Nesbit v. GEICO
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In the Circu it Court for B altimore C ounty Case No. 03-C-03-008624 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 131 September Term, 2003 ______________________________________ RICHA RD NE SBIT v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY ____________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Greene, J. ______________________________________ Filed: July 23, 2004 On February 7, 2003, Richard Nesbit ( Nesbit ) w as injured in a n automo bile accident. Nesbit attem pted to reco ver person al injury protection ( PIP ) be nefits from his insurer, Government Employees Insurance Company ( GEICO ). GEICO rejected the PIP claim because Nesbit had no PIP coverage, having signed a PIP waiver on June 15, 1998. Nesbit sued GEIC O in the District Court of Maryland sitting in Baltimore County. The parties tried the case on July 3, 2003, and the Court entered judgment on behalf of GEICO. Nesbit noted a de novo appeal in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on August 7, 2003. The Court held the trial on Decem ber 1, 2003 . Nesbit did n ot appear f or the trial, but his attorney attended. A fter taking tes timony and hearing arguments, the Court entered judgment in favor of GEICO. Nesbit petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted on M arch 11 , 2004. The issue before this Court is whether Section 19-506 of the Insurance Article of the Maryland Code voids a PIP waiver that (by its own terms) remains effective until withdrawn by the insured in writing, if the insured s policy has been renewed and changed since the signing of the PIP wa iver. We hold that such a contract is permissible under Maryland law. Nesbit also questions whether the waiver form used by GEICO complied with the statute and whether the Court erred by finding that he had received a three-page waiver form from GEICO even though GEICO only produced the signed signature page of the form at trial. We hold that the fo rm used complied with the statute and that the Circuit Court did not err in finding that Nesbit had received the whole form.1 FACTS At the ti me o f Ne sbit s acc iden t (Februa ry 2003), he maintain ed an auto mobile insurance policy with GEICO. The renewal policy had issued on October 11, 2002, and covered the period from November 27, 20 02, through M ay 27, 2003. N esbit obtaine d his original policy with G EICO in 1998. O n June 15 , 1998, Ne sbit signed a waiver of PIP benefits, which included the following language: I affirmatively waive the benefits required by section 539 of Article 48A of the Maryland Insurance Code (PIP). I understand and agree that this waiver of coverage shall be applicable to the policy or binder of insurance described below, on all future renewals of the policy and on all replacement policies unless I notify the company in writing to the contra ry, with the effectiv e date of such change being no earlier than the receipt date by the company of my written notification. Nesbit s original policy with GEICO covered a 1992 Honda and a 1992 Pontiac. At the time of the accident, Nesbit s policy covered the 1996 Dodge Caravan that was involved in the accide nt and a 2000 T oyota. 1 Nesbit frames the questions before the Court as: Is a purported waiver of PIP benefits, signed by an insured, for an insu ranc e policy five years earlier valid for an insurance policy with new terms and conditions? Is a purported waiver of PIP benefits, which consists of the third page of an alleg edly three pag e docum ent that fails to comply with the pro visions of M d. Ins. C ode A nn. §19-506, a valid waiver? -2- As noted prev iously, Nesbit d id not appe ar for the trial in Circuit Court. He was, however, represen ted b y an at torney wh o agreed to stipula te to c ertai n fac ts. Th e atto rneys stipulated to the fact tha t Nesbit was insured by GEICO at the time of the accident, that Nesbit was injure d in the accid ent, that Nesbit signed the signature page of the PIP waiver on June 15, 1 998, and th at Nesbit retu rned that signed page to GEICO. Nesbit s attorney presented no witn esses. He argued that the initial PIP waiver signed in 1998 was no longer effective because Nesbit had renewed and changed his policy to include two different vehicles than were originally covered and the waiver form itself did not comply with the statutory re quirem ents. GEICO called Alice Hinkle ( H inkle ), the underwriting and sales manager for GEICO, to testify. Hinkle testified that GEICO routinely sends out a three-page PIP waiver notice form to insureds, the third page being the signature page admitted to by Nesbit. The first two pages contain information about PIP including who it covers, how much the premiums are with full PIP coverage, how much the premiums are if PIP is waived, the minimum coverage benefits, what losses it covers, and for whom coverage can and cannot be waived. GEICO did not produce the original or a copy of the form a ctually sent to N esbit. Rather, GEIC O offer ed a copy of a sample f orm into evidence, which was received. Hinkle testified that such a form would have been sent to Nesbit and that GEICO only retained the signatu re page the po rtion of the form that Ne sbit retur ned to th em. Hinkle also testified that the PIP waiver form used by GEICO has been approved by -3- the Maryland Insurance Administration. In support of this testimony, GEICO introduced a letter from GEICO to the Maryland Insurance Commissioner regarding the approval of various GEICO form s, including the Waiver of Personal Injury Protection form, which was attached to the letter. The letter, which was received as an exhibit, included a June 7, 1994, stamp from the Maryland Insurance Administration that says APPROVED. Hinkle testified that since the time that Nesbit signed the PIP waiver, his policy had changed to include two different vehicles than were originally covered. She also acknowledged that the rate that would have been paid for PIP af ter the policy cha nged w ould have been diff erent than th e PIP rate that w ould have bee n paid originally. This change was based on a numbe r of factors, in cluding the fact that the v ehicles cov ered wer e differen t. As previously no ted, Nesbit did not testify. There is no evidence that he ever notified GEICO in writing or otherwise that he intended to revoke his PIP waiver. N either is there any evidence that he sough t to obtain PIP coverage at any time after the initial waiver or that he ever paid f or the PIP c overage h e chose to w aive in 1998. Hinkley testified that the declarations page received by Nesbit in October of 2002 showed that he had option A for PIP coverage which, as explained by that document, meant that $2,500 of PIP benefits had been waived by the signing of the PIP w aiver. At the conclu sion of the tria l, the judge fo und that N esbit waived his PIP coverage and that the form clearly and concisely explains in the right type . . . the effect of the waiver, the nature and extent and cost of coverage that would be provid ed. It did all of th at. And as I -4- said, he signed the form a nd sent it back and the evidence is that the form that was used has been approved by the Maryland Insurance Commission. Regarding Nesbit s legal arguments, the trial judge stated: I ll incorporate what I said earlier whic h brings us up to this po int and the argument that the insurance companies must, in this case GEICO, tell the insured each renewal period that they can waive or not w aive PIP. I don t believe the statute requires th e compa nies to do tha t . . . . Why MA IF is singled out in these two statutes, I do not know the answer to that, but I do know that the form that was sent that has been approved by the Commissioner to, in this case Mr. Nesb it, told him that this waiver was ap plicable to all future renewals and all replacement po licies unless Mr. Nesbit notified the company in writin g to the c ontrary. The Circuit Court entered judgment in favor of GEICO. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION Md. Rule 8-131(c) provides that when an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will rev iew the case on both the law and the evidence. It will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witn esses. The deference shown to the trial court s factua l findings under the clearly erroneou s standard does not, of course, apply to legal conclusions. When the trial court s order involves an interpretation and application of Maryland statutory and case law, our Co urt must determine whether the lower c ourt s conc lusions are le gally correct under a de novo standard of review. Walter v. Gun ter, 367 Md. 38 6, 392, 788 A.2d 609, 612 (2002 ). -5- When interpreting a statute, we must determine the intent of the legislature in enacting it. Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128, 756 A.2d 987, 991 (2000). The rules governing the search for legislative intent are settled. Id. In Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of Maryla nd v. Direc tor of Finan ce for Ma yor and C ity Council of Baltimore, 343 Md. 567, 683 A.2d 512 (1996), we stated: [W]e begin our analysis by reviewing the pertinent rules of [statutory construction]. Of co urse, the card inal rule is to ascertain and effe ctuate legislativ e intent. To th is end, we b egin our inquiry with the words of the statute and, ordinarily, when the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, according to their commonly understood me aning, we end o ur inquiry there also. Chesapeake and P otoma c, 343 Md. at 578, 683 A.2d at 517 (internal citations omitted). We assign words their ordinary and natural meaning when interpreting statutory language. Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653, 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998), quoting Gardn er v. State, 344 Md. 642, 64 7-48, 6 89 A.2 d 610, 6 12-13 (1997 ). Section 19-505 (a) of the Insurance Article of the Md. Code requires each insurer that issues, sells, or de livers a moto r vehicle liability insu rance polic y in this State to provide PIP coverage, unless that coverage is waived in accordance with § 19-506 of the Insurance Article. Md. Code (1997, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 19-505 (a) of the Insurance Article. Section 19-506 (a) (1) states that [i]f the first named insured does not wish to obtain the benefits described in § 19-505 of this subtitle, the first named insured shall make an affirmative written waiver of thos e bene fits. M d. Cod e (1997 , 2002 R epl. Vo l.), § 19-506 (a) (1) of the -6- Insurance Article. Sec tion 19-50 6 (c) notes th at a waiv er made under this section is not effective unless, prior to the waiver, the insurer gives the first named insured written notice of the nature, extent, and cost of the coverage described in § 19-505 of this subtitle. Md. Code (1997, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 19-506 (c) of the Insurance Article. Finally, Section 19-506 (e) states that [a] waiver made under this se ction by a perso n that is insure d continuo usly by the Marylan d Autom obile Insura nce Fun d is effectiv e until the waiver is w ithdrawn in writing. Md. Code (1997, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 19-506 (e) of the Insurance Article. Nesbit argues that because Section 19-506 (e) only mentions waivers made by people who are insured continuously by the Maryland Automobile Insu rance Fund (M AIF), waivers made by people insured continuously by other insurance companies do not remain effective until withdraw n in writing. N esbit asserts tha t such wa ivers cease to be effectiv e if the insured s policy changes in other respects.2 Nesbit is unable to prov ide any statutory support for that argument because Section 19-506 is silent as to when a PIP waiver of someone insured continuously by a compa ny other than M AIF cea ses to be ef fective. To assist in interpreting this silence, Nesbit suggests that we compare Section 19-506 (e) with Section 19-51 0 (e). 2 In particular, Nesbit notes that when his policy changed (to remove certain insured vehicles from the policy and to add different vehicles to the policy) the premium costs for PIP would have been different. He argues that GEICO should have been required to notify him of those p ossible p remium chang es in ord er for h is waiv er to rem ain eff ective. -7- Section 19-510 covers w aivers of u ninsured m otorist covera ge and pr ovides in pertinent part, [a] waiver made under this section by a person that is insured continuou sly by an insurer or by the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund is effective until the waiver is withdrawn in writing. Md. Co de (1997, 2002 R epl. Vol.), § 19-510 (e) of the Insurance Article. Nesbit argues that because the Legislature included all insurers in Section 19-510 (e), and only mentioned MAIF in Section 19-506 (e ), they must hav e intended to exclude all insurers but MAIF from the provisions of Section 19-506 (e). In light of the plain language and legislative histo ry of Section 1 9-506, this argument fails and the comparison to Section 19-5 10 (e ) bec ome s unn eces sary. Paragraph (c) of Section 19-506 is the only part of that section that discusses when a waiver provided by any insurer is ineffective. Md. Code (1997, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 19-506 (c) of the Insurance Article. As alread y noted, that sectio n provide s that a waiv er is ineffective unless prior to the waiver, the insurer gives written notice of the nature, exten t, and co st of the covera ge desc ribed in §19-5 05 of th is subtitle . 3 By contrast, para graph (e) o f Section 19-506 plainly discusses MAIF only. To interpret the silence regarding other insurers in accord ance with Nesbit s su ggestion is illogical. While it is true that the PIP statute has a clear reme dial purpose and theref ore must be afforded a liberal construction, Sabati er v. Sta te Farm , 327 Md. 296, 299, 609 A.2d 3 As will be discussed la ter in this opinio n, GEIC O provid ed such n otice to Ne sbit. -8- 307, 309 (1992) (citing Sabatier v. State Farm, 323 Md. 232, 249, 592 A.2d 1098), we have held that the Court must take a commonsensical approach when construing a statute. Board of Trustees of the Maryland State Retirement and Pension Systems v. Harry R. Hughes, 340 M d. 1, 7, 664 A.2d 1250, 1253 (1995) (quoting Frost v. State , 336 Md. 125, 137-38, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994). We mu st seek to av oid constru ctions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense. Id. Even if one could interpret paragraph (e) to mean that a waiver made by a person insured continu ousl y by a company other than MAIF becomes ineffective in some way other than when it is withdrawn in writing, the langua ge of th e statute make s no sug gestion about w hat that o ther wa y would be. Nesbit suggests that a waiver made by a person in sured con tinuously by a company other than MAIF becomes ineffective when the policy is renewed and vehicles are removed and added to the po licy, causin g a diff erence in PIP p remium costs. T here is absolutely nothing in th e languag e of the statu te that requires or even suggests such an outcome. We will not divine a legislative intention contrary to the plain language of a statute o r judicially insert language to impose e xceptions, lim itations or restrictio ns not set forth by the legislatu re." Langston v. Langston, 366 Md. 490, 515, 784 A.2d 1086, 1100 (2001). Similarly, "[w]e ne ither add no r delete wo rds to a clear a nd unam biguous s tatute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature used or engage in a forced o r subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute's meaning." Taylor v. NationsBank, 365 Md. 166, 181, 776 A.2d 645, 654 (2001). Nothing in Section 19-506 prohibits an -9- insured and an insurance company from entering into a contract that includes a PIP waiver containing an automatic renewal provision. As a general rule, parties are free to contract as they wish. Van H orn v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, 334 Md. 669, 695, 641 A.2d 195, 207 (1994) (citing State F arm v . Nation wide, 307 Md. 631, 643, 516 A.2d 586, 592 (1986)). 4 The waiver signed by Nesbit included this statement: I understand and agree that this waiver of coverage shall be applicable to the policy or binder of insurance described below, on all future renewals of the policy and on all replacement policies unless I notify the company in writing to the contrary . . . . The fact that the policy renewals and changes would have caused a difference in the cost of the PIP coverage does not c hange w hat Nesb it agreed to whe n he sig ned the PIP w aiver. While we believe the p lain langua ge (and lac k of langu age) in Sec tion 19-50 6 fairly resolves the issue in this case, we do not read statutory language in isolation or out of context [but cons true it] in light of the legislature s general purpose and in the context of the statute as a whole. Forbes v. Harleysville Mutual, 322 Md. 689, 696-97, 589 A.2d 944, 947-948 (1991); see also Ridge Heating, Air Conditioning & Plumbing v. Brennen, 366 Md. 336, 350-51, 7 83 A.2d 691, 699 (2001); State v. Thom pson, 332 Md. 1, 7, 629 A.2d 731, 4 Of course, any part of an insurance contract that is contrary to Maryland s public policy as set forth in any statute, is invalid and unenforceable. Stearman v. State Farm, 381 Md. 436, 441, 849 A.2d 539, 542 (citing Jennings v. Government Employees Insurance Company, 302 Md. 35 2, 356, 488 A.2d 166, 168 (1985 )). In the case at bar, the language of the statute itself certa inly does not ind icate a public policy that would prohibit a contract providing for an automatic renewal of a PIP waiver. Moreover, as will be discussed further in the opinion, the re is n othing in the le gisla tive h istor y that i ndic ates such a policy. -10- 734-735 (1993); Atkinso n v. State , 331 Md. 199, 212, 627 A.2d 1019, 1027 (1993 ). Context may include legislative history and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal. GEICO v. Insurance Commissioner of the State of Maryland, 332 Md. 124, 132, 630 A.2d 713, 717 (1993) (quoting Kaczorowski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 632-633 (1990)). Moreover, when a statute is silent as to a particular issu e, it is appropriate for the Co urt to consider legislative histo ry. See Jones v. Prince George s County, 378 Md. 98, 111, 835 A.2d 632, 639-640 (2003) (reg arding a w rongful d eath statute that was silent as to standing and turning to the history of the statute and general Maryland choice of law principles for guidance); Comptroller of Treasury v. Clyde s of Chevy Chas e, Inc., 377 Md. 471, 513, 833 A.2d 1014, 1039 (2003) (regarding tax statute language that was am biguous a nd silent as to some matters and relying on legislative history and case law to resolve the question at hand). With these principles in mind, we turn to a review of the legislative history of S ection 19-506 (e). Section 539 of Article 48A of the Insurance Code was the predecess or to the current Section 19-50 6 of the Insuran ce Artic le. The Bil l Analysis for House Bill 616 (which modified Section 539 (f) of Article 48A in 1992 to include the language regarding waiver renewals of MAIF policies) sheds light on the question before us. In particular, the Bill Analysis states that the bill clarifies that a waiver of PIP coverage under a policy issued by -11- [MAIF] shall continue in effect until withdrawn in writing provided that the vehicle[5 ] has been continuou sly insured with MAIF by the person making th e waiver. In addition, the Bill Analysis described the issue to be dealt with by this change to the statute as follows: Cur rently, the Insurance Division has interprete d a waive r of PIP co verage to be effectiv e if the policy holder renews the policy and does not a ffirmatively withdraw the waiver. However, because MAIF policies generally run for 1 year and technically cannot be renewed, the policy holder must waive P IP each time a M AIF p olicy is rew ritten as a new p olicy. It is clear that the Legislature passed this predecessor to Section 19-506 (e) for the purpose of allowing MAIF to do what the other insurance companies had already been doing, that is, operating as if waivers of PIP benefits rem ained eff ective until they have be en affirm atively withdrawn by the insured. Because we know th at the Legislature knew that the other insurance compan ies were alre ady engagin g in this practice, it is nonsensical to argue that the amendm ent giving M AIF the sa me ability was intended to prohibit other unnamed insurance companies from continuing to engage in the practice. Earlier and subseque nt legislation ca n be cons ulted to determ ine legislative in tent. Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 385-387, 614 A.2d 590, 593-594 (1992). Therefore, as further evidence of the Le gislature s inten t regarding Section 19-506 (e), we note that the 5 In order to avoid any possible confusion on the matter, we note that the usage of the word vehicle in this context was incorrect. Instead, as is made clear by the language of the statute itself, the word used should have been persons. The statutory language of section 539 (f) (4) stated: A waiver m ade unde r this subs ectio n by persons continuously insured by the Maryland A utomob ile Insurance Fund shall be construed to be effective until withdrawn in writing. Md. Code (1957, 1992 Cum. Supp.), Art. 48A §539 (f) (4) (emphasis added ). -12- General Assembly passed a new amendment to the section in the 2004 session. Senate B ill 236, passed un animous ly by both the House and Senate and signed by the Governor, changed paragraph (e) to read: A waiver made under this section by a person that is insured continuou sly by the Maryland Autom obile Insurance Fund or the insurer is effective u ntil the waiver is w ithdrawn in writing. (Emphasis added.) The Fiscal and Policy Note of Senate Bill 236 pro vides that the bill has no ef fect excep t that it codifies the Maryland Insurance Administration s current interpre tation of the law . We agree with the Insurance Administration s current interp retation of th e law that a PIP waiver made by a person insured continuously by the insurer remains effective until withdrawn in writing. As discussed in Washington Sub. San. Comm n. v. C.I. M itchell an d Best C o., 303 Md. 544, 495 A.2d 30 (1985 ), legislative acq uiescence to the adm inistrative con struction of a statute gives rise to a strong presumption that th e adm inistrativ e interpr etation is correct . Washington Sub. Sa n. Com m n., 303 Md. at 559, 495 A.2d at 37 (citing Valentine v. Bd. of Licens e Com m rs o f Anne Arund el Co., 291 M d. 523, 4 35 A.2 d 459 ( 1981) ). In addition to Nesbit s contention that the waiver in this case is ineffective because his policy has changed 6 since the initial signing of the waive r, he argues th at the waiv er is ineffective because the form used by GEICO does not comply with Section 19-506 (d) of the Insurance Article. We disagree. Section 19-506 (d) provides: 6 We disagree with the factual premise that the policy itself changed. In actuality, only the coverage changed when vehicles were removed from the policy and other vehicles we re added. -13- (1) A waiver m ade under this section shall be made on the form that the Commissioner requires. (2) The fo rm may be p art of the insu rance con tract. (3) The form shall clearly and concisely explain in 10 point boldface type: (i) the nature, extent, and cost of the coverage that would be provided under the policy if not waived by the first named insured; (ii) each effect of a waiver as stated in subsection (b) of this section; (iii) that a failure of the first named insured to make a waiver requires an insurer to provide the coverage described in § 19505 of this subtitle; (iv) that an insurer may not refuse to underwrite a person because the person refuses to w aive the coverage described in § 19-505 of this subtitle; and (v) that a waiver made under this section must be an affirmative written waiver. Md. Code (1997 , 2002 R epl. Vo l.), § 19-5 06 (d) o f the Ins urance Article. A s previously noted, the form provided by GEICO contains information regarding who is covered by the waiver, how m uch the premiu ms are with full PIP coverage and how much the premiums are if PIP is waived, w hat occurs if PIP is not waived, the minimum coverage benefits, what losses it covers, for whom coverage can and cannot be waived, and a statement that if the insured decides not to sign the waiver, the insurance company may not refuse to cover the insured. Furthermore, the Maryland Insurance Commissioner specifically approved the waiver in question. A s we rece ntly stated in O Connor v. Maryland, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___ (2004), -14- An administrative agency's interpretation and application of the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts. Board of Physicians v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 69, 729 A.2d 376, 381 (1999). [T]he expertise of the agency in its own field should be respected." Id. O Connor v. Maryland, ___Md. at___,__ A.2d at___ (2004) [slip op. at __]. Again, we agree with the interpretatio n of the Ins urance C ommissio ner on this matter. It is clear that the three-page waiver form provided by GEICO satisfies the requirements of Section 19-506 (d).7 Nesbit also argues that the Circuit Court erred by finding that he had signed a proper waiver in this case in v iew of the fact that G EICO only produc ed the last page of an alle gedly three page document into evidence. As stated previously, we will not reverse the trial court o n ques tions of eviden ce unle ss the fa ctual fin dings a re clearly e rroneo us. M d. Rule 8-131 (c). Furthermore, we will give due regard to the Court s opportunity to judge the credibility of the witn esses. Id. GEICO presented the testimony of its underwriting and sales manager, Hinkle, who testified that it was GEICO s policy to send the three-page PIP waiver notice form to insureds, the third page constituting the signature page admitted to b y Nesbit. Hinkle also testified that she only had the signature page from Nesbit to offer because 7 As noted previously, we reject Nesbit s argument that GEICO was required to notify him of PIP premium changes that would occur when his policy was renewed and changed. GEICO notified Nesbit in accordance with section 19-506 (d) originally and Nesbit agreed that the waiver wo uld remain effective o n all future renewals of the policy and on all replacement policies unless he notified GEICO in writing to the contrary. Neither paragraph (d) of Section 19-506 nor any other paragraph of Section 19-506 requires GEICO to send out a ne w notic e of PI P costs every tim e a polic y is renew ed or ch anged . -15- GEICO does not keep copies of the actual waiver form sent to the insureds. Ra ther, they only keep the page that is returned by the insureds -- the signature page. The Court accepted a blank sam ple form in to evidenc e, without o bjection fro m Nesb it.8 Based on the review of the sample form, Hinkle s testimony, and the signature page signed by Nesbit, it was not clearly erroneous for the Cou rt to determine that Nesbit had signed a valid PIP w aiver. In conclusion , we hold that Sectio n 19-506 (e) of the Insurance Article does not invalidate a PIP waiver like the one in this case, stating that it remains eff ective until withdrawn in writing. In addition, we hold that the waiver form used in this case complies with Section 19-506 (d) of the Insurance Article and that the proof offered by GEICO at trial regarding the waiver was sufficient evidence on which to decide that Nesbit had signed a valid w aiver of PIP be nefits. JUDGMENT OF TH E CIRCUIT COURT FOR B A L TI M OR E C O U N T Y A F F I R M E D . APPELLANT TO PAY COSTS. 8 Nesbit had objected to the entry of a s ample form with the premium amount filled in by GEIC O, but did not object to the form that listed all the information described above, without any actual cost numbers. -16-
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