Patton v. USA Rugby
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Patton v. USA Rugby, No. 113, September Term, 2003. TORT S NEG LIGEN CE DU TY SP ECIAL RELA TIONS HIP An amateur ru gby player and h is father, who was a spectator, were struck by lightning at a rugby tournament. The player was injured and the spectato r killed. Various mem bers of the family filed suit alleging negligence against the rugby tournament organizers, the game referee, and related orga nizations fo r not taking p recautions to avert the incid ent. Held: The element of dependence and ceding of c ontrol by the inju red party that is needed to find a special rela tionship is absent in this c ase. Our d ecision is con sistent with our view of n arrowly con struing the special relationship exception so as not to impose broad liability for every group activity. The rugby player and spectator were free to leave the volu ntary, amateur tournament at any time and their movements were not restricted by the tournament organi zers. An amateur sp orting event is a voluntary affair, and th e participants are capable of leaving the field under their own volition if they feel their lives are in danger. The changing weather conditions were visible to all competent adults. The spectators and participants could have sou ght shelter at a ny time they deem ed it approp riate to do so. It is unreason able to impose a duty on the organizers of ama teur outdoor events to w arn spectators or adult participa nts of a weather condition that everyone present is fully able to observe and react to on his or her own. The approach of a thundersto rm is readily app arent to reaso nably prudent adults and, th erefore, it is eve ry adult s respon sibility to protect him self or herse lf from the weather. There was no special relationship and, therefore, no legal duty to protect spectators and participants from the storm. Circuit Co urt for Anne A rundel Co unty Case # 02-C-02-081031 WD IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 113 September Term, 2003 JUD ITH E DW ARD S PA TTO N, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS THE SURVIVING SPOUSE OF DONALD LEE PATTON, AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AND EXECUTOR FOR THE ESTATE OF DON ALD LEE P ATTO N, et al. v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA RUGBY FOOTBALL, UNION, LTD. d/b/a U SA R UGB Y, et al. Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Harrell, J. Bell , C.J., join s in ju dgm ent o nly. Filed: June 10, 2004 On 17 June 2000 , Robert Carson P atton, II, and h is father, Do nald Lee Patton, wh ile at an am ateur ru gby tourn amen t in Ann apolis, w ere struc k by lightn ing. Robe rt, a player in the tournament, was seriously injured, but survived. Donald, a spectator watching his son play, died. Robert and various other membe rs of the Pa tton family filed suit in the Circ uit Court for Anne Arundel County alleging negligence against the rugby tournament organizers, referee, and related organizations with regard to the episode. Defend ants filed Motions to Dismiss arguing they owed no legal duty to Robert and Donald Patton. A hearing was held and, on 10 July 2003, the Circuit Court dismissed the action. The P atton fa mily appe aled. This Court, on its own initiative and before the appeal could be decided in the Court of Special Appeals, issued a writ of certiorari to determine whether any of the defendants, under the circumstances alleged in the complaint, owed a legal duty to Robert and Dona ld Patto n. Patton v. USA Rugby, 379 Md. 224, 841 A.2d 339 (2004). I. A. The Lightning Strike Based on Appellants amended complaint, we assume the truth of the following factual allegations:1 1 See Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 353 Md. 544, 548, 727 A.2d 947, 949 (1999) ( as the result of the trial court s granting a motion to dismiss, as opposed to the granting of summary judgment or judgment entered af ter trial, the Cou rt will assum e the truth of all wellpleaded facts and any reasonable inferences that can be properly drawn therefrom ) (citations omitted). Sometime during th e ear ly morning of 17 June 2000, Robert and Donald Patton arrived at playing fields adjacent to the Annapolis Middle School in Anne Aru ndel County, Maryland. Robert was to play rugby for the Norfolk Blues Rugby Club. Donald intended to support his son as a spectator. Robert and Donald , along with other participants and spectators, placed their equipment and belongings under a row of trees adjacent to the playing fields. The rugby tournament was coordinated by Steven Quigg and was sanctioned by the United States of A merica R ugby Footb all Union, L td., d/b/a US A Rug by, and Mid -Atlantic Rugby Footb all Unio n, Inc. R ugby matc hes involving over two dozen teams began at approxim ately 9:00 a.m. an d were p lanned to continue througho ut the day. It was a warm, muggy day. The weather foreca st for A nnapo lis was f or poss ible thun derstorm s. At some point prior to the start o f the twen ty minute match between the Norfolk Blues and the Washin gton Rugby Football Club ( the match ), a thunderstorm passed through the area surround ing the Annapolis Middle School. At the start of the match, rain commenced; lightning could be seen and thunder could be heard proximate to the lightning flashes. By this time, the National Weather Service had issued a thunderstorm warning for the Annapolis area. Kevin Eager, a member of the Potomac Society of Rugby Football Referees, Inc., was the volunteer re feree for th e afternoo n match in which R obert Patton was a pa rticipant. Under the direction of Eager, the match continued as the rain increased in intensity, the 2 weather conditions deteriorated, and the lighting flashed directly overhead. Other matches at the tournament ended. Robert Patton continued to play the match through the rain and lightning and his father continued to observe as a spectator until the match was stopped just prior to its normal conclusion. Upon the termination of the match, Robert and Donald fled the playing fields to the area under the trees where th ey left their posse ssions. As th ey began to m ake their exit from under the trees to seek the safety of their car, each was struck by lightning. Donald died. Robert Patton sustained personal injuries and was hospitalized, but recovered. B. Circuit Court Proceedings Appellan ts here and P laintiffs below are Judith E dwards P atton (wife of Don ald Patton), acting in both an individual capacity and as personal representative of the estate of Donald Patton; Sophia P. Patton and Robert C. Patton (the p arents of Donald Patton); Robert Carson Patton, II; and Meredith Patton (Donald s daughter). They sued the United States of America Rugby Football Union, Ltd., d/b/a USA Rugby ( USA Rugby ), the MidAtlantic Rugby Fo otball Union, Inc. ( MARFU ), the Potomac Ru gby Union, Inc. ( PRU ), the Potoma c Society of Rug by Football Referees, Inc. ( Ref erees Society ), Kevin Eag er,2 and Steven Quigg, alleging that Defendants were liable in tort for the death of Donald Patton and the injuries suffered by Robert Patton. This liability, Appellants contended, was due to 2 Kevin Eager never was served with process. 3 Defendants /Appellees failure to employ proper policies and procedures to protect players and spectators at the tournament from lightning strikes. Appellan ts alleged that Appellees each had a duty to, but failed to, do one or more of the following acts: (a) Have and implement proper policies and procedures regarding the protection of players and spectators from adverse weather conditions and lightning; (b) Have an d implem ent a policy regarding the safe evacuation of players and spectators fr om the fie lds of play at its m atches w hen lightnin g is present; (c) Safeguard the health, safety, and welfare of the players and spectators at its matches; (d) Term inate the rug by match an d tournam ent when lightning is pre sent; (e) Monito r and detec t dangerou s conditions associated w ith its matches; and (f) Train, supervise, monitor and c ontrol actions of officials prior to ensu re the safety of the participants and spectators from d angero us lightn ing strik es. On 26 August 2002, the Referees Society filed a Motion to Dismiss all claims pending against it on the ground that the Referees Society owed no tort duty to Robert or Donald Patton as a matter of law. Thereafter, on 16 September 2002, USA Rugby, MARFU, and Steven Quigg filed a joint Motion to Dismiss in which they adopted the arguments of the Referees Society and advanced the additional argument that Maryland s Recreational Land Use Statute, found in Maryland Code (1974, 2000 Repl. Vol., 2003 Supp .), § 5-110 1, et seq. of the Natural Resources Article, conferred tort immunity on them for injuries arising from recreational use of premises, i.e., playing rugby on the Annapolis Middle School fields.3 3 PRU was not served with process at the time that U SA Rug by, MARF U, and M r. Quigg filed their Motion to Dismiss and, consequently, PRU was not included in that motion (contin ued...) 4 Appellants, on 30 Decem ber 2002 , filed an am ended co mplaint. On 9 January 2003, USA Rugby, MARFU, PRU, and Mr. Quigg filed a second Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, for Summary Judgment. The Motion to Dismiss argued that: (1) Appellees owed the Pattons no legally cogniza ble tort duty as a matter of law; (2) Appellees are immune from tort liability under Maryland s Recreational Land Use Statute; and (3) the claims of Robert were barred by waiver. On 13 January 200 2, the Ref erees Soc iety also filed a M otion to Dismiss th e amend ed comp laint. The pending motions were heard on 5 Februa ry 2003. The Circuit Co urt, subs equently, issued an order granting the pending motions to dismiss and, on 17 November 2003, issue d a Mem orandum Opinion explaining the reasons for the dism issal. Based on Maryland precedents and caselaw from other jurisdictions, the Circuit Court concluded that Appe llees did not owe a d uty of care to R obert or D onald Patto n. The C ircuit Court noted gen erally that courts in other jurisdictions h ave foun d that land owners or their equivalent do not have a duty to warn invitees of the risk of lightning. As regards Don ald Patton, the Circuit Court stated: [D]ecedent Donald Patton was a nonpaying spectator at a rugby match organized and overseen by [Appellees]. There is n o indication from the reco rd that Decedent had entrusted himself to the control and protection of [Appellees], indeed he was free to leave the tournament at any time. 3 (...continued) as a moving party. PRU timely filed an Answer to Appellants original Complaint on 15 October 2002, and thereafter, was included as a moving party on all pending defense motions. 5 Additionally, there is no indication that he had lost the ability to monitor changing weather conditions and act accordingly. While [Appellants] allege the storm beg an near the beginning of the ma tch, it was no t until the conclusion of the game, that Decedent and plaintiff Robert Patton, attempted to escape the storm by running towards the tree line ad jacent to the o pen field to retrieve their belongings. It was here that both were struck by lightning. The inherently unp redictable nature of weather and the patent dangerousness of lightning make it unreasonable to impose a duty upon [Appellees] to protect spectators from the type [of] injury that occ urred h ere. As regards Robert Patton, the Circuit Court stated that [w]hile it is arguable that [Appellees] had a greater duty to protect plaintiff Robert Patton, a player/participant from injury, they were under no duty to protect and warn him of lightenin g strikes and other acts of nature. Th e hearing ju dge relied o n cases fro m other juris dictions involving lightning strikes on golf co urses to con clude that lig htning is a universally known danger created by the elements and, in the absence of evidence that Appellants created a greater hazard than brought about by natural causes, there is no d uty to warn and protect. The Circuit Court expressly rejected as grounds for its grant of Appellees m otions to dismiss both M aryland s Recreational Land Use Statute, and waiver argument based on language contained in Robert Patton s alleged execu tion of a USA Rugb y Participa nt Enro llment F orm. This appeal follows, therefore, fr om a dism issal of the amended complaint based solely on the ground that there was no legal du ty owed to Robert or Donald Patton. Appellants present the following question for our consideration: Did the trial court err, when it found that Appellees had no d uty to protect Appellan ts from lightning injuries and granted Appellees motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted? 6 II. Maryland Rule 2-322(b)(2) provides for the filing of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon w hich relief ca n be gran ted. We h ave stated th at: The granting of a motion to dismiss is proper when, even if the facts and allegations as set forth in the complaint were proven to be true, the complaint would nevertheless fail to state a claim u pon w hich reli ef cou ld be gr anted. . . . [I]t will be affirmed if the record reveals any legally sound reason for the decision. Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 353 Md. 544, 548-49, 727 A.2d 947, 949 (1999) (citations omitted). III. A. For a plaintiff to state a prima facie claim in negligence, he or she must prove the existence of four elements by alleging facts demonstrating (1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and (4) that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant s breach of the duty. Remsberg v. Montgom ery, 376 Md. 568, 582, 831 A.2d 18, 26 (2003) (quoting Muthukumarana v. Montgomery Co., 370 Md. 447, 486, 805 A.2d 372, 39 5 (200 2), and c ases cite d therein ). Generally, w hether there is adequate proof of the required elements to succeed in a negligence action is a question of fact to be determined by the fact-finder. The existence of a legal d uty, howeve r, is a question of law 7 to be de cided b y the cou rt. Valentine, 353 Md. at 549, 72 7 A.2d at 949. As establish ed in Maryland jurisprudence over a century ago: there can be no negligence where there is no duty that is due; for negligence is the breach of some duty that one pe rson ow es to anothe r. It is consequ ently relative and can have no ex istence apart from som e duty express ly or impliedly imposed. In every instance before negligence can be predica ted of a giv en act, back of the act must be sought and found a duty to the individual complaining, the observance of which duty would have averted or avoided the injury. . . . As the duty owed varies with circumstances and with the relation to each other of the individuals concerned, so the alleged negligence varies, and the act complained of never amounts to negligence in law or in fact; if there has been no brea ch of d uty. Bobo v. State, 346 Md. 706, 714, 697 A.2d 1371, 1375 (1997) (quoting West Virg inia Cent. & P.R. v. State ex rel. Fuller, 96 Md. 652, 666 , 54 A. 669 , 671-72 (1 903)). [O ]ur analysis of a negligence cause of action usually begins with the question of whether a legally cognizable duty existed. Remsburg, 376 M d. at 582 , 831 A .2d at 26 . When assessing whether a to rt duty may exist, we often have recourse to the definition in W. Pa ge Ke eton, et a l., Prosser and Keeton on The Law o f Torts § 53 (5th ed. 1984), which characterizes duty as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another. Id. In determining the existence of a duty, we consider, among other things: the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered the injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defe ndant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. 8 Ashburn v. Anne A rundel C ounty, 306 Md. 617, 627, 510 A.2d 1078, 1083 (1986) (citation omitted). Where the failure to exercise due care creates risks of personal injury, the principal determinant of duty becomes foreseeability. Jacques v. First Nat l Bank of Maryland, 307 Md. 527, 535, 515 A.2d 756, 760 (1986) (citations omitted). The foreseeab ility test is simply inten ded to reflect curren t societal stand ards with re spect to an acceptable nexus between the negligent act and the ensuing harm. Dobbins v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Com m n, 338 Md. 341, 348, 658 A.2d 675, 678 (1995) (quoting Henley v. Prince G eorge s C ounty, 305 Md. 320, 333, 503 A.2d 1333, 1340 (1986)). In determining whether a duty exists, it is important to consider the policy reasons supporting a cause of action in negligence. The purpose is to discourage or encourage specific types of behavior by one party to the benefit of ano ther party. Valentine, 353 Md. at 550, 727 A.2d at 950. While foreseeability is often considered among the most important of these factors, its existence alone does not suffice to establish a duty under Maryland law. Remsburg, 376 Md. at 583, 831 A.2d at 26. As we clarified in Ashburn: [t]he fact that a result may be fore seeable do es not itself im pose a du ty in negligence terms. This principle is apparent in the acceptance by most jurisdictions and by this Court of the general rule that there is no duty to control a third person's conduct so as to prev ent personal harm to an other, unless a "special relationship" exists either betwe en the actor and the third person or between the actor and the person injured. Ashburn, 306 Md. at 628, 510 A.2d at 1083 (citations omitted). In addition, a tort duty does not always coexist with a moral duty. Jacques, 307 Md. at 534, 515 A.2d at 759 (citing W. Pa ge Ke eton, et a l., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 56 (5th ed. 1984)). We 9 have held that s uch a sp ecial duty to protect another may be established (1) by statute or rule; (2) by contractural or other private relationship; or (3) indirectly or impliedly by virtue of the relationship between the tortfeasor and a third party. Bobo, 346 Md. at 715, 697 A.2d at 1376 (internal citations omitted). B. Appellants allege that a special relationship existed between Appellees (USA Rugby, MARFU , PRU, the Referee s Society, and S teven Qu igg) and R obert and D onald Patton sufficient to recognize the existence of a duty to protect the latter, the breach of which gave rise to a n action fo r negligenc e. Appella nts argue th at: A participant in a sporting event, by the very nature of the sport, trusts th at his personal welfare will be protected by those controlling the event. Stated another way, it is reasona bly foreseeab le that both the player, and the player s father, will continue to participate in the match, as []long as the match is not stopped by the governing bodies in charge. It als o is reasona bly foreseeab le that, when matches are played in thunderstorms, there is a substantial risk of injury from lightning. And finally, it is reasonably foreseeable that a father will not abandon his son, when he sees those wh o have as sumed re sponsibility for his s on s w elfare p lacing h is son in a perilou s cond ition . . . . Appellants essentially contend that the tourn ament org anizers had a duty to protect Robert and Don ald, a nd to extricate them , from the dan gers of playing in an d vie wing, res pect ively, a sanctioned rugby match during a thunderstorm. Appellees counter th at there is no sp ecial rela tionship betwe en M r. Patton , Sr., Mr. Patton and the [A]ppellees which would require the [A]ppellees to protect and warn these individuals of the dang ers associated with lightning. Appellees argue that they had 10 no ability to control the activities of players or spectators at any time, and there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Patton, Sr. and Mr. Patton were dependent upon or relied upon th e [A]p pellees i n any w ay, shape or form . We said in Remsburg that the creation of a special duty by virtue of a special relationship between the parties can be established by either (1) the inherent nature of the relationship between the parties; or (2) by one party undertaking to protect or assist the other party, and thus often inducing reliance upon the conduct of the acting party. Remsburg, 376 Md. at 589-90, 831 A.2d at 30. We conclude that Appellants here did not establish by either of these methods a triable issue as to the existence of a special relationship. Id. In Remsburg, among other issues, we focused on whether a special relationship was created because of an implied or indirect relation ship be tween the parti es. Id. We held that the leader of a hunting party was under no special duty to protect a property owner who was shot by a member of the leader s hunting party. We found insufficient the relationship of dependence between the leader of the hunting party and the injured prope rty owner. Th is meant there was n o duty on the part of the leader to protect the property owner from being accidentally shot by a h unting party mem ber. 376 Md. a t 593, 83 1 A.2d at 33. In holding that the inherent nature of the relation ship between the parties did not give rise to a special relationship and, henc e, a tort duty, we a gain appro ved the trad itional specia l relationships that consistently have been associated with the special relationship doctrine. 376 Md. at 593-94, 831 A.2d at 32-33. We adopted previously as Maryland common law § 314A of the 11 Restatem ent, entitled Special Relations Giving Rise to a Duty to Aid or Protect, which provides th at: (1) [a] common carrier is under a d uty to its passeng ers to take rea sonable action (a) to pro tect them agains t unreas onable risk of p hysical ha rm . . . . (2) An innkeeper is under a similar duty to his guests. (3) A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar duty to members of the public who enter in response to his invitation. (4) One who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another under circumstance such as to deprive the other of his normal opportunities for protection is un der a similar duty to the other. Restatement (Second ) of Torts § 314A (1 965); see South land Co rp. v. Griffith, 332 Md. 704, 719, 633 A.2d 84, 91 (1993). Although the foregoing list is not exhaustive, our caselaw where we have foun d a duty arises co nsistently requires an elemen t of depen dence tha t is lacking in the present case. See, e.g., Todd v. MTA, 373 Md. 149, 165, 816 A.2d 930, 939 (2003) (finding that an employee of a common carrier has a legal duty to take affirmative action for the aid or protection of a passenger under attack by another pa ssenger); Southland, 332 Md. at 720, 633 A.2d at 91 (finding that a convenience store, through its employee and by virtue of a special relationship between the business and its customers, owed a legal duty to a customer being assaulted in store parking lot to call the police for assistance when requested to do so). As stated in Rems burg, while w e have pe rmitted som e flexibility in defin ing this limited exception, such as including the employer-to-employee relationship and also that of business owner-to-patron, we have been careful not to expand this class of special 12 relationships in such a manner as to imp ose bro ad liabilit y for eve ry group outing . Remsburg, 376 Md. at 594, 831 A.2 d at 33. Sim ilarly, in Muthukumarana v. M ontgomery County , 370 Md . 447, 805 A.2d 372 (2002), we declined to recognize that a special relationship existed betw een two c hild victims of th e sequelae of a dom estic dispute and an emergency telephone operator. In Muthukumarana, the operator, a police services aide, received a frantic call from Ms. Muthukumarana reporting that her husband had assaulted her in their ho use and then ru n upsta irs. 370 M d. at 468 -70, 80 5 A.2d at 384- 86. The polic e services aide talked with Ms. Muthukumarana on the phone for one minute and forty seconds until the husband returned downstairs and shot and killed the two children huddled at her side and then himself. Id. Ms. Muthukum arana sued the police serv ices aide and her supe rvisors alleging that they had a tort duty of care to the deceden t children and herself and that that duty was brea ched by, am ong other things, a failure to timely advise her to leave the premis es. Id. In Fried v. Archer, the companion case to Muthukumarana, we also de clined to find that a special relationship existed betw een a wo man w ho died of hypothermia due to exposure to the elements and an emergency telephone system operator who erroneously reported the location of the woma n to police o fficers on p atrol who therefore f ailed to discover the victim before her dem ise. In Fried, a communications officer employed by the 13 Harford County Sheriff s Office received a n anonymo us call 4 reporting a f emale laying se miconscious in the woods behind a particular building. 370 Md. at 458, 805 A.2d at 379. The communications officer, ho wever, pr ovided po lice officers with the wrong location of the woman. 370 Md. at 460, 805 A.2d at 379. The responding officers were unable to locate the victim, who d ied of h ypotherm ia. 370 M d. at 460 , 805 A .2d at 38 0. The decedent s mother sued the communications officer and her sup ervisors alleging that they had a tort duty of care to the deced ent and tha t that duty was breached by the failure to provide the police off icers with the decedent s correct location. 370 Md. at 461, 805 A.2d at 380. We applied the special relationship doctrine to the circumstances surrounding the emergency telephone operators in both cases and held that no special relationship existed betwe en them and the plaintiff s. 370 Md. at 486, 805 A.2d at 395. We reasoned that for a special relationship to exist between an emergency telephone operator and a person in need of assistance, it must be shown that the telephone operator affirmatively acted to protect the decedent or a specific group of individuals like the decede nt, thereby induc ing specific reliance by an individual on the telephone operator s conduct. 370 Md. at 496, 805 A.2d at 401. 4 The call, it turned out, was placed by one of the young men who caused the young woman to become unconscious and placed her in the vulnerable location outdoors on a cold, rainy night. 14 The element of depen dence an d ceding o f self-contro l by the injured p arty that is needed under Remsberg and Muthukumarana/Fried is absent in the present case.5 There is no credible evidence that the two adults, Robert and Do nald Patton , entrusted the mselves to the control and protection of A ppellees. A ccordingly, w e follow o ur admo nition in Remsburg to avoid expanding the special relationship exce ption in such a manne r as to impose broad liability for ever y grou p act ivity. Remsburg, 376 Md. at 594, 831 A.2d at 33. Our decision here, in line with Remsberg and Muthukumarana/Fried, is consistent with our view of narrowly construing the special relationship exception. Of the relevant cases from our sister states, we find Dykema v. Gus Mack er Ente rs., Inc., 492 N.W.2d 472 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) to be particularly persuasive in the present case. In Dykema, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the sponsors of an outdoor b asketball tournament had no duty to warn a tournament spectator of an approaching thunderstorm that ultimately caused his injur y. Dykema, 492 N.W.2d at 474-75. A thunderstorm struck the area of the to urnam ent. The plaintiff, while running for shelter, was struck by a falling tree limb an d paralyz ed. Dykema, 492 N.W.2d at 473. Like Maryland, Michigan recognizes the general rule that there is no tort duty to aid or protect ano ther in the absence of a generally recognized special relationship. Dykema, 492 N.W .2d at 474. T he Mich igan court s tated that: 5 There may be a degree of dependen cy and ceding of con trol that could trigger a special relationship in, for example, a Little League game where children playing in the game are reliant on the adults supervising them. 15 The rationale behind imposing a legal duty to act in these special relationships is based on the element of control. In a special relationship, one person entrusts himself to the control and protection of another, with a consequent loss of control to protect himself. The duty to protect is imposed upon the person in control be cause he is in the best pos ition to provide a place of safe ty. Thus, the determina tion wheth er a duty-impo sing specia l relationship e xists in a particular case involves the determination whether the plaintiff entrusted himself to the control and protection of the defendant, with a consequent loss of control to protect himself. Id. (citations omitted). Like the situation of th e plaintiff an d tournam ent sponso rs in Dykema, Appellants here cannot be said to have entrusted themselves to the control and protection of the ru gby tourn amen t organ izers. Id. ( Plaintiff was free to leave the tournament at anytime, and his move ments w ere not r estricted by Defe ndant. ). We do not agree that, as App ellants argue , the participa nts in the tourn ament, in effect, cede control over their activities to those who are putting on the event. Robert and Donald Patton w ere free to lea ve th e voluntary, amateur tournament at any time and their ability to do so was not restricted in any meaningful way by the tournament organizers. An adult amateur sporting event is a voluntary affair, and the participants are capable of leaving the playing field on their own volition if they feel their lives or health are in jeopardy. The changing weather conditions in the present case presum ably were observable to all com petent adults. Robert and Donald Patton could have sought shelter at any time they deemed it appropriate to do so.6 6 The Dykema court continued its reasoning by assuming that, [e]ven if [Dykema] had succeeded in establishing that a special relationship existed . . . we are unable to find precedent for imposing a duty upon an organizer of an outdoor event such as this b asketball tournament to warn a spectator of approaching severe weather. Dykema, 492 N.W.2d at (contin ued...) 16 6 (...continued) 475. Citing Hames v. State, 808 S.W.2d 41 , 45 (Tenn. 1991), the M ichigan Court of App eals alternatively held that, because the approach of a thundersto rm is readily app arent to reasonab ly prudent p eople . . . it would be unreasonable to impose a duty . . . to warn . . . of a condition that the spectator is fully able to observe and react to on his own. Id. There is a line of cases, not depende nt on analysis o f whethe r a special relatio nship existed, that rely on the ability of com petent adu lts to perceive the approach of thunderstorms and to appreciate the natural risks of lightning associated with thunderstorms to justify finding no breac h of an ordinary duty of care ow ed to a plain tiff, wheth er that duty is recognized by common law, undertaken by the conduct of a defendant, or implied from the conduct of a defe ndant. For example, in Hames, the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that the State s failure to provide lightning proof shelters and lightning w arning dev ices at a State-owned golf cours e was no t actionable in neglige nce. Hames, 808 S.W.2d at 45. Like Robert and Donald Patton, the golfer in Hames began to play his sport of choice on an overcast day. On the day that the golfer was struck by lightning, no signs were posted informing patrons what to do in the event of a thunderstorm and no effort was made to clear the golf co urse by co urse em ployees. Hames, 808 S.W.2d at 42. Approximately 25 minutes after the go lfer began to play golf, a thunderstorm moved through the area. He was struck and killed by lightning while seeking cover on a small hill underneath some trees. The plaintiff in Hames argued tha t the U.S. G olf Association s Rules and Regulations created a golf course standard of care that required posting of lightning warnings and precautions. Hames, 808 S.W.2d at 43. Th e plaintiff s argument in Hames is analogou s to Appellants argument in the presen t case, i.e., the National Collegiate Athletic Association guidelin es cons titute a lig htning safety stan dard of care fo r outdo or spor ting eve nts. As well as finding no proximate cause, the Tennessee Court found that the risks and dangers associated w ith playing golf in a lightning storm are rather obvious to most adults. Hames, 808 S.W.2d at 45. The Court noted that it would have taken the decedent golfer two minutes to reach the relative safety of the clubhouse, but instea d he rema ined on the golf course. Id. The Court concluded that it is reasonable to infer that a reasonably prudent adult can recognize the approach of a severe thunderstorm and know that it is time to pack up the clubs and leave before the storm begins to wreak havoc. Id. Accordingly, even though the State, as owner-operator of the golf course, owed Hames a general duty to exercise reasonab le care unde r all the attenda nt circumsta nces to make the prem ises saf e . . . the defenda nt s condu ct did not fa ll below the applicable standard of care. Hames, 808 S.W.2d at 44-46. In Caldwe ll v. Let the Go od Time s Roll Festival, 717 So.2d 1263, 1274 (La. Ct. App. 1998), the Louisiana Court of Appeals held that the City of Shreveport and two co-sponso rs (contin ued...) 17 JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCU IT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANTS. Chief Ju dge Bell joins in th e jud gme nt on ly. 6 (...continued) of an outdoor festival had neither a general nor specific duty to warn spectators of an approachin g severe thun derstorm th at caused in juries due to its h igh wind s. The cou rt in Caldwe ll observed that: Most animals, especially we who are in the higher ord er, do not ha ve to be told or warne d abou t the vag aries of the we ather, that wind and clouds may produce a rainstorm; that a rainstorm and wind and rain may sud denly escalate to become mo re severe and dangerous to lives and property. A thundershower may suddenly become a thund erstorm with de structive wind a nd ligh tning. A thunderstorm in progress may escalate to produce either or both tornadoes and hail, or even a rare and u nexpecte d micro bu rst . . . all of which are extrem ely destructive to pers ons a nd prope rty. Caldwe ll, 717 S o.2d at 1 271. See also Seelbinder v. County o f Volusia, 821 So.2d 1095, 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) ( We begin by joining the almost universally agreed view that the Coun ty, in its capacity as landowner or the equivalent, did not have a duty to warn invitees, including beachgoers that there was a risk of being struck by lightning. ) (citations omitted); Grace v. City of Oklahoma City, 953 P.2d 69, 71 (Okla. Civ. Ct. App. 1997) ( Lightning is a universally known danger created by the elements. [The golf course owner] has no duty to warn its invitees of the patent danger of lightning or to reconstruct or alter its premises to protect against lightning[,] and all persons on the property are expected to assume the burden of protectin g themselv es from th em. ); McAuliffe v. Town of New Windsor, 178 A.D.2d 905, 906 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (upon the commencement of rain and thunder, the danger of lightning was adm ittedly apparent to plaintiff and there is no special duty to warn a specific swimmer against a condition that is readily observable by the reasonab le use of one s senses). The reasoning in the foregoing cases, although not explicated in terms of special relationship a nalys is as such, is co nsistent with the result reached in the present case. 18
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