O'Connor v. Baltimore County

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In the Circuit Court for Baltimore County Case No. 03-C-02-12190 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 124 September Term, 2003 JULIA NNE O CO NNO R, et al. v. BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Greene, J. Filed: July 26, 2004 Appellan ts Julianne O Conno r, Julianne U ehlinger, Jan ice Zimm erman, an d Gail Jett ( the Employees ) seek review of an Order of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, dated July 25, 2003, granting a declaratory judgment and summary judgment pursuant to a motion filed by Baltimore Coun ty ( the County ). The question before this Court is whether the Circuit Court erred by deciding as a matter of law that the Employees job classifications do not violate the County Charter and personnel law. FACTS The Employees are four part-time workers in the County s Department of Social Services. Their positions are classified by the County as exempt or non-merit positions.1 On Novemb er 1, 2002, the Emp loyees filed a complaint in the Circu it Court for Baltimore County seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that their employment violates the Baltim ore Co unty Ch arter ( C harter ) and th e Baltim ore Co unty Co de ( C ounty C ode ). Specifically, the Employees sought; (1) a declaratory judgment that designating permanent employees as part-time based on a 34 hour or 39 hour work week violates the Charter, and (2) an order from the court directing the County to classify plaintiffs positions as nonexem pt merit p ositions . The Employees complaint includes allegations that they have been doing the same work for virtually the same number of hours per week as merit system employees, but that 1 One employee, Julianne O Connor, has left employment subsequent to the filing of this a ction. they are denied merit status be cause they are classified by the County as p art-time or ho urly workers. The Employees argue that the Charter did not intend to create a class of permanent part-time workers who are exempt from the merit system. Rather, they argue, the Charter intende d to exe mpt on ly employe es wh o wor k occa sionally or tempo rarily. The Coun ty did not answer the com plaint but instead filed a motion f or summary judg men t. Th e Co unty a rgue d tha t in order to ob tain i njun ctive relie f aga inst a mun icipa lity, the Employees must show grave and irreparable injury. The County asserted that the Employees had not met that burden. The County also contended, among other things, that the class ification of the E mployee s as non -merit d id not v iolate the Charte r. In addi tion, the C ounty liste d a serie s of ma terial fac ts that are not in g enuine dispute . Those facts include, among other things, that : (1) the Employees are employed by the County; (2) all four of the positions are funded exclusively by the State or federal government; (3) the four positions are not merit positions; (4) all four positions are part-time; and (5) each employee signed a statement upon accepting his or her positions with the County, that stated I fully understand that the po sition I am accepting w ith Baltimore County is of a part-time nature and does not entitle me to benefits received by full-time employees of the Merit System . . . . These facts are supported by the affidavit and attachm ents also filed by th e Cou nty. Anton y J. Sharb augh, D irector o f the B altimore Coun ty Office of Hu man R esourc es, signed the affidavit, which describes the Employees job classifications. He stated that the 2 Charter expressly calls for the creation of non-merit or exempt positions in order to provide flexibility to meet the County s staffing needs. Mr. Sharbaugh s affidavit also states that the Office of Budget and Finance must approve merit positions based on sufficient funding, and that the County Council must approve each merit position. In addition, Mr. Sharbaugh notes in his affidavit that the two supervisory workers are part-time, professional consultants under Charter Section 801 (5) and that the other are non-supervisory, part-time workers under Charter Section 801 (9) and Regulations 1.03 and 1.04 of the County Personnel Law.2 2 Section 80 1 provide s in pertinent p art: The cou nty personne l law shall pro vide for the division of all employees in the county government into the classified and the exempt service, the latter to consist of: * * * (5) All p rofessi onal co nsultan ts perfo rming te mpora ry or part-tim e servic es, * * * (9) Such seasona l or occasional employees an d such nonsup ervisory employees paid on an hourly basis as may be specifically exempted from the effect of the county personnel law or from the plans, rules and regulations thereto. Section 25 -126, of the Baltimore County Co de provid es in relevan t part: Regulation 1.03. Exempt service means those county employees enumerated in article V III of the Charter, section 801 (1) through (8), inclusive, an d employee s defined in regulation 1 .04 below as seasona l, occasional, part-time, emergency, or temporary employees. (continued...) 3 In respons e to the mo tion for sum mary judgm ent, the Em ployees filed tw o affidav its on February 5, 2003. Julianne Uehlinger filed an affidavit stating that she was a social worker who supervised the School Based Services Program, that her position was supervisory, and that she was designated as a part-time, non-classified employee. She also stated that she was nev er informe d that she w as a consu ltant and that S harbaug h s affidav it was the first written document she had seen referring to her as a consultant. W. Michel Pierson,3 the Employees attorney, also filed an affidavit stating that the Employees needed an oppo rtunity to condu ct discovery co ncerning th e assertions m ade in Sha rbaugh s a ffidavit. On M arch 13, 20 03, the parties deposed Sharbau gh. Sharb augh stated that non-m erit employees h ave few er holidays, vac ation days, and personal lea ve days than m erit employees. H e also noted that when a merit positio n is eliminated , the merit em ployee is entitled to replace or bump an employee with less seniority in another position, so that the replace d emp loyee is term inated. The parties appeared before the Circuit Co urt for a hearing on the m otion for summa ry judgment on July 11, 2003. The Circuit Court granted the County s motion, deciding that there was no factual dispute and that, as a matter of law, the Charter did not prohibit the County from classifying the w orkers as non-merit exe mpt employees. Specifica lly, the Court 2 (...continued) Regulation 1.04. Seasonal, part-time, or temporary employees are those employees hired to perform seasonal, part-time or temporary duties. 3 Effective January 14, 2004, W. Michel Pierson, was appointed an Associate Judge, Baltimore City Circuit Court. 4 said: There is no factual dispute of the fact that the Plaintiffs are working for Baltimore County . . . after th ey agreed to w ork for B altimore C ounty. And in fact, their employment contract indicated, and each of them knew at the time they began working for Baltimore County that they were to be designated as part-tim e emp loyees [a nd] tha t they we re not m embe rs of the merit syste m. There is no factual dispute that these employees work somewhere between 35 and 39 h ours a we ek. . . . There is n o factual d ispute that the y are not merit system employees, as clearly their employment contract indicated and as they unders tood. T here is n o factu al dispu te that the y are paid on an h ourly bas is. Quite frankly, it seems to me that the facts that are material to the resolution of this matter are really not disputed. The argument really comes down to a matter of law. It s a question of whether the Baltimore County Charter prohibits such a designation of an employee as part-time, give n the undis puted fac ts of these em ployees emp loyment. * * * Well, it s this court s view that whether the County Charter calls it hourly or part-time is rea lly kind of irreleva nt as, in fact, the se people a re being pa id hourly, as the charter indicates that there is that class of employee. . . . But quite frankly, I don t see any prohibition for the County doing and classifying these employees as they have and according them the benefits that they have. This is something that is open. It s not hidden. It hasn t been kept from these employees. T hey began w orking, beg an accep ting mone y under this employment agreement. I don t think it s something that, quite frankly, they are prejudic ed becau se they began their emplo yment and th ey continue th eir employment under that understanding. I don t see why the County can t do this. I don t see w hy the ch arter pro hibits it. On July 25, 2003, the Circuit Court signed an order granting summary judgment and declared that, [t]he designation and employment of the plaintiffs as part-time, exempt employees does not violate the Baltimore County Charter and personnel law. Judgment was entered on July 29, 2003, and on August 19, 2003, Petitioners filed an appeal in the Court of 5 Special A ppeals of M aryland. Befo re the Cou rt of Specia l Appeals could dec ide the app eal, this Court granted certiorari on its ow n initiativ e. O Co nnor v . Baltim ore Co unty, 379 Md. 225, 841 A.2d 339 (2004). DISCUSSION Maryland Rule 2-501(e) provides, in relevant part, that the court shall enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. As we said in Remsburg v. Montgom ery, 376 Md. 568, 831 A.2d 18 (2003), [w]hen reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we must make the thresho ld determin ation as to w hether a ge nuine disp ute of ma terial fact exists, a nd only where such dispute is absent will we proceed to review determinations of law. Remsburg, 376 Md. at 579, 831 A.2d at 24. We also noted that [a]n appellate court reviews a trial court's grant o f a motion for summ ary judgmen t de nov o. The trial court will not determine any disputed f acts, but rather makes a ru ling as a ma tter of law. T he standard of appella te review, therefore, is whether the trial court was legally correct. Id. (quoting Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 114, 753 A.2d 41, 48 (2000)) (other citations omitted ). Before turning to the q uestions of law, we must first decide whe ther the Circuit Court properly determined that no genuine dispute of material fact exists. We con strue the fac ts properly before the court, and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them, in the 6 light mo st favo rable to t he non -movin g party. Todd v. MT A, 373 Md. 149, 155, 816 A.2d 930, 933 (2003) (citing Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 178, 757 A.2d 118, 127 (2000)). We have held that mere general allegations which do not show facts in detail and with precision are insufficient to prevent summary judgment. Beatty v. Trailmaster, 330 Md. 726, 738, 625 A.2d 1005, 1011 (1993) (citing Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Products, Inc., 273 Md. 1, 7-8, 327 A.2 d 502, 50 9 (1974)). T o properly op pose a m otion for su mmary judg ment, the fa cts presen ted mu st not on ly be detai led but a lso adm issible in eviden ce. Beatty , 330 Md. at 737, 625 A.2d at 1011. Furthermore, the mere presence of a factual dispute, in general, will not render summ ary judgm ent imp roper. Beatty , 330 Md. at 738, 625 A.2d at 1011. As we explained in Lippert v. Jung, 366 M d. 221, 783 A.2d 20 6 (2001), a dispute as to facts relating to grounds upon which the decision is not rested is not a dispute with respect to a material fact and such dispute does not prevent the entry of summary judgment. Lippert, 366 Md. at 227, 783 A.2d at 209 (quoting Salisbury Beauty Schs. v. State Bd. of Cosme tologists, 268 Md. 32, 40, 300 A.2d 367, 374 (1973)). Where the record shows that there was no such genuine dispute as to any material fact necessary to resolve the controversy as a matter of law, and it is shown that the movant is entitled to judgment, the entry of summary judgment is proper. Lynx, In c. v. Ord nance Produ cts, Inc., 273 Md. 1, 8, 327 A.2d 502, 509 (1974 ). In the case at bar, we agree with the Circuit Court s determination that no material dispute of fact exists. The Employees and the County agree about the manner in which 7 personnel were hired, the number of hours worked, and the duties and responsibilities of the positions. Th e Emplo yees argue tha t there is a gen uine dispu te as to wh ether the C ounty created a class of non-merit system employees whose positions are no different in any meaningful sense from their classified counterparts, with the express purpose of circumventing the Charter s merit system requirements. That so-called factual dispute is not a factual disp ute at all. Rathe r, it is the basis of th e worke rs legal argu ment that the County violated the merit system requirements of its Charter. The other disputed facts mentioned by the Emp loyee s in th eir brief a re no t con teste d by th e Co unty. 4 The only disa greemen t is the lega l effec t of the u ndispu ted fac ts. We turn, then, to the question of whether the County was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Employees argue that the court erred by ruling, as a matter of law, that the classification of the Em ployees does not violate the Ch arter or the County Code . In particular, the Employees argue that the Circuit Court s interpretation of the Charter avoided any examination of whether the permanent employment of appellants in their positions under the circumstances presented here amounted to an attempt to avoid the provisions of the Charter. The Employees also argue that the Circuit Court s interpretation of the Charter allows the m erit system to be subverted by a transparen t stratagem a nd gives n o weigh t to 4 Those facts include the hours worke d by the Employees (34 ho urs per week), their classification as part-time and non -merit, their job duties and the fact that they are the same as the duties of merit employees, the long-term length of their employment, and the supervisory roles of two of the workers. 8 the ben eficial p urpose s that the Charte r s merit system pr ovision s were design ed to se rve. The County argues that its interpretation of the Charter, to allow the designation of the Employee s as non-m erit, is in keeping with the leg islatively enacted classifications of merit and non-merit em ployees and the provisions of the Charter. 5 5 The Coun ty makes some additiona l arguments, the discussion o f which are unnecessary to the resolution of this case. In particular, the County argues that a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief against a local government must establish a clear and satisfactory showing of grave and irreparable injury to private rights, and that the employees in this case have not met that burden. We need not address that issue because the Coun ty is entitled to sum mary judgm ent on othe r grounds . In addition, the County argues that the Charter and the County Code have the full force of law and that such law is invalid only if it is in conflict with higher law. There is no dispute in this case about the validity of the Charter or County Code provisions at issue. Consequently, the County s reliance on Haub v. Montgomery County, 353 M d. 448, 727 A.2d 36 9 (1999) is misplac ed. In Haub, Montgomery County merit system employees filed complaints with the County Office of Human R esources when they were notified that their positions w ere going t o be pri vatized so that th e Cou nty could save m oney. Haub, 353 Md. at 454, 727 A.2d at 372. After the filing of those complaints, but before they were decided by the Office o f Hum an Reso urces, the M ontgom ery County Co uncil appro ved the bu dget, which include d the pr ivatizatio n of pr ogram s dispu ted by the merit syste m emp loyees. Haub, 353 Md. at 455, 727 A.2d at 372. On appeal, the employees argued that language in the Montgomery County Charter favoring a merit system prevented the County from enactin g legisla tion to p rivatize p ositions . Haub , 353 Md. at 465, 727 A.2d at 374. We held that the Charter language did not preclude the privatization or contracting out of work to non- govern ment e ntities. Haub, 353 Md. at 466, 727 A.2d at 378. The case at bar has nothing to do with privatizing positions. More importantly, there is no challenge in the instant case to the validity of locally enacted legislation. Rather, the issue is the proper interpre tation of the loca l Charte r and C ounty C ode. Finally, the County argues that the Court cannot grant injunctive relief to the Employees in this case because no legal remedy would be available and because many necessary parties (other exempt employees) were not a part of the suit. We need not address these arguments because the County is entitled to summary judgment on other (continued...) 9 Local ordinances and charters are interpreted under the same canons of construction that app ly to the inte rpretatio n of sta tutes. Howard Research v. Concerned Citizens, 297 Md. 357, 364 , 466 A.2d 31, 34 (19 83). The c ardinal rule o f statutory interpre tation is to asce rtain the inten tion of th e legisla ture. Oaks v. Con nors, 339 M d. 24, 35 , 660 A .2d 423 , 429 (1 995). The primary source of legislative intent is, of course, the language of the statute itself. State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129, 133, 669 A.2d 1339, 1340-41 (1996) (quoting Tucker v. Fireman s Fund, 308 Md. 69, 73, 517 A.2d 730, 731 (1986)) . When interpreting a statute, we ass ign the w ords the ir ordina ry and na tural me aning. Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653, 705 A.2 d 1128, 1 131 (199 8). We w ill not divine a legislative inten tion contrary to th e plain language of a statute or judicially insert language to impose exceptions, limitations or restrictions not set forth by the legislature." Langston v. Langston, 366 Md. 490, 515, 784 A.2d 1086, 1100 (2001). Similarly, "[w]e neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature used or engage i n a fo rced or su btle i nterpretation in an attem pt to exte nd or limi t the s tatut e's meaning." Taylor v. NationsBank, 365 M d. 166, 1 81, 776 A.2d 6 45, 654 (2001 ). The Employees in the case at bar assert that their employment violates the Charter because they do the same work as merit employees, yet they are classified differently. As evidence of the Co unty s bad fa ith, the Emp loyees allege tha t the Coun ty was obliviou s to Charter employee classifications until the lawsuit was filed, because only then were the 5 (...continued) groun ds, as w ill be disc ussed f urther in this opin ion. 10 supervisor plaintiffs informe d that they were consultants. T he Employees argum ents are unpersuasive. There is nothing in the relevant portions of the Charter to suggest that in order to classify someone as a non-merit employee, their job function must be different from the job functio n of those classified as m erit employees . Rather, the C harter perm its the Coun ty to make the different classification based on the hours worked. In addition, there is nothing in the relevan t portions of the Charte r to suggest th at in order fo r an emplo yee s non-m erit classification to be legitimate, the County must inform the employee that a part-time supervisor y employee is co nsidered to be a prof essional co nsultant. Fu rthermore, th ere is nothing in th e Charter to suggest tha t the Coun ty is limited in the am ount of em ployees it may classify as non-merit employees. As long as the workers fit into the allotted categories, their classification is acceptable.6 Finally, there is no limit on the hours per year a part-time employee ca n work b efore they are n o longer co nsidered ex empt. 7 Therefo re, the com monly understood meaning of the word indicates that anyone working under 40 hours per week 6 We note the Emp loyees allegation in their com plaint that the n umber o f parttime, exempt employees represents less than 15% of the County s work force. That hardly seems like a scheme by the County to circumvent the Charter s provisions regard ing clas sificatio n of em ployees in to merit a nd non -merit p ositions . 7 By contrast, Regulation 8.01 in Section 25-126 of the Baltimore County Code notes that seasonal or temporary employees may not be retained in the County employ for a period longer than six (6) months. (Emphasis added.) In addition, similar personnel provisions in o ther Maryland counties sp ecifically limit the number of hours per year th at some exem pt emp loyees (tem porary an d seaso nal) can work . See Anne Arundel County Charter, §802(a)(14) (limiting hourly-rate temporary employees to 1500 hours per c alendar year); P rince Geo rge s Cou nty Charter, §9 02(7) (limiting hourly-rate tempo rary or sea sonal e mployee s to 700 hours p er year). 11 could fairly be c lassified as p art-time. No ne of the w orkers in this c ase were scheduled to work over 34 hours p er wee k. Paragrap h (5) of Se ction 801 o f the Cha rter permits the County to ex empt from merit classific ation all p rofe ssional c onsu ltant s per form ing temp orar y or part-time services. (Emphasis added.) The definition of consultant is one who consults another, one who gives professional advice or services. Merriam Webster s Collegiate Dictionary 248 (10th ed. 2001). T he Cou nty s interpretation of the term professio nal consu ltant to includ e parttime emp loyees who act as super visors is com pletely reasona ble and log ical. 8 In the case at hand, it is und isputed that th e two w orkers w ho had su pervisory jobs w ere perform ing parttime services. The fact that those part-time services were ongoing for a long period of time (rather than for a temporary period) does not make their classification a violation of the Cha rter. T he C harter cle arly states that p rofe ssional c onsu ltant s per form ing temp orar y or part-tim e servic es may b e exclu ded fro m mer it classific ation. Paragrap h (9) of sec tion 801 o f the Cha rter permits the County to ex clude from merit classification [s]uch seasonal or occasional employees and such nonsupervisory employees 8 When the words of a statute leave room for interpretation . . . we ordinarily give some weight to the construction given the statute by the agency responsible for administering it. Mag an v. M edical M ut. Liab . Ins. Soc 'y. of Md ., 331 Md. 535, 546, 629 A.2d 62 6 (1993). A n administra tive agency's interp retation and application o f the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by review ing cou rts. Board of Physicians v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 69, 729 A.2d 376, 381 (1999). [T]he expertise of the agency in its own field should be respected." Id. Similarly, an agency s interpretation of its own regulations should be given a great deal of deference. MTA v. King, 369 Md. 274 , 288, 799 A.2d 1 246, 1254 (200 2). 12 paid on a n hourly b asis as may be sp ecifically exem pted from the effect o f the coun ty personne l law or fro m the plan s, rules and re gulations the reto. (Em phasis add ed.) There is no dispute that the other two workers in this case are nonsupervisory, paid on an hourly basis, and part-tim e. To classif y employees in th at situation as n on-merit em ployees is clearly permitte d by the C harter. In addition to the Charte r, the Coun ty Code perm its the Emp loyees classifica tions in this case. Sec tion 25-12 6, Regula tion 1.03 state s that [e]xe mpt service means tho se county employees enumerated in Article VIII of the Charter, section 801(1) through (8), inclusive, and employees defined in regulation 1.04 below as seasonal, occasional, part-time, emergency or temporary employees. Section 25-126, Regulation 1.04 states that [s]eas onal, part-time, or temporary employees are those e mployees hired to perform season al, part-time, or tempora ry duties. All of the person nel in this case were hired to perform part-time duties and there is no allegation in the complaint that any of them worked more than part-time ho urs. Conse quently, their classif ication as no n-merit em ployees is permissible under the releva nt local laws. The Circu it Court for Baltimore C ounty did not err by grantin g summ ary judgm ent to the Coun ty on that b asis. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED. APPELLANTS TO PAY COSTS. 13

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