Serio v. Baltimore County

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Robert L. Serio v. State of Maryland, No. 17, September Term, 2004. Constitutional Law: Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights Taking of P rope rty. Wrongful retention of seized firearms held unconstitutional under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Although Serio, a convicted felon, may not possess firearms, he retains a due process protec tion against wrongfu l retention of his p rope rty by th e Co unty. Because the County wrongfully retained the firearms, Serio may be entitled to just compensation. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 17 September Term, 2004 ROB ERT L . SERIO , et al. v. BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Battaglia, J. Filed: December 14, 2004 Petitioner, Robert L. Serio, comes before this Court to challenge the Court of Special Appeals s affirmation of the trial cou rt s summa ry judgment e ntered aga inst him. Serio argues that Baltimore County s continued retention of firearms seized from his home and its refusal to restore the seized property to him through a designee or through a sale and remuneration to him because he is a convicted felon violates A rticle 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the provisions of Section 551(c) of Article 27 of the Maryland Code (1957, 19 96 Rep l. Vol., 1998 Cum. Supp.). Based upon the circumstances of this case, we reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of the defendants in light of our decision that Serio retains a property interest in the firearms even though he cannot possess them. I. Background A. Facts On Octob er 8, 1998, the petitioner, Robert Serio ( Serio ), was driving with Stacy Corbin on York Road in Baltimo re County when the car struck a guardrail and overturned. Miss Corbin was thrown from the c ar an d die d at th e sce ne of the acci dent. Subseq uently, Serio was charged with vehicular manslaughter, which is a felony in Maryland.1 He pled 1 Md. Code (1 957, 199 6 Repl. Vol., 1998 Cum. Supp.), Art. 27 § 388 provided in part: Every person causing the death of another as the result of the driving, operation or control of an automobile . . . shall be guilty of a felony to be kn own a s man slaugh ter by auto mobile . . . and the person so convicted shall be sentenced to jail or the house of correction for not more than 10 years, or be fined not more th an $5,0 00 or b e both f ined an d impris oned. Article 27, Section 388 was recodified without substantive change as Md. Code (2002), § 2209 of the Crim inal La w Art icle. guilty to one count of manslaughter by automob ile and wa s sentenced on June 2 , 1999, to six month s impris onme nt. On the same day that Serio was sentenced, Officers Steven Russo and Robert Overfield of the Baltimore County Police Dep artment applied for a w arrant to search Serio s house and to seize any firea rms and a ny ammun ition, boxes, re ceipts, or ma nuals relating to said firearms, based upon information that they had gleaned from Serio s estranged wife and a search of the Maryland Automated Firearms S ystem. Serio was alleged to be a felon in possession of firearms in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1998 Cum. Supp.), Article 27, Section 445(d )(1)(ii).2 The warrant was issued, and the officers searched Serio s home on June 3, 1999. The off icers seized numerous firearms from Serio s home, including seven ha ndguns, f ive rifles, a sho tgun, a silenc er, and am munition. U ltimately, Serio was not charged with possessing firearm s in violation of Section 44 5(d), but the County, nonetheless, has refused to return the firearms to him, or give them to a designee, or sell the m and give Se rio the p roceed s. 2 Md. Code (1957 , 1996 Repl. Vo l., 1998 Cum. Sup p.), Art. 27 § 445(d) provided in relevant pa rt: Restrictions on possession In genera l. A person may not possess a regulated firearm if the person: (1) Has been convicted of: *** (ii) Any violation classified as a felony in this State. Article 27, Section 445(d) was recodified without substantive change as Md. Code (2003 ), § 5-133 of the Public Safety Article. 2 B. Procedural History On July 20, 1999, Serio filed a five count complaint in the Circuit Court for Ba ltimore County nam ing the Co unty and Officer Russo as defendants. The first three counts of the complaint were bro ught again st the County challenging the seizure of the firearms and seeking a return of the property pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1998 Cum. Supp.), Article 27, Sections 5 51 (a), (b), and (c). 3 In Count IV, Serio requested 3 Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1998 Cum . Supp.), Art. 27, §§ 551 (a), (b) an d (c), stated in relev ant part: (a) If, at any time, on application to a judge of the circuit court of any county or judge of the District Court, it appears that the property taken [pu rsuant to the search warrant] is not the same as that described in the warrant or that there is no probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which the warrant was issued . . . said judge must cause it to be restored to the person from whom it was taken . . . Howev er, if it appears that the property taken is the same as th at described in the warran t . . . then said judge shall order the same [property] retained in the custody of the person seizing it or to be otherwise disposed of accord ing to law . (b) If the criminal case in which property of a person was seized pursuant to a search warrant issued under subsection (a) of this section is disposed of because of (i) an entry of nolle prosequi, (ii) dismissal, or (iii) acquittal, or if the State does n ot appeal . . . all property of the person, except contraban d or any prop erty prohibited by law from being recoverable, may be returned to the person to whom it belongs without the necessity of that person instituting an action for replevin or any other legal proc eedi ng again st the agen cy hav ing c usto dy of the p rope rty. (c)(1) If, at any time, on applicatio n to a judge of the circu it court of any county or judge of the District Court, it is found that property rightfully taken under a search warrant is being wrongf ully withheld after there is no further need for retention of the property, the judge must cause it to be restored to the 3 damages from the Cou nty for any harm to the seized property. Serio also alleged a violation of his rights u nder Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights against Officer Russo in Count V for misconduct in obtaining and executing the search warrant used to seize the firearms from Serio s home.4 Judge Law rence Daniels of the Circuit Court for Ba ltimore County signed an order dated July 20, 1999, requiring the police department to preserve the property seized from Serio s hom e. The def endants w ere represen ted by the Co unty Attorney s Office and together they filed a mo tion to dismis s the comp laint for failure to state a claim , to whic h Serio filed an oppos ition. A motions h earing w as held in the Baltim ore Cou nty Circuit Court on November 29, 1999, during which the trial court ordered the parties to submit memoranda of law concerning whether the firearms were contraband. T he court also granted S erio leave to amend his comp laint. Serio filed a First Amended Complaint, and Bruce Stanski was added as a plaintiff based upon the allegation that Stanski intended to purchase the seized firearms. Plaintiffs Serio and Stanski re-alleged all of the same counts against the County and Officer person from whom it was taken. Article 27, Sections 551(a), (b), and (c) were recodified without substantive change as Md. Code (2001), § 1-203 of the Criminal Procedure Article. 4 Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states: That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed , or depr ived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgement of his peers, or by the Law of the land. 4 Russo that were alleged in the original complaint. Thereafter, the defen dants, wh o still continued to be represented by the same counsel, filed a joint motion to dismiss the original Complaint and the First Amen ded Co mplaint fo r failure to state a claim. Judg e Daniels held a hearing on February 7, 2000, to consider the defendants motions and ordered the following: 1. That the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on whether [Serio] had possession of the guns at issue; 2. That the Amended Complaint against Defendant Officer Russo is dismissed with prejudice; 3. That the case is dismissed as to Defendant Baltimore Co unty, subject to [Serio] amending the existing complaint which is to be filed within 15 days of Febru ary 7, 200 0. Pursuant to the Circuit Court s ruling, Serio and Stanski filed a Second Amended Complaint , in which they alleged in Counts I-III claims against the County under Section 551 and sought damages for any lost or damaged property in Count IV. They also re-alleged a claim against Officer Russo in Count V for a violation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, by taking actions inconsistent with [Serio s] rights of due process . . . . A new claim against the County was added in Count VI alleging that Serio s rights had been violated under various articles of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.5 Count VII against the 5 Count VI of the Second A mended Complaint alleged as follows: a. [V]iolation of Article 19 by seizing [Serio s] property, and denying [Serio] any remedy at all, speedy or otherwise, b. [V]iolation of Article 21 by determining that [Serio] is guilty (contin ued...) 5 County was also added based upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1999), 6 for violating Serio s rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution.7 The County, acting on behalf of both defendants, filed a request to remove the entire 5 (...continued) of a criminal act (Article 27 § 445 (d), Annotated Code) and by meting out punish ment in the form of w ithholding [Serio s] prop erty; yet in refusing or failing to indict or charge [Serio ] . . ., c. [V]iolation of Article 24 by depriving [Serio] of his p rope rty, yet by failing to afford [Serio] judicial process with res pect to the [Baltimore County s] seizure and/or retention of [Serio s] property, and d. [V]iolation of Article 25 by conducting a de facto forfeiture of [Se rio s] pro perty . . . . 6 42 U.S.C . § 1983 (2 000) states in relevant pa rt: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or u sage, of an y State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjecte d, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured. 7 Specific ally, Count V II of the Se cond A mended Comp laint alleged v iolations of various U.S. Constitutional provisions against Baltimore County as follows: a. [V]iolation of Plaintiff s [F]ourth [A]mendment right to be free from unreason able search and seizure and to have a warrant issued only upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized, for reasons stated . . . above, *** c. [V]iolation of Plaintiff s [F]ifth [A]mendment rights of due process, for reasons stated in Count VI section c [which references the due process clause of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights] above, and d. [V]iolation of Plaintiff s [E]ighth [A]mendment right to be free fro m exc essive f ines . . . . 6 case to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, and a motion for summary judgment on all of the claims in the Second Amended Complaint. After hearing argumen ts on the mo tion, Judge C atherine B lake filed an Order an d Mem orandum on July 20, 2000, granting the County s motion and dismissing Serio s claims for relie f. See Serio v. Baltimor e Coun ty, 115 F.Supp.2d 509 (D.Md. 2000). Sp ecifically, in her Memorandum Order Judge B lake, addres sing the du e process c laims unde r Count V II of the com plaint, determined that Serio had a property interest in the firearms and that the County had deprived Serio of that interest by retaining the firearms, but granted the County s motion to dismiss on the groun d that Serio h ad not cha llenged the validity of Se ction 551, a s violative of his due proces s rights. Id. at 516. The court reasoned that Serio did not make a facial challenge to the applicable statutes; instead, he challenged the County s execution of the statutes based upon due pro cess. Id. The court reasoned that the C ounty s actions in seizing the firearms and retaining them did not den y Serio his due process rights because the County at that point could retain the firearms in anticipation of a crimin al prose cution. Id. at 517. Once the need to keep the firearms terminated, the court held that Serio s due process rights would then be implica ted. Id. Furthermore, Judge Blake noted that the County could retain the firearms unless Serio could prove that there was no further need for the County to withhold them under Section 551(c). Id. at 518. The additional fe deral claims against the County under Count VII alleging violations of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution 7 also were dismissed, as well as all of the claims under Count VI of the Second Amended Comp laint, which related to Articles 19, 21, 24 and 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.8 Id. at 520. While the matter was pending in federal District Court, Serio noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals based upon the Circuit Court s dismissal of the First Amended Comp laint. In an unreported opinion, Serio v. Baltimo re Coun ty, No. 329 (Sept. Term 2000), the Court of Special Appeals dismissed the appeal because a final judgment had not been entered by the Circuit Court pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-602.9 After the case was remanded for entry of a final judgment, the defendants, still represented by the same counsel, filed a motion for summary judgment as to the First 8 The claims relating to Arti cles 19 and 24 were dismissed insofar as those Articles related to the federal due process claims that were dismissed. We note that Article 19 has no federa l counte rpart. See Dua v. C omcast C able of Maryland, Inc., 370 Md. 604, 618 n.6, 630, 805 A.2d 1061, 1069 n.6 (2 002). The court also dismissed the Article 21 claim because there was no criminal prosecution pending a gainst Serio at that time, so that Article 21 was not implicated. The Article 25 claim w as dismissed based up on the cou rt s analysis of the Eighth Amendment claim. Finally, the court summarily dismissed Counts I-V of the Second Amended Complaint based upon the Baltimore County Circuit Court s earlier order dismissing those counts. 9 Rule 2-602 states: (a) Generally. Except as provided in section (b) of this Rule, an order or other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all of the claims in an action (whether raised by original claim , counterclaim , cross-claim, o r thirdparty claim), or that adjudicates less than an entire claim, or that adjudicates the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties to the action: (1) is not a fin al judgme nt. 8 Amended Complaint, and Serio and Stanski filed an opposition together along with a motion for reconsideration of the Circuit Court s earlier ruling dismissing the First Amended Comp laint. On Au gust 6, 200 1, the Circu it Court ruled on the defendants motion and granted partial summ ary judgmen t in favor of the defen dants as to the issue of whether [Serio] had possession of the guns, which are the subject of the case. T he trial court dismissed Stanski s claims to have the firearms returned to him as an agent of Serio, as well as the claims against Off icer Russo. Finally, the Circuit Court dismissed the claims against the County sub ject to Serio am ending his complain t to add a claim bas ed upon the Eighth Ame ndme nt to the U nited S tates Co nstitution . On August 29, 2001, the Circuit Court held a hearing on Serio and Stanski s motion for reconsideration and determined that Serio should amend his complaint to plead with specificity the items that were taken by Officer Russo during the search. The court entered an order, vacating its previous orders of February 7, 2000, and August 6, 2001, and allowing Serio to amend his complaint consistent with th e Cou rt s instru ctions o f Aug ust 29, 2 001. Serio then filed a Third A mended Comp laint re-alleging in Counts I-III violations of Section 551 and seeking return of the seized property to Stanski as his agent. In Count IV Serio sought damages against the County for any damaged or lost property, and he claimed a violation of Article 24 of the Mar yland Decla ration of R ights agains t Officer R usso in Coun t V for miscon duct in o btaining the sear ch wa rrant use d to sea rch Ser io s hom e. The defendants, re presented b y the County A ttorney s Off ice, filed a m otion to 9 dismiss the Third A mended Comp laint, and a he aring wa s held on March 25, 2002. During the hearing, Judge John Hennegan denied the motion to dismiss and determined that it was not ripe because there were no affidavits , no exhibits, nothing, to support the motion. Thereafter, defenda nts, through their couns el, filed a mo tion for sum mary judgm ent on all counts, which was heard by Judge J. Norris Byrnes. In their motion, the defendants argued that there was probable cause to support the search warrant and that it would be against the law to return the firearms to Serio, a convicted felon. Furthermore, Officer Russo argued that his conduct in executing the warrant d id not violate S erio s due p rocess rights u nder Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. In opposition to the defe ndant s m otion, Serio argued that the firearms were not contraband per se and that the County was required either to institute forfeitu re proc eeding s or retur n the w eapon s. On September 4, 2002, the defendants motion for summary judgment was granted on all claims set fo rth in Counts II, III and V of the Third Am ended Com plaint, which were those claims r elated to Section 551 (b )-(c) and Offic er Rus so. Judge Byrnes also entered a show cause order to determine whether any of the firearms should be returned to S erio under Section 551(a) . A show cause hearing was held on November 6, 2002, and Judge Christian Kahl ruled that the seized firearms and related items could not be returned to Serio or given to Stanski for disposal because doing so would allow the defendant or claimant to profit by what he cannot possess legally. He ruled, however, that Serio could recover any items that were not 10 firearms or related m aterials. An o rder was f iled requiring the Baltimore County Police Department to retain the firearms until all appeals had been exhausted. On December 12, 2002, Serio noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals based upon the Circuit Court s dismissal of the Third Amended Complaint. Thereafter, an Amended Order was entered on January 6, 2003, to establish a final judgment in this case.10 In an unreported opinion, the Court of S pecial Appeals aff irmed the Circuit Cou rt s grant of the defendants motion for sum mary jud gmen t. See Serio, et al v. Baltimore County, Maryland, et al., No. 2393 (Sept. Term 2002). The Court of Special Appeals, addressing Serio s claim that items, including the firearms, should be returned to him under Section 551(a) because the search warrant was invalid, held that the w arrant was valid because it was 10 The Amended Order stated: 1. Count I [Restoration of property under Art. 27 Section 551(a)] is dismissed as to both Plaintiffs. 2. Although the parties be lieve that it was the intent of the Honorable J. Norris Byrnes, in his orde r filed S eptem ber 12, 2002, with respe ct to Counts II and III, that the dism issal pertained to both Plaintiffs, in order to remove any doubt, it is ordered that Coun ts II [Return of prope rty under Art. 27 Section 555(b)] and III [Restoration of property under Art. 27 Section 551 (c)] are dism issed as to bo th Plaintiffs. (C ount V [Constitutional Claim against Officer Russo] is not brought by Plaintiff Bruce Stanski). 3. Property not referred to in the order of November 13, 2002 shall be returned to Plaintiff Robert Serio. 4. As the court s o rder to the C ounty police that the property be preserved remains open; as to Count IV [Damage to property] remains open, the Court certifies finality as to Counts I, II, III, and V, under Rule 2-602; and that there is no reason for delay, so that Plaintiffs may pursue appellate rights as to Counts I, II, III and V. 11 not overly broad and was based in part upon untainted information. The court further explained that because seized items that were n ot named in the warrant had been returned, Serio ha[d] a lready rec eived a ll the relie f to wh ich he is entitled u nder C ount I. 11 The Court of Special Appeals also addressed Serio s argument that he retained a constitutiona lly protected p roperty interest in the firearms. The court noted that Serio did not allege constitutiona l violations in his Third Amended Complaint. Rather, he relied upon reasoning from the federal district court s prior dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint, to claim a viola tion of his d ue proces s rights. The in termediate a ppellate cou rt held that the trial court wa s correct in granting summary judgment on the due process claim beca use Serio did not properly raise this issue in his Third Amended Complaint, while it was before that court. The court further stated that even if Serio had properly alleged constitutional due process violations against the County in his Third Amended Complaint, his argument would fail because he could not lawfully possess the weapons and did not have a recognized proper ty interest in the firea rms. With respect to the allegations in Count II involving Section 551(b) (returning seized property), the intermediate appellate court held that Section 551(b) applies to situations where the items were seized from persons charged with illegal possession of weapons. According to the court, because Serio had not been charged with possession of weapons, 11 Before us, Serio has not challenged the Court of Special Appeals s decision upholding the trial court s grant of summary judgment as to Count I of the Third A mended Comp laint. 12 Section 551(b) was not applicable. The court also agreed with the County that Count III of Serio s complaint relating to Section 551(c) (restoring wrongfully retained property), shou ld be dismissed because Serio could not lawfully possess the weapons and the weapons m ust be retur ned to th e perso n from whom [they] w ere take n. The Court of Special Appeals addresse d the question of w hether the Circuit Cou rt erred in dismissing Coun t V, where Serio allege d that Officer Russo had made a false statement on the warrant application and had seized items that either were no t mentione d in the warrant or were not contraband, in violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Court of Specia l Appeals held that the stan dard for assessing an o fficer s conduct in obtaining and executing a search warrant is a shock the judicial conscience standard, and that O fficer Ru sso s cond uct fell short o f egregiou s behavio r that would warrant liability; thus, the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment as to Count V.12 Serio filed a petition for a writ o f certiorari in th is Court in which he asserted that several constitutiona l provisions a pplied, includ ing Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. This Court was asked to consider the following questions: 1. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in construing the verbiage of Article 27 S ection 551(c) that seized property shall be restored to the person from whom it was taken as precluding a court from ordering property to be handed over to an agent of the owner of the 12 Serio did not challenge the Court of Special Appeals s decision upholding the trial court s gran t of summ ary judgmen t as to Cou nt V of th e Third A mended Comp laint. 13 prop erty, as such a narrow construction of the statute precluded its remedial purpose. 2. Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in approving a common law forfeiture of appellant s property, based upon two reported decisions of the Eighth Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals concerning return of seized property under federal law; rather than upon Maryland law of forfeitu re, whic h preclu des com mon la w forf eiture. We granted the petitio n and is sued th e writ o f certior ari, Serio v. Ba ltimore County, Maryland, 381 Md. 324, 849 A.2d 473 (2004), and shall reverse the ju dgment of the C ourt of Special Appeals. II. Standard of Review This Court reviews an order granting summ ary judgmen t de novo. O Connor v. Baltimore County , 382 Md. 102, 110, 854 A.2d 1191, 11 96 (2004 ); Todd v. MT A, 373 Md. 149, 154, 816 A.2d 930, 933 (2003); Beyer v. Morgan State Univ., 369 Md. 335, 359, 800 A.2d 707, 721 (2002); Schmerling v. Injured Workers Ins. Fund, 368 Md. 434, 443, 795 A.2d 715, 720 (2002); see Fister v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 366 Md. 201, 210, 783 A.2d 194, 199 (2001). In so doing, we must determine, initially, whether a dispute of material fact exists. Md. R ule 2-501 (e) (2002); see O Co nnor, 382 Md. at 110-11, 854 A.2d at 1196; Todd, 373 M d. at 154, 816 A.2d at 933; Beyer, 369 Md. at 359-60, 800 A.2d at 721; Schmerling, 368 M d. at 443, 79 5 A.2d a t 720; Lippert v. Jung, 366 Md. 221, 227, 783 A.2d 206, 209 (2001). A material fact is a fact the resolution of which will somehow affect the outcome of the case. Todd, 373 Md. at 155, 816 A.2d at 933 (quoting Matthew s v. How ell, 359 Md. 152, 161, 753 A.2d 69, 73 (2000)). The facts properly before the cou rt as well as 14 any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them must be construed in the light most favorable to the no n-mov ing par ty. O Connor, 382 Md. at 111, 854 A.2d at 11 96; Todd, 373 Md. at 155, 816 A.2d at 933; Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 178, 757 A.2d 118, 127 (2000). If the record reveals that a material fact is in dispute, summary judgment is not appropriate. O Connor, 382 Md. at 111, 854 A.2 d at 1196; Todd, 373 Md. at 155, 816 A.2d at 933; Okwa, 360 Md. at 178, 757 A.2d at 127. If no material facts are disputed, however, then we must determine whether the Circuit Court correctly granted summary judgment as a matter of law. See Md. Rule 2-5 01(e); O Connor, 382 M d. at 111, 85 4 A.2d a t 1197; Todd, 373 Md. at 155, 816 A.2d at 933; Beyer, 369 M d. at 360, 80 0 A.2d a t 721; Schmerling, 368 Md. at 443, 795 A.2d at 720. III. Discussion Serio argues that the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that the trial court properly entered summary judgment against him on his claim to have the seized firearms restored to him under Maryland Code, Article 27, Section 551(c). In Serio s view, the language of Section 551(c) permits him to exercise his property interests in the firearms by allowing the property to be restored to him through an agent or delegate . Moreo ver, Serio contends that the Court of Special Appeals approved a common law forfeiture of the firearms by relying upon decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, rather than upon Maryland forfeiture statutes. In his brief, Serio also asserts that he was being deprived of his due process rights unde r Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. 15 During oral argument before this Court, Serio, when questioned, maintained that the County s continued retention of the firearms was a constitutional violation and that if he were to obtain the proceeds from a sale of the seized firearms, his property interests would be restored. The Coun ty conten ds, how ever, that the firearms were righ tfully seized pu rsuant to a search warrant and are being properly withheld from Serio because he is a convicted felon and is precluded from taking possession of the firearms. The County further claims that the unambig uous language of Section 551(c) does not allow the firearms to be restored to Serio through an agent or delegate. Finally, the County argues that the statute governing forfeiture of firearms requires a conviction for possession of firearms an d Serio has not been so convicted. At argument, the County s representative iterated that the County was keeping the firearms rather than selling th em and re turning their p roceeds to S erio becau se Serio was prohibited from possessing the firearms. Article 27, Section 551(c), states: (1) If, at any time, on application to a judge of the circuit court of any county or judge of the District Court, it is found that property rightfully taken under a search warrant is being wrongfully withheld after there is no further need for retention of the property, the judge must cause it to be restored to the person from w hom it w as taken . Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 1998 Cum. Supp.), Art. 27, § 551(c). When we interpret statutes, our goal is to identify and effectuate the legislative intent underlying the statute(s) at issue. Drew v. First Guaranty Mortgage Corp., 379 Md. 318, 327, 842 A.2d 1, 6 (2003) 16 (quoting Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 335, 748 A.2d 478, 483 (2000)). As we have stated, the best source of legislative intent is the statute s plain language and when the language is clear and un ambig uous, o ur inqu iry ordina rily ends th ere. Drew, 379 Md. at 327, 842 A.2d at 6; Beyer, 369 Md. at 349, 800 A.2d at 715. Althoug h the plain lan guage of the statute guides our understanding of legislative intent, we do not r ead the langua ge in a v acuum . See Drew, 379 M d. at 327, 84 2 A.2d a t 6; Derry, 358 Md. at 336, 748 A.2d at 483-84. Rather, we read statutory language within the context of the statutory scheme, considering the "purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body." Drew, 379 Md. at 327, 842 A.2d at 6; Beyer, 369 Md. at 349, 800 A.2d at 715; In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 711, 782 A.2d 332, 346 (2001) (quoting Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380 , 387, 614 A.2d 5 90, 594 (1992)). When interpreting the langua ge of a sta tute, we assign the words their ordinary and natural mean ing. O Connor, 382 M d. at 113, 85 4 A.2d a t 1198; Lewis v. Sta te, 348 Md. 648, 653, 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998). We will neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature used or engage in a forced or subtle interpretation in an at temp t to ex tend or lim it the statu te's mean ing." O Connor, 382 Md. at 114, 854 A.2d at 1198 (quoting Taylor v. NationsBank, 365 Md. 166, 181, 776 A.2d 645, 654 (2001)). Thus, the provisions must be read from a commonsensical perspective to avoid a farfetched interpretation. Graves v . State, 364 Md. 329, 346, 772 A .2d 1225, 1235 (2 001). We begin with interpreting the language of Section 551(c). The General A ssembly 17 did not define in the statute itself what it means to restore property that has been wrongf ully withheld. A review of the legisla tive history also is n ot helpful in discerning the meaning of restoring property under Section 551(c), because there is nothing in that history discussing the use of the term. It appears that the language of subsection (c) was derived from Section 551(a), w hich also states that property must be restored to the person from whom it was taken. Sub section (a), add ed in 19 58, see Ch. 74 of the Acts o f 1958, is primarily concerned with the return of property that was not adequately described in the warrant underlying the seizure of th e property or p roperty that wa s seized w ithout the existence of probable cause to issue the warrant. Later, in 1975, Section 551 (b), containing similar langu age, return ed to the pe rson to whom it belongs, was added as an additional way to have property return ed whe n criminal p roceeding s against the p roperty owner have ended. See Ch. 704 of the Acts of 1975. Subsec tion (c) was added in 1 976, as a w ay to return property that had been properly taken under a search warrant but in circumstances in which the government had no fur ther nee d to retai n the pr operty. See Chs. 194, 704 of the Acts o f 1976 . Furthermore, this Court has not interpreted the meaning of the term restored w ithin Section 551(c). Nevertheless, Serio contends that this Court s decision in State v. Denten Corp., 288 Md. 178, 416 A.2d 271 (1980), accommodates an expanded definition of restore . In Denten, the Baltimore City police executed a search and seizure warrant at Follies Bookstore, which was owned by defendants, Denten Corporation and Thomas Frank. 18 Id. at 180, 416 A.2d at 273. During the search the police seized several peep show motion picture films and film projectors because they were allegedly being shown without a license from th e Mar yland Sta te Boa rd of C ensors ( Boa rd ). Id. The defendants were convicted of showing unlicensed films, and they appealed, challenging the retention of the films. Id. The defenda nts argued that they could n ot be proh ibited from distributing th e films unless there had been a prior determ ination that the films wer e obscen e, which h ad not occ urred in the case. Id. at 181, 416 A.2d at 27 3. In addition , the defend ants argued that because the seized materials w ere the only co pies in their possession at the time of the seizu re, the State must either return the film or allow the film to be copied for the purpose of submitting the film to th e Boa rd for re view a nd licen sing. Id. This Court held that the State may not seize the only copy of a film as evidence of a licensing violation and then refuse to return the film or allow it to be copied for purposes of submitting the film to the Board for rev iew an d licens ing. Id. at 186, 416 A.2d at 276. We explained that the seized film could be copied and delive red to the Board for review under the provisions of Section 5 51(c). Id. at 187, 416 A.2d at 276-77. We explored the meaning of the phrase wrongfully withheld and stated: With respect to the very narrow problem area under discussion, which assumes that the sole copy of a motion picture film has been seized, and which further assumes that the person from whom it was taken applies to have the sole copy delivered to the Board of Motion P icture Censors for review or desires to have a copy made for such a submission, w e interpr et Art. 2 7, § 551(c) (1) to pe rmit hon oring th e reque st. 19 Id. at 187, 416 A.2d at 276-77. We then ordered the State to submit the copy seized to the Board for its de termina tion. Denten is inapplicable to the case sub judice, however, because the gravamen of that case was wh ether the seiz ed film w as rightfully taken as proof of distribution of unlicensed material. In Denten, the State wrongfully withheld the film when it refused to submit the film for Board review. The Board was not being given the films, as an agent of Denten and Frank; rather, its determination was a vital element of the State s charges. While the present case also deals with whether the C oun ty has wro ngfully w ithheld p rope rty, the similarities in the issues end before any discussion of restoration to an agen t or a sale with remuneration to the property owner, as Serio contends. Restoration to an agent or sale were never implicated in Denten. Serio also asserts that the Court of Special Appeals erred by approving a common law forfeiture in its reliance on decisions of the United States Co urt of Ap peals for the Eighth Circuit. The interm ediate appellate co urt held that th e firearms c ould not be return ed to Serio or a delegate or sold and proceeds returned to him because he was a convicted felon who could not lawfully possess the firearms. The court relied on two decisions of the Eig hth Circuit Court o f App eals, United States v. Bagley, 899 F.2d 707 (8 th Cir. 1990), and United v. Felici, 208 F.3d 667 (8 th Cir. 200 0), for the proposition that convicted felons could not posses s firearm s, and th at the fire arms co uld not be sold or give n to an a gent. To the extent th at the Court of Special Appeals was interpreting the provisions of 20 Section 551, we agree; our disagreement involves the failure on the part of the Court of Special Appea ls to recogn ize that Serio r etained a pr operty interest in the firearms to which Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights may be applicable. The Court of Special Appea ls was corre ct in its determina tion that Serio as a convicted felon could not possess the firearms. The court was incorrect, however, in not addressing whether Serio retained due process protection f or his prope rty interest in the firearms under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.13 Article 24 of the M aryland D eclaration of Righ ts Although Section 551(c) is inapplicable, Serio did not lose h is prope rty interest in the firearms because he is a convicted felon, and he retains due process protection against wrongful retention of his property under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which was the basis upon which Serio sued Officer Russo in the Third Amended Comp laint. 14 A convicted felo n s protected p roperty interest in firearms that he can no longer legally possess has been recognized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Cooper v. Greenwood, 904 F.2d 302 (5 th Cir. 199 0), a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 305. In Cooper, the p laint iff, a convicte d fel on, p led g uilty to receipt and possession of firea rms un der 18 U .S.C. § 1202(a), later 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), after the City of 13 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Bagley and Felici also did not address whether convicted felons may have due process rights in the firearms. 14 Article 24 was also one of the bases for Serio s suit against the County in the Second Amen ded Co mplaint. 21 Greenwood, pursuant to a warran t, seized 201 firearms fro m the attic of an anima l clinic operated by the plaintiff s son-in-law and later sold them at a public auction without prior court author ization. Id. at 304. The plaintiff instituted suit alleging violations of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and sought to recover the value of the firearms. Id. The Court of Appeals for the F ifth Circuit, in reversing a grant of sum mary judgment against the plaintiff, held that Cooper s claimed ownership interest in the firearms survived his criminal conviction and could not be extinguished without according him due proces s. Id. The court explained that seized property should be returned to its owner once the criminal proceedings have terminated, unless the property is contraband per se, that being objects [that] are intrinsically illegal in character, the possession of which, without more, constitutes a crime. Id. at 304 (internal citations omitted). Conversely, derivative contraband, was defined as property that was not inherently unlaw ful but w hich could become unlaw ful bec ause of its use. Id. The court classified the firearms as derivative contraband and explained that a property interest in derivative contraband is not extinguished automatica lly if the item is put to unlawful use ; the destruction of such items is subject to scrutiny for compliance with the safeguards of procedural due pro cess. Id. Recognizing that firearms are not inhe rently illegal, the Court explained that [t]hey become illegal only because [the owner] was technica lly a conv icted fe lon in p ossessio n of the m, and held that Cooper h ad a protected ow nership interes t in the fir earms. Id. (internal citations omitted ). 22 Likewise, the Court of Appea ls for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Seifuddin, et al., 820 F.2d 1074 (9 th Cir. 1987), held that convicted felons had a non-po ssessory prop erty interest in seized firearm s. Id. at 1079. Both defendants, Idi Seifuddin and Harvey Merriweather, had been convicted of armed robbery, and the government had seized firearms in connection with their offen ses. Id. at 1075-76. Subsequent to the seizures, the government sough t to dispo se of th e firearm s throug h forfe iture pro ceedin gs. Id. In determining whether the defendants had standing to challenge the forefeiture of the firearms, the Court found that the firearms were not contraband per se and that the firearms on ly became illegal when the defen dants p ossesse d them . Id. at 1079. A ccording to the court, the defenda nts therefore could hold a property intere st in the forfe ited [firearms] without that interest being possessory. Id. Fina lly, in Covington v. Winger, 562 F.Sup p. 115 ( W.D . Mich . 1983) , aff d, 746 F.2d 1475 (6 th Cir. 1984), the district court determined that a convicted felon was entitled to seek damages for the unlawful retention of firearms seized f rom his home . Id. at 123. The plaintiff, Coving ton, broug ht suit alleging that his personal property, including several firearms, had been seized b y the police during a search of his apartment for narcotics, that the property had n ot been retu rned to him in violation of the Fo urth and F ourteenth Amendments, and that he had retained a property interest in the firearms even though he was a convic ted felo n. Id. at 116. The Court determined that Covington had a property interest in the firearms despite his felony con viction, concluding that the firearm s were not 23 contraband per se. Id. at 123. When p roperty seized is not inherently illegal to possess, the court h eld that th e prope rty s own er may ra ise a du e proce ss claim . Id. We find this reasoning persuasive based upon our own jurisprudence. We have broadly defined p roperty as every interest or estate which the law regards of sufficient value for judicial recognition. Dodds v. Shamer, 339 Md. 540, 548, 663 A .2d 1318, 1322 (1 995). We have re cogniz ed that c ontrab and tha t is not inh erently illeg al to pos sess, such as derivative contraband, cannot be forfeited without a hearing, which implicates a need for due process of law w hen dis posing of suc h prop erty. See 1995 Corvette v . Mayor & City of Baltimore, 353 M d. 114, 1 36, 724 A.2d 680, 6 91 (1999 ); Director of Finance of Prince George s County v . Cole, 296 Md. 607, 619, 465 A.2d 450, 457 (198 3); Office of Finance of Baltimore C ity v. Previti, 296 M d. 512, 525 , 463 A.2d 842, 849 (1983). D erivative contraband is not per se illegal, but is contraband seized in connection with illegal activities, such as vehicle s used in associa tion wi th drug transac tions. See 1995 C orvette, 353 Md. at 136, 724 A.2d at 691 (describing vehicles seized in connection with drug transactions as derivative contraban d); see also Director of Finance of Prince George s County , 296 Md. at 619, 465 A.2d at 457 (defining money seized in connection with gambling as derivative contrab and). In the present case, whether Serio s firearms are viewed as derivative contraband as the court did in Cooper or as prope rty that is incapable of posses sion becau se of Serio s status as a convicted felon, Serio is not divested of his ownership interest, and th e Coun ty 24 cannot just retain the firearms. Although Serio is not permitted to possess the firearms, he retains an ownership property interest in them and is entitled to due process protections under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which states that, no man ought to be taken or imprison ed or disseiz ed of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any man ner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land. See Dua, 370 Md. at 630, 805 A.2d at 1076; Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 M d. 20, 28 , 410 A .2d 105 2, 1056 -57 (19 80). It is tru e tha t Serio did not institute suit a gain st the Cou nty for its retention of the firearms directly under Article 24 in his Third Amended Complaint but only against Officer Russo. Count V of Serio s complaint reads as follows: Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations within Counts I, II and III, and avers that Defendant Steven Russo violated Plaintiff s rights, under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, by taking actions inconsistent with Plaintif f s rights of due proces s. 15 Neverth eless, Serio h as been d enied his interest in his firearms because they have been wrongfully retained by Officer Russo and then by the Cou nty. 16 15 In Count V , Serio alleged that Officer Russo made false, misleading and insufficient statements in the wa rrant app lication to sea rch S erio s ho me a nd to seize any f irearms. Serio also incorporated all of the allegations set forth in Coun ts I, II and II of the Third Amended Complaint, which were tho se counts against the C ounty under Sections 55 1 (a), (b), and (c). 16 Summary judgmen t was entere d against S erio in Count V of his claim against Officer Russo alleging a v iolation of A rticle 24 for misconduct in obtaining and executing the search warrant. In Southern Mgmt. Corp. v. Taha, 378 Md. 461, 836 A.2d 627 (2003), we held that (contin ued...) 25 The County, then, may have deriva tive liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior for a violation of Serio s due process rights. The doctrine of respondeat superior is, of course, a means of holding employers, including local governments, vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of an employee acting withi n the sc ope of his/her e mploym ent. See Williams v. Maynard, 359 Md. 379 , 380-82, 754 A .2d 379, 380 (200 0); Housing Authority of Baltimor e City v. Be nnett, 359 Md. 356, 362, 754 A.2d 36 7, 370 (20 00); DiPino v . Davis, 354 Md. 18 , 47-50, 729 A.2d 35 4, 369-70 (1999); Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 104, 660 A.2d 447, 464 (1995). Furthermore, we have explicitly stated that local government entities do, indeed, have respondeat superior liability for civil damages resulting from State Constitutional violations committed by their agents and employees w ithin the scop e of their emplo yment. DiPino, 354 Md. at 51-52, 729 A.2d at 372 . In the instant case, Officer Russo s actions in reta ining the fire arms ma y provide a ba sis for respo ndeat sup erior liability on th e par t of th e Co unty. The County, under a theory of respondeat superior, and based upon its own continued wrongful retention of the firearms after Officer Russo submitted them, was in violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and Article III, Section 40 of the 16 (...continued) a corporate employer is not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the acts of its employees w hen a jury has d etermined that the employees conduct did not establish liability for malicious prosecution of the plain tiff. Id. at 486, 836 A.2d at 641. Nevertheless, the Taha holding is inapplicable in the present case because the claim against Officer Russo implicated only his application for the search warrant and not his retention of the firearms. 26 Constitution, providing for just compensation.17 We have held that where the facts show that the governm ental action in fringes up on an indiv idual s due process righ ts to property and his property is also taken without just com pensation both A rticle 24 and Article III, Section 40 are violated . See Dua, 370 M d. at 629, 80 5 A.2d a t 1076 (ho lding that the General Assembly s enactment of a statute that retroactively crea ted late fees and validated statutory interest rates in consumer contracts, violated both Article 24 and Article III, Section 40); Arnold, 270 Md. at 294, 311 A.2d at 228 (holding that zoning ordinances that deprive a property owner o f all reasona ble uses of his property vio late due pro cess and c onstitute a governmental taking); Leet, 264 Md. at 611-616, 287 A.2d at 494-497 (holding that requiring a person to remove property abandoned by a trespasser constitutes a taking without just comp ensatio n or du e proce ss). When property has been physically appropriated by a governmental entity from a property owner, the government must justly compensate the property owner. See City of Annap olis v. Waterman, 357 Md. 484, 529 n.21, 745 A.2d 1000, 1023 n.21 (2000). In order 17 Article III, § 40 of the M aryland Con stitution provid es: The General Assembly shall enact no L aw autho rizing private prop erty, to be taken for public use, without just compensation, as agreed upon between th e par ties, o r aw arde d by a Jury, being first paid or tendered to the party entitled to such compensation. We have applied Article III, § 40 to local governments and have held that the governmental action violated this prov ision of the M aryland C onstitutio n. See Becker v . State, 363 Md. 77, 88-92, 767 A.2d 816, 822-24 (2001) Arnold v. Prince George s Co., 270 Md. 285, 294, 311 A.2d 223, 228 (1973); Leet v. Montg omery C ounty, 264 Md. 606, 611-616, 287 A.2d 491, 494-497 (1972); Hebron Savings Bank v. City of Salisbury, 259 Md. 294, 305, 269 A.2d 597, 602 (1970). 27 to qualify for a compensation award, (1) the governmental action must constitute a taking, and (2) the taking must be for a public u se. See Brow n v. Legal F oundatio n of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 231-32, 123 S.Ct. 1406, 1417, 155 L.E .2d 376, 39 2 (2003); King v. State Rds. Comm n, 298 M d. 80, 83, 46 7 A.2d 1 032, 103 3-34 (198 3); Bureau of Mines of Maryland v. George s Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, 156-65, 321 A.2d 748, 755-760 (1974). Whenever a property owner is deprived of the beneficial use of his property or restraints are imposed that materially affect the property s value, without legal process or compensation, the owne r is depri ved of his prop erty within the me aning o f Articl e III, Sec tion 40 . See City of Annapolis, 357 Md. at 509, 745 A.2d at 10 13; Pitsenberger, 287 Md. at 28, 33, 410 A.2d at 1056 , 1060. We have defined just compensation a s the full monetary equivalen t of the prop erty taken; the property owner is to be put in the same position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken. King, 298 Md. at 84, 467 A.2d at 1034. The full monetary equivalent to com pensate a person de prived of his property interests by the government is based upon the fair m arket va lue of th e prope rty, see Dodson v. Anne Arundel County, 294 Md. 49 0, 494, 451 A.2d 31 7, 320 (19 82); Mayor of Baltimore v. Concord Baptist Church, Inc., 257 Md. 132, 141, 262 A.2d 755, 760 (1970), which in the present case may be realized through a court ordered sale of the firearms under the Maryland Rules.18 18 Maryland Rule 14-301 provides: Except as otherw ise specifica lly provided in Rules 2-644 and 3644 and Chapter 200 of this Title, the rules in this Chapter (contin ued...) 28 In the case sub judice, the retention of the firear ms wou ld appear to be a taking by the Cou nty. The County has conceded that it has no basis to institute forfeiture proceedings against the firearm s because Serio has n ot been co nvicted of illegal possession of the 18 (...continued) govern all sales of property that are s ubje ct to r atificatio n by a court. Furthermore, Maryland Rule 14-302 states: (a) When court may order. At any stage of an action, the court may order a sale if satisfied that th e jurisdictional requisites have been met and that the sale is appropriate. Court ordered sales of property have been found approp riate in se veral co ntexts. See Wallace v. Lechman & Johnson, 354 M d. 622, 635 , 732 A.2d 868, 875 (1999) (ho lding that a successful action for conversion results in a judicial sale of the property); Marriot employees Federal Credit Union v. MV A, 346 Md. 437, 443, 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997) (finding that repossessed vehicles are subject to judicial sale); Elkton Elec. Co. v. Perkins, 145 Md. 224, 228, 125 A. 851, 85 5 (1922) (holding that the s ale of a trust propert y is appropriate where the court had assumed jurisdiction of the trust). There must be a final decree before a court may order a sale o f property in order to meet th e jurisdic tional re quisites of Ru le 14-3 02. See Elkton Elec. Co., 145 M d. at 228 , 125 A . at 855. Federal regulations provide a means to have seized firearms sold and the proceeds returned to the owner at the discretion of the Director of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. See Disposition of Seized Personal Property, 27 C.F.R. § 72.39 (2004), which states: Final action. (a) Petitions for remission or mitigation of forfeiture. (1) The Director shall take final action on any petition filed pursuant to these regulati ons. Such fin al action shall consist either of the allowance or denial of the petition. In the case of allowance, the Director shall state the conditions of the allowance. (2) In the case of an allowed petition, the Director may order the property or carrier returned to the petitioner, sold for the account of the petitioner, or, pursuant to agreement, acquired for official use. In City of Greenwood v. Cooper, 904 F .2d 302 (5 th Cir. 1990), the United States Court of Appea ls for the Fifth Circuit interp reted Sectio n 72.39 to a pply to felon in possession cases where the ow ner of f irearms could n ot lawf ully posse ss them after co nviction . Id. at 306. 29 firearms. As a resu lt, the County cannot retain the firearms just because Serio cannot possess them, and Serio may be entitled to just compensation. In determining th at Baltimore County can not retain Se rio s firearm s without affording him due process, we shall direct a reversal of the summ ary judgment of the Circu it Court entered in favor of the defendants. A reversal of summary judgment returns the posture of the case to the point at which summary judgment was entered . See Ford v. Loret, 258 Md. 110, 120, 265 A.2d 20 2, 207 (19 70); Jordan v. Morgan, 247 Md. 305, 309, 231 A.2d 13, 15 (1967). Liberal amendment of the pleadings under Rule 2-34119 is permissible upon remand, so that Serio s claims can be decided on the merits and not based upon the technicalities of pleading. See Ott v. Kaiser-Georgetown Comm. Health Plan Inc., 309 Md. 641, 650, 526 A.2d 46, 51 (19 87). JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REM AN D E D T O T H AT 19 Maryland R ule 2-341 states in releva nt part: Amendment of pleadings. (c) Scope. An amendment may seek to (1) change the nature of the action or de fense, (2) se t forth a better s tatement of facts concerning any matter already raised in a pleadin g, (3) set forth transactions o r events that have occurred since the filing of the pleading sought to be ame nded, (4) cor rect m isno mer of a p arty, (5) correct misjoinder or nonjoinder of a party so long as one of the original plaintiffs and one of the original defenda nts remain as parties to the action, (6) add a party or parties, (7) make any other appropriate change. A mendm ents shall be free ly allowed when justice so permits. Errors or defects in a pleading not corrected by an amendment shall be disregarded unless they affect the substantial rights of the parties. 30 COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AND REM AND THE C ASE TO THE C IRCUIT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT. 31

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