Ehrlich v. State Employees Union

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In the Circu it Court for A nne Aru ndel Cou nty Case No. C-2003-88915 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 138 September Term, 2003 ______________________________________ GOVERNOR ROBERT EHRLICH, ET AL. v. MARYLAND STATE EMPLOY EES UNION, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES ______________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Green e, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Wilner, J. ______________________________________ Filed: August 23, 2004 On January 14, 2003 one day before the end of Governo r Parris N. Glenden ing s term of office as Governor and four days before th e Constitutional deadline fo r his successor, Governor Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr., to submit a balanced budget for FY 2004 to the General Assemb ly a staff person in the Governor s Office, upon direction by the Governor, approved two memoranda of understanding (MOU) with the American Federation of State, Cou nty, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) that carried a fiscal impact to the State of approxim ately $100 million. The principal issue before us in these cross-appeals is whether those MOUs are effective and enforceable. We shall hold that they are not effective and therefore are unenforceable. BACKGROUND A general program of collective bargaining for Maryland State employees was inaugurated in 1996, when Governor Glendening signed Executive Order 01.01.1996.13. That Executive Order recognize d the right of Executiv e Branch employees to form or jo in employee organizations, bargain collectively, and engage in other concerted activities and, in furtherance of those rights, provided for the creation of appropriate bargaining units and the elec tion and certifica tion of e xclusiv e barga ining re presen tatives. The only substantive provision regarding actual collective bargaining was in the section that defined the term co llective barga ining. Th at provision required th e employer and the employee ex clusive barg aining orga nization to n egotiate in go od faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. It stated further that, upon completion of negotia tions, the parties shall exec ute a written memorandum of understanding incorporating the terms of any agreement reached, and, to the extent they require legislative approval or the appro priation of f unds, such terms shall be recommended to the Legislature for approval or the appropriation of funds, as may be necessary. The term employer was not defined in the Executive Order. The order stated that the exclusive bargaining representativ es were e ntitled to mee t and nego tiate with the Governor or the Governor s designee in an effort to reach an agreeme nt subject to th e Gove rnor s appr oval, and it enjoined manage rial and supervisory employees fro m refusing to bargain collectively with the exclusive bargaining representatives. It did no t, however, specify who, in particular, was to sig n any MO U on behalf o f the State or a ny Sta te ag ency. The validity of that Executive Order was challenged, largely on the basis that there was no legislative authorization for it. We sustained the order, principally on the ground that [n]one of the provisions of the Executive Order, not one, makes or purports to make any agreement reached th rough the collective ba rgaining pr ocess con ducted by su bordinate administrative officials lega lly binding o r to divest the Governor, the General Assembly or other public officer of discretion given them by law. McCulloch v. Glendening, 347 Md. 272, 292, 701 A.2d 99, 108-09 (199 7). The order, we said, was not inconsistent with existing meet and confer provisio ns alrea dy in the S tate Co de, id. at 287-89, 701 A.2d at 106-07, and was within the general authority of the Governor as the Constitutional head of the Executiv e Branch of the State Govern ment. -2- In an effort to provide a more solid base for a colle ctive bargaining regime and not have it rest solely on an Executive Order that could be modified or revoked by subsequent Governors, Governor Glendening proposed legislation to the 1999 Session of the General Ass emb ly. The bill, which was enacted as 1999 Md. Law s, ch. 298, and took effect July 1, 1999, incorporated some features and provisions of the Executive Order but was far m ore extensive. In a thoroughly rewritten title 3 to the State Personnel and P ensions Article (SPP), it provided collective barga ining rights for Executive B ranch employees, reserved certain rights to the State, prohibited employees from engaging in strikes and the State from engaging in lockouts , set forth procedures for the election and certification of exclusive bargaining representatives and for the collective bargaining process, an d created a State Labor Relations Board (SLRB) as a unit within the Department of Budget and Management (DBM ) to adm inister an d enfo rce the la w. The bill was exte nsively amen ded durin g the legislativ e process. The provisions particularly relevant to the instant case are (1) SPP §§ 3-501 and 3-601, dealing with the collective bargaining process and MOUs, and (2) §§ 3-206 and 3-207, authorizing the Secretary of Budget and Management, by regulation, to define unfair labor practices and authorizing SLRB to investigate and take appropriate action in response to complaints of unfair labor practic es. As ena cted in 199 9, the law d id not apply to any institution of higher education but only to the p rincipal departments in the Executive Branch and certain other designated Executive agencies. In 2001, the Legislature extended the collective bargaining -3- provisions to the State universities and colleges and, in doing so, drew a number of distinctions between them and the other Ex ecutive age ncies, mostly in ter ms of w ho is authorized to negotiate, sign, and ratif y agreem ents. See 2001 Md. Laws, ch. 341. As we are dealing he re with M OUs in volving n on-collegia te agencies , we shall limit our consideration to the provisions relating to them. SPP § 3-501(a) requires the Gov ernor to des ignate one or more re presentative s to participate in the collective bargaining process on behalf of the State agencies. Section 3501(c) directs the parties to make eve ry reasonab le effort to co nclude ne gotiations in a timely manner for inclusion by the principal unit in its budg et request to the Gove rnor and provides expressly that they shall conclude negotiations before January 1 for any item requiring an ap prop riatio n of funds in the f iscal year t hat b egin s on t he fo llow ing J uly 1. Section 3-501(c)(2 )(ii) directs the Governor to include in the budget bill submitted to the General Assembly any amounts in the budgets o f the princip al units requ ired to accommodate any additional cost resulting from the negotiations . . . . Both § 3-501(d)(1) and § 3-601 contain provisions dealing with the execution of MOUs, some of which appear to be duplicative. Section 3-501(d)(1) provides that an MOU that incorporates all matters of agreement reached by the parties shall be executed by the exclusive representative, on behalf of the employees, and, for the State, by the Governor or the Governor s designee. Section 3-601(a)(1) requires that an MOU contain all matters of agreement reached in the collective bargaining process. Section 3-601(a)(2) requires that the -4- MOU be in writing, that it be signed by the exclusiv e bargainin g represen tative involve d in the collective bargaining negotiations, and by the G overno r or the G overno r s desig nee. Section 3-601(c) requires, in addition, that the MOU be ratified; it states that a memorandum of understanding is not effective until it is ratified by the Governor and a majority of the votes cast by the employees in the b argaining unit. (Emph asis added). The first MOUs between AFSCME and the State were negotiated and signed under the 1996 Executive Order. AFSCME was certified as the exclusive bargaining representative for bargaining units A, B, C, D , F, and H, a nd, in 1997 , entered into tw o-year MO Us with respect to those units covering fiscal years 1999 and 2000. In 1999, still under the Executive Order, the State and AFSC ME en tered into new MOUs for fiscal years 2001 and 2002. The MOUs covering th ose four year s are not in the record bef ore us, and we do n ot know who signed them f or the S tate. Governor Glendening believed that he may have signed the first ones, although h e was no t certain. Neg otiations for a n FY 20 03 MO U bega n in late 2001/early 2002, b ut, in the a bsence of an a greem ent on w age inc reases, the MOU for FY 2001- 2002 w as exten ded to c over F Y 200 3. According to Gerald McEntee, International President of AFSCME, he and Governor Glendening agreed to bifurcate negotiations with respect to a 2004 MOU to deal first with non-eco nomic issues and postpone negotiations on economic issues until after the general election in Nove mber, 200 2. By July, 2002, a ten tative agreem ent, in principle if not in language, had been reached o n the non- econom ic issues, but n o meetin gs took pla ce with -5- respect to economic issues until November 14, 2002, at which time the Governor, whose term of office would end in two months, apparently agreed to a 2% incre ase in wa ges for all State employees and certain other terms. Negotiations as to language bogged down, however, and a tentative agreement on an actual dr aft was n ot reached until December 13, 2002, when two MOUs one for bargaining units A, B, C, D, and F, and one for unit H were a pprov ed, but n ot signe d, by the c ollective bargain ing com mittees. The two MOUs were submitted for employee ratification on December 18, 2002 and were declared ratified on or abo ut January 13, 2003. On Jan uary 14, 2003, the MO Us were signed by the members of the collective bargaining committee. Signing For the State of Maryland were Charles M. Rhodes, Jr., chief negotiator, and Andrea M. Fulton, Executive Director of the Office of Personnel Services and Benefits, Department of Budget and Management. The MOU s had no sig nature line fo r the Gov ernor to ratify the agreements. They did, however, contain a signature line designated Approved By, and that was signed by Gen e Lyn ch w ho, u ntil n oon the n ext d ay, served as Governor Glendening s chief of staff. It is undis puted th at neithe r Gov ernor G lenden ing nor his succ essor, G overnor Ehrlich, signed the MOUs or made any other public pronouncement of ratification. The General Assembly commences its annual session on the second Wednesday of Janu ary, which , in 2003 , was Ja nuary 8. See Md. C onstitutio n, Art. III , §14. In the year following a Gube rnatorial electio n, the new ly elected Gov ernor is requ ired to subm it a budget for the ensuing fiscal year within 10 days after the convening of the General -6- Ass emb ly. See Md. Constitution, Art. III, §52(3). Governor Glendening had not submitted a budget to the 2003 General Assembly prior to leaving office and, indeed, at least as a practical matter, could not have done so. Govern or Ehrlich, in the belief tha t the State cou ld not afford the salary increases and other benefits provided for in the MOUs, not only never ratified the MOUs but declined to fund them in the budget that he submitted on January 17, 2003. When negotiations between AFSCME and the Ehrlich Administration regarding the MOUs failed to produce a satisfactory agreement, AFSCME filed suit in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County against the Governor, the State, the Secretary of Budget and Managem ent, and the SLRB for declaratory and mandatory injunctive relief. The union asked that the cou rt declare (1) th at the two MOUs are in full force and effect, (2) that Governor Ehrlich breached his Constitutional and statutory obligations by failing to request appropriations to fund the increases p rovided fo r in those M OUs, (3 ) that DBM breached statutory duties by failing to adopt regulations defining unfair labor practices and to provide administrative support to S LRB, a nd (4) that S LRB b reached its o bligation under the Administrative Procedure Act to adopt procedural regulations to permit declaratory ruling proceedings, and to investigate and remedy alleged unfair labor practice s. It asked, as w ell that the court dire ct the Gov ernor to req uest the necessary appropriations and direct DBM and SLRB to adopt appropriate regulations. After hearing argument on cross motions for summary judgment, the court, on -7- October 17, 2003, entered a memorandum opinion and order in which it concluded, in relevant pa rt, that: (1) By directing Mr. Lynch to sign the MOUs, Governor Glendening effectively ratified them, and that they therefore constituted binding contracts between the State and AFSCME; (2) In light of Maryland Code, § 3-205 of the State Government Article, which is part of the G ubernatoria l Transition A ct, Governor Ehrlich, in submitting his budget to the General Assembly, was not bound by the economic terms of the MOUs and was not required to submit an appropriation for pay raises agreed to by the Glendening Administration; (3) The M OUs w ere not sign ed and did not become fin al agreem ents until January 14, 2003, and therefore did not comply with the requirement of SPP § 3-501(c )(2)(i) that the parties conclude negotiations before January 1 for an item requiring an appropriation of fund s; (4) The Sec retary of Budget and Management had adopted procedural regulations governing petitions and proceedings for declaratory rulings; and (5) Althoug h the Secre tary was not required to adopt regulations governing unfair labor practices, AFSCME was not barred f rom proc eeding, in the instant litigation, to demand that they do so. Implicit in the first two findings is that, although Governor Ehrlich was not required to fund the economic provisions of the MOUs, the non-economic terms of those agree ments -8- were binding on the defendants. That point was made explicit in a subsequent order denying the defen dants re quest f or a stay. In that order, entered December 31, 2003, the court stated that it had relied on SPP §§ 3-501(d)(1)(i) and 3-601(c) in determining that the nonecono mic term s of the MO Us w ere bind ing. The defendants noted a timely appeal from the order, complaining that the court erred in finding that Governor Glendening had ratified the MOUs. Their position is that no ratification occurred a nd that, in the a bsence o f ratification, the MOU s were en tirely ineffective. AFSCM E filed a cross-appeal, complaining about the declaration that the Secretary was not required to adopt regulations governing unfair labor practices. By not pursuing the issue, AFSCM E has aba ndoned its argumen t that Gove rnor Ehrlich was requ ired to include in his budget appropriations sufficient to fund the economic terms of the MOUs essentially the 2% wage increase. We granted certiorari on our ow n initiative prior to proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals. 1 DISCUSSION Effectiveness of the MOUs The major issue at the Circuit Court level was whether Governor Ehrlich was obliged to fund th e wag e increa ses agre ed to by G overno r Glend ening. The defendants argued that 1 It appears that, prior to our grant of certiorari, the Court o f Special A ppeals did enter an order staying the Circuit Co urt order, although the intermed iate appellate court order is not in the record before us. -9- he was not so obliged for three reasons: (1) the MOUs were never ratified by Governor Glendening and theref ore never b ecame ef fective at all; (2) th ey were not, in any event, signed by January 1, 2003, which was a prerequisite with respect to any term requiring an appropriation; and (3) even if the MOUs were properly signed and ratified, in light of provisions in Article III, § 52 of the Marylan d Constitu tion and § 3 -205 of th e State Government Article, Governor Ehrlich was entitled to present h is own budget to the General Assemb ly and was not bound to include appropriations to fund agreements made by Governor Glendening. Although the court found that Governor Glendening had ratified the MOUs, it agreed with the second and third points made by the defendants and for those reasons denied relief with respect to the economic issues. The significance of ratification extends beyond the pay raise or other economic issues, for the effectiveness and enforceability of the non-economic terms those not requiring specific appropriations depends on whether Governor Glendening ratified the MOUs. Apart from the question regarding the duty of the Secretary of Budget and M anagem ent to adopt regulations re garding u nfair labor p ractices, that is the only live issue in the ap peal. The Circuit Court seemed to believe that the Governor could effectiv ely ratify the MOUs by directing a designee , in this case his chief of staff, Mr. Lynch, to do so in his stead. That does not suffice. Both SPP § 3-501(d) and SPP § 3-601(a)(2)(i) permit the Governor s designee to sign or ex ecute an M OU on behalf of non-collegiate State agencies. Section 3601(c) makes quite clear, however, that an MOU on behalf of a non-collegiate agency, even -10- though signed by the Gov ernor s des ignee at the G overnor s d irection, is no t effective u ntil it is ratified by the Gov ernor. It doe s not perm it ratification by a designee of the G overnor, but onl y by the Go vernor him/he rself. Section 3-601(c) was a new provision. There was no counterpart to it in the Executive Order. Because , as we ma de clear in McCullough, supra, 347 Md. 272, 701 A.2d 99, the Executive Order did not bind the Governor to do anything and did not serve to limit any discretion on his part, wh ether he ratifie d an M OU w as of no c onseque nce. If he o r, at his direction, some designee signed an MOU that required appropriations or statutory changes to implement and the Governor later decided not to request such appropriations or changes, he cou ld not b e com pelled to do so. The statute, a t least on its face, does purport to limit the Governor s discretion. Section 3-501(c)(2)(ii) requires that [i]n the b udget bill subm itted to the Ge nera l Ass emb ly, the Governor shall include any amounts in the budgets of the principal units required to accomm odate any additional cost resu lting fro m the n egotiatio ns . . . . Given that statutory mandate which, coupled with the Constitutional mandate of Art. III, § 52(4)(g) of the Maryland Constitution , would se em to require at least the incumbent Governor during whose term of office the MOU was signed to include appropriations to fund the MOU provisions, the Legislature obviously w anted to make certain that the Governor personally understood and approve d what w as in any M OU sig ned at his dire ction. It may well be that, if the Governor personally signs an MOU rather than having it signed by some designee, his act -11- of personally signing it will suffice as a ratification, but that is not what occurred here and we need not rule on that point in this case. Clearly, when the Governor does not sign the MOU, a separate ratification by the Governor is required. The question arises, then, of what is required for ratification. The term is neither defined nor described in the statute, but, because the term can be construed in a number of ways, depending on the context of its use, we need to focus on what the Legisla ture likely intended. Black s Law D ictionary gives tw o definition s of the term , one gene ric and one w ith particular reference to contracts: 1. Confirmation and acceptance of a previous act, thereby making the act valid from the moment it was done < the board of directors ratificatio n of the preside nt s reso lution > . 2. Contrac ts. A person s binding adoption of an act already completed but either not done in a way that originally produced a legal obligation or done by a third party having at the time no authority to act as the person s agent < an adult s ratification of a contract signed during childhood is necessary to make the contrac t enforc eable > . B LACK S L AW D ICTIONARY 1268-69 (7th ed. 19 99). The Restatement Second of Age ncy is generally in accord. It defines ratification as the affirmance by a person of a prior act which did not bind him but which was done or professedly done on his account, whereby the act, as to some or all persons, is given effect as if originally authorized by him. RESTATEMENT (S ECOND) OF A GENCY § 82 (1958). Although in some instances, ratification may be done expressly or by implication and may -12- be achieved orally, in writing, or even by mere acquiesc ence, in other instances mo re formality is required. In Sprecher v. Sprecher, 206 Md. 108, 114-15, 110 A.2d 509, 512 (1955), where the question was whether the grantor who had executed a deed while she was a minor had sufficiently ratified the deed upon reaching majority, we observed that [a]ll of the authorities see m to recog nize that there must be some positive act or declaration of an unequivocal nature in order to establish ratification. Neither general statements nor acquiescence sufficed. The context h ere, we think, requires some clear, affirmative, public act by the Governor. MOUs that embody collective bargaining agreements can affect the salaries or fringe benefits of 80,000 or more State employees. They can have enormous fiscal implications for the State and will like ly be a significan t factor in the Legislature s budget deliberations and, throug h those de liberations, in the establishment of public policy priorities. By requiring gubernatorial ratification, not required in the precursor Executive Order, the General Assembly no doubt w anted to m ake certain th at the Gov ernor not o nly fully understood the terms and conditions of the agreement but expressed his/her approval in an unmistaka ble and public manner a manner that could be documented in a way as to be beyond dispute. If, for whatever reason, the Governor chooses not to document his/her ratification in the mo st no rmal way, by signing the MOU, there must be some public act or statement of an equivalent nature. Nothing of that kind occurred here. Governor Glendening neither signed the MOUs -13- nor made any public pronouncement, following their execution by his designees, that he had read them and affirmatively ratified them. In deposition testimony, he said that Mr. Lynch had summarized the MOUs for him: He did get bac k and said , We hav e an agree ment. I said, G reat, and I said, What are the main issu es, and I reca ll specifically he went through them and said that they were all consistent, and I don t recall the details right now, but that s what he said, and that s when I said, Great, go ahead and wrap it up, which means do the f inal draf ts and sig n it. The Governor testified further that, in January, Mr. Lynch advised that it was done, and it ended the process as far as I was concerned, and he signed the contrac ts by authority as was to be the case. Although the record demonstrates that Governor Glendening personally discussed some of the main issues with AFSCME officials, gave general direction to his designees regarding those issues, and was kept apprised from time to time of the status of the negotia tions, there is sim ply nothing in the record to indicate that he ever actually read the MOUs once they w ere comp leted and sig ned or that h e took any clea r, positive step to ratify them. Accordingly, under the clear terms of SPP § 3-601(c), those MOUs never became effective. Adoption of Regulations The administrative aspects of the collective bargaining law for the non-colleg iate agencies are dealt w ith in SPP § § 3-201 to 3-210. As noted, the law created the SLRB as a unit within DBM . SPP § 3 -205 requ ires the Dep artment to p rovide adm inistrative supp ort -14- to SLRB . Section §3 -206 ma kes SLR B respon sible for adm inistering and enforcing the provisions of title 3 and authorizes it to establish guidelines for creating new bargaining units, establish standards for determining an appropriate bargaining unit, investigate and resolve disputes ab out appropriate bargaining units, establish procedures for and resolve disputes concerning elections for exclusive representatives, and investigate and take appropriate action in response to com plaints of unfair labor practices and lockouts. § 3206(b). Section 3-207 authorizes the Secretary of Budget and Management to adopt and enforce regulations, g uidelines, an d policies to c arry out this title wh ich: (1) defin e unfair labor practices; and (2) establish permissible labor-related activities on the work site. SPP § 3-207 d oes not, on its face, require the Secretary to adopt regulations, but states only that the Secretary may do so. That is true as well for the authority conferred on SLRB by SPP § 3-206 (b); it pro vides th at the SL RB m ay do th ose thin gs. There are certain provisions in the State Administrative Procedure Act (State Government Article (SG), title 10, subtitles 1 and 3) that perm it interested persons to prod agencies to adopt and interpret regulations. SG § 10-123 permits an interested person to submit to an agency a petition for the adoption of a regulation a nd requires the agenc y, within 60 days after the p etition is subm itted, to either, in w riting, deny the pe tition and state the reasons for the den ial, or initiate the procedures for adoption of the regulation. Section 10123 is part of Part IV of subtitle 1 of title 10, which contains certain special provisions dealing with regulations. Section 10-122 of that Article req uires each a gency subjec t to the -15- statute to adopt reg ulations to g overn pro cedures u nder this Pa rt IV of this su btitle, including the related forms that the unit requires and the instructions for completing the forms . Finally, SG § 10-304 allows an interested person to submit to an agency a petition for declaratory ruling as to how the agency would apply a regulation of the agency or a statute that the agency enforces to a person or property on the facts set f orth in the petition. Section 10-304(b) requires the agencies to adopt regulations that set forth the form for a petition and the procedures for submission, consideration, and disposition of a petition. On April 1 8, 2002, the Executive Director of AFSCME wrote to the Secretary of Budget and M anagem ent, noting, among other things, that AFSCME was interested in the timetable for the promulgation of regulations for the State Labor Relations Board operations and for Unfair Lab or Practices which are under the jurisdiction of your office and indicating concern about what procedure is in place prior to the implementation of thes e regula tions. It does not appear that the Secretary ever answered that letter. Aside from that letter and one or more requests for info rmation under the Public Information Act, there is nothing in the record to indicate that AFSCME ever filed or attempted to file with either the Department or SLRB a petition under SG § 10-123 for the adoption of a regulation or under SG § 10-304 for the i nterpre tation of a statute or regu lation. In its complaint, AFSCME alleged that SLRB had not carried out any of the tasks assigned by SPP §3-206(b) and that the Department had failed both to provide administrative support to SLRB as required by § 3-205 or to adopt regulations under § 3-207. Those -16- failures on the part of the Department, AFSCME complained, had prevented SLRB from carrying out its responsibilities . It asked that th e court dec lare those fa ilures to be contrary to law and to decree tha t the Se creta ry of Budget and Management and the State Labor Relations Board shall execute and perform their statutory obligations to draft, publish for public comme nt and pro mulgate re gulations co nsistent with Md. C ode An n., State Go v t § 10-304(b); and Md. Code Ann., State Gov t § 3-207. In response to those allegations, the Circuit Court noted, first, that the law did not require the Department to adopt regulations under § 3-207 but merely authorized it to do so. The court also pointed ou t that, in conformance with the requirement of SG § 10-304, the Department had, in fact, adopted regulations governing petitions for the adoption of regulations. See COMAR 17.02.02.01 and .02. The court also concluded, however, that AFSCM E s April, 2002 letter to the Secretary inquiring about a timetable for regulations sufficed as a petition under SG § 10-123 for the adoption of regulations and that [s]ince regulations were not adopted even though discretionary, it is not appropriate to bar AFSCME from p roceed ing in th is litigation . AFSCME complains that the court s literal reading of §3-207 as merely authorizing the adoption of regulations is too superficial. Absent regulations defining unfair labor practices, the union says, SLR B can not eff ectively p erform its statuto ry functio ns. AFSCME asks that we either construe the statute as m andatory or hold that the Secretary abused his/her discretion in refusing to adopt regulations. We find no merit in that argument. For one thing, -17- the Legislature carefully cast the Secretary s adoption of regulations in this regard as discretio nary, not mand atory. As we pointed ou t, in other statutes, the Legislature has directed agencies to adopt certain k inds of regulations by using the w ord shall. It knows how to fashion a true legislative m andate. H ere, with fu ll knowled ge of its intended scheme of splitting respo nsibility betwee n the Departm ent and the SL RB, it u sed the word may. If the refusal o f the Secre tary to exercise his/h er authority makes the implementation of the law more difficult, the Legislature is free to make the authority a duty or deal with the issue by statutorily defining unfair labor practices. We take issue as well with the Circuit Court s construction of AFSCME s April, 2002 letter as a petition un der SG § 10-123. A s the court n oted, the D epartmen t had in place regulations governing the filing of petitions for both the adoption of regulations and for declaratory rulings. See COMAR 17.02.02.01 and .02. Those regulations set forth who may file a petition, the form of a petition, and the manner of submission. A petition for the adoption of a regulation must contain, among other things, a brief statement of the regulation or ame ndme nt the pe titioner p ropose s. . . . COMAR 17.02.02.01.B. AFSCM E s April, 2002 letter did not come close to com plying with tha t requireme nt. It simply expressed interest in the timetable for the promulgation of regulations and inquired as to the procedure to be followed prior to the adoption of regulations. On this rec ord, we fa il to see what relief a court co uld properly order. -18- JUDGMENT OF CIRCU IT COURT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REV ERSED IN PART; CASE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO DISMISS COMPLAINT; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT. -19-

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