-201) and, thus, provides a remedy for the actions targeted by § 13-209, the Court also was of the view that the statute lack[ed] detailed parameters and, in an y event, was n ot sufficien tly narrowly tailored to m eet the compelling S tate interest. Ha ving determ ined that the s tatute was facially unconstitutional, the court declin ed to address the other issues raised in the case, including its constitutionality under the State Constitution. The State time ly noted an appeal to the C ourt of S peci al Appeals and, s imultane ousl y, filed with this Court a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. We issued the writ of certiorari before there were any proceedings in the intermediate appella te court. State v. Brookins, 374 Md. 582, 82 4 A.2d 58 (20 03). On appeal, the re sponden ts argued th at, because th e measure limits speech, the determination of whe ther it meets constitutional muster turns on the time-honored test of whether the State law is narrow ly tailored to mee t a compe lling state interest to survive strict scrutiny. With regard to th at standard, th e respond ents asserted that §13-20 9 is unconstitutional because it neither enunciates a compelling state interest nor is suffic iently narrowly-tailored, and, thu s, it impermissibly violates their right to freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The State argue d that § 13-2 09 is constitu tional. In supp ort of its position , the State first argued that this Court should not apply strict scrutiny in its analysis of whe ther or not § 5 13-209 is unconstitutional. To the contrary, the State asserted that we should employ a less stringent standard because the provision is, at its hear t, abo ut the con duct of s pending mon ey, and only incidentally affects spee ch. The S tate alternatively arg ued that the provision is constitutional even under the strict scrutiny analysis because 1) the law was enacted to meet a compelling state interest, to prevent real or apparent corruption of the electoral proces s , and 2 ) the pro vision w as narro wly tailore d to acc omplis h that ob jective. Following oral argument, the Court issued, on September 4, 2003, an Order affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court, with the reasons therefor to b e set forth in a n opinion to follow . State v. Brookins, 376 Md. 697, 831 A.2d 453 (2003 ). We now give our reasons. II. The First Amendment to the United States Co nstitution prov ides that C ongress sh all make no law ... abr idging the freedom of speech... . That right, among the fundamental personal rights and libe rties[, is] secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by a State. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95, 60 S. Ct. 736, 740, 84 L. Ed. 1093, 1098 (19 40). Disc ussion of p ublic issues and debate on the qualifications of candidate s are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14, 96 S. Ct. 612, 632, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659, 685 (1976). Acco rdingly, as the Suprem e Court ha s recognize d, the First A mendm ent has its fullest and most urgent application to speech uttered during a camp aign fo r politica l office . Eu v. San Francisco Cty. Democratic Central Comm., 489 U .S. 214, 223, 109 S. Ct. 1013, 6 1020, 103 L. Ed. 2d 271, 282 (1989) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272, 91 S. Ct. 621, 625, 28 L. Ed. 2d 35, 41 (1 971)). Further, [t]he First Amendment affords the greatest protection to political expression in order to assure the unfettered exchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14, 96 S. Ct. at 632, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 685 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1308, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498, 1506 (1957)). The Bu ckley Court continued: Although First Amendm ent protections are not confined to the exposition of ideas, Winters v. New Y ork, 333 U.S. 507, 510, [68, S. Ct. 665, 668, 92 L. Ed. 2d 840] (194 8), there is practically unive rsal agreem ent that a major purpose of that Ame ndment w as to protect the free discussion of g overnmental affa irs ... of course includ(ing) d iscussions of can didates ... . Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218, [86 S. Ct. 1434, 1437, 16 L. Ed. 2d 484, 488] (1966). This no more than reflects our profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, rob ust, and wide open , New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, [84 S. Ct. 710, 721, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 701] (1964). In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make in formed c hoices am ong cand idates for of fice is essentia l, for the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the course that we must fo llow as a nation . Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15, 96 S. Ct. at 632, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 685. See also McIntyre v . Ohio Elections Com m'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1518-19, 131 L. Ed. 2d 426, 439-440 (1995) (noting that no form of speech is entitled to greater constitutional protection than political speech); Burson v. Freemen, 504 U.S. 191, 196, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1850, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5, 12-13 (19 92); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421, 108 S. Ct. 1886, 1891, 100 L. Ed. 2d 425, 434 (1 988). See also, Eanes v. S tate, 318 Md. 436, 445, 569 A.2d 604, 608 (1990) 7 (holding that [t]he freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think is a means indispensa ble to the discovery and spread of political truth and is essentia l both to stable governm ent and to po litical change . (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77, 47 S. C t. 641, 64 8-49, 7 1 L. Ed . 1095, 1 105-0 6 (192 7)). When a law bur dens core political speech, we apply exacting scrutiny, and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored t o serve an ove rriding s tate intere st. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections C omm n, 514 U.S. at 347, 115 S. Ct. at 1519, 131 L. Ed. 2d 426, 440. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. at 423, 108 S. Ct. at 1893, 100 L. Ed. 2d a t 436; Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. at 197, 112 S. Ct. at 1 850, 11 9 L. Ed . 2d at 13 (1992 ). Meyer v. Grant makes clear that petition circulation is core political speech for which the First Amendment protection is at its zenith. 4 86 U.S. at 4 25, 108 S . Ct. at 1894, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 438. The Supreme Court has also recognized, as we have seen, that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office ," Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. at 272, 91 S. Ct. at 625, 28 L. Ed. 2d at 41, and that [a]dvocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federa l office is no less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48, 96 S. Ct. at 648, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 704. Consequently, the actions that make up the walk around services that § 13-2 09 pro scribes o n electio n day are no less core po litical spe ech. Particula rly, where a statute restricts or burdens political speech , the State has the 8 burden of showing that there is a sufficiently compelling reason, unrelated to the content of the speech, for enacting the legislatio n. Burson, 504 U.S . 191, 196-9 8, 112 S. C t. 1846, 185051, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5, 12-15 (1 992). Furth ermore, the State must p rove that the statute is narrowly tailored to effectuate that compelling interest and is the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest. Id., U.S. v. Playboy Entm t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 120 S. Ct. 1878, 1887, 146 L. Ed. 2d 865 , 879 (2000) (quoting Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2836, 106 L. Ed. 2d 93, 105 (1989)); State v. Sheldon, 332 Md. 45, 53, 629 A.2d 753, 758 (1993). Stated differently, the State s burden is met if it establishes that the statute remedies the conduct aimed at without excessively abridging the speech of those not engaged in the targeted action. Fed. Election Comm n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 265, 107 S. Ct. 616, 631, 93 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1986 ). In Meyer v. Grant, supra, a case factu ally similar to the on e at bar, at issue was the constitutionality of Colo. Rev. S tat. §1-40-110 (1973), 4 which p rohibited the use of pa id petition circulators. Section 1-40-110, w hich made it a felony to pay petition circulators to 4 Colorado Rev. Stat. § 1 -40-110 (1 980) prov ides: Any person, corporation, or association of persons who dire ctly or indirectly pays to or receives from or agrees to pay to or receive from any other person, corporation, or association of persons any money or o ther thing of value in consideration of or as an inducement to the circulation of an initiative or referendum petition or in consideration of or as an inducem ent to the signing of any such petition commits a class 5 felony and shall be punished as provid ed in se ction 18 -1-105 , C.R.S . (1973 ). 9 obtain the requisite number of signatu res, id. at 417, 108 S. Ct. at 1889, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 431, was one of the provisions of a State law that permitted voters to place propositions, i.e. proposals for new laws or amendments to the Constitution, on the ballot through an initiative process, so long as th ey were able to obtain the signatures o f at least five percent of the qualified voters on an initiative petition within a six-m onth pe riod. Id., 486 U.S. at 416, 108 S. Ct. at 1889 , 100 L. Ed . 2d at 431. T he appellee s, propone nts of an am endmen t to the state constitution, paid individuals to help obtain enough signatures to have their proposed amendment placed on the ballot and were subsequently charged with violating the State law. The United S tates District C ourt for the D istrict of Colorado held that the statute was constitutiona l, id. at 418-19, 1 08 S. Ct. at 1890, 100 L. E d. 2d at 432-33, and the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed,5 id. at 419, 108 S. Ct. at 1890-91, 100 L. Ed. 2d a t 433, holdin g that the effect of the statute s absolute ban on comp ensation of solicitors is clear. It impedes the sponsors opportunity to disseminate their views to the public It curtails the discussion of issues that normally accompanies the circulation of initiative petitions. And it shrinks the size of the audience that can be reached. ... In short, like the campaign expenditure limitations struck down in Buckley, the Colorado statute imposes a direct restriction which necessarily reduces the quantity of expression. 5 Initially, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court for the reasons given by the trial court: the pro hibition aga inst the use o f paid circulators did not burden appellees F irst Amen dment righ ts because th ey remained free to use their money to employ other spokesmen who could advertise their cause and because any burden on their political speech was justified by the State's interests in ensuring that an initiative measure has a sufficiently broad base of support and in protecting the integrity of the initiative process against the padding of petitions. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 419, 108 S. Ct. 1886, 1890, 100 L. Ed. 2d 425, 433. 10 Id. (quoting Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d 1446, 1453-1454 (10th Cir. 1987) quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19, 96 S. Ct. 612, 634, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659, 687 (1976)). Furthermore, the Appellate Court rejected the State s justifications of the measure: to prevent fraud or to protect the pub lic from circulato rs that m ight be to o persu asive , id. at 420, 108 S. Ct. at 1892, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 434, and to assure that [an initiative] had a b road ba se of p ublic su pport. Id. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals. As an initial matter, it concluded that the provision prohibiting the us e of paid petition circulators was a limitation on political expression subject to exacting scrutiny. Id. at 420, 108 S. Ct. at 1891, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 434. That is so, the Court explained, because [t]he circulation of an initiative petition of necessity involves both the expression of a desire for political change and a discussion of the merits of the proposed change. Although a petition circulator may not have to persuade potential signatories th at a particular p roposal sho uld prevail to capture their signatures, he or she will at least have to persuade them that the matter is one deserving of the pub lic scrutiny and d ebate that would attend its consideration by the who le electora te. This will in almost every case involve an explanation of the nature of the proposal and why its advocates support it. Thus, the circulation of a petition involves the type of interactive communication concerning political change that is appropriately described as "core political speech. Id. at 421-22, 108 S. Ct. at 1891-92, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 434-35. (footnotes omitted). Thus, the Court said, the issue the appellees championed was a matter of societal concern that appellees have a right to d iscuss p ublicly w ithout ris king cr iminal s anction s. Id. at 421, 108 S. Ct. at 1891, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 434 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. at 101-102, 60 S. 11 Ct. at 744, 84 L. Ed. 2d 1093 ( The freedom of speech a nd of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern withou t previous restraint or fear of subsequ ent punishment )). Th e Court concluded: The refusal to permit appellees to pay petition circulators restricts political expression in two w ays: First, it limits the number of voices who will convey the appellee s message and the hours they can speak and, therefore limits the size of the audience they can reach. Second, it makes it less likely that the appellees will garner the number of signatures necessary to place the matter on the ballot, thus limiting their ability to make the matter the focus of statewide discuss ion. Id. at 422-23, 108 S. Ct. at 1892, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 435-36. The Court rejected the appellant s contention that the statute was not overly burdensome because it allowed the appellees other means of political speech: That appellees remain free to employ other means to disseminate their ideas does not take their speech through petition circulators outside the bounds of First Amendment protection. Colorado s proh ibition of paid petition circulators restricts access to the most effective, fundamental, and perhaps economical avenue of political discourse, direct one-on-one communication. That it leaves open more burdensome avenues of com municatio n, does no t relieve its burden on Firs t Ame ndme nt expr ession. The First Amen dment pro tects appellees right not only to advocate their cause but also to select what they believe to be the most ef fective mean s for so doing. Id. at 424, 108 S. Ct. at 1893, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 436 (citations omitted). Nor was the Cou rt persuaded that the Colorado statute was justified by the compelling government interest proffered, to protect the integrity of the electoral process. It explained: [W]e are not prepared to assume that a professional circulator -- whose qualifications for similar future assig nments may well depend on a reputation 12 for compete nce and in tegrity -- is any more likely to accept false signatures than a volunteer who is motivated entirely by an interest in having the proposition placed on the b allot. Id. 486 U.S. at 426, 108 S. Ct. at 1894, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 438. The Court fu rther decline d to accept the S tate s argum ent that the C olorado sta tute was n arrowly tailored to effectua te its stated interest, holding that the State had no t proven that it was necessary to inhibit the appellees exercise of expression in order to maintain the integrity of the initiative process. Id. at 426-27, 108 S. C t. at 1894-95, 100 L. E d. 2d at 438. To the co ntrary, the Court concluded that portions of the Colorado initiative statute, including those that made it a crime to forge a signature on a petition , Colo. Rev. Stat. §1-13-105 (1980), to make false or misleading statements relating to a pe tition, Colo. R ev. Stat. §1-4 0-119 (Su pp. 1987 ), or to pay someone to sign a petition, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-40-110, more ade quately dissuaded paid petition circulators from subverting the integrity of the petition initiative process than did the provisio n at issue . Id. In the case sub judice, the State submits that [t]his is not a case about speech - it is a case about money, which, in addition to being able to be used to hire laborers, can be used to corrupt. Section 13 -209, it contends , limits the use o n money an d only inciden tally affects or restricts speech and therefore, is not subject to the full measure of First Amendment protection that a direct restriction on speech wo uld receive . Therefo re, the State ass erts (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19, 96 S. Ct. at 635, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 688, and Fed. Election Comm n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S. Ct. 2200, 2210, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 193-94 (2003)), 13 because it applies only to payments for a narrow category of electioneering type activities on a portion of a s ingle cam paig n day, [§13-20 9] canno t possibly be read to seriously restrict the quantity of cam paign spe ech, ... or to curta il core political expression or activity critical to effective s peech or p olitical associatio n... . Rather th an strict or exacting scru tiny, where complex competing constitutionally protected interests such as the right to vote or the right to spend political money is involved, the State argues for a more flexible balancing standard one in w hich the lev el of scrutiny is based on the importance of the political activity at issue to effective speech or political association. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 146, 123 S. Ct. at 2210, 156 L. Ed . 2d at 19 3-94. A s demo nstrated by the cas es cited, Beaumont, supra; Fed. Election Comm n v. Colorado Rep. Fed. C ampaign Comm., supra; Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 120 S. Ct. 897, 145 L. E d. 2d 886 (2000); Buckley, supra, the State relies h eavily on those cases in which the validity of restrictions of campaign contrib utions w ere at issu e. The seminal case regarding the First Amen dment an d campa ign regulatio n is Buckley. In that case, the appellants, various candidates , political contributors, political parties and organizations, brought su it in the United S tates District C ourt for the D istrict of Colu mbia to challenge certain provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and related provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, all as amend ed in 1974 , that inter alia, limited the allowa ble amounts of campaign contributions and expenditures. 424 U.S. at 6-8, 96 S. Ct. at 629-30, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 680-82 . They alleged that such res trictions violated their 14 First Amendment right to free speech.6 Similar to the case sub judice, the appellees argued that the Act only regulated conduct in the form of contributions and expenditures of money and that suc h cond uct only in cidenta lly affecte d speec h. Id., 424 U.S. at 15, 96 S. Ct. at 633, 46 L. E d. 2d at 6 85. The District Court upheld the constitutionality of the legislation and the Court of Appea ls for the D.C. Circuit affirmed, the latter identifying a clear and compelling interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process. Id., 424 U.S. at 10, 96 S. Ct. at 630, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 682 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 , 841 (D.C . Cir. 197 5)). P artic ularly, the appellate court upheld the constitutional validity of the Act s contribution and e xpenditure provisions, reasoning that those prov isions were aimed at regula ting con duct, id. at 15-16, 96 S. Ct. at 633, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 686, a nd only in cidenta lly affecte d or imp acted sp eech. In so holding, it relied on United States v. O Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S. Ct. 1673, 20 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1968), a case in which a d efendant challenge d his prosecution for burning his draft card, arguing that the act of burning the ca rd was symbolic speech engaged in as a demonstration against the war and against the draft. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16, 96 S. Ct. at 6 The provisions restricting campaign contributions limited political contributions to ca ndid ates for f eder al ele ctive office b y an in dividual or group to $1 000 and by a political committee to $5,000 per election. The relevant provisions restricting campaign expenditu res limited ex penditures by a candida te from his p ersonal fu nds to spec ific yearly amounts a nd also restric ted overall g eneral and primary cam paign exp enditures to specific amounts dependent on the office sought. Also challenged, and decided by the Court, w ere provisio ns of the ac t that impose d strict record-k eeping req uirements f or all campaign contributions. We limit our analysis only to those provisions in Buckley that concerned campaign contributions and expenditures. 15 633, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 686 (quoting O Brien, 391 U.S. at 376, 88 S. Ct. at 1678, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 679 (internal quotations omitted)). Assuming that the alleged communicative element of the conduct triggered the pro tections of the First Amendment, the Court sustained the defendant s conviction, holding tha t there was a sufficien tly important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element that was unrelated to the suppression of free expression and that had an incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms ... no greater than (was) essential to the furtherance of that interest. Id., (quoting O Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77, 88 S. Ct. at 1678, 20 L . Ed. 2d 672 at 680 ). Before the Supre me Cou rt, the appellan ts in Buckley argued that the Court o f Appe als failed to apply the ap propriate critical scrutiny demanded by the First Amendment and equal protection princip les. Id. 424 U.S . at 11, 96 S. Ct. at 631, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 683. Exacting scrutiny was required, they asserted, because contributions and expenditures are at the very core of political spee ch, id. at 15, 96 S. Ct. at 633, 46 L . Ed. 2d at 685, and the Act s limitations ... constitute restraints on First A mend ment lib erty that are both gr oss and direct. Id. The Supreme Cou rt agreed w ith the appe llants. Havin g enuncia ted the gen erally accepted principle that the First Amendment affords the broadest protection to political expression in order to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes d esired by the people, id. at 14, 96 S. Ct. at 633, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 685 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1308, 1 L. Ed. 2d 16 1498, 1506 (19 57)), and tha t its purpose w as to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs, ... of course includ[ing] discussion s of candidates ..., id., (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218, 86 S. Ct. 1434, 1437, 16 L. Ed. 2d 484, 488 (1966)), it held that the Act s contribution and expenditure provisions regulated in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. 424 U.S. at 14, 9 6 S. Ct. at 632, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 685. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument analogizing those provisions to the limitations on conduct upheld in O Brien: The expenditu re of mon ey simply canno t be equated with such conduct as destruction of a draft card. Some forms of communication made possible by the giving and spen ding of m oney involve speech alone, some involve conduct prim arily, and some involve a combination of the two. Yet this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny re quired by the Firs t Ame ndme nt. Id. at 17, 96 S. Ct. at 633, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 686. Assuming the appropriateness of categorizing the expenditure of mone y as cond uct, the Court determined n evertheless that the contributions and expenditure limitations at issue in that case would not meet the O Brien test. Id. at 17, 96 S. Ct. at 634, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 686. While it treated expenditures and contributions the same for purposes of reasonable time, place and manner regulations, noting, in that regard, a critical difference between the limitations imposed in that case and those cases applying reasonable time, place and manner restrictions - the present Act's contribution and expenditure limitations [also] impose direct quantity restrictions on political communication and association by persons, groups, 17 candidates, and political parties, id. at 17-18, 96 S. Ct. at 634, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 687, the Court acknowledged a distinction between restrictions on contributions and expenditures insofar as they affect political expression. The Court pointed out that any law limiting the amount of expenditures made by a candidate or a campaign on behalf of a candidate has a direct impact on political expression because the ability to spend money to convey a candidate s political mes sage is inex tricably linked to the q uantity, and perhaps the quality, of that can didate s political s peech . Id., 424 U.S. at 19, 96 S. Ct. at 634-35, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 687-88. Thus, the Court stated: A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of is sues discus sed, the dep th of their exploration, and the size of the aud ience reach ed. This is be cause virtua lly every mea ns of com mun icating id eas in tod ay s mass society requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies g enerally necessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the even t. Th e ele ctorate's increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes o f comm unication in dispensab le instrum ents of effect ive polit ical spee ch. Id. (footnotes omitted). On the other hand, the Court observed: By contrast with a limitation upon expenditures for political expression, a limitation upon the amo unt that any one person or g roup may contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor s ability to engage in free communication. A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not commu nicate the underlying basis for the support. The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of the contribution provides a 18 very rough index of the intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate. A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organizatio n thus invo lves little direct restra int on his po litical communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does n ot in any way inf ringe the co ntributor s fre edom to discuss candidates and issues. While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by some one oth er than th e contrib utor. Id., 424 U.S. at 20-21, 96 S. Ct. at 635-36, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 689 (footnote omitted). In sum, in contrast to restrictions on expenditures, as to which the Court emphasized, this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment, id. at 16, 96 S. Ct. at 633, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 687, the Court held that provisions restricting campaign contributions did not unjustifiably burden First Amendment freedoms. Id. at 29, 96 S. Ct. at 640, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 693-94. In so doing, it paid deference to the congressional judgment as to the governmental interests to be further ed, id. at 27-28, 96 S. Ct. at 638-39, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 692-93, and concluded that, in the case of contribution restrictions, the test is whether the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and emp loys means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of that interest, 424 U.S. at 25, 96 S. C t. at 638, 4 6 L. Ed . 2d at 69 1, a lesser standard than stric t or exac ting scru tiny. See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 146, 123 S. Ct. at 2210, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 193-94. This less exacting standard h as been ap plied in the cases on which the State relies, all decided subsequently to Buckley and involving restrictions on campaign contributions. In Beaumont, supra, the issue was whether the prohibition against corporations contributing 19 directly to candidates for federal office should be applied to nonprofit advocacy corporations. 539 U.S. at 146, 123 S. Ct. at 2204-2205, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 186. The Court rejected the argument that the determ ination as to w hether the a pplication o f the prohib ition was consistent with the F irst A men dme nt was su bjec t to strict scrutiny. Id. , 123 S. Ct. at 2210-11, 156 L. Ed. 2d at 193-94. To be sure, as the State points out, the Court did state that in setting First Amendment standards for reviewing political financial restrictions: the level of scrutiny is based on the importance of the political activity at issue to effective speech or political association, id., 123 S. Ct. at 2210, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 194, (quoting Federal Election Comm n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S . 238, 259, 1 07 S. Ct. 616, 628, 93 L. Ed. 2d 539, 557 (1986 )), but it is what was at issue and the holding in the case that gives the statement context. Moreover, after making that statement, the Court emphasized its prior treatment of restrictions of political contributions as merely m arginal spee ch subject to relatively complaisant review under the First Amendment. Id. It is significant that the Court then explained why strict scrutiny was n ot approp riate in the con tribution regu lation contex t: While contribution s may result in political expression if spent by a candida te or an association ..., the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someon e other than the contributor Buckley . . . at 20-21, 96 S.Ct. 612. This is the reason th at instead of requiring contribution regulations to be narrow ly tailored to serve a compe lling govern ment interes t, a contribution limit involving significant interference with associational rights passes muster if it satisfies the lesser demand of being closely drawn to match a sufficiently important interest. Id., (quoting Nixon, 528 U.S. at 387-88, 120 S. Ct. at 904, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 898, quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, 96 S. Ct. at 636, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 691). 20 In Federal Election Co mm n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. at 437, 121 S. Ct. at 2356, 150 L. Ed. 2d at 470-71, the Court addressed the issue of whether campaig n expend itures by a political p arty in coordinatio n with that p arty s candidate should be treated, in the First Amendment context, like campaign contributions or campaign expenditures. Noting that the functional definition of contribution includes expenditures coordin ated with a candidate, id. at 438, 121 S. Ct. at 2356-57, 150 L. Ed. 2d at 471, the Court held that the s ame scrutin y that applied to the other political actors should be applied to a party's coordinated spending limitation, namely, scrutiny appropriate for a contribution limit, enquiring whether the restriction is closely drawn to match what we have recognized as the sufficiently important government interest in combating political corruption . Id. at 456, 121 S. Ct. at 2366, 150 L. Ed. 2d at 482, (quoting Nixon, 528 U.S . at 387-388 , 120 S. Ct. at 904, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 898, quoting Buckley, supra, 424 U.S. at 25, 96 S. Ct. at 638, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 691) . The restriction on campaign contributions was also upheld with respect to contributions made by politica l action c omm ittees. Nixon, 528 U.S . at 397, 120 S. Ct. at 904-905, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 909.7 See McCon nell v. Federal Election Co mm n, 124 S. Ct. 619, 670-673, 157 7 Justice Stevens s concurring opinion in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC , 528 U.S. 377, 398, 120 S. Ct. 897, 910 (2000) does not support the S tate s argument that we should apply a lesser standard of scrutiny in this case. Employing a lesser standard of scrutiny than strict or exacting scrutiny, requiring that the provision only be closely drawn to match a sufficiently important interest, a plurality of the Court held that a Missouri State Statute that imposed limits on campaign contributions did not violate the First Amendment right to speech. To be sure, as the State notes, Justice Stevens concurred, and added: Money is property; it is not speech. 21 L. Ed. 2d 491 (2 003), (h olding , inter alia, that the cost of third-party issue ads coordinated with federal candidates campaigns could validly be considered as contributions to those campaigns). In this case, the responde nts were h ired to further the Ehrlich/ Steele ticket s political message; the campaign expended campaig n funds f or that purp ose. The re sponden ts chose to meet their obligation to the campaign by paying workers to advocate for the ticket by distributing campaign materials, communicating to potential voters a voting preference and electioneering or canvassing the polls, the aim of all of which clearly was to convey a political message. As the Court in Buckley pointed out, the spending of money by a political Speech has the power to inspire volunteers to perform a multitude of tasks on a campaign trail, on a battleground, or even on a football field. Money, meanwhile, has the power to pay hired laborers to perform the same tasks. It does not follow, however, that the First Amendment provides the same measure of protection to the use of money to accomplish such goals as it provides to the use of ideas to achieve the same results. Id. In a footnote, Justice Stevens clarified his position: Unless, of course, the prohibition entirely forecloses a channel of comm unicatio n, such as the u se of p aid petitio n circula tors. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 42 4, 108 S. Ct. 1886, 10 0 L. Ed. 2d 425 (1988) ( Colorado s prohibition of paid petition circulators restricts access to the most effective, fundamental, and perhaps economical avenue of political discourse, one-onone communication. ... The First Amendment protects appellees right not only to advocate their cause but also to select what they believe to be the most ef fective mean s for so doing) . Nor doe s Justice Bre yer s advoca tion, in his opin ion concu rring in the jud gment in United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2311, 156 L. Ed. 2d 221(2003), of an intermediate level of scrutiny where complex, competing constitutiona l interests are po tentially at issue or sp eech-related harm is po tentially justified by unusually strong governmental interests. Id. The con text in that case is quite different f rom that sub judice. As Justice Breyer described it, in American Library Assn: The statutory restriction in question is, in essence, a kind of selection restriction (a kind of editing). It af fects the kin ds and am ount of m aterials that the lib rary can presen t to its patrons. ... And libraries often properly engage in the selection of materials, either as a matt er of nece ssity (i.e., due to the scarcity of resources) or by design (i.e., in accordance with co llection d evelop ment p olicies). Id. 22 candidate directly affects the ability of that candidate to disseminate his or her political message effectively. It is to pr event that very political speech that § 13-209 specifically was enacted. Indeed, that statute restricts cam paign exp enditures in th e form of payments to individuals to provide walk around services on election day. As defined by § 13-209, the relevant statute, these walk around services include the distribution of campaign materials, communicating a voting preference, and electioneering or canvassing the polling place, all of which the statute was designed to prevent, or at least has the effect of impacting. All of the activity at which th e statute is aimed, in fa ct, directly impede s the ability of the c andidate to conve y his politic al mess age. The State urges us to accept that su ch measures are necessary to prevent the conten tneutral purpose o f avoiding corruptio n or the appearan ce of corru ption. W e decline to conclude that § 13 -209 is c ontent n eutral. Whether individuals may exercise their free speech rights by paying another individual to distribute his or her campaign flyers or perform other walk around services depends entirely on whether their speech is related to a political camp aign. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. at 197, 112 S. Ct. at 1850, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 13 (1992). The Su preme C ourt has h eld that the F irst Amen dment s h ostility to content-based regulation extends not only to a restriction on a particu lar viewpo int, but also to a prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic. Id., (citing Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Service Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U .S. 530 , 537, 10 0 S. Ct. 2 326, 23 33, 65 L . Ed. 2d 319, 3 28 (1980); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116, 112 S. Ct. 50 1, 508, 116 L. Ed. 2d 476, 487 (1991)). Thus, it is clear that the actual 23 purpose of the legislation [arises] in so me mea sure becau se the com municatio n [in the form of paid cam paigning] is ... though t to be ha rmful. Buckley, supra. Moreover, the restriction is of a campaign expendit ure, which generally curb[s] more expressive and associational activity than limits on contributions do. Colorado Rep. Fed l Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. at 440, 121 S. Ct. at 2358, 150 L. Ed. 2 d at 472 . See Nixon, supra, 528 U.S. at 386-388, 120 S. Ct. at 904, 145 L. Ed. 2d a t 897-98; Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Com m'n, 518 U.S. 604, 615, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2315, 135 L. Ed. 2d 795, 804805 (1996) (C olorado I); Buckley, supra, 424 U.S. at 19-23, 96 S. Ct. at 634-37, 46 L. Ed. 2d at 687-90. As the Court observed in Colorado Rep. Fed l Campaign Comm., limits on contributions are more c learly justified by a link to political corruption than limits on other kinds of unlimited political spending are. 533 U.S. at 440-41, 121 S. Ct. at 2358, 150 L. Ed. 2d at 47 2. The State argues that § 13-209 is supported and justified by the compelling governmental interest of ensuring the integrity of, and public confidence in the electoral process. By prohibiting the payment of money for walk around services , asserts the State, the provisio n prote cts the p ublic fr om th e appe arance , if not the reality of v ote-bu ying. [petitioner s brief at 14]. The historical context and background surrounding the enactment of the walk around services statute is offered, via newspaper clippings from the 1960s and 1970s, to support the proposition that the statute was enacted to temper the then-rampant corruption and vote-buying in the electoral process. The State also avers that the mea sure prevents candidates and their supporters from misleading voters by hiring merce naries ... 24 who present the fraudu lent appear ance of b road pub lic support b ased on th e merits of th eir candid acies. [petition er s brie f at 16], ( quotin g Nixo n, supra, 528 U.S. at 399, 120 S. Ct. at 910, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 886 (Justice Stevens, concurring)). The State also relies on Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5. Add ition ally, the State argues that §13-209 is narrowly tailored to accomplish the stated interest for three reasons. First, relying on Burson v. Freeman, supra, the State argues that the provision is limited to a single day, the day of the election, when, the State alleges, the danger of corruption and its appearance are at their height and when payments are most likely to be perce ived as a su bterfuge f or vote-bu ying. [petitione r s brief at 17 ]. Second, it asserts that the pro hibition app lies only to those whose partisan election day activities are motivated by the potential corrupting influence of money. Id. Finally, the State submits that the statute allows candidates to pay for other political campaign activities that are less likely to be corrupt or appear corrupt, including providing meals for workers, telephoning voters, transporting them to polls, and media advertising. Id. In Burson, the Suprem e Court up held a Te nnessee sta tute that restricted vote solicitation within 100 feet of the polling place. Acknowledging that the statute was a facially content-based restriction on political speech, 504 U.S. at 198, 112 S. Ct. at 1851, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 13, - rather than a restriction on the voic ing of a pa rticular view point, it prohibited public discussion of an entire topic - id. at 197, 112 S. Ct. at 1850, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 13, applying strict scrutiny, the Court held that it was necessary to serve the compelling state interests of protecting the right of the State s citizens to vote freely for the candidates of 25 their choice and ensuring an election conducted with integrity and reliability and that it was narrow ly drawn to acco mplish those g oals. Id. at 211, 112 S. Ct. at 1857-58, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 21-22. Recognizing that to survive strict scrutiny, it is not enough merely to assert a compelling interest, the State must demonstrate that its law is necessary to serve the asserted interest, id. at 199, 112 S. Ct. at 1852, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 15, it examined the evolution of election reform in this co untry and abroad . Id. at 200-06, 112 S. Ct. at 1852-55, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 15-19. Following its examination, the Court summarized its findings: In sum, an examination of the history of election regulation in this country reveals a persistent battle against two evils: voter intimidation and election fraud. Af ter an unsu ccessful ex periment w ith an unoff icial ballot system, all 50 States, together with numerous other Western democracies, settled on the same solution: a sec ret ballot secu red in part by a restricted zone around the voting compartments. We find that this widespread and time-tested consensus demonstrates that some restricted zone is nec essary in order to serve the State s comp elling in terests in preven ting vo ter intima tion and election fraud. Id. at 206, 112 S. Ct. at 1855, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 19. Thus, critical to the Court s holding was evidence of the history of the election process in the United States during the colonial era, when there were no secret ballots and voters were left open to flagrant bribery and intimidation, Tennessee s con tinual historical efforts to reform the election s ystem to ensure the right of vote rs to vote sec retly and witho ut intimidation and the consensus among the states on the need for legislation red ucing voter intimidation and bribery to the extent that each o f the 50 states ha d enac ted legis lation lim iting acc ess in or around polling places. Noting that it is rare that legislation will survive strict scrutiny, the Court pronounced that case to be such a rare instance. 504 U.S. at 21, 112 S. Ct. at 1857, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 22. 26 It concluded: Here, the State, as recognized administrator of elections, has asserted that the exercise of free speech rights conflicts with another fundamental right, the right to cast a ballot in an election free from the taint of intimation and fraud. A long histo ry, a substantial consensus, and simple common sense show that some restricted zone around polling places is necessary to protect that fundamental right. Given the conflict between these two rights, we hold that requiring solicitors to stand 100 feet from the entrances to polling places does not constitu te an un constitu tional co mprom ise. Id. at 211, 112 S. Ct. at 1857-58, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 21-22. The interest asserted by the State, to prevent real or apparent corruption of the electoral process, is a com pelling o ne. Unlike in Burson, howev er, we are n ot persuad ed that the S tate has demonstrated that § 13-209 is necessary to serve that interest or that it is narrowly drawn to achieve its asserted goals. To be sure, the State subm itted new s articles from the 1 960's and 70's, concern ing the prac tice of political c lubs and/o r organizatio ns to pay for walk around services on election day. These articles included inter alia, an inside look at the process in one particular club and the views of certain politicians with respect to the corrupting influence and impact of the practice. The petitioner submitted these articles, which also detail the legislative focus on the practice of paying for walk-around services, and how it resulted in the enactment of Acts of 1979, Ch. 217, the direct precursor of § 13-209, as evidence of the com pelling state interest to prevent corruption and it urges this Court to rely on these articles as evidence of the legislative intent behind the enactment of §13-209's to curb vote-buying, endorsement buying or their appearance. It asserts that the payment for walk around services, given scenarios in which candidates with large campaign budgets paid individuals to provide 27 campaign services, cast an ominous pall over the then-existing state of the electoral process. One article cited by the State suggested that the payment for these services actually amounted to vote-buying, ensuring that those who were hired to campaig n for a give n candida te would vote for that candid ate on e lection d ay. See Mich ael We isskop f, Baltimore: Politics as Usual, Washington Post, September 11, 1978. The State, in addition, offers evidence that there were or are concerns about paying walk around money in oth er states and th at, as a result, bills to prohibit the practice were introduced in several State Legislatures, including Georgia, New Jersey, So uth Ca rolina an d Lou isiana. This showing does not approach either the clear history of blatant voter intimidation and coercion, offered and relied upon, in Burson or the widespread national consensus that Court iden tified as m akin g the legis lativ e res ponse in that c ase n eces sary. Of course, it is not required that the showing in this case be identical to the showing in Burson or any other case or that there be s ome form ulaic model for determining whether a compelling state interest has been shown or demonstrated. Nevertheless, it is required that the State must demonstrate that its law is necessary to serve the asserted interest, Burson, 504 U.S. at 199, 112 S. Ct. at 1852, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 15. We agree with the Circuit Co urt, the State simply has not made the requ isite sho wing. The State has shown neither that the statute is necessary to accomplish the stated goal nor that the statute is narrowly tailored to punish the targeted actio n withou t needlessly infringing the First Amen dment righ ts of others. F irst, the State s pu rported intere st in 28 corruption or apparent corruption of the electoral process by prohibiting vote-buying, endorsement buying or their appearance already is sufficiently covered by existing statutes. Md. Code (2003) §16-201 of the Election Law Article (derived without substantive change from Art. 33, § 16-201), imposes penaltie s of up to $2,500 in f ines and up to 5 years imprisonment for anyone who inf luence[s] or attempts to influen ce a voter s voting decision through the use of force, threat, men ace, intimidation, bribery, reward, or offer of rewar d. Md. Code (2003) § 16-203 of the Election Law Article, criminalizes interference with the vote balloting process and prohibits access to campa igners and electioneers within 100 yards of the polling p lace. There fore, regard ing the State s interest in preventing actual vote-buying, § 13-209 is superfluous and redundant and, thus, is not the least restrictive measure for achiev ing that g oal. Moreover, we are unconvinced that there exists the appearance, not to mention the actu ality, of vote-buying when a candidate pays individuals to campaign on his or her be half on election day. L ogically, in order f or the payme nt in return for campaign services to constitute vote-buying, tw o things m ust coalesce : 1) the individ ual paid to campa ign on beh alf of the candidate must not have planned to vote for the candid ate for wh ich he or sh e is campaigning; and 2) as a result of payment, the campaigner must have voted for or planned to vote for the candid ate. For vote -buying to be apparent, th e voting po pulace m ust be aware of these factors. There is no evidence that individuals paid to hand out campaign materials advocating for the Ehrlich/Steele ticket voted for, o r would b e more like ly to vote for, those candidates as a result of being paid to perform walk around services on election 29 day. 8 Neither is there evidence that voters would have had any knowledge that the individ uals were paid to hand ou t leaflets. In fac t, the statute does not purport to prohibit payment on the day of election, w hen the ap pearance of vote-bu ying would be the stron gest, but it prohibits payment at any time or the incurring of any obligation to pay individuals for campaign services to be performed on the day of the election. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that voters would know that the campaigner was paid at all. There is also no reason to believe that voters would be aware of the paid cam paigner s v oting prefe rence prior to the day of elec tion. This Court is not willing to uphold a statute that restricts core political speech on the basis of such a specu lative an d unlik ely, in any ev ent, hypo thesis. We also do not believ e that paying ind ividuals to ha nd out leaf lets on electio n day necessarily creates the appearance that a candidate has broader-than-actual constituent support. Inherent in the conclusion that the payment of paid leaflet circulators creates an appearance of false broad-based support is the supposition that those handing out leaflets do not actually suppo rt the candid ate. That co nclusion, ho wever, is n ot substantiate d or even necessarily supported by the weight of probability; it is equally as probable that those hired to hand ou t leaflets do, ind eed, emb race the can didate s po litical views, as it is that they do 8 In fact, as in the instant case of the homeless individuals hired by the respondent Brookins, it is conceivable that individuals paid to campaign for a given candidate might reside outside of the jurisdiction in which they are campaigning and, thus, would not be eligible to vote in the election for which he or she was hired to campaign. In such situations, there is absolutely no possibility that payment for walk around services would result in vote-buying, and, if their non- residence were known, the appearance of vote-buying. 30 not, resulting, therefore, in an accurate reflection of the candidate support. To determine whether or not broad-based support for a candidate e xists in actuality, in pro portion to his or her visible support, would require a court to look into the subjective intent of each campaigner and to attempt to discern the effect of any imbalance between actual support and the perceived support fo r the candid ate on the v oters. Even if the payment of paid leaflet circulators created an appearance of greater than actual candidate support, it still does not rival the apparent corruption inherent in the assumption of quid pro quo that arises when individuals make large campaign contributions to a candidate. The State s asserted goal of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption does not rise to the level of a compelling state interest in ligh t of the fact th at the meas ure restricts access to the most effective, fundamental, and perhaps economical avenue of political discourse, direct one-onone comm unicatio n , Meyer, supra, 486 U.S. at 424, 108 S. Ct. at 1893, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 434, and thus, it unconstitutionally infringes on freedom of speech protected by the First Amen dment. We are not remotely convinced that the decision of a candidate to spend money conveying his or her m essage by hirin g individua ls to hand o ut literature one -on-one to the voters creates any greater appearance of voter support than any other election-day expenditure. The statute does not penalize a candidate who chooses to spend his money on major network advertising on the day of election, even if he pays the actors to c onvey their support for his can didacy. Surely, any su ch expen diture could conceiva bly lead voters to believe that a given candidate has greater support than he or she actually has, and, in the case 31 of mass media, such a candidate reaches far more v oters than v olunteers h anding ou t leaflets at the polling p lace. The sta tute in this case is not appropriately crafted to justify the restriction of political speech. In Burson, the Court recognized that because the Tennessee statute limited the prohibited electioneering zone to the 100 f eet surroun ding the po lling place, the statute was sufficiently narrow to effectuate the goal of ensuring the right to vote free from intimidation and dure ss while limiting the infringement upon f ree spe ech. The statute in this case, (which, we note, purports to alleviate some of the same evils as Burson: the election corruption or the appearance of corruption), eliminates all paid political advocacy on the entire day of election, a day, which argua bly is the most crucial for conveying a can didate s message. Accepting, as we do and as the Supreme Court does, that a candidate has the right to spend money to best convey his or her political message to the voters, the fact that the statute leaves open other avenues of advocacy does not remedy the fact that a particularly representative form of p olitical speech , one-on-o ne interaction with the vo ters, is significan tly reduced as a resu lt of §13 -209. See Meyer v. Grant, supra, 486 U.S. at 424, 108 S. Ct. at 1893, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 423-24. In effect, considering the fact that Maryland already has statutes that criminalize votebuying and voter-interference within 100 feet of the polling place, § 13-209 addresses those areas where f raud and corruption may potentially cre ep into the e lector al system. That justification, however, does not give the State the right to abridge speech beca use it paternalistically seeks to establish a completely fraud-free atmosphere within which the electorate is exposed only to the absolute untain ted truth abo ut political can didates or the ir 32 platforms. We embrace the reasoning conveyed by the Colorado Court of Appeals and th e Supreme Court in Meyer, supra, that [t]he First Amendment is a value-free provision, whose protection is not dependent on the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered. Meyer, 486 U .S. 414 , 419-2 0, 108 S . Ct. 188 6, 1891 , 100 L. E d. 2d at 433-44 (1988) (quoting Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d 1446, 1455,(10th Cir. 1987) quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445, 83 S. Ct. 328, 344, 9 L . Ed. 2d 405, 425 (1 963)). The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority assuming a guardianship of the public mind ... in this field every person must be his own watchman for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any governmen t to separate the true from the fa lse for us. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. at 419-20, 108 S. Ct. at 1891, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 43 3-34, ( quoting Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d at 1455, quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545, 65 S. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 2d 430, 448 (1945) (Jackson, J. Co ncurring)). 33

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