Triggs v. State

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David Triggs, Jr. v. State of Maryland, No. 118 September Term, 2003. [Domestic Violence Repeated Violations of a Protective Order, held; When a protective order requires an abuser to have no contact w ith a victim, rep eated calls co nstitute separa te acts for the purposes of the sentencing provisions requiring penalties for each offense in Section 4-509 of the Family Law Article.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 118 September Term 2003 __________________________________ DAVID TRIGGS, JR. V. STATE OF MARYLAND __________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Battaglia, J. Filed: June 16, 2004 We are called upon in this case to determine whether it was error for the trial judge to impose eighteen consecutive sentences when the defendant was convicted for making eighteen threatening calls to his wife in violation of a protective order requiring that he have no contact with his wife. We find no error in the sentence. I. Introduction A. Facts On Sunday morning, September 16, 2001, David Triggs (hereinafter Petitioner ) made the first of dozens1 of calls to his e x-wife, P amela Triggs (hereinafter Mrs. Triggs ), who lived in M ontgom ery County, in vio lation of a protective order prohibiting him from having any contact with her. When he made many of the calls, which continued over a fourday period, Petition er threatened to rape and murder his ex-wife and murder their three children , who w ere with him du ring a sc hedule d visitatio n whe n he ca lled. Petitioner and Mrs. Triggs were married for almost seven and a half years when they divorced on March 1, 2002. They had three children together, who were eight, six, and four at the time of their divorce. Petitioner s four-day reign of terror, as Judge Ann S. Harrington, Circuit Court for Montgomery County, called it, was the culmination of a long history of a troub led relatio nship f illed wit h dom estic abu se. In her victim impact statement, Mrs. Triggs described some of Petitioner s controlling 1 Thirty-two message s were rec orded on Mrs. Trig gs s hom e and cell ph one voice mail, beginning at 11:46 a.m. on Sep tember 16, 2001 a nd ending at 1:01 a .m. on Septembe r 19, 2001. The State offered in to evidenc e Sprint telep hone bills indicating that Petitioner made more than fif ty calls to M rs. Trigg s from Sund ay, Septemb er 16 , 200 1 to W ednesda y, Septem ber 19, 2 001. and abusive behavior that occurred over the course of their marriage and during the period at issue during this case. According to Mrs. Triggs, Petitioner, in the past, had he ld electric hedge clippers to her throat, pointed a gun to her head, fired a gun at her, and raped her four times. In 1996, she obtained her first protective order after Petitioner shot at he r. When Mrs. Triggs attempted to leave her husband, Petitioner harassed her friends who were helping her, causing them to get peace orders against him. Petitioner also harassed Mrs. Triggs at work a nd threaten ed to kill her co -workers , which res ulted in her p lace of work closing for two days and hirin g security for three weeks. M rs. Triggs claims she lost [her] job because of him. In addition, the couple lost their home and M rs. Triggs s credit record was ruined when Petitioner refused to sign the papers to sell their home, telling the realtor he pref erred to have th e hom e forec losed so as to d estroy M rs. Trigg s. Mrs. Triggs also described h ow Petitioner verbally abused her and attempted to control her every move and thought. He dictated the types of clothes she could wear ( no sweatpa nts or baggy clothes allowed ), taped her telephone calls, removed her car radio, and disabled her car on several occasions. During the month before th ey separated, h e would wake her up every time she fell asleep, allow ing o nly one hour a night. After they separated, Mrs. Triggs related how Pe titioner would tell the children to tell mommy her cement shoes are c oming, tell mom my I am going to cut her head off, tell mommy she doesn t have long to live, and tell mommy I m watching. On September 26, 2000, Mrs. Triggs obtained her second order of protection from the -2- District Court of Maryland s itting in Montgomery County. She stated she was afraid for her life because her husband had shot at her in the past and sought the order because he wanted her to get an ap artment an d prostitute he rself to support the family and th reatened to burn her like a witch on a stick if she did not comply. The court issued an order, effective for one year, requiring P etitioner to refra in from thre atening or a busing M rs. Triggs an d to begin couns eling im media tely. On March 28, 2001, the court amended the September 26 protective order pursuant to Mrs. Triggs s emergency motion to modify the order, ordering, among other things, that Petitioner have no contact with Mrs. Triggs, that he could not take the children out of the state or out of school if it was not his scheduled time, and that h e must abide by a twoweek visitation schedule requiring him to pick up his children from school on Friday and drop them off at school on Monday. One month later, in April 2001, Petitioner violated the protective order by banging on Mrs. Triggs s door in the middle of the night. Mrs. Triggs called the police, w ho arrested Petitioner w hen he tried to flee the apartm ent comp lex in his car. While he was in jail awaiting tria l, Petitioner sent numerous letters to his children containing disturbing references to Mrs. Triggs and their marriage. Mrs. Triggs filed a complaint about the letters with the police commissioner because she feared for her and her children s perso nal safe ty. On July 23, 2001, Petitioner was convicted for violating the March 28 amended -3- protective order. He was sente nced to 90 days in the Mon tgomery County Deten tion Center, with 36 days suspended and credit for 54 days, and one year of supervised probation. He was ordered, again, to have no contact with Mrs. Triggs. In mid-Septembe r 2001, a bench warrant was issued from the Circuit Court for Petitioner s arrest because Petitioner was telling his children that he wanted to put his wife in cement shoes. Because of a technical problem w ith the warrant, howev er, the Sheriff s Office for Montgo mery County cou ld not arrest Petitioner before he picked up his children on September 14, 2001, for his scheduled two-week visitation. On September 16, 2001, at approximately 11:45 on Sunday morning, Petitioner made the first of mor e than fifty calls occurring over a four-day period to Mrs. Triggs.2 Petitioner 2 The chart below indicates the day and time of the calls Petitioner made from September 16 to Sep tember 19 , 2001, that h ad messa ges associa ted with th em that were recorded o n Mrs. T riggs s hom e and cell ph one voice mail: Day Time 1 September 16, 2001 11:46:06 a.m. 2 September 16, 2001 11:47:58 a.m. 3 September 16, 2001 11:48:58 a.m. 4 September 16, 2001 11:50:12 a.m. 5 September 16, 2001 11:54:26 a.m. 6 September 16, 2001 11:55:55 a.m. 7 September 16, 2001 12:51:26 p.m. 8 September 16, 2001 1:06:02 p.m. 9 September 16, 2001 1:06:55 p.m. -4- 10 September 16, 2001 1:08:26 p.m. 11 September 16, 2001 1:09:01 p.m. 12 September 16, 2001 9:17:45 p.m. 13 September 16, 2001 10:30:32 p.m. 14 September 16, 2001 10:31:36 p.m. 15 September 17, 2001 1:55:49 p.m. 16 September 17, 2001 8:53:08 p.m. 17 September 17, 2001 9:21:14 p.m. 18 September 17, 2001 9:51:20 p.m. 19 September 18, 2001 20 September 18, 2001 2:52:20 p.m. 21 September 18, 2001 5:34:3 5 p.m. 22 September 18, 2001 5:41:4 6 p.m. 23 September 18, 2001 8:35:33 p.m. 24 September 18, 2001 9:07:0 9 p.m. 25 September 18, 2001 9:30:04 p.m. 26 September 18, 2001 9:56:26 p.m. 27 September 18, 2001 10:52:17 p.m. 28 September 18, 2001 10:53:27 p.m. 29 September 18, 2001 11:20:10 p.m. 30 September 18, 2001 11:35:08 p.m. 31 September 19, 2001 12:30:00 a.m. 32 September 19, 2001 1:01:39 a.m. 10:22: 07 a.m . Calls one up to a nd includin g eighteen are the subje ct of the insta nt appeal. Although the -5- called Mrs. Triggs while she was at home alo ne in her ap artment in Gaithersburg. After Mrs. Triggs reminded Petitioner that he should not be calling her because of the protective order, he said, I don t give a fuc k about a piece of p aper, are you g oing to talk to me, you nee d to talk to me. When she did not respond, he continued saying, God dammit, Pamela, these children are dead by the end of this week end. I don t want them , I want you, bu t I will kill them. Mrs. T riggs hu ng up a nd calle d the po lice imm ediately. Three Gaithersburg police officers arrived at Mrs. Triggs s ho use in respo nse to her call. While she waited for the police, the phone rang about six times with the Caller-ID showing Petitioner s name and n umber. When th e police arriv ed, she han ded her p hone to Officer Chris Vance, who listened to the messages that Petitioner had left. Officer Vance testified that the mes sages con tained threats that if she [ didn t] call him back, he [would] kill the kids. After being advised by the police that it was not safe for her to remain at home, Mrs. Triggs w ent to a friend s house . Officer Vance subsequently requested a warrant for Petitioner s arrest, which was issued late that afternoon. Petitioner continued to call Mrs. Trig gs s pho ne an d lea ve m essa ges, mak ing a total of fourteen c alls th at da y. On Mon day morning, S eptem ber 17, 2 001, Mrs. Triggs met with the Fugitive Division of the Sheriff s Office to assist them in their effo rts to find Petitioner. Petitioner made four calls to M rs. Triggs on M onday. subject of the cha rges in this case, calls nineteen through thirty-two w ere not sent to the jury because the trial judge granted defendant s motion for judgment of acquittal as to these charge s. -6- On Tuesday, Se ptember 1 8, 2001, P etitioner made a total of twelve calls to Mrs. Triggs. At one point, he claimed he was giving one of their sons A mbient, a s leeping pill. He also asked Mrs. Trig gs, who is a nurse, w hat does it m ean wh en your respira tions only get to one . . . when your breathing, respirations are only one a minute. He also threatened to break [th e children s] arms and their legs and then their neck. In another recorded c all, he stated, In abo ut two ho urs I m go ing to call you w ith an interstate n umber o r an exit number off of 270 where I m going to leave something for you, or somebody. In yet another recorded call, he told her that she w as dow n by one ch ild and tha t will leave on ly two. He also told her that he was getting a very itchy trigger finger. In still yet another recorded call, he said Unfortuna tely, I don t care what [the] court orders, what laws or whatever you ve got. It makes no difference to me . . . I m either going to be dead or in jail, and tha t s fine w ith me. At approximately nine or ten at nigh t on September 1 8, while several sheriff s deputies waited with Mrs. Triggs at her home, Petitioner called and demanded that she meet him at a designa ted location. Petitioner said that Mrs. Triggs had to jump through hoops of fire to get to [her] kids and [her] first hoop was going to be this place, G ood T ime A uto. He told her to be at the auto shop by 11:00 p.m. Mrs. Triggs decided to meet him as he requested as part of a plan with the Sheriff s Office to locate Petitioner and the children. Mrs. Triggs, however, did not meet Petitioner at the auto sh op because the of ficers decided it was unsafe for her to do so because the bu ildings were dark and there were two -7- men standing outside. When she did not meet him there, he called again, after m idnight. When Mrs. Triggs told Petitioner she was afraid of m eeting him , he said, I m not going to kill you yet. Petitioner th en told M rs. Triggs tha t, waiting for her at Good Tim e Auto, were four men . . . and they are the re to rape you w hile I listen on the othe r phon e to you sc ream. Mrs. Triggs then testified: He said that he was going to beat me, an d he wa s going to torture me, and then he was going to rape me and th en he w ould kill me, and then he was going to shove h is cock in my mouth. And he said that if I didn t do it, he said I would never see my children while I was alive, he kept telling me, Make no bones about it, you are dead to night, you will d ie tonight, it s up to you wheth er or no t you see yo ur child ren bef ore you d o. Petitioner then called again, telling Mrs. Triggs that he still wa nted her to go to Good Time Auto. When she told him that she w as in a safe place, Petitioner be came very upset and his voice went flat. He then said, W ell, now you n eed to pick one. Pick one child to die, it is time for another one to die, you need to pick one. Mrs. Triggs, who now was being encouraged by the deputies to continue talking with Petitioner because they had been able to trace his cell phone to Ocean City, said that she c ouldn t cou ld not pick a child and tried to get him to talk about other things. Mrs. Triggs testified: He kept saying, O h, well, if you can t pick one, I will. And he got my daughter on the phone and she w as kind of rea l slee py, she is lik e, Mo mmy? And I am like , Hi, ba by. And sh e is like, Mommy? And I am like, Are you okay? And he goes, Uh, uh, uh, say goodbye to mommy forever. And I heard her scream . Mrs. Triggs testified that she was so hysterical that she couldn t could not get back on the -8- phone with Petitioner anymor e. Petitio ner calle d again , leaving a mess age. Sargent M axwell Uy listened to the message and testified that Petitioner said, I hope you know a good orthopaedic surgeon. At this point, Petition er had bee n located in Ocean City, and officers there w ere negotiating with him to try to get him to release the children. Petitioner was apprehended on September 19, 2001, and Mrs. Triggs s children were returned to her physically unharmed later that d ay. During the period of September 16 to September 19, while Petitioner was calling Mrs. Triggs, he also called and threatened his mother, grandmother, sisters, and nieces and nephews, who, because they lived near Ocean City, were escorted to the police department for their own safe ty. While he was in jail for the second time awaiting trial, Petitioner sent numerous letters to his children and to his sister that contained disturbing references about Mrs. Triggs.3 B. Procedural History 3 Mrs. Triggs was on good terms with Petitioner s sister, who showed her the letters. In one of his letters to his sister, Petitioner described, at length, his wife s appearan ce at a hearing ( th at old hag lib rarian look is s cary ) and ex horted his siste r to take he r to a hair stylist and help her out. In another letter, he enclosed a cartoon with the caption I m . . . a menace to society. In yet ano ther letter, he fantasized about having sex with his wife in the courtroom and signed the letter her incubus. Using computers in the jail, he also discovered that Mrs. Triggs was employed at Georgetown Hospital as a nurse, a fact the S tate went to great lengths to keep co nfidential from Petitioner. In one of his letters to his sister, he enclosed a copy of an advertisement for Georgetown Hospital and stated, Hide and seek was always fun to play. -9- On October 18, 2001, Petitioner was indicted by the State on the following forty-three charges: one count of telephone misuse,4 thirty counts of violating a protective order, 5 four 4 Maryland Code, Art. 27, § 555A (1957, 1996 Rep. Vol.) provided: It is unlawful for any person to make use of telephone facilities or equipment (1) for an anonymous call or calls if in a manner reasonab ly to be ex pected to anno y, abuse, to rment, harass, or embarrass one or m ore per sons; (2 ) for rep eated c alls, if with intent to annoy, abuse, torment, harass, or embarrass one or more persons; or (3) for any comment, request, suggestion or proposal which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecen t. Any person violating any one of the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be subject to a fine of not more than $500.00 or to imprisonment for not more than three (3) years, or both, in the discretion of the court. This section was repealed in 2002. Section 3-804 of the Criminal Law Article (2002) presently includes provisions regarding regulation of telephone abuse. 5 At the time Petitioner was indicted, Section 4-509 of the Family Law Article provided in part: (a) A person who fails to comply with the relief granted in an ex parte order under § 4-505(a)(2)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) of this subtitle, or in a protective order und er § 4- 506(d)(1), (2), (3), (4), or (5) of this subtitle, is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject, for each offense, to: (1) for a first offense, a fine not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 90 days or both; and (2) for a second or subsequent offense, a fine not exceeding $2,500 or imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or both. Marylan d Cod e, § 4-50 9 of the Family L aw A rticle (19 84, 199 9 Rep . Vol.). -10- counts of harassme nt, 6 and eight counts of telephone threats.7 See supra note 2 for a chart of the c alls that w ere cha rged. During a pre-trial hearing, Judge Harrington of the Circuit Court for Mo ntgomery Cou nty, heard, among other things, Petitioner s motion to strike duplicitous counts. Petitioner argued that the telephone misuse charge and the harassment charges were the same and that the thirty counts of violating a protective order were duplicitous because they constituted a course of conduct instead of separate incidents. The court denie d his motion, 6 Montgomery County Code, Chapter 32, § 19A p rovides: (a) In this Section course of conduct me ans a persistent pattern of conduct of a series of acts over a period of time that shows a continuity of purpose. (b) A person must not follow another person in o r about a pu blic place or intentiona lly engage in a course of conduct that alarms or seriously annoys another person: (1) with intent to harass, alarm, or annoy the other person; and (2) after reasonable warning or request to desist by or on behalf of the other person. (c) This Section does not a pply to any constitu tionally protected conduct. (d) A violation of this Section is a Class A violation. Each day that a person violates this Section is a separate offense. 7 Montgomery County Code, Chapter 32, § 19 provides: If any person sh all use obsc ene or inde cent langu age or sha ll threaten an y person with physical harm or shall make indecent proposals to any person by means of the telephone he shall be subject to punishment for a class A violation as set f orth in section 1-19 of cha pter 1 of the C ounty Code. E ach d ay a violation continues to exist shall constitute a separate offense. This section shall apply with respect to any telephone commu nication either originating or received in the county, or both. -11- noting that the State in its assertion has some technica l or record procedure to identify each and every call, there is a time when a c onnection occurs, there is a time when a connection disconnects. . . . If it constitutes a violation of law, regardless of how brief it is, if it can be verified and proven, so be it. Following a jury trial, Petitioner w as convicte d of thirty of the forty-three cou nts: one count of telephone misuse, four counts of harassment, seven counts of telephone threats, and eighteen counts of violating a protective order. At the sentencing hearing, conducted about two months after the trial, the court sentenced Petitioner to three-years imprisonment for the telephone misuse conviction, consecutive six month sentences for each of the harassment and telephone threat convictions, and consecutive one-year sentences totaling eighteen years for each violation of a protective order conviction. The sentences resulted in a term of imprisonment totaling twenty-six years and six months. When she imposed the sentence, Judge Harrington stated: It is . . . extremely significant to me that these offenses occurred when you were already on probation for violating a protective order. There is evidence before me that you have said that you have no regard for any court order that the Court might put in place and no regard for any law that might be enacted because you are simply not go ing to adhe re to it. I don t know how you got the information as to where Ms. Triggs was now located but I think it s apparent in letters you sent even after being convicted of these offenses, that you had that information and you were using your knowledge of it when everybody had gon e to great lengths on the State s sid e to try to -12- keep you from knowing that, to further torment her with your ability to control where she goes and what she does even when you are c onfine d. . . . I think clearly there is a n obsessio n there that n othing that the Court o r the law s . . . have b een ab le to dislo dge. . . . the concern for me in formulating a sentence in this case is really the aspect o f protection , not rehabilitation, not general deterrence, but protection for the family involved in this particular case. In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals vacated the sentences for harassment and telephone threats and affirmed the eighteen convictions and sentences for violating a protec tive ord er. With respect to the harassment and telephone threats, the court concluded that Petitioner was punished for the same conduct under Section 32-19A of the Montgom ery County Code, regarding harassment, and Section 555A of Article 27 of the Maryland Code, regarding telephone threats. Applying Miles v . State, 349 Md. 215, 707 A.2d 841 (199 8), the interm ediate appe llate court dete rmined that the sentences for harassment and telep hone threats merged under the rule of l enity because the county ordinance did not clearly indicate an intent of cumulative punishment when the conduct also violated anothe r statute. 8 With respect to the eighteen counts of violating a protective order, the Court of Special Appeals observed that Section 4-509 of the Family Law Article provides penalties 8 The State did not file a petition for writ of certiorari with respect to the Court of Special Appeals holding regarding the sentences for harassment and telephone threats. We, thus, ha ve not a ddress ed this is sue. -13- for each off ense of v iolating a pro tective order . Becaus e each call constituted a separate offense, the court affirmed Petitioner s eighteen convictions for violating a protective order. We granted Petition er s petiti on for a writ o f certior ari, Triggs v. State, 379 Md. 225, 841 A.2d 340 (2004), which presented the following question for our review: Where Petitioner was convicted of harassing and threatening his wife, by telephone, over a period of tw o days, was it er ror to impose separate, one-year, con secutive sen tences as to each of eighteen convictions under the Family Law statute? Although Petitioner frames his question in terms of the multiple sentences only and does not address the multiple offenses and convictions, he maintained at oral argum ent, and the S tate likewise co nceded th is point, that his argument necessarily implicates what we have called the unit of prosecution, which arises in the context of determining whether the charging of multiple off enses is appropriate. Our focus in this opinion, thus, is the unit of prosecution the General Assembly intended in order to trigger the penalty provisions for violating a protective order. When a protective order requires an abuser to have no contact with a victim, we conclude that repeated calls constitute separate acts and theref ore separa te offenses for the purposes of the sentencing provisions requiring penalties for each offense in Section 4-509 of the Family Law Article. II. Standard of Review When sentencing criminal defendants, [i]t is well settled that [a] judge is vested w ith very broad discretion. Jackson v. State, 364 Md. 192, 199, 772 A.2d 273, 277 -14- (2001)(quoting Poe v. State, 341 Md. 523, 531, 671 A.2d 501, 505 (1996)). The judge is accorded this broad latitu de to best ac complish th e objectives of sentenc ing--punish ment, deterrence and reh abilitatio n." Id. at 199-200, 772 A.2d at 277 (quoting State v. Dopkowski, 325 Md. 671, 679, 602 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1992)). Maryland recognizes three grounds for appellate review of sentences: (1) whether the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or violates other constitutional requirements; (2) whether the sentencing judge was motivated by ill-will, prejudice or other impermissible considerations; and (3) whether the sentence is within statutory limits." Id. at 200, 772 A.2d at 277 (quoting Gary v. S tate, 341 Md. 513, 516, 671 A.2d 495, 496 (1996)); see also Jennings v. State, 339 Md. 675, 682-84, 664 A.2d 903, 90 7 (199 5). In this case, in order to determine w hether Petitioner s sentence was legal we must determine what unit of prosecution the Legislature intended when it established the crime of violating a protective order. We apply our normal rules of statutory construction in determinating the legislative intent regarding the proper unit of prosecution and the appropriate unit of punishment in respect to violations of any criminal statute. Melton v . State, 379 M d. 471, 4 78, 842 A.2d 7 43, 747 (2004 ). III. Discussion Petitioner does not maintain that his sentence is unconstitutional or that Judge Harrington was mo tivated by ill-will or p rejudice; rathe r, he conten ds that it was error to impose separate, one-year sentences under the F amily Law Article bec ause the pe nalty provisions for violating a protective order under the statute are ambiguous. In such an -15- instance, he maintains, merging the offenses is required under the rule of lenity, a rule of statutory construction that turns multiple offenses into a single c ourse of c onduct w hen it is uncertain as to whether the legislature intended multiple punishments for the same act or transaction. Describing the calls as occurring in flurries or clusters bec ause som e of the calls occurred within minutes of each other, Petitioner also urges that the phone calls should be punished in the aggregate rather than as separate calls. He notes that, under the telephone misuse statute, harassing or threatening telephone calls are punished in the aggregate. He maintains that the le gislative history of the dom estic vio lence sta tute, which includes the protective order proc edure, reflec ts a focus on protecting victims from domestic abuse and not on lengthy in carcera tion for each o ne in a f lurry of tele phone calls. The State argues that the protective order statute is plain and unambiguous, noting that the statute states that a person who violates a protective order is subject to conviction and sentence, for each offense. Because there is no ambiguity, the State maintains that the eigh teen sepa rate o ffen ses d o not mer ge under the rule of le nity. If there is ambiguity in the statute, the State contends, separate sen tences are permissible given the statute s legislative history. Beca use the pu rpose of th e statute is to protect victims of domestic violence from further abuse, the State maintains that punishing -16- an abuser for each call he makes in violation of the statute is appropriate.9 The State also argues that tre ating separa te calls as a flurry would undermine the purpose of the statute becau se such an interp retation would give an abuser a pass to ca ll . . . 15, 20, 100 more times in the day and say whatever [he wants]. A. Section 4-509 of the Family Law Article establishes the crime of violating a protective order: (a) A person who fa ils to comply w ith the relief gra nted in an ex parte order under § 4-505(a)(2)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) of this subtitle, or in a protective order und er § 4- 506(d)(1), (2), (3), (4), or (5) of this subtitle, is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject, for each offense, to: (1) for a first offense, a fine not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 90 days or both; and (2) for a second or subsequent offense, a fine not exceeding $2,500 or imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or both. Code, § 4-509 of the Family Law Article. Petitioner argues that the rule of lenity applies because it is not clear the General Assemb ly intended in Section 4-509 to allow courts to impose consecutive one-year sentences for violating a protective order when the violations consisted of separate calls 9 As we noted in Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 251 n.3, 674 A.2d 951, 954 n.3 (1996), although men can be victims of domestic abuse, women are the majority of victims in domestic violence cases. Although we shall use the pronoun he when referring to abusers, our interpretation o f the dom estic violence statute is gender-neutral, and we do not intend to ignore dome stic abu se that o ccurs to male v ictims. Id. -17- occurring within relatively close periods of time. The issue in this case thus turns on whether repeated calls constitute separate acts for the purposes of the sentencing provisions requiring penalties for each offense in Section 4-509 of the Family Law Article. In Purne ll v. State, 375 Md. 678, 692, 827 A.2d 68, 76 (2003), we explained that determining whether the Legislature intended multiple sentences for the same offense turn[s] on the unit o f prosecu tion of the o ffense an d this is ordinarily determined by reference to legislative intent." See also Randa ll Book C orp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 323, 558 A.2d 715, 719-20 (1989)(explaining that, in cases involving multiple pu nishmen t, cumulative sentences for the same offense may under some circumstances be imposed when specifically authorized b y the legislature). We analyze the unit of prosecution when we are faced with m ultiple p unishm ents de riving f rom a s ingle sta tutory pro vision. Purnell, 375 Md. at 692, 827 A.2d at 76. As we explained in Purnell: [W]hether a particular course of conduct con stitutes one or more violations of a single statutory offen se affects a n accused in three distinct, albeit related ways: multiplicity in the indictment or information, multiple convictions for the same offense, and multiple sentences for the same offens e. All three turn on the unit of prosecution of the offense and this is ordinarily determ ined by re ferenc e to legis lative inte nt. Id. (quoting Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 432, 535 A.2d 485, 488 (1988)). In other words, whether the defen dant is challengin g multiple ind ictments, mu ltiple convictio ns, or multiple sentences, the unit of prosecution reflected in the statute controls whether multiple sentences ultimately may be im posed . [A]m biguou s units o f prose cution . . . , pursuant to the rule of -18- lenit y, must normally be construed in favor of the defendant, effectively merging the offenses. Melton, 379 Md. at 488, 842 A.2d at 75310 ; Randa ll Book Corp., 316 Md. at 327, 558 A.2d at 721. Thus, in order to determine the unit of prosecution, a critical question is one of legislative intent. Rand all Boo k, 316 Md. at 324, 558 A.2d at 72 0; State v. Boozer, 304 Md. 98, 106, 497 A.2d 1129, 1133 (1985)(stating that the classic test . . . is whether the legislative intent is to punish individual acts separately or to punish only the course of action which they constitute )(quoting State v. Frazier, 440 A .2d 916 , 925 (C onn. 19 81), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 112, 102 S.Ct. 3496, 73 L.Ed.2d 1375 (1982)). As we have explained many 10 Gen erall y, the required evidence test or Blockburger test applies when a defendant argues that two o r more of fenses stem from the s ame act or course of conduct. Purne ll, 375 Md. at 692, 827 A.2d at 77. In Purnell, we explained: The required ev idence test is that which is minimally necessary to secure a conviction for each . . . offense. If each offense requires a proof of a fact which the other does not, or in other words, if each offense contains an element which the other does not, the offenses are not the same for double jeopardy and merger purposes, even though arising from the same conduct or episod e. 375 Md. at 694, 827 A.2d at 77 (quoting Williams v. State, 323 Md. 312, 317-18, 593 A.2d 671, 673 (1 991)). When there is a merger u nder the req uired evide nce test, sepa rate sentences are nor mally pre cluded . State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385, 392, 631 A.2d 453, 457 (1993 ). Here, the separate offenses of violating a protective order for which Petitioner was convicted would n ot have m erged un der the requ ired eviden ce test. Because Petitioner made separate phone calls at different times, the State ha d to prove each sepa rate call and tim e in order to prove that he made each call in violation of the protective order. Thus, although Petitioner refers to the required evidence test in his argument, the required evidence test would not preclud e separate sentences f or separate o ffenses u nder the circ umstance s of this case. -19- times, when d iscerning leg islative intent, we look first to the language of the statute, read in light of the full context of the statute and other external manifestations of intent or general purpo se. Jones v. Sta te, 357 M d. 141, 1 59, 742 A.2d 4 93, 502 (1999 ). [W]he n the language is clear an d unam biguou s, our inq uiry ordin arily ends there. Drew v. First Guar. Mortgage Corp., 379 Md. 318, 327, 842 A.2d 1, 6 (2003). Reading the statutory language within the context of the statutory scheme, our approach is a commonsensical one designed to effectuate the "purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body." Id. at 327-28, 842 A.2d at 6-7. Remedial statutes, furthermore, are to be liberally construed to suppress the evil and advance the remedy. Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256, 674 A.2d 951, 957 (1996)(providing a history of the d omestic vio lence statute a nd determ ining that it is a remedial statute). 11 B. The Maryland G eneral As sembly first enacted the domestic violence statute in 1980. See 1980 M d. Laws , ch. 887; see also Coburn, 342 Md. at 252-56, 674 A.2d at 955-57 (providing a history of the domestic violence statute and a detailed explanation of how to file 11 Although the domestic violence statute is a remedial one, the Legislature has no t excused th e perpetrato rs of dom estic violence from the re ach of the criminal law . They are sub ject to prosecution for their conduct for assault, rape, and other sexual offenses, criminal homicide, kidnaping and, indeed, for failing to comply with relief provided in a protective order. Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. 122, 134 n.2, 775 A.2d 1249, 1256 n.2 (2001)(citing Family Law Article, Section 4-509(a)). -20- for a protective order); Richard A . DuB ose III, C omm ent, Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen: Through the Eyes of the Victim-Maryland s Civil Protection Order and the Role of the Court, 32 U. B ALT . L. R EV. 237 (2003)(describing Maryland s domestic violence law). In 1992, Maryland s domestic violence laws were strengthened . See 1992 Md. Laws, ch. 65.12 The 1992 changes included extending the period of relief from 30 to 200 days, expanding the def inition of abuse, expand ing the definition of hou sehold memb ers eligible for relief, adding forms of relief the court may order such as prohibiting contact between the parties, changing the standard of proof from a preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing evidence, granting courts the ability to modify a protective order, and establishing penalties for each offense of violating a protec tive ord er. Id. The legislative 12 The purp ose clause f or Senate B ill 282, whic h was en acted in 19 92, provid es: For the purpo se of altering the length o f time that an ex parte order or protective order issued in a domestic violence case may be effective; altering the contents of a petition filed in a domestic violence case; providing that certain information may be omitted from certain documents filed in domestic violence cases; clarifying a certain finding that shall be made before a court may issue an ex parte order or protective order and protective order; altering the types of relief that may be granted in an ex parte order; pro viding for th e modific ation of ce rtain orders; altering certain provisions relating to the enforcement of an ex parte order or protective order; prohibiting a person from violating certain provisions of certain orders; establishing certain penalties for certain vio lations; provid ing for certa in petitions for modifications and ap peals; prov iding that certa in orders or decisions or compliance with certain orders may not be admissible or considered in certain divorce proceedings; defining certain terms; altering certain definitions; and generally relating to domestic violence cases. -21- bill file includes numerous documents from newspaper articles to testimony from representatives from the Governor s Office revealing the overarching purpose to strengthen the law and protec t victims of dom estic abu se. See, e.g., Letter from Senator B arbara Hoffman, The Women Legislators of Maryland, to the House Judiciary Committee (March 20, 1992)(on file with the Department of Legislative Services); Bonnie A. Kirkland , Deputy Legislative Officer for the Office of the Governor, Briefing Document for Senate Bill 282 before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee and House Judiciary Committee; Betha Hill, Violence A gainst Women: Schaefer wants to Expand Md. Law s Protections, W ASH. P OST, Feb. 10, 1992, at D1. The General Assembly has continued to strengthen the domestic violence statute. In 1994, for example, the General Assembly added a provision allowing a police officer to arrest an abuser without a warrant. 1994 Md. Laws, ch. 728. In 1 995, the G eneral As sembly allowed the court to waive filing fees for the issuance of a temporary ex parte order o r a protective order. 1995 Md. Laws, ch. 9. In 1996 , the Gene ral Assem bly provided th at a law enforcement officer may remove a firearm from a domestic violence scene. 1996 Md. Law s, ch. 561. In 19 97, the Ge neral Asse mbly increase d the availab le relief period that may be granted from 2 00 days to 12 mo nths. 19 97 M d. Law s, ch. 30 7. In 1998, the General Assembly increased the fine for violating a protective order from $500 to $1000 and adopted separate penalties for the first violation and second and subsequent violatio ns. 199 8 Md . Laws, ch . 685. When the 1998 legislation was first -22- proposed, House Bill 339 read: (a) A pers on wh o fails to comp ly with the relief gr anted in . . . a protecti ve orde r . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject, for each offense, to a fine not exceeding $10,00 0 or imp risonm ent not e xceed ing 3 yea rs. According to the House Floor Report, one of the purposes of the bill was to make violating a protective order an offe nse over wh ich the District Court has concurren t jurisdiction w ith the circuit court. The report also notes that, because the terms of imprisonment would be increased, the defendant would have a right to demand a jury trial. Floor Report, H.B. 339 (1998). In addition, the proposed increases in the maximum penalties are designed to deter potential violations of an ex parte or protective order. The purpose of the law was described initially as in creasin g the am ount of the fine and the term of impriso nmen t. House B ill 339 was amende d, howe ver, in a way that established multiple penalties for each o ffense of viola ting a pr otective order. 1998 Md. Laws, ch. 685. The capped fine of $10,000 and maximum punishment of three years was changed to an ap proach that more clearly penalized the abuser for each offense. After the amendment, Section 4-509 established the current penalty scheme: (a) A person w ho fails to com ply with th e relief g ranted in . . . a protecti ve orde r . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject, for e ach offe nse, to: (1) for a first offense, a fine not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 90 days or both; and (2) for a second or subsequent offense, a fine not exceeding $2,500 or imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or both. -23- 1998 Md. Laws, ch. 685 (em phasis add ed). Finally, the R evised Fisc al Note for Hou se Bill 339 stated that [t]his amended bill increases the penalties for violation of a d omestic violence order. The note also observed that [g]eneral fund revenues could increase or decrease under the bill s alteration of the monetary penalty provision, depending upon the number of co nvictions and fines imp osed . . . . Revised Fiscal No te, H.B. 339 (1998 ). Our exploration of Section 4-509 reveals that the provision unambiguously provides that a person who violates a protective order may receive cu mulative p enalties for se parate offenses. Not only does the statute use the phrase for each offense, it also establishes subsequent penalties based on the n umber of times an abuser violates a protective orde r. Section 4-509 pla inly and unam biguously co ntemplates that a person may be sub ject to multiple convictions for the multiple offenses of violatin g a sing le protec tive ord er. Section 4-509, however, does not define what an offense consists of under the Family Law A rticle. Section 4-506(d), how ever, of the Family Law Article provides what kind of relie f may be inc luded in a final protective order. 13 In order to determine whether 13 Und er Se ction 4-50 6(d) of th e Family L aw A rticle , a co urt m ay: (1) order the responde nt to refrain from abusing or threatening to abuse any person eligible for relief; (2) order the responde nt to refrain from contacting, attempting to contact, or harassing any person eligible for relief; (3) order the respondent to refrain from entering the residence of any person eligible for relief; (4) . . . order the respondent to vacate th e home im mediately and award temporary use and possession of the home to the person eligible f or relief . . .; (5) order the respondent to remain away from the place of -24- an offense has been committed in violation of a protective order, a court must review what the protective order required. See Coburn, 342 Md. at 254, 674 A.2d at 956 (describing the process for petitioning for a protective order and the different types of relief a court may order). For ex ample , a court may order, among other things, an abuser to stay away from the victim and to h ave no contac t with th at victim . In this case, after amending the September 26 protective order, the court ordered that Petitioner have no contact with Mrs. Triggs in person or by any other manner, including contact at her residence, place of em ployment [and the like] (em phasis added). Add ition ally, in order to ensure that Petitioner not contact Mrs. Triggs, the court required him to pick up and drop off his children at school, rather than at home, when he had them for employme nt, school, or temporary residence of a perso n eligible for relief or home of other family members; (6) award temporary custody of a minor child of the respondent and a person eligible for relief; (7) estab lish tem porary vis itation w ith a min or child . . .; (8) award emergen cy family mainten ance . . .; (9) award tem porary use an d possessio n of a veh icle jointly owne d by the re spond ent and a perso n eligibl e for rel ief . . . ; (10) direct the respondent or any or all of the persons eligible for relief to participate in profession ally supervised counse ling or a domestic violence program; (11) order the respondent to surrender to law enforcement authorities any firearm in the respondent's possession for the duration of the protective order; or (12) order the respondent to pay filing fees and costs of a proceeding under this subtitle. Marylan d Cod e, § 4-50 6(d) of the Fam ily Law A rticle (19 84, 199 9 Rep . Vol). -25- visitation every two w eeks. The court also designated Mrs. Triggs s father to serve as an intermediary between Mrs. Trig gs and Pe titioner should Petitioner need to relay messages to Mrs. Triggs in case of an emergency. Finally, the court required the children to call their father twice a week instead of permitting Petitioner to call them. Pursuant to Section 4-506, therefore, Petitioner clearly was ordered to have no contact whatsoever with Mrs. Triggs. We have no difficulty concluding that each call constituted prohibited contact and, thus, was a sep arate and d istinct offen se for the p urposes o f the pena lty provisions in Section 4-509. As our review of the domestic violence statute s legislative history indicates, the Maryland domestic violence statute reveals a strong legislative intent to protect victims. See Coburn, 342 M d. at 252, 67 4 A.2d a t 955 (exp laining that the purpose o f the dom estic violence statute more generally is to protect and aid victims of domestic abuse by providing an immediate and ef fective remedy )(quoting Barbee v. Barbee, 311 Md. 620, 623, 537 A.2d 224, 225 (1988)). In fact, when we construe the statutory language authorizing protective orders within the context of the domestic violence statute s overall scheme, we discern a clear legislative intent to define each incident of dom estic violence as a separa te and punishable act. In Section 4-501, for example, abuse under the domestic violence statute is defined as any of the follo wing acts : (i) an act that causes serious bodily harm; (ii) an act that places a person eligible for relief in fear of imminen t serious bod ily harm; (iii) assault in any degree; (iv) rape or sex ual offen se as defin ed by Article 27, §§ 462 through 464C o f the Cod e or attemp ted rape or s exual offense -26- in any degree; or (v) false impriso nmen t. Maryland Code, § 4-501 of the Family Law Article (1984, 1999 Rep. V ol.)(emphasis added). In Richmo nd v. State, 326 Md. 25 7, 265, 604 A.2d 483, 487 (1992 ), we explained that [w ]e have . . . construed the us e of the w ord any in a crim inal statute to m ean every an d to support a legislative intent authorizing multiple convictions. As it thus takes only one act under Section 4-501 to constitute abuse u nder the domestic violen ce statute in order for a court to issue a protec tive ord er, see Ka tsenelen bogen , 365 Md. at 134-35, 775 A.2d at 125657 (upholding a trial court s decision that one instance of shoving constituted abuse under the act in ord er to issue a protective order), it follows that it should take only one act, such as a telephone call, to constitute an offense in violation of a protective order under Section 4-509, particularly given that the provision mandates pen alties for each offense and authorizes multiple convictions. Such an approach is not only logically sound but is also consistent with the statute s overall scheme to protect victims of domestic violence. By holding that each separate call constitutes contact in violation of a protective order, we are effectuating the purpose of the domestic violence statute, a statute clearly designed to prevent abuse a nd pro tect victim s of do mestic v iolence . In State v. McGee, 84 P.3d 690, 693 (N.M. App. 2003), the Court of Appeals of New Mexico conclude d that each p hone call constituted a separate instance of prohibited contact in violation of a protective order. In McGee, the defendant received six consecutive sentences for four violations of a protective order on February 16, 2000, and two other -27- violations occurr ing on O ctober 2 , 2000. Id. at 695. Arguing that he eng aged in a single course of conduct on two occasions when he made calls in violation of a protective order on two days, the defendant, further, argued he should be sentenced once for each course of condu ct. Id. The New Mexico intermediate appellate court disagreed, observing that the order of p rotection clea rly and unam biguously ordered Defendant not to contact Victim and that [t]he legislature has made its intent clear that each violation will be punished separately. Id. at 696. Notably, the court reached this conclusion based on penalty language that arguably is less clear than Maryland s penalty provision, which, unlike the New Mex ico statu te, clearly m andate s penal ties fo r each o ffense . 14 Similarly, in Walke r v. Wa lker, the Court of Appeals of New York concluded that separate and consecutive sentences could be imposed for each separate and distinct violation of a protective order. 658 N.E.2d 1025 , 1026, (N.Y. 1995 ).15 In Walker, while he 14 N. M. S tat. Ann. § 4 0-13-6 E (Michie 1 978, 199 9 Repl. Pa mphlet) pro vides: A person convicted of violating an order of protection granted by a court under the Family Violence Protection Act is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be sen tenced in ac cordance with Section 31-19-1 NMSA 1978. Upon a second or subsequent conviction, an offender shall be sentenced to a jail term of not less than seve nty-two consecutive hours that shall not be suspende d, deferred or taken un der advisem ent. 15 In support of his argument, Petitioner cites Vitti v. Vitti, 609 N.Y.S.2d 686 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994), a New York case holding that, where a husband made a series of ph one calls in violation of a protective order, two consecutive six-m onth incarc erations w ere not valid under the Family Court Act because the Act, on its face, prohibited consecutive sentences. Id. at 688. In Carmille A. v. David A., 615 N.Y .S.2d 584 , 587 (N.Y .Fam.Ct. 1994), the New York Family Cou rt declined to follow Vitti, holding instead that [t]he plain reading of [the Family Court Act] discloses that for each separate finding of violation, for each sepa rate -28- was jailed, the def endant sen t three written commu nications to his wife in violation of a protective order requiring that he have no contact with his wife. Id. The Family Cou rt sentenced him to three consecutive six-month incarcerations, one for each violation of the protective order. 16 Rejecting the defendant s argument that the statute penalizing the violation of a protective order allow[ed] a maximum of six months inc arce ratio n on ly, regardless of the number of willful a cts of disobedience ag ainst the same order, the C ourt of App eals observ ed that, und er the defe ndant s arg ument: [A] violator already penalized for willfully failing to obey an order of protectio n would garner immunity from further official sanction for persistent, separate violations. Such an approach is in no way compelled or warranted by the governing statutes, sentencing principles or reasona ble statutory ana lysis. Its incongruous and untenable result would also constitute an invitatio n to v iolat e and no in cent ive to obey. Id. at 1027 (citation omitted). The court went on to observe that the fact that the defendant disobeyed the court's order from jail serves only to underscore the need for an effective judicial option for app ropriate punish ment a nd dete rrence. Id. Without strict enforce ment, failure to obey the ord er of protec tion, a guilty respo ndent m ay be committed to jail for a term not to exce ed six months. Id. at 590. In Walke r, the case we discuss above, the New York Court of Appeals cites Carm ille A. with approval, adopting its holding that each separate finding of a violation may result in separate punishments. 658 N.E.2d at 1027. 16 Section 84 6-a of the N ew Yo rk Family Co urt Act pro vides that: If a respondent is brought before the court for failure to obey any lawfu l order is sued u nder th is article . . . a nd if, after hearing, the court is satisfied by competent proof that the respondent has willfully failed to obey any such order, the court . . . may commit the respondent to jail for a term not to exceed six months. -29- in the court s view, the core p urpose o f the dom estic violence statute to protect victims of dome stic viole nce w ould be frustrate d. Id. We also expressly reject Petitioner s argume nt that the statute anticipates tha t a single course of conduct such as a flurry of calls occurring within seconds or minutes of each other shou ld be treat ed as one offense under the rule of l enity. We first observe that Petitioner s contention that he was just pressing the redial button is somewhat disingenuous. Although some of the calls for which he was convicted were separated by a minute or minutes, see supra note 2, many of the calls were separated by more than twenty minutes. In fact, in the first call he made to his w ife, Petitioner s statement I don t give a fuck about a piece of paper indicates he was doing m uch more than passiv ely pressing red ial: he wa s intentio nally and delibera tely conta cting his wife. Moreover, we reject the implication underlying Petitioner s flurry argument that somehow the repeated calls were less violative of the protective order prec isely because there were so many of them and because some of them occurred close in time to each other. In fact, as we stated in Boozer: The courts of this country have had little difficulty in concluding that separate acts resulting in separate insults to the person of the victim may be separate ly charged and punished even though they occur in close proximity to each other and even though they are part of a sin gle crim inal epis ode or t ransac tion. Id. at 105, 497 A.2d at 1132 (determining that a defendant may be subject to multiple charges arising out of the same criminal sexual course of conduct); see also H arrell v. State, 277 -30- N.W.2d 462, 464-69 (Wisc. App. 1979)(concluding that, where a defendant was convicted of two counts of rape when twenty-five minutes transpired between acts of sexual intercourse, each act w as analytically separated by considerations of fact and time and noting that [e ]ach ac t [was ] a furth er denig ration o f the vic tim s inte grity ). As the Court of Appea ls of New York observed, if a violator [of a protective order] already penalized for willfully failing to obey an order o f protection would garner immunity from further official sanction for persisten t, separa te violatio ns, the result would be an invitation to violate and no incentive to obey. Walker, 658 N.E.2d at 1027. Because we believe the General Assemb ly created a penalty scheme in Section 4-509 to give abusers a disincentive to violate protective o rders, we re ject Petitioner s flurry argum ent for this rea son as w ell. IV. Conclusion We conclude that repeated calls constitute separate acts for the purposes of the sentencing provisions requiring penalties for each offense in Section 4-509 of the Family Law Article. In this case, Petitioner received eighteen sentences because he willfully and deliberately flouted an order of p rotection eigh teen times b y making eig hteen calls in violation of a protec tive order requiring that he have no contact with Mrs. Triggs. Judge Harrington did not err because Petitioner was convicted of eighteen distinct offenses and because the eighteen sentences Petitioner received were authorized by the penalty provisions of the domestic violence statute. -31- JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIA L APPEALS AFFIRMED; COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER. -32-

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