Consumer Protection v. George

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Consumer Protection Division v. Paris G. George No. 12, September Term, 2004 CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION The term affirmative action may be used to justify a variety of actions taken by the Consumer Protection Division when those actions are corrective measures that address the specific violations that are the subject matter of the Division s Final Order. The term affirmative action, however, will not justify all actions taken by the Division simply because they are in furtherance of the purpose of the statute. When an interpretation of statutory language is not supported b y the statutory language, history, relevant case law, etc., we will not uphold that interpretation. CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT AFFIRM ATIVE ACTIO N PERFORM ANCE BO ND the authority to order the posting of a performance bond in a consumer protection case is derived from the equitable juris diction of th e courts and its authority to gran t ancillary equitab le relief in connection with an injunction. The Consumer Protection Act authorizes the Agency to seek an injunction from the court when a cease and desist order proves to be insufficient in preventing continued violations of the Act. Th e Agen cy may apply to the c ourt for an order requiring the posting of a performance bond, however, it does not have the authority on its own to order such a requireme nt. CONSUMER PROTECTION RESTITUTION F INANCIAL D ISCLOSURES T he Consumer Protection Division is expressly authorized to order restitution and assess civil penalties against persons found to have violated the Consumer Protection Act. CL II §§ 13-403 and 13-410. It is also authorized to seek from the court an order of jud gment necessary to restore to a person any money or real or personal property acquired f rom him by mean s of any prohibited practice. CL II § 13406(b)(2). Once an order of judgment has been obtained the Agency is entitled to certain financial disclosures pursuant to the Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure, Md. Rule §§ 2-633(a) and 3-633(a). In the Circu it Court for B altimore C ounty Civil No. 03-C-02-008007 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 12 September Term, 2004 ______________________________________ CONSUMER PROTECTION DIVISION v. PARIS G. GEORGE ____________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Greene, J. ______________________________________ Filed: November 9, 2004 The issue before the Court is whether the language, to take affirmative action, found in the Consumer Protection Act, Md. Code (1975, 2000 Repl. Vol), § 13-101 et seq. of the Commercial Law Article ( A ct ), permits the Consum er Protection Division to ord er a person adjudicated in violation of the Act to post a surety bond before engaging in further business transactions and to disclose certain financial information.1 Our narrow holding is that § 13-403(b )(1) does no t authorize the Division to take affirm ative action either to require a violator of the Act to post a bond or to disclose financial information to aid the Division s enforcement of a cease and desist order. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit C ourt fo r Baltim ore Co unty. The Fa cts Paris George, ( Ge orge ), 2 is the sole proprietor of a company that sells durable medical equipment and other s upplies. H e operates o ut of his ho me unde r various trade names, including Allied Home Healthcare, Allied Healthcare, Allied M edical E quipm ent Co ., 1 The Division states the issue as follows: Did the Consumer Protection Division err when, pursuant to § 13-403(b)(1) of the Co nsumer P rotection A ct, it ordered P aris George, who had repeatedly taken substantial amounts of money from consumers for medical goods and related services that George did not provide, to take affirmative action consisting of the posting of a security designed to prevent reoccurrence of his past violations and the disclosure of financial information to facilitate redress of past violations? 2 Although George participated in the administrativ e appeal to the Circuit Court sitting in Baltimore County of the Division s Final Order, George did not participate in the proceedings befo re this Court either by counsel or pro se. Maryland Home Healthcare Services, Access Professionals, and Access Medical Equipment Co. He advertises in the yellow pages t he sale a nd rent al of du rable m edical e quipm ent, i.e., wheelchairs, scooters, and stairlifts, as well as sickroom equipment, i.e., hospital beds, bed rails, and bathing equip ment. His c ustomers a re seriously ill or disa bled peop le or their families. The ave rage cons umer paid George more than $800.00 for equipm ent while others paid as much as $6,0 00.00. In a hearing before A dministrative Law Judge Beverly Sherman Nash ( ALJ ), the ALJ found that George violated the Consumer Protection Act, Md. Code (1975, 2000 Repl. Vol), § 13-101 et seq. of the Commercial Law II Article, the Door-to-Door Sales Act, Md. Code (1975, 2000 Repl. Vol), § 14-301 et seq. of the Commercial Law II Article, and the Merchandise Delivery Law, (1975, 2000 Repl. Vol), § 14-1801 et seq. of the Commercial Law II Article. Specifically, the ALJ found that George engaged in repeated violations of the Acts by, among other things, failing to deliver the purchased items,3 claiming to be an authorized dealer of a certain ma nufacture r when h e was no t,4 failing to refund money after 3 In one instance, a customer contacted George to purchase a chairlift. After George met with the customer and her husband in their home in February of 1999, the customer contracted to purchase a chairlift for $ 2,650.0 0. The customer gave George a deposit of $1,886.50 representing two thirds of the purchase price and sales tax of $134.75. George gave the cus tomer a receipt in dicating installatio n wou ld take p lace in 3 0 days. After 30 days passed with no word from George, the customer repeatedly attem pted to get in contact w ith George. He never returned the calls. Finally, in May of 1999, the customer contacted the Attorney G eneral s O ffice and in Augu st George refunded the depos it. 4 George claimed to be an authorized dealer of the chairlift company, Bruno Independent Living Aids, Inc. ( Bruno ). Bruno, however, had informed George that they (contin ued...) -2- not delivering the product or after delivering nonconforming goods, 5 and charging sales tax on nontaxable items.6 He also failed to properly notify customers of their rights to cancel orders and to provide w ritten estimated delivery dates as required by law. W hen customers called to inquire ab out their orde red produ cts, their calls often went unreturned. When customers did reach a live person at Allied, the person often identified himself as Pat, an alias used by George, who informed them that George was una vailable or tha t he, Pat, wo uld check on their items and call them back, which he would fail to do. Based on the above violations, the Division issued a Final Order against George on June 24, 2002. George appealed to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, the H onorable John F. Fader II, presiding. The circuit court affirmed the order in the following respects: 1. Ordering George to cease and desist from violating Maryland law; 2. Requiring George to make m odifications to the contra cts used by him so as to comply with M aryland law a nd to 4 (...continued) would no longer do busine ss with him wh en he failed to pay for his initial equipment order with the comp any. Neverth eless, Geo rge continu ed to hold hims elf out as a d ealer and so ld seven Bruno chairlift s follow ing the n otificatio n from Bruno . The seven orders were never forwarded to Bruno. 5 In one instance George entered into a contract to p rovide a ho spital bed w ith a half rail and an extra wide wheelchair. He delivered a hospital bed with a full rail and a regular wheelchair. Despite repeated requests, George refused to deliver the conforming goods or refund the cus tomers mone y. 6 The ALJ found that George collected $9,832.92 in Maryland sales tax on medical devices that are not taxable. The mon ey was deposited in G eorge s regular bank account and was not forwarded to the Maryland State taxing authorities. -3- give fair notice to customers; 3. To provide refunds and restitution; 4. To require George to list his prior customers and the specifics of transactio ns with them, so as to identify and locate individuals who may be entitled to a refund from him, and to establish a claims process for those who are entitled to a refund; 5. To pay restitution in the amount of $32,510.92; 6. To establish a restitution account to be maintained by the Division for future claims against George; and 7. Imposing a civil penalty against George in the amount of $75,000 for violations of the consumer protection laws, and requiring that he pay the costs of the administrative proceedings in the amount of $4,357. The circuit court reversed the order of the Division with regard to the following two provisions: 1. Requiring George to post a surety bond in the amount of $30,000 for the protection of future customers; and 2. Requiring George to list his assets, sources of income, and a list of all transfers of assets or payments in an amount greater than $1,000 to anyone in the previous two years. In reversing the order reg arding the b ond, the circ uit court note d that: [w]hile the court is aware of the general remedial purpose of the statutes to protect consum ers, it is not convinced that the general right to fence in a person found to have violated the law includes the right to order the posting of a bo nd . . . . Where the Maryland Legislature has meant there to be a requirement for the posting of a bond, they have so provided as part of other -4- statutory schemes. With regard to the second issue, the disclosu re of Ge orge s asse ts and transf ers, the circuit court noted [t]he statute does not give that authority; the Division can point to no specific case law interpreting any part of the State or Federal consumer protection statutes as giving this authority, and no case law interpretation can be strained or b ent to say the au thority exists. On March 12, 2004, the court issued an order and monetary judgment against George in the amount of $111,867.92, representing the sum of the civil penalty, restitution order, and costs in the case. The Division appealed the circuit cou rt s conclusio ns regardin g the surety bond and the financial disclosure provisions. The Division argues that [t]he [Division s] Order against George furthered the purpose of the Consumer Protection Act, was issued pursuant to the [Division s] statutory authority and was reasonably tailored to address the violations committed by Geo rge . . . . We granted certiorari before consideration of the matter in the Court of Spec ial Appeals. 380 M d. 617, 846 A.2d 401 (2004). II. Standard of Review In Watkins v. Dept. of Public Safety and Correctional Services, 377 Md. 34, 831 A.2d 1079 (2003), Judge Battaglia, writing for this Court, summarized the relevant standard of review: -5- Because an appellate court reviews the agency decision under the same statutory standards as the circuit court, w e reevalua te the deci sion of th e age ncy, n ot the low er co urt. G ener ally, judicial review of administrative agency action is narrow. The reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agenc y. We must respect the expertise of the agency and accord deference to its interpretation of a statute that it administers; however, we may always determine whether the administrative agency made an error of law. Typically, such a determination requires considering (1) the legality of the decision and (2) w hether there was sub stantial evidence from the record as a wh ole to su pport th e decisio n. Id. at 45-4 6, 831 A .2d at 10 86 (inte rnal citati ons om itted). In interpreting a statute we have said that the predominant goal, when construing statutes, is to ascerta in and im pleme nt the leg islative in tent. Baltimore County v. RTKL, 380 Md. 670, 678, 846 A.2d 433, 437 (2004). In a scertaining th e intent of the General A ssembly we look first to the words of the statute, id.; howe ver, if the true legislative intent cannot readily be determined from the statutory language alone, we look to other indicia of that intent, including the title to the bill, the structure of the statute, the inter-relationsh ip of its various provisions, its legislative histo ry, its general purpose, and the relative rationality and legal effect of vario us com peting c onstruc tions. RTKL, 380 Md. at 678 , 846 A.2d at 437 -38 (internal citations omitted). The Consumer Protection Division The Consumer Protection Division is entrusted with broad powers to enforce and interpret the Consum er Protection Act, Md. Code (1975, 2000 Repl. Vol), § 13-101 et seq. of the Commercial Law II Article. Consumer Protection Division v. Consumer Pub l Co., -6- 304 Md. 7 31, 745 , 501 A .2d 48, 5 5 (198 5). In adopting the Act, the G eneral As sembly concluded that it should take strong protective an d preven tive steps to investigate unlawful consumer practices, to as sist the public in obtaining re lief from th ese practices , and to prevent these practices from occurring in Maryland. It is the purpose of this title to accomplish these ends and thereb y maintain the health and welfare of the citizens of the State. CL § 13-102(b)(3). The General Assembly further provided that the Act should be construed and applied liberally to promote its purpose. CL § 13-105. We summarized the statutory powers of the Division in Consumer Publishing: The statutory powers of the Division include the power to receive and inves tigate consu mer com plaints, initiate its own investigation of any possibly unfair and deceptive trade practices, issue cease and desist orders, adopt rules and regulations which further define unfair or deceptive trade practices or otherwise effectuate the purposes of the Act, and seek a temporary or permanent injunction in a civil enforcement proceeding. §§ 13-204 and 13-403(c)(2). The statute further provides that the Division may exercise and perform any other function, power a nd duty appropriate to protect and promote the welfare of con sumers. § 13-204 (11). Consumer Publishing, 304 M d. at 745 , 501 A .2d at 55 . The cease and desist provision of the statute is found at CL § 13-403(b)(1). It provides: If, at the conclusion of the hearing, the Division determines on the preponderance of evidence that the alleged violator violated this title, the Division sh all state its findings and issue an order requiring the violator to cease and desist from the violation and to take affirmative action, including the restitution of money or prop erty. The order shall contain a notice which states that if -7- the Division determines that the violator has not corrected the violation and complied with the order within 30 days following service of the order, the Division shall proceed w ith enforcement pursuant to this title. CL § 13-403(c)(2) provides: To obtain compliance with its order, the Division m ay institute a civil proceeding, including a proceeding which seeks a restraining order and a temporary or permanent injunction. CL § 13-406 provides: (a) The Attorney General may seek an injunction to p rohibit a person who ha s engage d or is engaging in a violation of this title from continuing or engaging in the violation. (b) The Attorney General shall serve notice of the gen eral relief sought on the alleged violator at least s even days b efore the a ction for an injunction is filed. (c) The court may enter any order of judgment necessary to: (1) Prevent the use by a person of any prohibited practice; (2) R estore to a person any money or real or personal property acquired from him by means of any prohibited practice; or (3) Appoint a receiver in case of wilful violation of this title. The Surety Bond The Division ordered George to post a surety bond in the amount of $30,000 .00 within thirty days of the date of the Final Order. 7 The Order provides that the bond 7 The relevant section of the Final Order provides: 13. Within thirty (30 ) days of this Final Order, [George] shall either: (a) post a surety bond with the [D ivision], in a form acceptable to the [Division], in the amount of $30,00 0.00. (i) The Bond shall be issued by a surety licensed to do business in the State of Maryland and shall provide that [George] and the surety are held an d firmly boun d to consu mers wh o suffer a ny loss in (contin ued...) -8- 7 (...continued) connection with their purchase of medical equipment, devices, supplies or related services from [George]. (ii) The bond shall permit any consumer who suffers any loss in connection with his or her purch ase of me dical equip ment, devices, supplies or related serv ices from [ George ] to file a claim for their loss with the surety and, if the claim is n ot paid, to brin g an action based on the bond and recover against the surety; the bond shall also permit the [Division] to file a claim with the surety for any loss suf fered by a co nsumer in connection with his or her purchase of medical equipment, devices, supplies or related services from [George]. (iii) The bond posted by [George] pursuant to this paragrap h shall rema in in effect until three (3) years from the last claim that is made aga inst it, or if no claim s are made , three years from the date it was first posted. (iv) [George] shall maintain accurate records of any bond posted under this Final Order, including records of the bond and premium payments made on it. Commen cing ninety (90 ) days from th e date of th is Final Order, and annually thereafter for the duration of the bond [Georg e] shall provide copies of all records maintained by him concerning the bond, including a copy of the bond itself and any documents reflecting premium payments made on it, to the [Division]. or (b) Provide the Proponent with a letter of credit or cash deposit in the amount of $30,000.00. (i) Consumers who suffer any loss in connec tion with the ir purchase of medic al equipm ent, devices, supplies or re lated service s from [G eorge] sha ll have the righ t to file a claim for their loss against the letter of credit or cash deposit provided by [George]. The [D ivision] may also file a claim against the letter of credit or cash deposit for any loss suffered by a consumer in connection with his or her purchase of medical equipment, devices, supplies or related services from [George]. (ii) The [D ivision] may ho ld [Geor ge s] letter of c redit or cash deposit for three (3) years from the last claim that is made against the letter of credit or cash de posit or if no claims are made three years from its receipt of the letter of credit or cash deposit. (iii) The Agency shall resolve all claims made by either consumers or the [Division] against [Georg e s] letter of cre dit or cash de posit. 14. [Georg e] Shall inclu de in his con tracts or order forms use d to offer a nd sell medical equipment, devices, supplies or related services a written statement, in boldface type, at least 10 points or larger, that states as follows: If you feel that you have suffered any loss in connection with your purchase of medical (contin ued...) -9- shall permit any co nsumer w ho suffe rs any loss in con nection with his or her purchase of medical equipment, devices, supplies or related services from [George] to file a claim for their loss with the surety and, if the claim is not paid, to bring an action based on the bon d and rec over aga inst the su rety; the bond s hall also permit the [Division] to file a claim with the surety for any loss suffered by a consumer in connection with his or her purchase of medical equipment, devices, supplies or related services from [G eorge]. According to the terms of the bond, it shall remain in effect for three years following the last claim made against it, or if no claims are made, for three years from the date that the bond is posted. In the alternative, George has the option of providing the Division with a letter of credit or cash deposit in the same amount, subject to the same rules, in lieu of posting the 7 (...continued) equipment, devices, supplies or related services, you may contact the Maryland Attorney General s Consumer Protection Division at (410) 576-6300 or by writing to Consumer Protection Division, 200 S t. Paul Place, 16th floor, Baltim ore, M D 212 02. 15. [Georg e] shall includ e in his contracts or order fo rms used to offer and sell medical equipment, devices, supplies or related services, the address and telephone number of any surety from whom [George] obtains a surety bond pursuant to this Final Order. [George s] contracts or order forms used to offer and sell medical equipment, devices, supplies or related services, shall also inform consum ers of their righ t to file a claim against [George s] surety bond or any letter of credit or cash deposit held by the Consumer Protection Division. 16. If [George] believes that due to changed circumstan ces any of the specific prohibitions or affirma tive obligation s that are imp osed by this Fin al Order should be chang ed, he may petition the Age ncy to amend this Orde r. -10- surety bond. Although the Division titled the bond a suret y bond, it is clear that the purpose of the bon d is to insure perform ance of a ny contract G eorge ente red into w ith consumers. 8 Thus, for the purposes of our analysis, we shall treat the three options as a performance bond. See Black s Law Dictionary 1158 (7th ed. 1999) (defining performance bond as a bo nd given by a surety to ensure the timely perfo rmance of a co ntract ). The trial court concluded that the Division exceeded its statutory authority by requiring the posting of a bond. The court noted the general remedial purpose of the Act but concluded that whenever the General Assembly has intended for the posting of a bond it has expressly done so in other statutes. The Division c ontends th at the autho rity to order the posting of a bond is encompassed within CL § 13-403(b)(1) s grant of au thority to take af firmative ac tion whe n a person is found to have vio lated the A ct. The D ivision argu es that the bo nd will pro tect future customers by providing a financial incentive to George to actually deliver the ordered goods and services because he otherwise will not make a profit on the sale. The bond will also provide an efficien t means of financial rec overy to future customer s, allowing them to purchase the necessary equipment from an alternative dealer should George fail to deliver the correct goods. It notes that in the interim between when the Division s Order was issued 8 Black s Law Dictionary defines surety as: A person who is prim arily liable for the payment of another s debt or the performance of another s obligation. Black s Law Dictionary 1455 (7th ed. 1999). For the definition of surety bond, Black s says: See Performance Bond. Id. at 172. -11- and when the appeal was pending in the circuit court, George continued to take money from consumers for medical-related equipment and services without providing the equipment or a refund. The term affirmative action is not defined in the statute beyond the instruction that affirmative action includes the restitution of money or property. CL § 13-403(b)(1). In Consumer Publishing, we stated that the affirmative action language authorized the Division to include affirmative disclosure provisions in future advertisements.9 Consumer Publishing, 304 Md. at 772 n.18, 501 A.2d at 69 n.18. In Consumer Protection Division v. Outdoor World Corporation, 91 Md. App. 275, 603 A.2d 1376 (1992), the Court of Special Appea ls applied the affirmativ e action lan guage to authorize the Division to require that any future notices from an out-of-state campground sent into M aryland disclose , in meaningful terms, what would be expected of the recipients should they attempt to claim any prizes [advertised in the notice] a nd wha t the likelihood is that they will receive a prize of 9 Pursuant to the cease and desist order issued by the Division, the violator was required to disclose w ith regard to th e sale of its diet plan : (1) that dieting was required to lose weight; (2) every part of the plan that was necessary for someone to achieve significant weight loss; (3) the active ingredients; and (4) a no tice that If you feel that this product does not live up to the claims we have made for it in our advertising, we would like to hear about it. Please notify us and the M aryland C onsum er Prote ction D ivision. Consumer Publishing, 304 Md. at 772, 501 A.2d at 69. The Court noted that the U. S. Supreme Court has held that un lawful co mmercia l speech is not protected by the First Amendment but declined to reach the ultimate question presented, whether the Division had the authority to require the disclosu res in a national advertising campaign, because the issue was not raise d at the a dminis trative lev el. Consumer Publishing, 304 Md. at 772-775, 501 A.2d at 69- 71. -12- any significant value. Outdoor World Corporation, 91 Md. App. at 290, 603 A.2d at 1383. And in Luskin s Inc. v. Consumer Protection Division, 353 Md. 335 , 726 A.2d 702 (1999), we acknowledged the Division s author ity to requir e a viola tor to tak e affi rmative action, but held that the cease and desist order in question imposed requirements that went beyond the deceptive practices engaged in by the violator in the underlying matter and was, therefore, too bro ad. Luskin s, 353 M d. at 380 -82, 72 6 A.2d at 724- 25. We have addressed the meaning of the term affirmative action in cases involving the Commission on Human Relations, Md. Code (1957, 1972 Repl. Vol.), Art. 49B, which contained a provision with statutory language similar to the language in question here. Section 14(e) of Art. 49B authorized the Commission to issue a cease and desist order provided that: If upon all the evidence, the Commission finds that the respondent has engaged in any discriminatory act within the scope of any of the se subtitles, it shall so state its findings. The Commission thereupon shall issue and cause to be served upon the respondent an order requiring the respondent to cease and desist from the discriminatory acts and to take such affirmative action as will effectuate the purpose of the particular subtitle. (Emp hasis ad ded.) 10 Expounding upon the term affirmative action, in Bulluck v. P elham W ood Ap artments , 283 Md. 505, 520, 390 A.2d 1119, 1127 (1978), we said that the term affirmative action authorized the Com mission to re quire an ap artment co mplex to initiate a program of tenant 10 Now fou nd at § 11(e). Md . Code (1957, 19 98 Rep. Vo l.) Art. 49B § 11(e). -13- recruitment designed to reach minorities after the apartment complex was found to have engag ed in a d iscrimin atory actio n in vio lation of § 14(e) of the A ct. In Gutwein v. Easton Publishing Company, 272 Md. 563 , 325 A.2d 740 (1974), however, we held that the term affirmative action did not authorize the Comm ission to order monetary awards fo r compensatory or other da mages resulting from the discriminatory practices. Gutwe in, 272 M d. at 575, 325 A.2d at 746. Similar to the argument of the Division here that the purpose of the surety bond is to provide financial recovery for victims and protect future customers from fraud, it was argued in Gutwe in that the purpose of the monetary award was to make wh ole victims of discrimination as well as insure against future unlawful conduct. Gutwe in, 272 Md. at 568, 325 A.2d at 743. We concluded that based on the C ommission s legislative back ground, the failure of [§ 13(e)] to specifically authorize an award of comp ensatory dam ages, the un likelihood o f a legislative grant of unbridled power to an administrative agency to make monetary awards without guidelines or limitations, and the [state and federal cases cited in the opinion], that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by awarding compensatory damages.11 Gutw ein, 272 Md. at 576 - 77, 325 A.2d a t 747. Based on the cases discussed above, it is clear that the term affirmative action may be used to justify a variety of actions taken by the Division when those actions are corrective 11 The statute has since been amended by the Gene ral Assem bly to authorize monetary awards, including ba ck pay. Art. 49B § 11(e ). -14- measures that address the specific violations that are the subject matter of the Division s Final Order . See Consumer Publishing, 304 Md. 73 1, 501 A .2d 48; Outdoo r World, 91 Md. App. 275, 603 A.2d 13 76; Bulluck, 283 Md. 505, 390 A.2d 1119. It is equally clear, however, that the term affirmative action will not justify all actions taken by the Division simply because they are in furtherance of the purpose of the statu te. See Luskin s, 353 Md. 335, 726 A.2 d 702; Gutwe in, 272 Md. 563, 325 A.2d 740. When the interpretation of affirmative action sought by the Division is not supported by the relevant indicia of statutory intent, we will not uphold the Division s interpr etation. See RTKL, 380 Md. at 678, 846 A.2d at 438 (noting that in interpreting ambiguous statutory language, the [language] can take its proper meaning only by reference to other relevant indicia of legislative intent, the clearest and most pertinent evidence of which lies in other provisions of the s tatute . . . ). According to the Division s own assessment, the bond is designed to ensure fu ture compliance with the Act. We agree with the Division that the requirement of posting a bond is an action in furtherance of the purposes of the statute. Th e bond w ill assist the pu blic in obtaining relief from [unlawful consumer] practices, and . . . prevent these practices from occurring in Maryland. See CL § 13-102(b)(3). If read in isolation, the term affirmative action may indeed justify the posting of a bond. We do not, however, read ambiguous statutory language in isolation. Here, the express language of the statute provides the Division a means of enforcing future compliance of its orders. The Division m ay institute -15- other civil proceedings to restrain or enjoin continuing violations of its orders when a cease and desist order proves to be ineffective in stopping the unfair and deceptive practice. CL §§ 13-403(b )(1), 13-403 (c)(2), and 1 3-406; Outdoo r World, 91 Md. App. at 289, 603 A.2d at 1383 ( Sections 13-403 and 13-406 authorize the Attorney General to require violators of the Consumer Protection Act to cease their violations and upon noncompliance, to seek an injunction against con tinued viola tions. ). Beca use the plain language of the statute specifically addresses the steps to tak e in the case of nonco mpliance with the A ct, we will not strain for a reading of the statute that wo uld permit th e same res ult as one ex pressly authorized. To do so would constitute a violation of the rule of statutory construction which requires that we look first to the words of the statute . . . . RTKL, 380 Md. at 678, 846 A.2d at 437. The Division has broad authority to construc t the roadblo ck necess ary to close all roads to the pro hibited g oal, 12 it must do so, howev er, within the confines of the statutory authorization which in this case requires intervention of the courts.13 12 In FTC v. R uberoid, 343 U .S. 470, 72 S .Ct. 800, 96 L.Ed. 108 1 (1952), in interpreting the authority of the FTC to prevent illegal practices in the future, the Supreme Court said: If the Com mission is to a ttain the objectives Congress envisioned, it cannot be required to confine its road block to the narrow lane the trans gressor has traveled; it must be allowed effectively to close all roads to the p rohibited go al, so that its order m ay not be by-passe d with i mpun ity. 343 U.S. at 473, 72 S.Ct. at 803, 96 L.Ed. at 1087. 13 We need n ot addr ess wh ether, in an action to enfo rce a ce ase and desist or der, a court would h ave autho rity under its general equitable power to require a violator of the cease (contin ued...) -16- 13 (...continued) and desist order to post a bond. But see CL § 13-406 which authorizes the Division to seek injunctive relief in c onsum er prote ction ca ses. See also § 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 53(b), which permits the FTC to seek a pre liminary or, in the proper case, permanent injunction when a person , partnership, o r corporation is violating, or is about to violate any provision of law enforced by the [FTC]. In a number of federal consumer protection cases, § 13(b) has been construed to authorize the posting of performance bonds as ancill ary equita ble relief . See FTC v. SlimAmerica, Inc., 77 F.Supp.2d 1263 (S.D.Fl. 1999); FTC v. W olf, 1996 WL 812940 (S.D.Fl. 1 996); FTC v. Career Assistance Planning, Inc., 1996 W L 9296 96 (N.D .Ga. 1996 ); FTC v. US Sales Corp ., 785 F.Supp. 737 (N.D. Ill. 1992). The authority to grant ancillary relief, including the require ment o f a perf orman ce bon d, is deriv ed from the cou rt s equi ty jurisdictio n. In US Sales Corp., the court interpreted § 13(b) of the FTC Act, and held that the Act authorizes a performance bond because ancillary equitable relief is ne cessary to acco mplish com plete justice in this case. M erely p rohibiting the adv ertisements discussed in this opinion is insufficient, especially considering Defendants contemptuous beha vior in violating the Preliminary Injunction Order. Ancillary equitable relief will be nec essary to effectuate enforcement of Section 5 of the FTC Act and to deter future violations by these Defendants. The court concludes therefore that the permanent injunction should require D efendan ts to obtain a performance bond for any future sales of credit card or auction information. US Sa les Cor p., 785 F.Supp. at 753. In SlimAmerica, the defendants engaged in deceptive practices in c onnection with the sale of ineffective weight-loss products. The court order ed ancillary equ itable relief in the form of a requirement that the defe ndants po st a perform ance bon d before e ngaging in any business re lated to weigh t-loss sp ecifica lly and tele marke ting in g eneral. SlimAmerica, 77 F.Supp.2d at 1276. The court noted that ancillary equitable relief is necessary to protect consumers and ensure that the defen dants do not perpetrate new frauds. Id. Acc ordingly, the court concluded, that a performance bond requirement is an appropriate remedy to (contin ued...) -17- The Consumer Protection Division and the Attorney General of Maryland, like the Federal Trade Commiss ion, clearly have a mandate to protect the consumer from deceptive practices. See CL § 13-102; Consumer Publishing, 304 Md. at 765, 501 A.2d at 66. Not unlike the FTC which has wide discretion in its choice of a remedy deemed adequate to cope with the unlawful practice disclosed, (Rubero id, 343 U.S. at 473, 72 S .Ct. at 803, 96 L .Ed. at 1087 (internal citation omitted)), the Maryland Consumer Protection Division also has broad powers to enforce and interpret the Consumer Protection Act. 13 (...continued) protect consumers and prevent defendants from engaging in further deceptive practices. Id. In Wolf, the defendants violated the FTC Act by employing deceptive telemarketing techniques in connection with a scheme that promised substantial returns on business opportunities offere d by the d efend ants. Wolf, 1996 WL 812940 at 1. After noting that [b]road injunctive provisions are often necessary to prevent transgressors from violating the law in a new g uise, the co urt ordered the defen dants to po st a $5,000,000 performance bond before engag ing in an y form o f telem arketing . Wolf, 1996 WL 812940 at 8-9 . The court concluded that [t]he tele marketing skills mastered by the defendants make it imperative that the public be protected from future exploits by them. Wolf, 1996 WL 812940 at 9. And in Career Assistance Planning, the defen dants violated the FTC Act by failing to deliver prom ised college scholarship information, misreprese nting the suc cess rate of its customers, and us ing cred it card in forma tion wi thout au thorizat ion. Career Assistance Planning, 1996 WL 929696 at 1-2. The court concluded that the FT C was e ntitled to all ancillary relief it sought, including the requirement that the defendants post a performance bond before engag ing in tel emark eting sa les in the future. Career Assistance Planning, 1996 WL 929696 at 4. The court agreed with the FTC that in light of the [defendants ] proven propensity to engage in fraud and to r efuse c oopera tion wi th law e nforce ment a uthoritie s, the posting of a performance bond was warranted. Id. -18- Consumer Publishing, 304 Md. at 745, 501 A.2d at 55. Those broad powers, however, must fit w ithin the statut ory sc hem e establis hed by the Gen eral A ssem bly. Financial Disclosures The Restitution section of the Division s Final Order pro vides that w ithin 30 d ays of the date of the Final Order, George must pay the Division $32,510.92, to be placed in an account for the payment of restitution to con sumers. A mec hanism for determining individual consumer claims is also set forth in the Order. Additionally, if the $32,510.92 proves to be insufficient for satisfying claims against George, the Divisio n is required to notify him of any necessary additional sums. George would then have 14 days to comply by submitting the add itional fu nds. The two provisions o f the restitution section in question on this appeal state: 31. [George] shall, wit hin f orty-f ive (45) d ays of the date of this Final Order, provide the [Division] with a comple te listing of all of his assets and sources of income. The listing shall cover a ll assets in which [George] has any interest whatsoever. The listing shall fully identify any banks or similar institutions in which [George] has deposited money or other assets. 32. [George] shall, within forty-five (45) days of the date of this Order, pro vide the [D ivision] with a complete listing of all transfers of assets he has made within the past two (2) years and of all payments he has made to anybody in the amount of $1,000 or more within the past two (2) years. The trial court reversed the Final Order regarding the two provisions mentioned above, stating that -19- [t]he statute does not g ive th at au thority; the Division can point to no specific case law interpreting any part of the State or Federal consumer protection statutes as giving this authority and no case law interpretation can be strained or bent to say the authority exists. As a follow through, the Division points to Rule 2-633 allowing a creditor to tak e steps in aid to enforce a judgment. Simply stated, the Division does not yet have a judgmen t.14 The Division, o n the other h and, conte nds that the a uthority to require the disclosure is encomp assed in C L §§ 13 -403(b)(1) and 13-4 10 whic h authorize the Divisio n to order restitution and civil penalties. As previously noted, George has been ordered to pay $32,510.90 in restitut ion and $75,00 0 in civil penaltie s. The d isclosur e provi sions, according to the Div ision, are design ed to fa cilitate the paymen t of the m oney ow ed by G eorge. It contends that, [r]equiring George to provide [the finan cial] inform ation was a reasonab le exercise of the [Division s] authority to order affirmative action, including the payment of restitution . . . and fulfill the G eneral As sembly s stated purpose o f assisting the public in obtainin g relief f rom the se [un lawfu l] practic es . There is no doubt that the Division may order an alleged violator to pay restitution if, based on a preponderance of the evidence, the Division determines the alleged violator violated the Act. CL § 13-403(b)(1). The Division may also assess civil penalties, not to exceed $1,000 per vio lation of the Ac t, for first time of fende rs, (CL § 13-41 0(a)), and not more than $5 ,000 pe r subse quent v iolation . CL § 1 3-410 (b). The questio n is whether the 14 The Div ision subseq uently obtained an Orde r of Judgm ent against G eorge in the amount of $111,867.92 on March 12, 2004. -20- Division s authority to assess penalties encompasses the authority to enforce the penalties through the disclosure of financial information as a requirement in a cease and desist orde r. We hold that it does no t. We have held that an order of restitution pursuant to the A ct is intended to divest a violator of benefits it would be unjust for him to keep. Luskin s Inc. v. Consumer Protection Division, 353 Md. 335, 383, 726 A.2d 702, 726 (1999) (discussing the purpose of restitution verses damages and finding that an order of restitution is not aimed at compensating the plaintiff but at forcing the defendant to disgorge benefits it would be unjust for him to keep. ) (quoting Consumer Publishing, 304 Md. at 776, 501 A.2d at 71 ); State v. Andrew, 73 Md. App. 80, 89 n. 7, 533 A.2d 282, 287 n. 7 (1987) ( To permit the [retention of] even a portion of the illicit profits would impair the full impact of the deterrent force that is essential if adequate enforcement [of the law] is to be achieved. ) (quoting Consumer Publishing). To this end the Gene ral Assem bly has expres sly authorized th e Division to apply to a court for an order of judgment necessary to restore to a person any money or real personal property acquired from him by mea ns of any prohibited practice. C L § 13-406(c). In this case, the order of restitution represents money George took from consu mers in violation of the Act. Clearly, it would be unjust fo r George to continue to profit from his behavior by eluding the restitution orde r. The prop er procedu re for prev enting this outcome, according to the express language of the statute, is for the Division to obtain a judgment. Armed with a money judgme nt, the Divisio n could ob tain inform ation to aid in its -21- enforcement of the judgm ent. See Md. Rule 2-633(a) (Circuit Court) ( A judgment creditor may obtain discovery to aid enforcement of a money judgment (1) by use of depositions, interrogatories, and requ est for documents. ); Md. Rule 3-633(a) (District Court) ( A judgment creditor may obtain discovery to aid enforcement of a money judgment (1) by use of inter rogato ries purs uant to R ule 3-4 21. ). On March 12, 2004, the Division obtained a judgment against George in the amount of $111,867.92. Pursuant to the above mentioned rules the Division is in the position to enforce the judgment. The Division erred by seeking the information prior to receiving an order of judgment from a court of appropriate jurisdiction. JUDGMENT OF TH E CIRCU IT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED W ITH COSTS. -22-

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