Attorney Grievance v. Goodman

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In the Circu it Court for B altimore C ity Case No. 24-C-03-004820 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 15 September Term, 2003 ____________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. ELLIS HOWARD GOODMAN ____________________________________ ____________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Greene Eldridge, John C. (retired, specially assigned), JJ. ____________________________________ Opinion by Greene, J. ____________________________________ Filed: June 7, 2004 On June 26, 2003, the Attorney Grievance Commission, acting throu gh Bar C ounsel, filed a petition with this Court for disciplinary or remedial action against Respon dent, Ellis H. Goodman. Bar Counsel charged Respondent with violating several Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC), alleging that he filed a complaint in the District Court of Maryland and signed the name of a different attorn ey (David H erman) to th e compla int, without that attorney s knowledge or permission. The Commission also alleges that Respondent attempted to negotiate a settlement with opposing counsel w hile pretend ing to be David Herman and that Respondent intentionally misled the trial judge to make him think that David H erman w as the attorney who had filed the action and that Respondent was merely standing in for Mr. Herman. In particular, the petition alleged that Respondent violated MRPC 3.3(a)(1) (Candor Tow ard Tribunal), 1 MRPC 3.4(c) (Fairness to Opposing 1 Rule 3.3(a)(1) provides as follows: A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribuna l[.] 2 Party and Counse l),2 MRPC 8.1(a) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), 3 8.4(b),(c), and (d) (Misconduc t),4 and Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law Art. Section 8-606.5 2 Rule 3.4(c) provides as follows: A lawyer sh all not: (c) 3 knowin gly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no v alid obli gation e xists[.] Rule 8.1(a) provides as follows: An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a lawyer in connection with a b ar admission application or i n connectio n with a dis ciplinary matter, sh all not: (a) 4 know ingly mak e a false stateme nt of m aterial fa ct[.] Rule 8.4 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: **** (b) commit a criminal act that refle cts adversely o n the lawyer s h onesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (c) engage i n conduct inv olving disho nesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; **** 5 Md. C ode An n., Crim. La w Art. sec tion 8-606 provides in pertinent pa rt: (b) Prohibited. A person may not or may not attempt to: (1) willfully make a false entry in a public record. 3 Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752(a)6 , we referred the matter to Judge Shirley Watts, of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, to make findings of fact and proposed conclusions of law. Judge Watts held an evidentiary hearing on October 29, 31, and November 19, 2003, and concluded that Respondent violated the following Rules of Professional Conduct: 3.1(a)(1), 3.3(c), 7 and 8.4(c), as well as Md . Code Ann ., Crim. Law A rt., Sec. 8-606. In addition, Judge Watts found one mitigating factor present in this case. Respondent filed exceptions to the factual findings and conclusions of law and recommended that the app ropriate sanction for his conduct should be a stern reprimand. The Attorney Grievance Commission excepted to the failure o f Judge W atts to find spe cifically that Respondent violated Rule 8.4(b), and has recommended that Respondent be disbarred. We overrule all of Respondent s exceptions and sustain the exception of the Commission. Moreo ver, we co nclude tha t the approp riate sanction in this case is d isbarmen t. 6 Md. Rule 16-752(a) states: (a) Order. U pon the filin g of a Petitio n for Dis ciplinary or Remedial Action, t he C ourt of A ppeals m ay enter an order designating a judge of any circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the record. The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing of motions, and hearing. 7 It is clear that the hearing jud ge made a clerical error a nd mean t to write 3.3(a)(1) and 3.4(c). There is no 3.1(a)(1). Also, 3.3(c) a lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false has nothing to do with th e case a t bar. Furthermore, later in her Find ings of Fa ct and Co nclusions o f Law, Ju dge Wa tts cited the corr ect rules. 4 I. The Hearing Judge s Opinion FINDINGS OF FACT The findings of fact made by Judge Watts can be sum marize d as fo llows. Respondent has been a member of the Maryland Bar since June 23, 1966, and has been employed as an Assistant Public Defender (APD) in Baltimore City. Respondent has not been the subject of prior disciplinary proceedings. In 1991, R esponde nt found ed a charity called Heroes of Hope, an organization that helps children and families living through a life threatening illness. He founded the charity because of his experience with the life threatening illness of his surrogate son, Bobby Herman.8 Bobby is the biological child of David Herman, the Maryland attorney whose name Respondent used to file the case that became the subject of these disciplinary proceedings. Mr. Herman and Respondent had been friends and law partners for many years and when Mr. Herman divorced and moved away from Maryland, his son Bobby remained in Maryland with Respondent and his wife. Respondent created the InterMall project, consisting of advertising kiosks in shopping malls, in order to rais e funds f or Heroe s of Hop e. Fairfield Communities, Inc. (Fairfield) purchased advertising space from InterMall. According to Respondent, Fairfield failed to pay the amount billed for the space provided. Thereafter, Respondent filed an action in the 8 In 1990, Bobby was diagnosed with aplastic anemia. During the illness, Responden t s daughter b egan throw ing a penn y into a wishin g well for Bob by to recover. His condition improved unexpectedly. Thereafter, Respondent started a charity to place wishing wells in hospitals and later established the Heroes of Hope, an organization that awards medals to young people with life threatening illnesses. 5 District Court of M aryland on behalf of In terMa ll, seeking to recover $1,491.00 from Fairfield. He later amended the complaint to increase the damages amount to $2,176.80. On both complaints, Respondent listed the name of D. David Herman as the attorney for the plaintiff. Respondent did not state his own name on either of the complaints. Respondent also sent a letter and four subpoenas to the District Court of Maryland, identifying David Herman as the attorney for the plaintiff. The letter was printed on letterhead stating Law Offices of D. D avid Herman. Respondent testified that he created the letterhead for use in the InterM all suit. Mr. Herman did not know of the InterMall suit and did not give Respondent permission to use his name on the pleadings. Thomas W. Jones, Esq., was the attorney for Fairfield and the co mplainan t in the case at bar. During telephone negotiations with M r. Jones, Respondent represented himself as David Herman. On October 17, 2002, the day the case was scheduled to go to trial, Respondent, pretending to be Mr. Herman, negotiated a settlement over the phone with Mr. Jones. Later that day, Mr. Herman left a message for Mr. Jones stating that Mr. Herm an would be u nable to attend the trial and that Ellis Ho ward Goodman would be there instead , represe nting In terMa ll. When Mr. Jones met Resp ondent, he became suspicious because he recognized Respondent s voice as the voice known to him as Mr. Herman. Mr. Jones called Mr. Herman in Hawaii and discovered that Mr. Herman was unaware of this case, was not the attorney for the plaintiff, and had not given Respondent permis sion to u se his na me. 6 When the case was called, Respondent informed the judge that he was handling the case and then attempted to place the settlement on the record. Respondent implied that Mr. Herman was the attorney in the case but would not be present for trial. Mr. Jones then asked to speak w ith the judge in chamb ers. Mr. Jon es told the jud ge that Respondent had been posing as Mr. Herman and that he would n ot go forw ard with the settlement in light of the misrepresentations. Respondent denied the accusations, by either shaking his head or saying, no, that s not true. When Responden t testified at the disciplinary hearing, he admitted that he was not candid with the judge about filing the case under Mr. Herman s name. Specific ally, Judge Watts found that Re sponden t did not ack nowled ge to Judg e Chiapp arelli that he had been impersonating Mr. Herman (and that Mr. Herman was not, in fact, the attorney of record in the case) and Respondent specifically denied the Complainant s accusations on this point. Judge Chiapparelli decided to place the trial at the end of his docket. When the case was called, Respondent did not appear and Judge C hiapparelli dismissed the case. The case has not been refiled. Mr. Jones filed a Complaint with Bar Coun sel. Res ponde nt then c alled M r. Jones to apolo gize fo r his con duct. Judge Watts s pecific ally foun d that, Respondent engaged in intentional dishonesty and deceit when he filed the pleadings and requested subpoenas in this case an d repeated ly misrepresented the identity of counsel of record in this ca se to Mr. Jones. The Court also finds that the Respondent engaged in intentional dishonesty and deceit before Judge Chiappa relli when he denied having been posing as Mr. Herman and failed to advise the Court th at Mr. H erman w as not in fact the attorney of record in the InterMall case. The Court finds that the Respondent misrepresented the identity of counsel of record, at least in part, because as an APD, he was 7 generally prohibited f rom eng aging in the private practice of law, and in part, because he thought his actual appea rance in court would not be necessary. The Respon dent, a recently appointed APD, did not want to have his appearance recorded in a civil case because he believed that such action was against the policy of the Public Defender s office. The Respondent did not seek the permission of any supervisor in the Office of the Public Defender to participate in the case. The Respondent testified that he believed that the case would be settled and th at it would n ot actually be necessary for him to app ear in court. Add ition ally, the Respondent did not want to appear as both a witness and counsel in the case; an d this thoug ht affected his decision to use Mr. Herma n s name. The record establishes that the Respondent had logical reasons that motiva ted his d ishone st and d eceitfu l behav ior. MITIGATION Respondent argued that his misconduct was caused by health problems. In particular, he argued that he had an inability to think clearly, which was caused by low blood sugar and a bad reaction to some medication he was taking. Dr. K roopnick , Respon dent s internis t, testified about these matters. Judge Watts decided that there was, no medical evidence that the Respondent had low blood sugar during the relevant period of tim e. Further, the re is no evidence that the Respondent was unable to think clearly during the time period in question. The Respondent filed the lawsuit on April 17, 2002, and misrepresented his identity to Mr. Jones up until the day of trial on October 17, 2002. The evidence establishes that during this time he functioned as a competent APD and showed no eviden ce of c onfus ion or d isorienta tion in an y other asp ect of h is life. Judge Watts noted that Dr. Kroopnick was not able to produce a single test that verified that Respondent had low blood sugar during the relevant time period. She con cluded that Dr. Kroopnick s testimony (that Respondent s behavior in this case was caused by low blood sugar and a bad reaction to medication) was without merit. Respondent also presented the testimony of Dr. Adler, a psychologist who performed 8 a psychological evaluation of Respondent, at the request of Dr. Glass, a psychiatrist to whom Respondent had been referred after notifying Dr. Kroopnick of the insta nt case. Dr. Adler testified that diabetes, h istory of chron ic pain, finan cial stress, and d epression a nd anxiety contributed to Respondent s behavior in this case. He admitted on cross-examination, however, that he did not know how long Respondent had suffered from depressive thinking, and that he could not confirm that Respondent had depression or anxiety during the relevant time period. Dr. Adler also testified that Respondent had a somew hat bizarre over-attachment to his charity, but did not say that the attachment caused Responden t s behav ior in the instant c ase. Judge Watts noted that the testimony of Dr. Tellefsen, Bar Counsel s rebuttal witness, confirmed that Respon dent had a n obsessiv e attachme nt to his charity an d dysthymic disorder, or chronic depressed mood. Although Dr. Tellefsen testified on cross-examination that it was probably unlikely that Respondent would have engaged in the deceit if the matter had concerned any entity other than his charity, she did not conclude that any mental condition or disorder caused Responden t s behavior. In fact, as noted by Judg e Watts, Dr. Tellefsen testified that she was unable to find any mental condition that was impairing Respondent s ability to function at the time. Judge Watts concluded that the record did not establish that any mental health disorder caused Respondent s behavior. She also concluded that none of the other problems experienced by Respondent (car accidents, bankruptcy, financial stressors, pain and sleep 9 medication, diabetes, depression) caused his behavior in this case. The judge noted that the record establishes Respon dent s beh avior wa s motivated by his desire no t to interfere w ith his job as an APD, his belief that the case would be settled, and his desire not to appear as both a witness and the attorney of record. Respondent urged the court to find that his misrepresentations were not for personal gain, but for the b enefit of h is charity. Judge Watts declined to make such a finding, noting that InterMall had been funded almost entirely by Respondent and that the project did not generate a profit and was not generating enough sales to have been financially viable at the time of the law suit. Judge Watts also noted that the record reflected Respondent s recent histo ry of p erso nal f inan cial d iffic ulty. For mitigation purposes, Respondent also presented the testimony of his employer, Stephen Harris, Public Defender for the State of Maryland. Judge Watts found that Respondent had established that he performed his job as an APD in a conscientious and diligent mann er and M r. Harris is willing to have him co ntinue in the pos ition. Fina lly, Respondent presented evidence that Mr. Herman would have represented InterMa ll pro bono if Respondent had asked him. Judge W atts found that Mr. H erman s willing ness to h ave tak en the c ase did not mitig ate Res ponde nt s con duct. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Judge Watts concluded that Responden t violated MRP C 3.3(a)(1), 3.4(c), and 8.4(c) and Section 8-606 of the Criminal Law Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland. 10 Specifically, Judge Watts wrote: The Respon dent mad e a false statem ent to the C ourt whe n he filed the Comp laint, Amended Complaint and subpoena requests in the name of another attorney in disregard for his obligation to be truthful to the Court and thereafter in Court misled the tribunal to believe that he had not been impersonating the other attorney. The Respondent engaged in deceitful and dishonest conduct when he misrep resented his identity to oppo sing coun sel. In filing the la wsuit and in his representations and omissions to Judge Chiapparelli, the Respondent made false statements of material fact in violation of Rule 3 .3(a)(1), disregarded obligations to be truthful in violation of Rule 3.4(c), and engaged in conduct involving d ishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(c). In m isrepresentin g his identity to op posing co unsel, the Respondent engaged in dishonest and deceitful behavior in viola tion of rule 8.4(c). In addition, the Court finds that the Respondent willfully made a false entry in a public record in violation of section 8-606 of the Criminal Law Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland. II. Standard of Review This Court has original jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary matters. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Harris , 371 M d. 510, 539, 810 A.2d 457, 474-475 (2002). The hearing judge s findin gs mus t be sup ported by clear an d conv incing e videnc e. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 388, 794 A.2d 92, 100 (2002). Although we conduct an independen t review of the record, w e accept the hearing judg e s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Attorney G rievance C omm n v. Garfield , 369 Md. 85, 97, 797 A.2d 757, 763-64 (2002). We review the hearing judge s proposed conclusions of law de novo. Attorney Grievance C omm n v. Mclau ghlin, 372 Md. 467, 493, 813 A.2d 1145, 1160 (2002). 11 III. Discussion Bar Counsel filed exceptions9 challenging Judge W atts s failure to find specifically that Respon dent violated MRP C 8.4(b). M RPC 8 .4(b) provid es that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to comm it a criminal ac t that reflects adversely on the lawyer s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects. In view of the fact that Judge Watts found that Respondent willfully made a f alse entry in a pu blic record, in violation of section 8-606(b)(1) of the Criminal Law Article, we agree with Bar Counsel on this matter. The hearing judge, also, should have concluded that Respondent violated MRPC 8.4(b). Respondent filed a number of exc eptions , which we w ill summ arize an d addre ss. Respondent first lists a num ber of fac tual finding s that he believ es Judge W atts failed to make.10 They consist of Respondent s long history as an attorney and a discussion of his past contributions to the profession and to charity. They also include a discussion of 9 Bar Counsel s other exceptions refer to clerical errors in Judge Watts s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. These include the judge s reference to MRPC 3.1(a)(1) and 3.3(c). We have noted that the rules intended were 3.3(a)(1) and 3.4. In addition, on page 14 of the Findings, Dr. Tellefs en s firs t name is spelled Chris tine ins tead of Chris tiane. Bar Counsel requests that the record be corrected to show the name as Christiane. 10 We have said in the past that, [o]ur hearing courts duties are to consider all evidence properly submitted in the discipline process. Absent indications that such evidence is not consid ered, we p resume it was considered along with all the other evidence. Attorney Grievance Com m n v. V ander linde, 364 Md. 376, 38 5, 773 A .2d 463 , 468 (2 001). The mere failure to mention a particular fact in its findings, normally is not the equivalent of failing to consider it. Id. We keep that stand ard in mind while addressing Respondent s long list of findings he thinks should have been made. 12 Respondent s recent financial troubles and a statement that the Pub lic Defend er s office is willing to continue to employ him . Respon dent also cla ims that Jud ge Watts failed to make a finding that he had a bizarre over-attachment to his charity and that he has acknowledged that it wa s wron g for h im to rep resent h imself a s Mr. H erman . Judge Watts found that Respondent had been an attorney since 1966 and that he had never been the subject of a disciplinary proc eeding. Sh e also discu ssed his cha rity work, his financial difficulties, his e mployer s w illingness to reta in him, his ov er-attachm ent to his charity, and the fact that he called op posing counsel to ap ologize for pretending to be Mr. Herm an. Respondent also argues that Judge W atts should have found that his actions were not motivated by financial ga in or unde rtaken for a selfish mo tive, and tha t no individual or entity lost money as a result of M r. Goodman s actions, other than that InterMall was denied the recovery that it claimed. We see no reason why the record in this case requires Judge Watts to have made those findings. It is clear that the judge was aware of the relevant facts. Furthermore, there is no reason the judge should be forced to believe any testimony that Respondent acted completely u nselfishly. Judge Watts specifically noted that InterMall had been funded almost entire ly by Respond ent and tha t it was not generating enough sales to have been f inancia lly viable a t the time of the la wsuit. Judge Watts also noted that the record reflected Respondent s recent history of personal financial difficulty. She did not, howev er, find that Respondent s behavior was motivated by a desire for personal gain. Rather, she 13 discussed the fact that as an APD, Respondent would not have been permitted to represent InterMa ll without permission, the belief that he could get away with the deception because he thought h e would not have to appear in c ourt, and the desire to avo id being both a witness and an attorn ey in the ca se. Judge Watts then concluded that Respondent had logical reasons that motivated his dishonest and deceitful behavior. We cannot say that a refusal to find that Respondent s behavior was not motivated by a desire for personal gain was clearly errone ous. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Garfield , 369 Md. 85, 97, 797 A.2d 757, 763-64 (2002 ). Respondent also urges us to conclude that Judge Watts erred by failing to find that he did not ac t with intentional dis honesty when he took the actions that are the subject of this matter, and that he would not have taken the actions that are the subject of this matter but for the mental and physical cond itions from w hich he su ffered at the time he acte d in this fashio n. There w as sufficien t evidence in the record to support a finding that Respondent persistently pretended to be someone he was not and that he did so intentionally. In fact, on this record, there is no other way to see the actions of Respondent. He pretended to be a different attorney because he believed he was not in a position to represent InterMall himself. The record in this case does not require Judge Watts to have been persuaded that medical problems, emotional problems, car accidents, medication, financial difficulties, or bizarre over-attachments to his charity caused or mitigated Respondent s actions. The hearing judge is free to disregard eviden ce if it is n ot credib le. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. 14 Miller, 301 Md. 592, 607, 483 A.2d 12 81, 1289 (1984). It was not clearly erroneous for Judge Watts to de cide that R esponde nt acted with intentional dishonesty. In fact, as previously mentioned, Judge Watts noted that the evidence establishes that during this time he functioned as a competent APD and showed no evidence of confusion or disorientation in any other aspect of his life. Respondent asserts that Judge Watts should have found that Mr. Herman would have handled the case had he been a sked to do so. Judge W atts noted that fact but concluded that it did not mitigate Respondent s actions. We agree with the hearing court. The fact is that Respondent did not ask Mr. Herman to represent InterMall. Instead, Respondent pretended to be Mr. Herman, an act of intentional dishonesty that is a violation of the Rules of Profession al Condu ct. Fina lly, Respon dent conte nds that Jud ge Watts s hould have found that Respondent has been cooperative and forthcoming throughout the grievance process; that he has a reputation for hone sty, integrity, good cha racter, and co mmitme nt to charitable causes; that the acts in this case were an aberration; that he is fit to continue practicing law; and that the public would not be threatened by his continued practice of law. We do not think Judge Watts erred by refusing to make those findings. We have said, that intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the most important matters of basic character to such a degree as to make intentio nal dish onest c onduc t by a lawyer almos t beyond excuse . Honesty and dishonesty are, or are not, present in an attorney s character. Vanderlinde, 364 Md.376, 15 418, 773 A.2d 463, 488. While we recognize Respondent s long history of service in the legal profession , the actions tha t resulted in this d isciplinary matter w ere intentiona lly dishon est and canno t be igno red. In addition to his complaints that the hearing judge failed to make certain findings, Respondent also asserts that some of the findings the judge made are not supported by the record. The list of allegedly unsupported findings is 14 pages long. We find these exceptions to be without merit. Rather than repeating every one of the comp laints in detail, (some of which do not m atter to the outcome of this ca se),11 we will summarize them below. Respondent contends that the judge incorrectly fou nd that Re sponden t engage d in intentional dishonesty an d deceit bef ore Judge Chiappa relli when h e denied h aving been posing as Mr. H erman an d failed to advise the Court that Mr. Herman was not in fact the attorney of record in the InterMall case . . . [, and] knowingly made a false statement to Judge Chiappa relli in Chambers when he denied the accusation that he had been impersonating the other attorney. Res ponden t admitted tha t he was n ot candid with the judge about what had taken place and my filing the case in the name of David Herman. In the face of such an admission, we fail to see how it is clearly erroneous to determine that he knowingly made a false statement to the judge. In order to have made such a statement it was not necessary 11 For example, Respondent s first argument is that the court erred by finding that he gave a false answer to an interrogatory relating to David Herman s letterhead. Whether he gave a false answ er abou t the letter head d oes no t affec t the outc ome o f this ca se. Judge Watts s finding that he provided a false answ er to an interro gatory did not f orm the ba sis of her conclusion that he violated various rules of professional conduct when he intentionally misreprese nted his iden tity to opposing c ounsel an d then misle d the judge about it. 16 for Respondent to have stated exactly, for the last two m onths and until I arrived in cou rt here today, I was pretending to be David Herman and David Herman has no knowledge of this lawsuit. It is en ough that R esponde nt misled the judge into thinking that he was just standing in for Mr. Herman, implying that Mr. Herman was really the attorney who had filed the case. In doing so, Respondent violated MR PC 3 .3(a) (1) w hich proh ibits attor neys from knowin gly making a false statement of mate rial fact or law to a tribunal. He also violated MRPC 3.4(c) which prohibits attorneys from knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribun al. Respon dent had a n obligation to be truthfu l with opposing counsel and with the judge and he knowingly disobeyed that obligation. He also violated MRPC 8.4(c), which prohibits attorneys from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrep resenta tion. Respondent also argues that the hearing judge incorrectly found that Respondent must prove a mental disorder. Judge Watts did n ot make such a f inding. Rather, she noted that she did no t find any evid ence in the record to support Respondent s claims that physical problems, emotional problems, or any other host of problems he noted, caused or mitigated his behavior in this case. She also found that the evide nce did not support a finding that any mental health disorder caused or mitigated Respondent s behavior. We agree with her findings on those questions. As we have said: [I]n cases of intentional dishonesty, misappropriation cases, fraud, stealing, serious criminal conduct and the like, we will not accept, as compelling extenuating circu msta nces , an ything less than th e most serio us and utter ly debilitating mental or physical health conditions, arising from any source that 17 is the root cause of the miscond uct and that also result in an attorney s utter inability to conform his or her con duct in acco rdance w ith the law a nd with the MRPC. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 413-14, 773 A.2d at 485. In Vanderlinde, we refused to hold that the attorney s dysthymic disorder, or long lasting depression, was the cause of her dishonest behavior, or a reason for her to av oid disb armen t. Vand erlinde , 364 Md. at 387, 414, 773 A.2d at 469, 485 . Likewise , the record in this case do es not dem and or ev en suppo rt a finding that the most serious and utterly debilitating mental or physical health conditions caused Respondent s inability to conform his conduct in accorda nce with th e law and with the rules. As for Respondent s arguments that Dr. Adler testified that as far as his intentionality is concerned, I don t think he at that time was demonstrating that he was intentionally trying to m isrepres ent him self . . ., there is no requirement that the hearing judge has to accept that testimony as true or persuasive. See Miller, 301 Md. at 606-07, 483 A.2d at 1289 (noting that the hearing judge is free to disregard evidence that is not credible). In view of Judge Watts s findings that Respondent acted with intentional dishonesty and that he had logical reaso ns for eng aging in the dishonest behavio r, it is clear that she rejected Dr. Adler s opinion. It was not clearly erroneous for her to do so.12 IV. Sanction The appropriate sanction for a violation of the MRPC depends on the facts and 12 The same analysis can be applied to Respondent s argument that Dr. Tellefsen testified that Respondent s obsessive attachment to his charity had an impact on how he conducts his activities, and compromised his ability to conform to the rules he knew he should follow . 18 circumstances of each case, including consideration of any mitigating factors. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Awuah, 374 Md. 505, 526, 823 A.2d 651, 663 (2003); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. McC lain, 373 Md . 196 , 211 , 817 A.2d 21 8, 22 7 (20 03). Prim arily, we seek to protect the public, to deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, and to maintain the integrity of the legal Profe ssion. Awuah, 374 Md. at 526, 823 A.2d at 663 (quoting Attorney Grievance C omm n v. Blum, 373 M d. 275, 303, 818 A.2d 219, 236 (2003)). To achieve the goal of protecting the public, we impose a s anction tha t is comm ensurate w ith the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which they were committed. Id. Here the evidence shows that Respondent intentionally and willfully pretended to be Mr. Herman for a period of two months, in order to represent InterMall, an entity existing for the purp ose o f rais ing m oney for Respondent s charity. He lied to opposing counsel and misrepresented the facts to the district court judge. The evidence was clear and convincing that Respon dent intentio nally committed th ese a cts, a nd th is conduct ref lecte d on his h onesty, trustworthin ess, and fitne ss as a lawyer. Ju dge Wa tts found th at, [i]n filing the lawsuit and in his representations and omissions to Judge Chiappa relli, the Respondent made false statements of material fact in violation of Rule 3.3(a)(1), disregarded obligations to be truthful in violation of Rule 3.4(c), and engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(c). In addition, the Court finds that the Respondent willfully made a false entry in a public record in violation of Section 8-606 of the Criminal Law Article of the Annotated Code of Marylan d. In Vanderlinde, we held that disbarment was the appropriate sanction when an 19 attor ney, over a perio d of time, while working outside of the profession of law, misappropriated $3,880.67 from her employer for her own u se. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 381, 419, 773 A.2d at 46 5, 488. In tha t case we e mphasize d that disba rment ord inarily should be the sanction for intentional dishonest conduct. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 418, 773 A.2d at 488. Similarly, in Attorney Grievance Comm n v. White , 354 Md. 346, 731 A.2d 447 (1999), after a ban on private practice went into effect, we disbarred White, an assistant public defende r, for lying unde r oath (in a deposition and in a trial) about the extent of her private practice . White, 354 M d. at 350, 355, 731 A.2d a t 449, 452. As in the cas e at bar, White s actions violated MRPC 8.4(b), which provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to commit a criminal act that reflects adverse ly on the la wyer s ho nesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects. White, 354 Md. at 362, 731 A.2d at 456. Also similar to the case at bar, White s actions violated M RPC 8.4(c) (law yers are prohibited from eng aging in co nduct invo lving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation), and 3.3(a)(1) (lawyers are prohibited from making a false statement of materia l fact or la w to a tr ibunal) . White, 354 M d. at 363 -64, 73 1 A.2d at 457. We noted in White that a lawyer s act of dishonesty, fraud, or deceit might cause the public to lose confidenc e in other lawyers and the judicial system as a whole. White, 354 Md. at 364, 731 A.2d at 457 (citing Attorn ey Grie vance Com m n v. R ichard son, 350 Md. 354, 368, 712 A.2d 52 5, 532 (19 98)). We a lso said that cand or by a lawyer, in any ca paci ty, 20 is one of the most important character traits of a member of the bar. White, 354 Md. at 364, 731 A.2d at 457. We disbarred White and con cluded that [t]he very integrity of the judicial system demands that the attorneys who practice in this State, who represent clients in the courts, and who interact in judicial matters with the courts do so with absolute honesty and personal integrity. White, 354 M d. at 367 , 731 A .2d at 45 9. Judge Watts found that Respondent engaged in intentional dishonest conduct. That finding is su pported b y the record in this case . Mr. Goodman presented no ethical or legal justification for his intentio nally dishonest conduct. As previously stated, intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the most impo rtant matters of basic ch aracter to such a degree as to make intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost beyond excuse. Honesty and dishonesty are, or are not, present in an attorney s character. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 418, 773 A.2d at 488. Judge Watts also found one mitigating factor: namely, that Respondent performed his job as an assistant public defender in a conscientious and diligent manner and M r. Harris is w illing to have him continue in the position. We do not believe that Mr. Harris s willingness to continue to employ Respond ent is enoug h to permit Respondent to retain his license to practice law. Only in the case of compelling extenuating circumstances will we even consider imposing less than the most severe sanction of disbarment in cases involv ing dish onesty an d fraud ulent co nduct. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 414, 773 A.2d at 485. We reject Respondent s arguments, overrule his exceptions, and find no co mpelling e xtenuating circumstan ces. The a ppropriate s anction is disb arment. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE COSTS OF A LL T RAN SCR IPTS , PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-515(C), FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARY LAND AGA INST ELLIS HOWARD GOODMAN. 22

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