University System v. Baltimore System

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University System of Maryland, et al.v. The Baltimore Sun Company, et al. No. 138, September Term, 2002 HEADNOTES: MARYLAND PUBLIC INFORMATION ACT; CONTRACTS; THIRD PARTY CONTRACTS; PUBLIC DOCUMENTS Records evidencing a contract or agreement betw een a State employee an d a third party, which provides income to that employee and to which the State entity employing that employee is not a party, when the subject of a Maryland Public Information Act (MPIA) request, are subject to in camera review to determine whether they are financial information within the con templa tion of § 10-61 7 (f) an d, thus, n ot requ ired to b e disclo sed. Circuit Co urt for Prince George s County Case No. CAE02-06069 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 138 September Term, 2002 UNIV ERSIT Y SY STEM OF M ARY LAN D, et al. v. THE B ALTIM ORE SUN COM PAN Y, et al. Bell, C.J. *Eldridge Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia, JJ. Opinion by Bell, C.J. Harrell, J., con curs in part an d dissents in p art. Filed: April 15, 2004 *Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adop tion of this opinion. This case concerns a request to the University of Maryland, College Park ( UMCP ) for public records, m ade by The Baltimore Sun and Jon Mo rgan, one o f its sports reporters (collectively, the appellees ) pursuant to the Maryland Public Information Act (hereafter the MPIA ). The MPIA is codified at Maryland Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2001 Cum. Supp.) §§10-611 et seq. of the State Government Article.1 I. This case had its g enesis wh en the app ellees mad e a written M PIA requ est to the Athletic Department of UMCP seeking copies of the original and revised employment contracts for head football coach Ralph Friedgen. ... [and] any separate letters of understanding, side letters or similar documents specifying incentives, bonuses, broadcast agreements, athletic footwear contracts, and other matters concerning the terms and conditions of [Coach Friedgen s] employment and co mpensation. In response, U niversity Counsel disclosed that Coach Friedgen s annual salary was $183,920,2 and denied the remainder of the requ est, citing § 10 -616(i) 3 and § 10-617(f ),4 which prohibit the disclosu re 1 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references hereinafter are to these provisions of the State Government Article. 2 Ms. Andrews reported that Coach Friedgen s salary was originally $175,000 as of November 30, 2000. As of January 1, 2002, however, Coach Friedgen s salary was $183,920. 3 Section 10-616, as relevant, provides: (a) In general. Unless otherwise provided by law, a custodian shall deny inspec tion of a public r ecord, a s provid ed in this section . ... (i) Personnel Records. (1) Su bject to p aragrap h (2) of this sub section , a custodian s hall deny inspe ction of a p ersonnel re cord of an individual, of pers onnel a nd certa in finan cial info rmation . Dissatisfied with the UMCP s response, the appellees re tained cou nsel, who sought reconsideration of UMCP s decision to disclose only those documents related to Coach Friedgen s salary and to refuse disclosure of documents describing other employment related compensation due him. They argued that UMCP s reliance on §10-616(i) and §10617(f ) was f lawed becau se UM CP im proper ly and na rrowly in terprete d the term , salary, and, at the same time, improperly construed the term , personn el, broadly, both including an application, performance rating, or scholastic achievement information (2) A cu stod ian shall p ermit inspect ion b y: (i) the person in interest; or (ii) an elected or appointed official who supervises the work of the individ ual. ... 4 Section 10-617, as relevant, provides: (a) In general. Unless otherwise provided by law, a custodian shall deny inspection of a part of a public record, as provided in this section. ... (f) Financial information. (1) This subsection does not apply to the salary of a public employee. (2) Subject to paragraph (3) of this subsection, a custodian shall deny inspection of the part of a public record that contains information about the finances of an individual, including assets, income, liabilities, net worth, bank balances, financial history or activities, or creditworthiness. (3) A custod ian sha ll permit i nspect ion by the person in intere st. 2 incons istently wi th the b ias in fa vor of disclosu re recog nized b y the cou rts. 5 The UMCP was not persuaded and maintained its position. Responding to the appellees request for reconsideration, it wrote: Although we understand the MPIA s general construction favoring disclosure of public reco rds, we rem ain constrain ed by its specific prohibitions . With respect to the Baltimore Sun s request, the MPIA expressly requires us to deny inspection of Coach Friedgen s personnel records, as well as any part of a record that contains information about his finances, including income. (See §§10-61 6(i) and 10-617(f) of the MPIA). The only exception to these requirements is limited to his sa lary as a S tate em ployee. (See §§ 10611(g)(2) and 10 -617(f)(1) of the M PIA). With respect to salary, we have concluded, in consultation with the Maryland Attorney General s Office, that the MPIA requires the disclosure of the total amou nt of an emplo yee s Stat e earnin gs. Nonetheless, perhaps in an attempt to avoid the threatened lawsuit, Coach Friedgen 5 The appellees relied on an opinion of the Attorney General, 83 Op. Att y Gen. 192 (Md. 1 998), available at 1998 Md. AG LEXIS 35 (Opinion No. 98-025, December 18, 1998), in which the term, salary, was given a broad construction, to include records that reflect the earnings of government officers and employees, whether those earnings consist solely of a regular salary or are augmented by a bonus or performance award. The Attorney General reasoned: In our opinion, the General Assembly enacted the salary provisions of the PIA to en sure that me mbers of the public c ould find o ut how m uch pub lic employees earned. The term salary should be construed to help achieve this objective. Giving salary too narrow a construction would allow governments to secretly augment the earnings of public employees through bonuses and performance awards, contrary to the General Assembly's goal of holding a government publicly accountable for its compensation decisions. Under the PIA, to borrow a phrase from an Ohio court, the public has an absolute righ t to ascertain the earnings of its servants. State ex rel. Jones v. Myers, 581 N .E.2d 6 29, 631 (Ohio Com . Pl. 199 1). Id. at 194. 3 voluntarily agreed to provide addition al inf ormation about his com pensatio n. Accor ding ly, the UMCP disclosed the following additional information: Coach Friedgen receives a salary of $179,753 in 2001-2002. Also, he has earned the maximum amount of compensation for competitive achievement (ACC Championship and BCS Bowl), automobile allowances, radio and television appearances and app arel/endorse ment com pensation, w hich totals $762,000. The availability of student athlete academic achievement and citizenship bonuses is evaluated subsequent to the completion of the fiscal year. In the meantime and prior to receipt of the additional information voluntarily disclosed by Coach F riedgen, the appellee s made an other M PIA requ est of the U MCP Athletic Departm ent, this one seeking information with respect to the compensation and income of UMC P s head basketball coach, Gary Williams.6 The University responded to that request 6 The MPIA request relating to Coach Williams was significantly broader than that pertaining to Coach F riedgen. It sou ght: 1. All employment contracts and any revised contracts for head bas ketball coac h Gary W illiams togethe r with all attachments and amendments to any contracts; 2. Any contract or other record describing the payment of any incentive, bonuses, broadcast fees, athletic clothing or footwear fe es to Will iams by the Univers ity or a ny third pa rty; 3. Any report or other record of any athletically related compensation received by Williams from any source outside the University including but not limited to income, annuities, sports camps, housing benefits, complimentary ticket sales, television and/or radio fees, endorsements or consultation contracts with athletic shoe, apparel or equipment manufacturers; and 4. Any notices to the University or other record of any items described in paragraphs 1-3 or approval of the same by the Unive rsity. 4 as follows: Except for salary of a State employee, the MPIA requires State agencie s to deny access to personn el records an d financia l informatio n of an ind ividual, including incom e. See § 10-616(i) and § 10-617(f) of the MPIA. Therefore, University of Maryland legal counsel has advised Intercollegiate Athletics to provide the following informatio n in respon se to your requ est. Coach Gary Williams receives a regular salary of $202,991 in FY 2002. To date, he has also earned $540,400 for competitive achievement (ACC Regular Season Champ ionship an d NCA A Natio nal Cham pionship), au tomobile allowance and radio, television and personal appearances. The availability of additional University compensation based upon student-athlete academic achievement and NCAA compliance is evaluated at a later d ate. His apparel/endorsement compensation is received directly from the apparel com pany. We must decline to provide you with copies of Coach Williams employment contract and/or any other records in the University s po ssession pe rtaining to other income, which Coach Wil liams may receive directly from outside sources (e.g., apparel/equipment endorsements, sports camps, consulting, speaking engagements outside the scope of the contrac t, etc.) Such do cuments would constitute personnel records and/or contain personal financial information other than th e salary of a Sta te employee, an d their disclosure is prohib ited und er § 10- 616(i) a nd § 10 -617(f ) of the M PIA. Thus, UMC P reaffirmed its previously communicated interpretation of the MPIA and, acco rdingly, refused to disclose an y information relating to Coach W illiams non-U niversity related incom e. Nor did it d isclose a cop y of Coach William s U niversity contrac t. The app ellees filed su it in the Cir cuit C ourt for P rince Ge orge s Co unty, naming as defenda nts the Unive rsity System of Maryland, Deborah A Yow, Ph.D, the athletic director at UMCP, and David Haglund, the assistant director of Intercollegiate Athletics at UMCP (collectively, the appellants or the University ). The parties filed cross-motions for 5 summary judgment, at the center of which was the question whether the University was required to disclose, not only each coach s total salary from the University, but, the underlying contracts an d agreem ents relating to each coach s income. The appellants argued that the plain language of the applicable sections of the MPIA statute requires state agencies to deny disclosure of a state employee s personnel and financial records, with a narrow exception for salary derived from State funds. The appellees, on the other hand, maintained that the records sought w ere subject to the mandatory disclosure requirements of the M PIA and that the appella nt s interpretatio n accord s broad sec recy to the terms of a state employee s compensation co ntrary to the MPIA s m andate that the salary of public employees should be a matter of public record. The trial court found in favor of the appellees. It reasoned: the legislature has directed that the MPIA shall be construed in favor of permitting inspection of public records; the term salary unambiguously is included in the definition of public record in § 10611(g)(2); the financial records exclusion contained in § 10-617(f) does not apply to the salary of a public em ployee; and, sa lary related docu ments are n ot personn el records w ithin the meaning of the statute. C onsequently, the trial court granted the app ellees motion for summary judg men t and denied th e app ellan ts cr oss-motion. A ccor ding ly, the court ordered that the records requested by the appellees be produced.7 The court instructed that, to the 7 The trial court s order listed the records to be disclosed, as follows: a. The original and revised employment contract for head football coach Ralph Friedgen; 6 extent that sala ry information and personnel records coexist in the same document, the personnel informatio n should be redacte d before th e records a re delivered to the appellees. The appellants moved to alter or amend the judgment, in an attempt to have any references to payments to the coaches from third parties deleted from the court s order. They argued, in that regard, that such payments did not constitute salary of a public employee and pointed out that the appellee s requested informatio n only about payments to the coaches by the State U niversity from public funds and indicated that the records it sought did not reveal anything about the coaches personal finances other than how much taxpayer money b. Any separate letter of understanding, side letters or similar documents specifying incentives, bonuses, broadcast arrangements, athletic footw ear contracts and other m atters concerning the terms a nd conditions of C oach Friedgen s employment and compensation; c. All employment contracts and any revised contracts for head bas ketball coac h Gary W illiams togethe r with all attachmen ts and ame ndments to any contrac t; d. Any contract or other record describing the payment of any incentives, bonuses, broadcast fees, athletic clothing or footwear to Will iams by the Univers ity or a ny third pa rty; e. Any report or other record of any athletically related compensation received by Coach Williams from any source outside the University including but not limited to income, annuities, sports camps, hou sing benefits, complime ntary ticket sales, television and/or radio fees, endorsements or consultation contracts with athletic shoe, apparel or equipment manufacturers; and f. Any notice to the Un iversity of Maryland or other record of any item described in paragraphs []b-d of this order or approv al of the same b y the Un iversity. The order required th e disclosure to be mad e within thirty-one (31) days of the order. 7 they are paid from th eir pub lic emp loyment. The trial court denied that motion, whereupon the appellants timely noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Prior to any proceedings on the merits in th e intermed iate appellate c ourt, 8 this Court, on its own initiative, issued a writ of certiora ri. University System of Maryland v. The Baltimore Sun Co., 374 M d. 81, 82 1 A.2d 369, (2 003). III. We recently considered the applicability of the MPIA in Hamm en v. Baltimore County Police Department, 373 Md. 44 0, 455-456, 818 A .2d 1125, 1134-3 6 (2003). In that 8 Prior to this Court s grant of certiorari, the Court of Special Appeals entered an order re mand ing the c ase to th e trial cou rt for co mplian ce with Marylan d Rule 2-601 (a). Maryland Rule 2-601(a) provides: (a) Prompt entry Separate document. Each judgment shall be set forth on a separate document. Upon a verdict of a jury or a decision by the court allowing recovery only of cost or a specified amou nt of money or denying all relief, the clerk shall forthwith prepare, sign, and enter the judgment, unless the court orders otherw ise. Upon a verdict of a jury or a decision by the court grantin g other relief , the court sha ll promptly revie w the for m of the ju dgment p resented, an d, if approved, sign it, and the clerk shall forthwith enter the judgment as approved and signed. A judgment is effective only when so set forth a nd whe n entered a s provided in section (b) of this Rule. Unless the court orders otherwise, entry of the judgment shall not be delayed pending determ ination o f the am ount of costs. The Court of Special Appeals Ordered that appeal shall not be affected by the remand. By order da ted April 16 , 2003, the C ircuit Court f or Prince G eorge s C ounty entered an order pursuant to the remand and in accordance with the order of the Court of Special Appeals. 8 case, we commented that the MPIA requires that a custodian shall permit a pe rson. . . to inspect any public record at any reasonable time except as otherwise provided by law. Id., citing § 10-613.9 We explain ed that th e prov isions o f the. . . Act reflect the legislative intent that the citizens of the State of Maryland be accorded wide-ranging access to public information concerning the operation of their government. Id., quoting Kirwan v. The Diamondback, 352 Md. 74, 81, 721 A.2d 196, 199 (1998 ) (emphasis in original). Mo reover, we made clear that the MPIA is to be construed in favor of disclosure. Id., citing §10-612 (b).10 See also, Fioretti v. Maryland State Board of D ental Examiners, 351 Md. 66, 73, 716 A.2d 258, 262 (1998) ( <the provisions of the Public Information Act reflect the legislative intent that citizens of the State of Maryland be accorded wide-ran ging acce ss to public information concerning the operation of their government. ), quoting A.S. Abell Publishing 9 § 10-613. Inspection of public records. (a) In general. Except as otherwise provided by law, a custodian shall permit a person or governmental unit to inspect any public record at any reasonable time. 10 Section 10-612, General right to information, as relevant, provides: (a) General right to information. All persons are entitled to have access to inf ormation a bout the af fairs of go vernmen t and the of ficial acts of public officials and employees. (b) General construction. To carry ou t the right set fo rth in subsection (a) of this section, unless an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of a person in interest would result, this Part III of this subtitle shall be construed in favor of permitting inspection of a public record, with the least cost and least delay to the person or governmental unit that requests the inspec tion. ... 9 Co. v. Mezz anote, 297 Md. 26, 32, 464 A.2d 1068, 1071 (1983) (the provisions of the statute must be liberally construed . . . in order to effectuate the Pu blic Information Ac t s broad remedial purpose ); Cranfor d v. Mo ntgomery C ounty, 300 Md. 759, 771, 481 A.2d 221, 227 (1984); Faulk v. State s Attorney for Harford County, 299 Md. 493, 506-507, 474 A.2d 880, 887 (1984). To be sure, the parties do not dispu te that the records sought by the appellees are public reco rds. T hey dispute only whether those records fall within the category of docume nts and/or information that the statu te ma ndatorily i nstru cts a custodia n to d eny, 11 or permit, inspection. As a preliminary matter, it is important to note the differences in the docume nts requested by the appellees and how these documents came to be public records. Both Coach Friedgen and Coach Williams are employees of the University of Maryland, College Park, a part of the University System of Maryland, an instrumentality of the State of Maryland. Conseq uently, both coaches are employees o f the state of Maryland. Both also 11 § 10-615. Required denials In general. A custodian shall deny inspection of a public record or any part of a public record if: (1) by law, the public record is privileged or confidential; or (2) the inspection would be contrary to: (i) a State statute; (ii) a federal statute or a regulation that is issued under the statute and has the force of law; (iii) the rules adopted by the Court of Appeals; (iv) an order of a court of record. 10 have entered into written agreements with the University, outlining the terms and conditions, including salary, of the employment arrangement. These written agreements, and any amendm ents thereto, similar to other government contracts, come under the definition of public record as § 10-611 (g)12 defines it, as th ey originated as docume ntary evidenc e in the transaction of public business. Indeed, § 1 0-611(g) (2) is clear, a public record includes a document that lists the salary of an employee of a unit or instrumentality of the State government or of a political subd ivision. Cle arly, employmen t contracts on file with 12 Section 10-611 (g) provides: (g) Public record. (1) Public record mean the original or any copy of any docum entary material th at: (i) is made b y a unit or instrum entality of the Sta te government or of a political subdivision or received by the unit or instrumentality in connection with the transaction of public business; and (ii) is in any form, including: 1. a card; 2. a computerized record; 3. correspondence; 4. a drawing; 5. film or microfilm; 6. a form; 7. a map; 8. a photog raph or ph otostat; 9. a recording; 10. a tape. (2) Public record includes a document that list the salary of an employee of a unit or instrumentality of the State government or of a political subdivision. (3) Public record does not include a digital photographic image or signature of an individual, or the actual stored data thereof, recorded by the Motor Vehic le Adm inistratio n. ... 11 the University are public records. The University is a member of the National Collegiate Athletic Association ( NCAA ).13 Pursuant to NCAA regulations, contractual agreements between a member institution and its athletic coaches, and hence between UMCP and both coaches in this case, must include an express stipulation that NCAA Enforcement Provisions shall apply to the terms of the employment contract. § 11.2.1.14 Violatio ns of these pro visio ns by a coach, it is further stipulated, can result in disciplinary or corrective action, including suspension without pay and term ination, for se rious and d eliberate violation of N CAA regulati ons. § 11.2.1.1.15 In addition, the NC AA b ylaws, see §11.2.2, pro vides that an athletic coach must report annually to the member institution the sources of his or her athletically related income from third parties.16 To be sure, therefore, coaches may earn supplemental pay, § 11.01.7,17 13 The NCA A is a voluntary association of about 1,200 colleges and universities, athletic conferences and sports organization devoted to the sound administration of intercollegiate athletics. NCAA Online, (July 25, 2002) available at http://ncaa,org /about/wh at_is_the_n caa.html. 14 Stipulati on T hat N CA A Enforcem ent P rovision s Ap ply. Contractu al agreem ents or appoin tments betw een a coa ch and an institution shall in clude the stip ulation that a coach who is found in violation of NCAA regulations shall be subject to disciplinary or corrective action as set forth in the provisions of the NCAA enforcement procedures. 15 Termina tion of Em ployment. Contractual agreements or appointments between a coach and an institution shall include the stipulation that the coach my be suspended for a period of time, without pay, or that the coach s employment may be terminated if the coach is found to be involved in deliberate and serious violations of NCAA regulations. 16 Section 11.2.2 of the NCAA B ylaws reads: 11.2.2 Athletically Related Income. Contractual agreements, including 12 see § 11.3.2.1 ( A staff member may earn income in addition to the institutional salary by performing services for outside groups ); however, the NCAA recognizes the institution s letters of appointment, between a full-time or part-time athletic department staff membe r (excluding secretarial or c lerical person nel) and an institution shall include a stipulation that the staff member is required to provide a written detailed account annually to the chief executive officer for all athletically related income and bene fits from so urces outsid e the institution. In addition, the a pproval o f all athletically related income and benef its shall be consistent with the institution s policy related to o utside incom e and ben efits applicab le to applicab le to all fulltime or part-time employees. Sources of such income shall include, but are not limited to, the following: (Revised 1/10/92, 1/11/94, 1/10/95, 4/26/01 effective 8/1/01) (a) Income from annuities; (b) Sports camps; (c) Housing ben efits (including preferential housing arrangements); (d) Country club memberships; (e) Complimentary ticket sales; (f) Television and radio programs; and (g) Endorsement or consultation contracts with athletic shoe, apparel or equipm ent ma nufac turers. 17 The term supplemental pay is defined by NCAA Bylaw §11.01.7 as the payment of cash ov er and above an athletic department staff me mber s institutional salary by an outside source for the purpose of increasing that staff member s annual earnings (See Bylaw 11.3.2.2). Bylaw 11.3.2.2, in turn, provides: 11.3.2.2 Supplemental Pay. An outside source is prohibited from paying or regularly supplementing an athletic department staff member s annual salary and from arranging to supplement that salary for an unspecified achievem ent. This inclu des the do nation of c ash from outside sou rces to the institution earmarked for the staff member s salary or supplemental income. It w ould be pe rmissible fo r an outside source to d onate fun ds to the institution to be used as determined by the institution, and it would be permissible for the institution, at its sole discretion, to use such funds to pay or supp lemen t a staff m embe r s salary. 13 control of the c oache s emp loyment a nd sala ry, see § 11.3.1,18 by both limiting and prohibiting the source of, and how, supplemental pay may be earned. Section § 11.3.2.2, for example, prohibits [a]n outside source ... from paying or regularly supplementing an athletic department staff member s annual salary and from arranging to supplement that salary for an u nspeci fied ac hievem ent. Sim ilarly, § 11.3.2.3 limits bonuses to direct cash payment[s] in recognition of a specific and extraordinary achievement (e.g., contribution during career to the a thletic department of the institution, winning a conference or national championship, number of games or meets won during career/season), provided such a cash supplement is in recognition of a specific ach ievemen t and is in con formanc e with institutional policy. Additionally, An institution s coaching staff member may not promote a noninstitutional camp or clinic by permitting the use of his or her quotations and/or pictures in the camp or clinic brochure, unless that coaching staff m embe r is emp loyed by the camp . Bylaw § 11.3.2.6. Con sequ ently, pursuant to the NC AA rep orting requ irements with respect to the ability of athletic coaches to earn outside income, the University has come into possession of documents that contain references to contracts for remuneration, and other financial arrangements, between the coaches and third parties. These documents evidence, at least 18 Bylaw, § 11.3.1, Control of Employment and Salaries, provides: The institution, as opposed to any outside source, shall remain in control of determining who is to be its employee and the amount of salary the employee is to receive within the restriction specified by NCAA legislatio n. 14 purportedly, income in addition to both coaches state-provided salaries, i.e., in NCAA parlance, institutional salary, see By-Law, § 11.01.7, that is d erived from athletically related source s outsid e of the Unive rsity. Aga in, the do cume nts, as all parties agree, fall within the definition of p ublic record as defined in § 10-611 (g). The interplay between the NCAA reporting requirements and the MPIA, as it relates to state employees, is, as we have said, at the heart of the dispute sub judice. Without the NCAA reporting req uirement, the University, potentially, would not be in possession of the records the respon dent seeks . Or, if both c oaches w ere emplo yed by a private u niversity in Maryland, although subject to the same NCAA reporting requirements, the MPIA would not be applicable and the appellees could not compel their disclosure, since the MPIA does not apply to th e busin ess reco rds of a private e ntity. Whether, in this case, the records in the possession of the University need be disclosed depends solely upon the legislative inten t in enacting th e MPIA. That is a question of statutory construction, the principles of wh ich are w ell settled . Most recently, the principal canons of statutory construction, and those relevant to the decision of the case sub judice, were reviewed by this Court in Bank of America v. Stine, 379 Md.76, 85-86, 839 A. 2d 727, 732-733 (2003): [T]he primary goal of [statutory construction is] to ascertain and effe ctuate the intention of the legislature. Oaks v. Con nors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995). In order to discern legislative intent, we first examine the words of the statute and if, givin g them the ir plain and ordinary meaning, the statute is clear and un ambig uous, w e will en d our in quiry. Comptroller of the 15 Treasury v. Kolzig, 375 Md. 5 62, 567 , 826 A .2d 467 , 469 (2 003). As we have recognized, however, [a]n ambiguity may ... exist even when the words of the statute are crystal clear. That occurs when its application in a given situation is not clear. Blind Indus. & Servs. of Md. v. Md. Dep t of Gen. Servs., 371 Md. 221, 231, 808 A.2d 782, 788 (2 002). Therefore, a statutory provision may be ambiguo us: 1) wh en it is intrinsically unclear; or 2 ) when its in trinsic meaning may be fairly clear, but its application to a particular object or circumstance may be uncertain. Gardne r v. State, 344 Md. 642, 648-49, 689 A.2d 610, 613 (1997). Further, when the statute to be interpreted is part of a statutory scheme, . . . [we read it in context, together with the other statutes] on the same s ubject, harm onizing th em to the extent possible. . . . MidAtlantic Power Supply Ass n v. Pub Serv. Co mm n, 361 Md. 196, 204, 760 A.2d 1087, 1091 (2000). We also seek to av oid constructions that are unreasonable, or inconsistent with com mon sense, Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994), and we will presume that the Legislature intends its enactments to operate togeth er as a consistent and harmonious body of law, Toler v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 373 Md. 214, 220, 817 A.2d 229, 234 (2003), quoting State v. Ghajari, 346 Md. 101, 115, 695 A.2d 143, 149 (1997) (quoting State v. Ha rris, 327 Md. 32, 39, 607 A.2d 552, 555 (1992)), so that no part of the statute is rendered meaningless or nug atory. Id., (citing Gillespie v. State, 370 Md. 21 9, 222, 804 A.2d 426, 428 (2002 )); see also Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523-24, 636 A.2d 448, 452 (1994). In our endeavor to harmonize the provisions of all of the relevant statutes, this Court will prefer an interpretation that allows us to avoid reaching a const itutiona l questio n. East Prince Frederick C orp. v. Cou nty Board of Comm rs, 320 Md. 178, 182, 577 A.2d 27, 29 (1990) . Autom obile Trade Ass n v . Ins. Comm r, 292 M d. 15, 21 , 437 A .2d 199 , 202 (1 981). See Comptroller of the T reasury v. Olaf A . Kolzig, 375 Md. 562, 567-69, 826 A.2d at 469-70 (2003). At the threshold, we point out that the MPIA does not require the carte blanche, and unrestricted disclosure, of all public records. To the contrary, it clearly requires the custodian of public records, in some circumstances, to deny inspection of public records and disclosure of specific information, e.g. §§ 10-616 (i) and 10-617 (f), and, in certain other 16 circumstances, where disclosure would b e contrary to the public interest, § 10-618,19 gives the custodian discretion to deny inspection of parts of a public records. Moreover, the M PIA recognizes that an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of a person in in terest 20 is reason 19 Section 10-618, Permissible denials, as relevant, provides: (a) In general. Unless otherwise provided by law, if a custodian believes tha t inspection o f a part of a public reco rd by the applic ant wou ld be contrary to the public interest, the custodian may deny inspection by the applicant of that part, as provided in this section. * * * * (f) Investigations. (1) Su bject to p aragrap h (2) of this sub section , a custodian may deny inspection of: (i) records of investigations conducted by the Attorney General, a State s Atto rney, a city or county attorney, a police department, or a sheriff; (ii) an investigatory file compiled for any other law enforcem ent, judicial, c orrectio nal, or p rosecu tion pu rpose; . . . . (2) A custodian may deny inspection by a person in interest only to the extent that the inspection would: (i) interfere with a valid and proper law enforcement proceeding; (ii) deprive another person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication; (iii) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (iv) disclose the identity of a confidential source; (v) disclose an investigative technique or procedure; (vi) prejudice an investigation; or (vii) endanger the life or physical safety of an indiv idual. 20 Section 10-611 (e) defines person in interest as (1) a person or gov ernmental unit that is the subject of a public record or a 17 to deny insp ection o f a pub lic recor d. See § 10-612 (b). Read in its totality and in con text, it is clear that, in enacting the MPIA, the General Assembly was attempting to balance the right of the public to unfettered access to government records against the unwarranted invasion of the privacy of a person in interest, see §10-612 (b), that unrestricted disclosure would cause. Clearly, it is the threat of, and protection against, an unwarranted invasion of privacy that led to the exclusions found in §§10-616 and 10-617. Nonetheless, the Legislature has also instructed, and we have repeatedly affirmed, see Hammen supra, 373 Md. at 457, 818 A.2d at 11 36; Caffrey v. Dept of Liquor Control for Mont. Co. 370 Md. 272, 305, 805 A.2d 26 8, 287-28 8 (2002); Office of the Attorney General v. Gallagher, 359 Md. 341, 343, 753 A.2d 1036, 1037 (2000); Fioretti v. Md. State Bd . of Dental Exam iners, 351 Md. 66, 73, 716 A.2d 258, 262 (1998); Kirwan supra, 352 Md. at 96-97, 741 A.2d at 207, that the MPIA is to be construed in favor of permitting inspection of public records. designee o f the perso n or gove rnmental u nit; (2) if the person has a legal disability, the parent or legal representative of the person; or (3) as to requests for correction of certificates of death under § 5-310 (d) (2) of the H ealth-Gen eral Article, the spouse, ad ult child, paren t, adult sibling, grandparent, or guardian of the person of the deceased at the time of the dec eased's d eath. Being the subject of the public records sought by the appellees, both Coach Friedgen and Coach W illiams are per sons in intere st. 18 Our case law interpreting the MPIA s disclosure requirements is instructive. For example, in Hammen, a retired Baltimore Coun ty Police Officer, pursuant to an M PIA request, sought to inspect surveillance tapes taken of his activities. The videotapes were taken by the county to be used in a separate administrative proceeding related to the reevaluation of the officer s disability retirements benefits. Denying the request to inspect the videotape, the Baltimore County Office of Law opined that disclosure of the videotapes would be contrary to the decision in Shenk v. Berger, 86 Md. App. 498, 587 A.2d 551 (1991). In that case, the Court of Special Appeals addressed the issue of whether surveillance videotapes of an injured party, taken by the opposing party after the alleged injuries had occurred, w ere subject to Maryland s disco very rules. The intermediate appellate court held that they were, provided that, prior to disclosure, the party having to disclose is afforded the opportunity to depose the injured party. Shenk, supra, 86 Md. App. at 506-507, 587 A.2d at 556. In Hammen, the defend ant agreed to honor th e MPIA request, if Hammen would agree to be deposed in a separate proceeding, which he agreed to do. Nevertheless, we conclude d that Shenk was not a pplicable b ecause it inv olved a p rivate personal injury civil action a nd did not involve statutorily guaranteed access to public records by a party in interest Hammen, supra, 373 Md. at 452, 818 A.2d at 1133. We held that the rules of discovery applicable to circuit court p roceeding s are not, gen erally, applicable 19 in respect to MPIA proceedings, id. at 453, 818 A. 2d at 1133, explaining that an MPIA request is an attempt to gain statutorily guaranteed access to public information, not private information. Id. at 457, 818 A.2d at 11 35 (emp hasis adde d). Thus, ab sent some rule of law to the contrary, whatever rights the appellees have to compel disclosure and, convers ely, whatever rights the appellants have to deny disclosure, are embodied within the MPIA. Prior to Hammen, this Co urt add ressed th e scope of the M PIA in two ca ses, Office of the Governor v. Washington Post Co., 360 Md. 520, 759 A.2d 249 (2000) and Kirwan v. The Diamondback, 352 Md. 74, 721 A.2d 196 (1998). The MPIA request in Washington Post sought disclosure of the telephone records of the Governor of the State of Maryland for all phones in the Governor s Mansion (Government H ouse); his Sta te House offices; all phones in Shaw House (an annex office in Annapolis); all phones in the Washington and Baltimore offices; all car phones and cellular pho nes used b y the governo r and anyon e on his staff. In addition, the Washington Post asked to review the scheduling and appointment records of the Governor for a two-year period. Asserting executive privilege, the Governor s Office, denied the request, choosing instead to disclose only the aggregate cost of the telephone calls. In addition, it rele ased the G overnor s p ublic agen da, but refu sed to release the appoin tment a nd sch eduling record s, whic h, in its op inion, did not constitute public 20 record s. We addressed, as a preliminary matter, whether the provisions of the MPIA applied to the Gov ernor s off ice. Conclu ding that the statutory langua ge clearly encompassed. . .[the Governor s office] as a unit or instrumentality of the State gov ernment, this Court determined that records of the Governor s office are subject to the right of inspection guaranteed in the MPIA.21 We con cluded tha t there was n o statutory exclu sion in the MPIA for certain of the records sought by the Wash ington Po st and, acco rdingly, required their disclosure. More important, however, to the case sub judice, was the determination that phone records from the Govern or s Man sion, althoug h technically pro perty owned and paid for by the State and in the possession of the Govern or s office, did not come within the definition of public record, in light of one s reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her own home. 360 Md. at 537, 759 A.2d at 258. The Court explained: In light of the nature of Government House and the role of the Government House Trust, the Governor and his family might not have the identical 21 One of the dissents in Office of the Governor v. Washington Post, 360 Md. 520, 565, 759 A.2d 249, 574 (2000), argued that the Maryland General Assembly was precluded, by the doctrine of separation of powers, enumerated in the Maryland Cons titution, see Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights, Article II, Section 17 of the Maryland Constitution, from enacting laws compelling the Governor s office to disclose the nonpublic activities, such as appointments and scheduling of private interviews, of the Gove rnor. 21 expectation of privacy w hile living there as one ha s in his or her p rivately owned home. Nonetheless, we do not believe that the Governor and his fam ily must relinquish all normal ex pectations o f privacy in their h ome simp ly because, in accordance with constitutional and statutory provisions, their home and fu rnishing , includin g teleph one ser vice, are supplie d by the S tate. Washington Post, supra, 360 Md. at 537-38, 759 A.2d at 259. Thus, the determina tion in Washington Post, with respe ct to the Governor s h ome telephone b ills, turned on this Court s construction of those records as being in their nature private and, therefore, not being the kinds of records that are encompassed within the definition of a public record intended by the Leg islature. Id. at 538, 759 A.2d 259. Also at issue in Kirwan v. Diamondback, supra, was the scope of an MPIA request involving the records of parking citations issued by UMCP to student-athletes, and, coin cide ntall y, to the UMCP head basketball coach, G ary Williams. T he MP IA reque st, made by the campus student-ne wspaper, was denied by the University, the custodian of the parking citation records, on the basis that they were either personnel records exempt from disclosure under § 10-616 (i) of the MPIA or, in the alternative, financial information exempt from disclosure under § 10-617 (f) of the MPIA. This Court rejected both rationales. We concluded, instead, that a citation for a parking violation is, in sum, a charging document accusing the recip ient of a petty crim e, and the monetary penalty imposed for a parking 22 violation is a fine rather than a debt. 352 Md. at 87, 721 A.2d at 202. As such, we stated, such records did not constitute financial information as defined under the statute and, moreover, did not fit within the commonly understood meaning of the term personnel records. Id. at 83, 72 1 A.2d at 200. We also w ere not p ersuad ed by the Unive rsity s argu ment, pursuant to § 10-618 (permissive denials), that d isclosure of the records is against the public interest. Id. at 8788, 721 A.2d at 202-03. That argument was premised upon the, supposed, chilling eff ect disclosure would have on the University s obligation to self report NCAA violations. The Court concluded that the public interest argument did not fall clearly into categories recogn ized in § 10-61 8's perm issive de nials. Id. Fina lly, the University argued, citing §10-612, that disclosure of parking ticket records would be an unwarranted invasion of privacy because it would subject student-athletes and their families to extreme embarrassment and humiliation. 352 Md. at 88, 721 A.2d at 203. In response, we stated When an adult commits or is formally charged with committing a criminal offense, even a petty one, it is doubtful that a ny in vasion of privacy occasioned by an acc urate ne wspa per rep ort of th e matte r is unw arrante d. Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that one might reaso nably believe that such disclosure is an unwarranted invasion of privacy, the M aryland Pub lic Information Act does not contain an exemption for particular cases whenever 23 the disclosure of a record might cause an unw arrante d invas ion of p rivacy. Section 10-612 (b), previously quoted, related to the General Construction of the Act. It provides that the Act sh all be construed in favor of disclosure unless an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of a perso n in interest w ould result. The statutory construction issues raised in the present case regarding the Maryland Public Information Act concern the meaning of the terms personnel records and financ ial recor ds. As explained in P art II A and II B above, the records sought in the present case do not constitute personnel records or finan cial info rmation . Furthermore, we do n ot believe tha t a broader definition of these terms would b e justified under the statutory constru ction pr inciples set forth in § 10- 612 (b ). Id. at 88-8 9, 712 A .2d. at 20 3. Our cases thus instruct that, in a dispute relating to an MPIA request, a party s right to deny or compel inspection of public records is grounde d, almost, if no t exclusively, w ithin the Act. The express exemptions set out in §§ 10-616 (i) and 10-617 (f), are intended to address the reasona ble expec tation of priv acy that a person in interest has in certain types of records identified by the Legislature. To be sure, the M PIA expressly requires the disclosu re of a state-employee s salary as a matte r of pu blic reco rd. See § 10-611(g)(2) (defining a public record to include a document that lists the salary of an employee o f a unit or instru mentality of the State government. ) and § 1 0-612 . The appellants, while acknowledging that a document evidencing a state-employee s salary is subject to MPIA s disclosure require ments 24 (Petitioner s Brief at 7), maintain th at the emp loyment con tracts sought by the appellees are either personnel records or financial information exempt under §§10-616 (i) and 10-617 (f). (Petitioner s Brief at 8). With respect to the former, they reason: when § 10-616 (i) and § 10-617 (f) (1) are read together, it is clea r that § 10-617 (f) (1) does not trump the personnel records exemptio n. They po int out that the la tter provision re fers to th e subs ection, meaning § 10-617 (f). It does not refer to § 10-616 (i), which it easily could have done, had that been what the Legislature intended. The appellants also rely on 83 Op. A tt y Gen. 1 92 (M d. 1998 ), available at 1998 Md. AG LEXIS 35 (Opinion No. 98-025, December 18, 1998). In that opinion, the Attorney General, respondin g to an inqu iry from the C ounty Exec utive for A nne Aru ndel County concerning public access to records reflecting individual bonuses or performance awards paid to merit system employees and appointed officials of Anne Arundel County, concluded that the public is entitled to inspect records that reflect the earning s of governme nt officers and employees, whether those earnings consist solely of a regular salary or are augmented by a bonus or performance award. Id. He cautioned, however, that [t]his conclusion does not imply that the public has an entitlement to the documents establishing the ba sis for a bonus or performance award [,] for example, performance evaluations. Underlying records of this kind fall within the exemption for personnel records. Id. at 192 n.3. The app ellants 25 argue that the employment contract the University has with each coach is an underlying record of the kind to which the Attorney General made reference and, therefore, comes within the exemption for personnel records found in § 10-616 (i). (Petitioner s Brief at 11). So viewing the contracts for employment, they disclosed the salary information that the contracts authorized, but refused to disclose the contracts themselves. The appellants argum ent with res pect to § 10 -617 (f) is pre mised on the financ ial information concerning the coaches contractual and financial arrangements with, and thus payments from, third parties, being personal financial information and not a part of the salary the coaches receive from the State. They note, in this regard, that, while public record is broadly defin ed, the requ irement of disclosure is te mpered b y whether the law prov ides otherwise. Section 10-617 (f) provides otherwise, they assert, by prohibiting inspection of the part of a public record that contains informatio n about the finances o f an individ ual, including assets, income, liabilities, net worth, bank balan ces, financial history or activities, or creditwo rthiness. Th us, the appe llants subm it: [T]he plain language of the MPIA requires only the disclosure of salary and expressly prohibits the disclosure of income. Had the Legislature intended that State agencies disclose private income of an individual derived from any university asset, it could have easily so provided. But those words do not appear in the sta tute. ... The plain meaning of SG § 10-617 (f) (2) requires that a custodian deny inspection of a public record that contains information about [the] finances of an individ ual, inclu ding in come . There is no exception for 26 income derived fro m any university asset. (Citations omitted). The need to give effect to the plain language of the statute is not trumped, the appellants conclude, by the statutory direction to construe the MPIA in favor of perm itting insp ection o f a pub lic recor d. This court is not p ersuaded by the appella nts personnel records argum ent. Moreover, the MPIA clearly requires, as all of the parties agree, the disclosure of the salary of an employee of a unit or instrumentality of State government. § 10-611 (g) (2). That certainly would include the dollar amount paid. W e believe tha t the requirem ent must inc lude, in addition, disclosure of any document evidencing the employment arrangement and how the state-fu nded s alary is earn ed. A public record includes documentary material, in any form, made , or received, by a unit or instrumentality of Sta te governm ent in conn ection with the transactio n of State business. A contract between the University and the coaches of their athletic teams entered into after negotiations is the result of, and indeed, is, the transactio n of Sta te busin ess. While it may not fall n eatly into the defin ition of sa lary, a contract setting out the rights and responsibilities of each party to it and the circumstances and conditions governing the coaches entitlement to receive the salary is not only a document entered into, i.e. made by 27 and received by the Unive rsity in connectio n with the tra nsaction of public bus iness, but it certainly informs and gives context to salary. Indeed, the purpose of the MPIA , see § 10612 (a) ( all persons are entitled to have access to information about the affairs of government and the official acts of public officials and employees ), is better served when the full context in which the salary is due or paid is know n, i. e., fully disclosed. T hat is achieved only when the contract itself is disclosed. Thus, it is clear that the employment contracts evid enci ng th e reg ular salaries p aid to each coac h by th e Un iversity, and their obligations and rights, are exactly the types of records to which the Legislature intended the public to have a ccess. We are not persuaded that the employment contracts are themselves the kinds of underlying documents referred to by the Attorney General and argued by the appellants. They may establish th e basis for th e salary, for they state th e rights and obligations of the coach in order to earn the contractual remuneration, but they are not in the nature of a performance evaluation. Thus, under the legislative policy favoring disclosure of public records, we conclude that they do not fall within the exemption for personnel records found in §10- 616(i). Moreover, denial of inspection of the employment contracts would contribute to the lack of public understanding of the amounts earned by Coach Friedgen and Williams as a 28 result of their public employment and would thwart the achievement of the goal of the MPIA. We, therefore, h old that the em ployment co ntracts and a ny amendm ents thereto, side letters or documents reflecting the total compensation and sums of monies paid directly by the University to Coach es Friedge n and W illiams must b e disclosed . The terms of the employment contract are essential to an understanding of the salaries paid to the coaches, especially in light of the various alternatives for compensation potentially available to the coaches, supra note 8, in the form of car allowances, country club memberships, complimentary ticket sales, use of state-owned resources for clinics and camps, etc. Con sequ ently, the trial court correctly ordered disclosure of the reco rds eviden cing payme nts of state funds to Coa ch Frie dgen a nd Co ach W illiams. We reach a different result, one co ntrary to that reach ed by the trial cou rt, with respect to recor ds of f inancia l arrang emen ts betw een the coach es and t hird pa rties. There are, to be sure, b enefits that flo w from being the h ead footb all or basketb all coach at an institution lik e UM CP. As w ith any emplo yment oppo rtunity, there are both benefits and bu rdens. Along with status an d celebrity, these positions afford the individu als holding them with a wide array of business and financial opportunities. Often, these opportunities result in financial remuneration from third parties over and above that called for by, bu t nev ertheless con siste nt with, th e con tract with the U nive rsity. As employees of 29 the State of Maryland, Coach Friedgen and Coach Williams share in the burden with the thousands of other state employees whose employment terms and affairs are subject to the inspection requirements of the MPIA. To date, the MPIA does not provide an exception for head coaches who work at schools w ith NCAA programs. While it is true that the records evidencing these third party transactions are in the appellants possession, we must also note that these reco rds have come to be there only by virtue of the regulations governing the relationship between the University and the NCAA. Not only does the MPIA not require the University to collect these records, no Maryland statute requires the Coaches to provide these documents. None theless, balancing the public s right of access to the affairs of government and the caution against unwarranted invasions of privacy, articulated in §10-612, as manifested in the Legislature s exemption of certain financial information from disclosure pursuant to § 10-617 (f), we do not believe the records of the private business affairs of Coaches Friedgen and Coach W illiams, includin g contracts with third parties, unrelated to their public employment, are required to be disclosed. The situation may be different, however, when the contract with the third party, and the income flow ing therefro m, are so co nnected w ith, and related to, the coach s public employment as to be, in effect, authorized by, and thus, a part of, the University contract. Although, as articulated ab ove, the M PIA is to be construed so as to promote disclosure of 30 public documents, the General Assembly simply, and clearly, provided that a custodian deny the part of a public record that contains the finances of an individual, including assets, income, liabilities, net worth, bank balances, financial history or activities, or creditw orthine ss. § 10-617 (f) (2). There fore, the de cision wh ether it is appropriate to disclose the third party contract under the MPIA is one that cannot be made in a vacuum. Rather, to determine whether disclosure is appropriate, both the University contract and the third party contract w ill have to be re viewed in tandem. The University contract must be reviewed to determine whether, arguably, it authorizes or contemplates the third party contract or contracts similar thereto. And the terms of the third party contract must be reviewed in order to d etermine w hether the income d erived by that co ntract is closely connected with, and related to, the coach s employment with the University, to determine, in other words, whether, but for the c oach s em ployment w ith the Univ ersity, the third party contract would not have been made, or many of its terms included.22 The NCAA by-laws require that a coach must report annually to the member 22 That both coaches may profit, even handsomely, from these third party financial arrangements, by virtue of their employments as head coaches at UMCP, must be conceded, and, indeed may be a strong, even a persuasive argument for requiring the disclosure o f, not simply the salaries of state employees, b ut third party paym ents, as we ll, howev er the mere existence o f said com pensation is not determ inative of w hether it is proper ly disclose d unde r the M PIA. 31 institution the sources of his or her athletically related income from third parties, and thus, make the third party contracts relating to athletically related income important when discuss ing the U niversity s emplo yment co ntract w ith the co aches. We have also pointed out that, under the circumstances where public employment and remuneration, subject to the MPIA, and private employment and remuneration, not subject to the MPIA, intersect, the ability to comply with the MPIA is dependent on reviewing the contracts governing both in tandem. An unwarranted disclosure of private financial information can be avoided by the review being ma de by the trial cou rt in camera. During that in camera review, the court mus t construe the MPIA as the Leg islature enac ted it, and not give it a forced or strained mean ing. See Kolzig, 375 Md. at 568-569, 826 A.2d at 469470; Holbroo k v. State, 364 Md. 354, 364, 772 A.2d 1240, 1246 (20 01); Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 346 , 772 A.2d 1225, 12 35 (2001 ); Haupt v . State, 340 Md. 462, 471, 667 A.2d 179, 183 (1995 ) Brown v. State, 285 Md. 469 , 474, 403 A.2d 7 88, 791 (1979). If the court determines that Coach Williams is receiving payments from companies solely as a result of his position as coach at UMCP, and that the income is intimately connected to his activities as coach of UMCP, then that income is part of his compensation and subject to disc losure. Thu s, for instance , if the third party co ntract require s that the members of the bask etball team wear that party s shoe s or clothing during U MCP basketball 32 games, the court ma y find that the financial benefit to the coach is directly related to the coach s sta tus with the U niversity and, therefore, order the contract pursuant to which it is paid disclosed. On the other hand, if after reviewing the contract terms, the court is convinced that the payments the coach is rec eiving from the third party company, although prompted by his position as an NC AA coac h, and the University s coach in p articular,23 are not so conne cted with o r related to his activities as coach of UMCP as to render the contract proceeds a part of his official compensation, the contract is not subject to disclosure under the M PIA. 23 Coach Williams honors, for example, include: ¢ Naismith National Coach of the Year Finalist, 1995, 1997, 2002 ¢ National Coach of the Year, 2002 (Basketball America, CBSSportsline.com) ¢ Atlantic Coast Conference Coach of the Year, 2002 ¢ Victor Award, 2002 (National Academy of Sports Editors) ¢ Winged Foot Award, 2002 (N.Y. Athletic Club) ¢ Harry Litwack Eastern Coach of the Year Award, 2002 (Herb Good Basketball Club of Philadelphia) ¢ District Coach of the Year, 2002 (Basketball Times) ¢ Seaboard Region Coach of the Year, 1997, 2002 (Basketball Times & Easte rn Baske tball) ¢ Nationa l Coach o f the Yea r, 2001 (P laybo y) ¢ Atlantic Coast Conference Coach of the Year, 2000 (College Hoops Illustrated) ¢ Atlantic C oast Con ference C oach of th e Year, 19 98 (AC C Athlete Magazine) ¢ U.S. Olympic Team Selection Committee, 1988 See Unive rsity of M aryland O fficial A thletics O fficial S ite, Coa ches, available at http://umterps.ocsn.com/sports/m-baskbl/mtt/williams_gary00.html (last visited March 12, 20 04). 33 We conclude that the records evidencing contracts and agreements, to which the University is not a party, providing income to the coac hes and supplied b y third parties, must be view ed by the lower court, in camera, in order to determine whether they are financial information within the contemplation of § 10-617 (f) and, thus, are not required to be disclose d pursu ant to the MPIA . JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT F O R PRINCE GEORGE S COUN TY AFFIRMED IN PART AND REV ERSED IN PART. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT CONSISTENT WITH THIS O PINION. COSTS TO BE PAID ONE HALF BY THE APPELLANTS AND ONE HALF BY THE APPELLEES. 34 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 138 September Term, 2002 UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF MAR YLA ND, et al. v. THE BALTIMORE SUN COM PAN Y, et al. Bell, C.J. *Eldridge Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia, J.J. Concurring in part an d Dissenting in part Opinion by Harrell, J. Filed: April 15, 2004 *Eldridge, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case w hile an active membe r of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. Although I agree with m ost of the M ajority s reasonin g and con clusions, I resp ectfully dissent with regard to the Majority s reasoning that either coach s income received from a private contract with a third-p arty, outside of S tate governm ent, can som ehow b e so closely conne cted, intimately connected, or related to the coaches employment by the State as to morph into a part of the salary paid by the State. Maj. op. a t 30-33. Th e salary of a pu blic employee is paid by the State. The M PIA simply and clearly distinguishes be tween salary and income so that the privacy of the non-salary finances of an individual is protected against an unwarranted invasion. Balancing the public s right of access to the affairs of government against an individual s right to privacy, articulated in § 10-612, as manifested in the Legislature s exemption of certain financial information from disclosure under § 10-617(f), I conclude that the records of the private business affairs of Coach Friedgen and Coach Williams categorically do not warrant disclosure, let alone in camera examination. As is customary in matters of statutory interpretation, we begin by reminding ourselves of the pertinent rules of interpretation. The goal with which we approach the interpretation of a statute or ordinance is to determine the inten tion of the Legislature enacting it. County Council of Prince George s County, Maryland, Sitting as the District Counc il v. Dutcher, 365 Md. 399, 416, 780 A.2d 1137, 1147 (20 01) (citation o mitted). It is well settled th at the cardinal rule is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. To this end, we begin our inquiry with the words of the statute and, ordinarily, when the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, according to their com monly understood meaning, we end our en quiry there also. Where the statutory language is plain and u nambigu ous, a cour t may neither add nor d elete language so as to reflect an intent no t evidenced in that langu age, nor m ay it construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application. Moreover, whenever possible, a statute should be read so that no wor d, cla use, sentence or ph rase is ren dere d sup erflu ous o r nug atory. Id. (citations and formatting omitted) The language of the MPIA statute is clear and unambiguous. The plain language clearly states that salary must be disclosed a nd the parts of public records that contain financial information not relating to salary are excluded from inspection. § 10-617(f)(1) . M ERRIAM W EBSTER S N INTH C OLLEGIATE D ICTIONARY 1031 (10th E D. 1989) defines salary as fixed compensation paid regularly for services. As regards the financ es of an ind ividual, the General Assembly provided that a custodian deny disclosure of the part of the record that contains the finances of an individual, including assets, income, liabilities, net worth, bank balances, financial history or activities, or creditworthiness. § 10-61 7(f)(2). By enacting the MPIA , the Legislature expressly chose to exe mpt from disclosure public records that contain information about the personal finances of an individual, including income, that do not constitute salary paid by the State. The information that the University holds about the contracts between the coaches and third parties is financial information about income fro m outside sources that is no t part of the coaches salaries. Mo reov er, th ose d ocumen ts are colle cted by the Univers ity, not as part of any requirement of State Law , but in obeisance to NCAA regulations. The Legislature has not required the inspection of public records tha t reflect all sourc es of a State employee s in come it chose not to do so. I would conclude, therefore, that the recor ds eviden cing contra cts and agre ements providing income to the Univ ersity s coaches supplied by third parties, and to which the University is not a party, are financial information other than salary information under § 10617(f). Thus, thos e docum ents and the information c ontained therein are not required to be disclosed pursuant to the MPIA.

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