State v. Nieves

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

State of Maryland v. Chris Nieves, No. 10, September Term, 2004. Criminal Law & Procedure: Search & Seizure Search Incident to Arrest. Strip Search of defendant incident to arrest for several minor traffic violations held unreasonable under the Fourth Amen dment. T he applicab le standard f or evaluatin g strip search es incident to arrest for minor traffic violations is the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard that the arrestee was carrying weapons or contraband at the time of the arrest. An arrestee s prior drug history and the fact the he was driving the truck of a missing female does not satisfy the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 10 September Term, 2004 STATE OF MARYLAND v. CHRIS NIEVES Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Battaglia, J. Filed: November 15, 2004 This case requires us to consider whether a strip search conducted incident to a lawful arrest for a mino r traffic offense is reasonab le under the Fourth Amendment. We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the strip search conducted incident to arrest for a minor traf fic offen se was un reasonab le, and thus, v iolative of the Fourth A mendm ent. I. Background A. Facts On January 22, 2002, at approxim ately 7:45a.m., Officers Jason Ackerman and Jason Dietz of the Hagerstown Police Department, were on patrol in their vehicle, in the area of Wakef ield Road an d West F ranklin Stree t. They had sto pped their v ehicle appr oximately six feet behind a b urgundy T oyota Takoma truck, which was sitting at the intersection stop sign. While the officers were behind the truck, they noticed that the drive r, later identified as Chris Nieves, was having some kind of problem around the shifting area. The truck then began to drift back, as if the clutch w as engaged and it wasn t in gear, and struck the officers vehicle. Officer Ackerman got out of the patrol car, approached Nieves, and asked Nieves, the sole occupant of the truck, for a valid driver s license. Nieves responded that he did not posses s a valid driver s license i n any state or any ph oto iden tification . After the officers reported the accident to police dispatch, they learned that the truck was registered to a female who had been reported missing by her parents ten da ys earlier. In response to their question about his identity, Nieves replied that his name was Nathan Nieves and that his birth date was June 26, 1976. A subsequent search of police records failed to identify any person under that name. During the encounter, Nieves appeared calm and relaxed to the officers. A third police officer, Jason Batistig, arrived at the scene within a matter of minutes, pursuant to police department policy, in order to investigate the accident involving the police patrol car. Offic ers Batistig an d Dietz be gan to que stion Niev es about h is identity and the truck s ownership. When asked again by the officers for his identity, Nieves supplied the same birth date bu t instead gav e a differen t first name, C hris, with the same last name. The dispatcher ran a search for Chris Nieves and found that Nieves driving privileges were suspended and that a state identification card had been issued to him. When asked how he came to be in possession of the truck, Nieves responded that he got it from a guy named Mike from West Virginia. Officer Batistig stated that N ieves was then a little nervous, fidg ety, and evasive during the interrogation. Nieves was placed under arrest for giving false inform ation to t he polic e and f or obstr ucting a police o fficer. Nieves consented to a pat down, after Off icer Acke rman requ ested perm ission, to insure that Nieves d id not have weapo ns, becaus e a crime co uld have been committed in light of the fac t that a f emale w as missi ng. During the pat down, Officer Ackerman found a r oll of mon ey totaling $377.00 in Nieves pocket. The officers then searched the truck that Nieves was driving and found no contraband or weapons. Officer Batistig thereafter transported Nieves to the police station. After Officer Batistig and Nieves arrived at the Hagerstown police station, they were met by Lieutenant Richard Johnson, who was investigating the disappearance of Melissa 2 Langdon, the registered owner of the truck Nieves was driving. Based upon information provided by Langdo n s parents, L ieutenant Jo hnson w as aware that Langdon s disappearance was allegedly linked to drugs. Lieutenant Johnson immediately recognized Nieves as having been arrested twice in the year 2000 for drug offenses. 1 Although not aware of the $377.00 found on Nieves person, Lieutenant Johnson ordered a strip search of Nieves during the booking procedures based upon the information regarding the missing person and the prior history of drugs. At the request of Lieutenant Johnson, Detective Schultz conducted the strip search, which produced two small plastic baggies containing individually wrapped baggies of cocaine that were protruding from Nieves rectum. B. Procedural History On January 22, 2002, Nieves was charged with possession of cocaine,2 possession with intent to distribute cocaine,3 and five minor traffic violations: Failure to control speed,4 1 During one of the arrests, Nieves had been taken to a local detention center and the arresting officers had found money and drugs on Nieves person. Lieutenant Johnson indicated that as far as [he could recall], Nieves had been charged with possession w ith intent to distribute as a result of either one or both of the arrests and had been convicted of those c harges . 2 Md. C ode (195 7, 1996 R epl. Vol.), A rt. 27 § 287 (a) stated in rele vant part: Except as authorize d by this subhe ading, it is unlawful for any person: (a) To possess or administer to another any controlled dange rous su bstanc e. . . . Section 287(a) was recodified without substantive change as Md. Code (2002), § 5-601 of the Criminal Law Article, effective Oct. 1, 2002. 3 Md. Code (1957 , 1996 Repl. Vo l., 2001 Supp.), Art. 27 § 28 6(a)(1) and (b)(1) (contin ued...) 3 driving without a valid license,5 negligent driving,6 giving a false name,7 and giving false 3 (...continued) provided in relevant p art: (a) Prohibited conduct. Except as authorized by this subheading, it is unlawful for any person: (1) To . . . possess a co ntrolled dan gerous su bstance in sufficient quantity to reasonably indicate under a ll circumstances an intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a contro lled dan gerous substan ce . . . . *** (b) Penalty. Any person who violates any of the provisions of subsection (a) of this section with respect to: (1) A substan ce classified in Schedules I or II which is a narcotic drug is guilty of a felony and is subject to imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or a fine of not more than $25,000, or both. Sections 286(a)(1) and (b)(1) were recodified without substantive change as Md. Code (2002 ), §§ 5-6 02 and 5-607 of the C riminal L aw A rticle, eff ective O ct. 1, 200 2. Under Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Art. 27 § 279(b)(4), cocaine was classified as a Schedule II substance. Section 279(b)(4) was recodified without substantive change as Md. Code (2002), § 5-403(b)(3)(iii) and (iv) of the Criminal Law Article, effective Oct. 1, 2002. 4 Md. Code (1 977, 199 9 Repl. V ol.), § 21-801 (b) of the T ransportation Article provided : Driver to control speed. At all times, the driver of a vehicle on a highw ay shall control the speed of the v ehicle as necessary to avoid colliding with any person or any vehicle or other conveyance that, in comp liance with legal require ments and the duty of all persons to use due care, is on or entering the high way. Section 21-801(b ) was deriv ed from th e former M d. Code (1 957, 197 6 Supp.), A rt. 66½ § 11-801. 5 Md. Code (1 977, 199 9 Repl. V ol., 2001 Su pp.), § 16-1 01(a) of th e Transp ortation Article prov ided: In general. An individual may not drive or attempt to drive a motor vehicle on any highway in this State unless: (contin ued...) 4 accident report information.8 Nieves was also charged with the common law crimes of obstructing and hindering a police officer. Prior to trial, Nieves filed a motion to suppress the cocaine that was seized during the strip search arguing that the arrest was unlawful and the strip search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendmen t. On M ay 22, 20 02, a suppression hearing was held on the motion, during which the court heard testimony from Officers Jason Ackerman, Jason Batistig, and Lieutenant Richard Johnson, and admitted the stipulated testimony of Detective Schultz. The officers testimony recounted the facts as they 5 (...continued) (1) The individual holds a driver s license issued under this title. Section 16-101(a) is derived from the former Md. Code (1957, 1976 Su pp.), Art. 66½ § 6101. 6 Md. Code (1977 , 1999 R epl. Vo l., 2000 S upp.), § 21-901.1(b) of the Transportation Article prov ided: Negligent driving. A p erson is guilty of neglige nt driving if he drives a motor vehicle in a careless or imprudent manner that endange rs any property or th e life or perso n of any indiv idual. Section 21-901.1(b) was derived from the former Md. Code (1957, 1976 Supp.), Art. 66½ § 11-9 01. 7 Md. Code (1977 , 1999 Repl. Vo l.), § 16.112(e) of the Transportation Article provided: (e) Giving false name. A person may not give the name of another person to any uniform ed office r who is atte mpting to determine the identity of a driver of a motor vehicle. Section 16.112(e) was derived from the former Md. Code (1957, 1976 Supp.), Art. 66½ § 6112. 8 Md. Code (1 977, 199 9 Repl. Vol.), § 20-108 of the Transportation Article provided: A person may not give any information that he knows or has reason to believe is false in any oral or written report required by this title. Section 20-108 was derived from the former Md. Code (1957), Art. 66½ § 10-108. 5 have b een pre sented here. In an order dated June 7, 2002, the Circuit Court denied Nieves motion to suppress stating that detaining the defendant under the totality of the circumstances and the subsequent search were r easona ble. On October 8, 2002, the case proceeded to a bench trial in which Nieves was con victed of p ossession w ith intent to distribute cocaine and the lesser included offense of possession of cocaine. Subsequently, Nieves was sentenced to ten years imprisonment without the possibility of paro le. He wa s also conv icted of driv ing witho ut a license, negligent d riving, and f ailure to control speed, for wh ich the court imposed m onetary fines. The court found Nieves not guilty of the charges of obstructing an officer, giving false inform ation, an d givin g false a cciden t report in forma tion. On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, Nieves argued that the Circuit Court s denial of the suppression motion should be reversed because the officers lacked pro bable cause to arrest him. N ieves also arg ued that the officers lac ked reaso nable susp icion to strip search him subsequent to his arrest for a minor traffic offense and that the search was uncon stitutiona l as viola tive of th e Four th Am endm ent. The Court of Special A ppeals addressed the probab le cause issue and found that the officers lacked pro bable cause to arrest Nieves for obstructing an officer. The court found, however, that the officers did have probable cause to a rrest Nieve s for the m ultiple traffic violations. Because probable cause existed, the court reasoned, a search incident to the arrest 6 was permissible under the circumstances.9 The Court of Special A ppeals then turned to the question of whether the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to strip search Nieves incident to arrest for minor offenses and concluded that the strip search was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court applied a b alancing tes t by weighing Nieves p rivacy interests against the government interest in conduc ting the strip sea rch. In applying the balancing test, the interme diate appellate court held that strip searches incident to an arrest for a minor offense should not occur unless the arresting officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the individual is presently in possession of weapons or contraband. The court further reasoned that conducting a strip search solely on Nieves past criminal record would create a per se rule that would shift the determination of reasonable suspicion from the individual arrestee to a class or category of offenders. Additionally, the court noted that it was far too great a leap to conclude that any possible narcotics involvement of the missing female ipso facto carried over to [Nieves] simply because he was the driver of the vehicle. Thus, the court concluded that based upon the totality of the circ umstance s, the officer s lacked rea sonable, articu lable suspicio n to con duct the strip sea rch and reverse d the jud gmen t of the tr ial court . The State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court to consider the following question: 9 The probable c ause issue w as not raised on appea l to this Cour t; therefore, we assume that pro bable c ause ex isted fo r the arre st. 7 Did the Court of Special Appeals err when it determined that the strip search conducted by the police was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment? We granted the petition and issued the writ of certiora ri. State v. Nieves, 380 Md. 617, 846 A.2d 401 (200 4). We ho ld that unde r the circum stances of this case, the strip search was unreason able as a search incident to arrest for a minor crime, and therefore, Nieves motion to suppress the evidenced seized from the search should have been granted. Thus, we aff irm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. III. Standard of Review In reviewing a Circu it Court s grant or denial of a motion to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendm ent, we ordinarily consider only the inform ation contained in the record of the suppression hearing and not the tria l record . Laney v. S tate, 379 Md. 522, 533, 842 A.2d 773, 779 (2004 ); Dashiell v. State, 374 Md. 85, 93, 821 A.2d 372, 376 (2003) (quoting State v. Collins, 367 Md. 700, 706-07, 790 A.2d 660, 663-64 (2002) (citing Ferris v. State , 355 Md. 356, 368, 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999)). We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party on the motion. Laney, 379 Md. at 533, 842 A.2d at 779; Dashiell, 374 at 93, 821 A.2d at 376-77 (quoting Collins, 367 Md. at 707, 790 A.2d at 664)(citing Riddick v. S tate, 319 Md. 180, 183, 571 A.2d 1239, 1240 (1990)). Although we extend great deference to the hearing judge s findings of fact an d will not disturb them unless clea rly erroneous, we r evie w, in dependently, the application of the law to th ose facts to d etermine if th e evidenc e at issue w as obtained in 8 violation of the law and, ac cordin gly, shoul d be su ppress ed. Laney, 379 Md. at 533-34, 842 A.2d at 77 9-80; Dashiell, 374 Md. at 93-94, 821 A.2d at 378 (citing Lancaste r v. State, 86 Md. App. 74 , 95, 585 A .2d 274, 28 4 (1991)); State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199, 207, 821 A.2d 439, 44 4 (200 3). IV. Discussion The State asserts that the Cou rt of Specia l Appeals erred in hold ing that the strip search was unre asonable under the Fourth Amendment because the search was not supported by reasonab le, articulable suspicion that Nieves was concealing a weapon or contraband on his person. In the State s v iew, the reas onable su spicion stan dard for co nducting s trip searches incident to arrest requires a minimal level of objective justification and should be based upon the totality of the circumstances when assessing the reasonableness of the officer s basis fo r condu cting the strip sea rch. According to the State, because Nieves was driving the truck of a missing person suspected of being involved in drug activity, had failed to properly identify himself when questioned by the police, and had a criminal history involving drugs, reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying the strip search in this case had been created. Consequently, the State argues, the judgment of the intermediate appella te court should be reversed. Nieves argument, quite understandably, adheres to the analysis of the Court of Special Appeals. He maintains that the test for reasonableness of the officer s basis for conducting the strip search involves balancing the privacy interests of the person being 9 searched against the g overnm ent s need f or condu cting the search. Nieves argues that the police must have reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a strip search under the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment, when the arrest is for a minor traffic offense. Nieves a sserts that Lieutenant Jo hnson did not have re asonable, a rticulable suspicion that Nieves was carrying weapons or contraband. Even co nsidering th e totality of the circumstances, Nieves maintains that Lieutenant Johnson based his decision to order the strip search solely on Nieves prior criminal history and his connection to a missing girl s truck. Those circumstances, according to Nieves, do not amount to reasonab le, articulable suspicion justifying a strip search incident to arrest. For the reasons stated below, we agree. A. Fourth Ame ndment and Search Incident to Arrest The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable to the State of Ma ryland throug h the Fou rteenth Am endmen t, guarantees individuals th e right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizure s. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 647, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1687, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1085 (1961); Laney, 379 Md. at 545, 842 A.2d at 786. It is axiomatic that the Fourth Amendment only prohibits those searches and seizures that are unreasonable under the circumstances. See Carter v. S tate, 367 Md. 447, 458, 788 A.2d 646, 652 (2002) (citing Gadso n v. State, 341 Md. 1, 9, 668 A .2d 22, 2 6 (199 5)), cert denied, 517 U.S. 1203, 116 S.Ct. 1704, 134 L.Ed.2d 803 (1996); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 493, 479 A.2d 903, 907 (1984). In determining the 10 reasonableness of a search, each ca se requires a balancing of the gov ernment s need to conduct the search against the invasion of the individual s privacy rights. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U .S. 520 , 559, 99 S.Ct. 18 61, 188 4, 60 L .Ed.2d 447, 48 1 (197 9). Furthermore, it is well established that warran tless searches are per se unreason able under the Fourth Amendment absent some recognized excep tion. Gamb le v. State, 318 Md. 120, 123, 567 A.2d 95, 97 (1989). A search incident to a lawful arrest is one of the well delineated excep tions to th e warr ant requ iremen t. See Carter, 367 Md. at 460-61, 788 A.2d at 653-54; State v. Evans, 352 M d. 496, 5 16, 723 A.2d 4 23, 432 -33, cert denied, 528 U.S. 833, 120 S.Ct. 310, 145 L.E d.2d 77 (1999); Ricks v. State , 322 Md. 183, 188, 586 A.2d 740, 743 (1991) (citing Chime l v. California , 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969 )). The Supreme C ourt in Chime l v. California , 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), articulated the bases for a search incid ent to arrest, those being, to remove any weapons that the [arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arre st or effect h is escape....[or] to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. Id. at 763, 89 S .Ct. at 2040, 2 3 L.Ed.2d at 694; see also United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-03, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 1237, 39 L.Ed.2d 771, 775 (1974); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226, 94 S.Ct. 467, 472, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 435 (197 3); Carter, 367 M d. at 460 , 788 A .2d at 65 3. Likewise, in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 11 (1973), the Court allowed a full search of the person, including a pat-down of his pockets and their conten ts as incid ent to a la wful a rrest. Id. at 221-24, 94 S.Ct. at 470-71, 38 L.Ed.2d at 433-34. In Robinson, a police officer suspected the defendant of driving without an operator s permit based upon a pre viou s che ck of the defe ndant s o pera tor s perm it fou r days earlier. Id. at 220, 945 S.Ct. at 469-70, 38 L.Ed.2d. at 432. The defendant was stopped by the officer, arrested for driving without a valid operator s permit, and patted down after getting out of th e vehic le. Id. During the pat-down, the officer found a cigarette pack in the defendant s front coat pocket, which the officer opened and found several vials of heroin. Id. at 222-23, 94 S.Ct. at 470-71, 38 L.Ed.2d at 434. The officer then proceeded to search the defendant s waist, pants, and remaining pocke ts. Id. Subsequently, the defendant was convicted for possession of heroin and he appealed challenging the validity of the area of his person . Id. at 220, 9 4 S.Ct. a t 469, 38 L.Ed.2 d at 432 . Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, explained that the decision of an arresting officer to search a person incident to a lawful arrest is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgmen t and that the potential danger that the arrestee is carrying weapons provides an adequate basis for treating all custodial arrests alike for purposes of [the] search justifica tion. Id. at 235, 94 S.Ct. at 476-77, 38 L.Ed.2d at 440. C onsequently, the Court held that police officers are not required to assess the likelihood that the arrestee is carrying weapons or concea ling eviden ce; rather, the officers may undertake a full search of the arrestee. Id. The Court established that a full search incident to arrest can involve a 12 relatively extensive exploration of the person , aimed toward locating weapons, or evidence that could b e conc ealed o r destroye d. Id. at 227, 94 S.Ct. at 473, 38 L.Ed.2d at 436 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 78 2 (1967)); see also Carter, 367 M d. at 461, 78 8 A.2d a t 654 (recog nizing that the right of an officer to search a person follows automatically from the arrest. ) (citing Evans, 352 Md. 496, 508, 723 A.2d 423, 42 9, cert denied, 528 U .S. 833 , 120 S .Ct. 310 , 145 L .Ed.2d 77 (19 99). In United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974), the Court held that jail administrators could exchange and search the clothes of an individual who had been arrested and de tained. Id. at 801-02, 94 S.Ct. at 1236, 39 L.Ed.2d at 775. The Court stated that exchanging and searching the detainee s clothes for evidence one day after his arrest was a normal search incident to a custodial arrest and that the delay in the search was reasonable because the search could have been c onduc ted at the time of the arre st. Id. at 805, 94 S.Ct. at 1238, 39 L.Ed.2d at 777. The Court observed that it is customary to search an arrestee who is being processed for confinement and that such searches are reasonable. Id. at 804-05, 94 S.Ct. at 1238, 39 L.Ed.2d at 776. See also Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960) (holding that a search of a suitcase that could have been m ade at th e arrest s cene w as allow ed at a la ter time in the dete ntion ce nter). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not addressed the valid ity of strip searches incident to an arrest; in Illinois v. Lafayette , 462 U.S. 640, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983), the Court explicitly stated that, [w]e were not addressing in Edwards, and do not 13 discuss here, the circumstances in which a strip search of an arrestee may or may not be appropriate. Id. at 646 n .2, 103 S .Ct. at 26 09 n.2, 7 7 L.Ed .2d at 71 n.2. B. Strip Searches The term strip search has been defined a nd used in differing c ontexts in F ourth Amendment jurisprudence. In general, strip searches involve the removal of the arrestee s clothing for inspection of the under c lothes a nd/or b ody. See William J. Simo nitsch, Visual Body Cavity Searches Incident to Arrest: Validity Under the Fourth Amendment, 54 U. M IAMI L. R EV. 665, 667 (2000). So me have defined strip searches to also include a visual inspection of the genital and anal regions of the b ody. Id. B LACK S L AW D ICTIONARY (7 th Ed. 2004) defines a strip search as a search of a person conducted after that person s clothes have been removed, the purpose usual ly being to find any contraband the person might be hiding . Likewise, in the instant case, the Hagerstown Police Department procedural rules (Departmental Rules), define a strip search as any search of an individual requiring the removal or rearrang ement of some or a ll clothing to permit the v isual inspectio n of the sk in surfaces of the g enital are as, brea sts, and/o r buttoc ks. See Departmental Rules, § 18.11.2.1. There is a distinction between a strip search and other types of search es, such as b ody cavity searches, which could involve visually inspecting the body cavities or physically probing the body cavities . Simonitsch, supra, at n.9. Based upon the r ecord, it app ears that a strip search was co nducte d rather than a p hysical bo dy cavity sea rch. It is clear that strip searches by their very nature can be degrad ing and invasiv e. See 14 Wood v. Clemons, 89 F.3 d 922, 928 (1 st Cir. 1996) (stating that a strip search, by its very nature, constitutes an extreme intrusion upon personal privacy, as well as an offense to the dignity of an in dividual. ); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 , 1272 (7 th Cir. 1983) (noting that strip searches involving the visual inspection of the anal and genital areas [are]....demeaning, dehuma nizing, und ignified, hu miliating, terrifying, u npleasant, embarrassing, repulsive, sign ifying degradation and submission. ); John Does 1-100 v. Boyd, 613 F. Supp. 1514, 1522 (D.Minn. 1985)(commenting that the experience of disrobing and exposing one s self f or visual insp ection by a stran ger clothed with the uniform and autho rity of the state, in an enclosed room inside a jail, can only be seen as thoroughly degrading and frightening. ); Deserly v. Department of Corrections, 995 P.2d 972, 977 (Mont. 2000) (noting that being strip searched is an em barrassing and hum iliating experience ); Draper v. Walsh, 790 F.Supp. 155 3, 1559 (W.D . Okla. 1991) (stating, Strip searches can be described by a numb er of adjectives, but being dign ified is not one of their num ber ). 10 10 In the instant case, the Departmental Rules also acknowledge the intrusive nature of strip searche s. They provid e: This Department recognizes that the use of strip sear ches ....ma y, under certain conditions, be necessary to protect the safety of officers, civilians and other prisoners; to detect an d secure evidence of cr imin al ac tivity a nd to safe guard the sec urity, safety and related in teres ts of this a gency s h olding facility. Recognizing the intrusiveness of these searches on individual privacy, howe ver, it is the policy of this Department that such searches shall be conducted only with proper authority and justification, with due recognition and deference for the human dignity of those being searched and in accordance with the (contin ued...) 15 Even though in trusive, how ever, strip searches have been perm itted under th e Fourth Amendment in vario us settin gs. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 523-24, 99 S.Ct. at 1864, 60 L.Ed.2d at 458-59 (strip search allowed of pretrial detainee in a detention c enter); United States v. Dorlouis , 107 F.3d 248 (4 th Cir. 1997) (strip search in a police van was allowed because the defen dant w as susp ected o f hiding mone y related to his arres t for dru g posse ssion). Strip searches commonly have been upheld fo r two reaso ns: (1) as a m eans to maintain the security of the detention facility; and (2) as a search incident to arrest. See 3 Wayne LaFa ve, Search and Seizure § 5.3(a) at 108-09 (3d e d. 1996). Although this Co urt has not specifically addressed the issue of strip searches in an institutional setting or as a search incident to arrest, various courts have done so in the context of a suit brought by the arrestee for damages for violation of his/her constitutional rights and have delineated various factors to be as sessed . In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 44 7 (1979), the Supreme Court addressed the permiss ible scope o f searches incident to arr est that occu rred in association with pr etrial dete ntion. Id. at 523, 99 S.Ct. at 1866, 60 L.Ed.2d at 458. Several defenda nts brought a class action suit challenging detention policies requiring pre-trial detainees to be subjected to a visual body cavity search every time the detainee had contact 10 (...continued) procedural guidelines for conducting such searches a s set forth in this po licy. Depa rtmenta l Rules , Section 18.1.1. 16 with individuals outside of the institution. Id. The Court assessed the reasonableness of these search es by stating: The test of reason ableness u nder the F ourth Am endmen t is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is cond ucted. Id. at 559, 99 S .Ct. at 1884, 6 0 L.Ed.2d at 481. Be cause pen al institutions face unique security challenges arising from the possibility of having contraband and weapons brought into the institution, the Court held that the searches were reasonable and could be conducted on less than probable cause that the detaine e was c arrying w eapon s or con traband . Id. at 99 S.Ct. at 1884-8 5, 60 L.Ed .2d at 481-8 2. Justice Po well, conc urring in part and dissenting in part, suggested that reasonable suspicion should be the level required to justify the visual body cavity searches that occurred in the ca se. Id. at 563, 99 S.Ct. at 1886, 60 L.Ed.2d at 484. Since Bell, a number of courts that have exa mined institu tional policies a ttempting to prevent detainees from bringing weapons and contraband into the institution and have required that the strip search be based upon reasonable suspicion that the individual was carrying weapons or contraband at the time of arrest. See Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 7 (1 st Cir. 1997) (holding tha t there must b e reasonab le suspicion that the detainee will carry weapons or contraban d into the priso n or the deta inee is conc ealing evid ence); Justice v. Peachtr ee City, 961 F.2d 188, 193 (11th Cir. 1992) (explaining that the officers must have 17 reasonab le suspicion that the detainee is concealing evidence or will bring weapons or drugs into the prison); Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248 , 1255 (6 th Cir. 1989) (noting that an officer could have reasonable suspicion that a detainee is concealing weapons or contraband if the crime was related to a major felo ny); Watt v. Rich ardson P olice Dep t., 849 F.2d 195, 198 (5 th Cir. 1988) (explaining that reasonable suspicion that the defendant was carrying weapons or contraband did n ot exist solely based upon the def endant s criminal history); Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 800 (2 nd Cir. 1986) (holding tha t the officers lacked rea sonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was concealing contraband because the defendant had only been arrested for falsely reporting a c rime, whic h did not rela te to contrab and); Stewart v. County of Lubbock, 767 F.2d 153, 156-57 (5 th Cir. 1985) (holding that jail authorities had no reasonab le suspicion to believe that the defen dant was carrying wea pons or dr ugs simply because he had a prior drug history); Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1271 n.7 (held strip search of detainees a rrested for m inor offen ses unreaso nable because the officers lacked rea sonable suspicion that the detainees were carrying weapons or contraban d that could be introduced into the prison); Holton v. Mohon, 684 F. Supp. 1407, 1415 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (holding that strip searches of pretrial detainees must be based upon reasonable suspicion that the detainees were carrying con traband or weap ons). Reason able suspicion has been d efined as being m ore than a mere hunch, but is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 18 675-76, 145 L.E d.2d 570 , 576 (200 0); Nathan v. Maryland, 370 Md. 648, 663, 805 A.2d 1086, 1095 (2002). 11 In discussing the concept of reasonable suspicion, the United States Supreme Court has opined that, [a]rticulating precisely what reasonable suspicion and probable cause mean is not po ssible, Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1 661, 134 L.Ed.2d 911, 918 (1996), but such terms are commonsense, nontechnical conceptio ns that deal w ith the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on wh ich reasona ble and prudent men, not legal technicians act. Id. A determination of whe ther reason able suspic ion exists to justify a search is made by loo king at the to tality of the circu mstances . In this regard, th e Court state d: When discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable-suspicion determinations, we have said repeatedly that they must look at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis f or suspectin g legal wro ngdoing . This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative inform ation av ailable to them th at migh t well elu de an u ntrained person . United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 749-50, 151 L.Ed.2d 740, 746 (2002); Ranso me v. State, 373 Md. 99, 104-05, 816 A.2d 901, 904 (2003); Nathan, 370 Md. at 663, 805 A.2d at 1095 (internal citations omitted). 11 Although not dispositive in any way regarding the constitutional issue in this case, the Departmental Rules in the case sub judice address the reasonable suspicion standard in relation to minor crim es, stating: Ind ividuals arrested for traffic violations and other minor offenses of a nonviolent nature shall not be subject to strip searches unless the arresting officer has articulable, reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual is concealing contrab and or w eapon s. Dep artmen tal Rule s, Sectio n 18.11 .2.5. 19 Strip searches of detainees h ave been perm itted when a felony or violent misdemeanor is the sub ject of th e charg e. See Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107 , 112 (1 st Cir. 2001) ( The reasonable suspicion standard may be met simply by the fact that the inmate was charged with a violent felony. ); Watt, 849 F.2d at 198 (explaining that a strip searc h is inherently based upon reasonable suspicion when the detainee is charged with or has a criminal history of contraband or w eapons); Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d 614, 61 7 (9 th Cir. 1984) (recognizing a detainee s prior arrest record as a factor in determining whether the officer had reasonable suspicion that the detainee was carrying weapons or co ntraband); Dufrin v. Spreen, 712 F.2d 1084, 1087-89 (6 th Cir. 1983) (upholding strip search as reasonab le based upon a felony charge that was considered to be a crime of violence.); Smith v. Montg omery C ounty, 643 F. Supp. 435, 439 (D. Md. 1986) (holding that an officer may have valid reason able suspic ion that a detainee is carrying drugs or weapons when the detainee has a prior record involving drugs or weapons or if the person has been arrested for a felony); but see Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Department, 901 F.2d 702, 71 4, 716 (9 th Cir. 1990) (holding that the felony/misdemeanor classification alone indicates little about the likelihood of the [detainee] concea ling drugs, weapon s, or contraband..., howev er, [g]rand theft, a felony...could be considered as a factor to determine reasonable suspicion of the detainee conc ealing weapon s or contraband) (em phasis added)). One of our sister states had occasion to address the appropriateness of a strip search incident to a felony arrest. In State v. Jenkins, 842 A.2d 1148 (Conn. App. 2004), an 20 undercover police officer, after having been informed that the defendant was dealing drugs, arranged to buy he roin fro m him . Id. at 1151. W hen Jenkins approached the officer and attempted to sell the heroin, the officer placed Jenkins under arrest, conducted a pat down, and noticed that an object was p rotrudin g from Jenkin s pants . Id. The officer pulled down Jenkins pants and underwear and discovered several glass vials of crack and heroin protruding from J enkins buttoc ks. Id. As a result, Jenkins was charged with possession of narcotic s with th e intent to distribu te and c onvicte d. Id. The intermedia te appellate court of Connecticut, faced with a Fourth Amendment challenge to the strip search, held that p robable ca use did ex ist to arrest and th at the strip search was v alid as a s earch in cident to arrest. Id. at 1154. The court explained that the justification for an officer to search inc ident to a law ful arrest is pre dicated up on the nee d to disarm the suspect in order to take him in to custody as it does on the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use at trial. Id. at 1157. When the arrest is for a felony offense, the officer m ust have a re asonable a nd articulable suspicion to believe that the arrestee is carrying w eapon s or con traband . Id. at 1156. Th e court def ined reason able suspicion as the officer s specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Id. at 1157. In upholding the search, the court applied the balancing test articulated in Bell, and explained that the officer had reason to believe that Jenkins was carrying contraband because the officer was meeting Jenkins presumably to buy heroin. Id. The court also noted that the nature of the offense for which Jenkins was arrested 21 created the suspicion necessary to justify the strip search . Id. Based on those factors, the court found that reasonable suspicion existed to conduct the search of Jenkins; therefore, the search was re asonab le. Id. at 1158. Strip searches conducted of detainees who had b een arrested for minor offenses not associated with weapons or contraband generally have been found wanting, unless the officer had informatio n that wou ld have led the officer to have reaso nable suspicion that the person was carrying weapons or contraband a t the time of arres t. See Roberts, 239 F.3d at 112 (strip search unreasonable based upon arrest for an outstanding body attachment, a misdemeano r, because there was no evidence that the defendant was carrying weapons or contraband at the time of arrest); Edwards v. State, 759 N.E.2d 626, 629 (Ind. 2001) (strip search of arrestee charged w ith speeding and giving a false name held unconstitutional due to the absence of reasonable suspicion that the defenda nt had w eapons o r contraban d on his person during the arrest); People v. Kelley, 762 N.Y.S.2d 438, 440 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (strip search unreasonable because the officers did not have reasonable suspicion that the defendant was carrying weapons or contraband at the time of arrest, where the arrest was for driving without a driver s licen se); People v. Jennings, 747 N.Y.S.2d 235, 236 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (strip search cond ucted incident to an arrest for a routine traffic stop was unreason able because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that the defendant was carrying weapons or contraba nd at the time of arrest); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 941 (Utah 1994) (strip search of a person arrested for p roviding fa lse informa tion to an of ficer held 22 unreason able because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that the arrestee was carrying weapons or contraband on his person); Taylor v. C ommo nwealth , 507 S.E.2d 661, 664 (Va. App. 1998) (strip search for minor non-jailable offense held unreasonable when arrest was for public intoxication and there was no reasonable suspicion that the defendant was carrying weapons or c ontraband at the time of arrest).12 Several courts have also addressed the m inor crime d istinction in the c ivil context, where defenda nts filed suits ag ainst police d epartmen ts challenging strip search policies for arrestee s. Those courts held that conducting strip searches of detainees arrested for minor offenses must be justified by reaso nable susp icion that the in dividual is carrying weapons or contraband at the time o f arrest. See Swain, 117 F.3d at 9 (holding strip search unconstitutional based upon arrest for non-felony matter because the type of offense did not indicate reasonable suspicion that the arrestee was carrying weapons or contraband at the time of arrest). 13 12 A minority of courts have applied the probable cause standard to determine whether the officer w as reasona ble to strip sea rch ind ividuals arrested for min or traff ic offe nses. See Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F.Supp. 486, 491 (E.D.Wis. 1979) , affirmed, 620 F.2d 160 (7 th Cir. 1980); Burns v. Loranger, 907 F.2d 233, 23 6 (1 st Cir. 1990); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 708 N.E.2d 669, 673 (Mass. 1999); Elk v. Townson, 839 F.Supp. 104 7, 1052 (S.D.N .Y. 1993); DiLoreto v. Borough of Oaklyn, 744 F.Supp. 610 , 621 (D.N.J. 1990 ). 13 Wachtler v. County of Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 81 (2 nd Cir. 1994) (strip search held unreason able after defen dant was arrested for speed ing becau se there w as no reaso nable suspicion to believe that the defenda nt was carrying weap ons or drugs on his person); Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393, 395-98 (10th Cir. 1993) (strip search w as unreaso nable where the detainee was arrested for speeding and driving without a license charges that were unrelated to drugs or w eapons); Justice, 961 F.2d at 193(strip search of teenager (contin ued...) 23 13 (...continued) arrested for loitering and truancy must be justified by reasonable suspicion that the teenager was carrying wea pons or co ntraband a t the time of a rrest); Masters, 872 F.2d at 1255 (strip search unreason able for minor offenses of failure to appear for expired registration plates and for failure to m aintain auto in surance); Walsh v. Franco, 849 F.2d 66, 68-69 (2 nd Cir. 1988) (strip search of pers on arrested on bench warrant fo r outstandin g parking ticket held unreason able because m inor offenses do not implicate the need to search for weapons or contraband on the pers on); Watt, 849 F.2d at 199 (strip search u nreasona ble when person was arrested on outstan ding wa rrant for failu re to register his dog); Weber, 804 F.2d at 802 (strip search of arrestee who was charged with falsely reporting an incident and resisting arrest violated the Fourth Amendment because the arrest was unrelated to the arrestee having drugs or weapons in his person) ; Stewart, 767 F.2d at 156-57 (strip search unconstitutional based on arrest for minor crimes public intoxication and bad check writing, without proof that the officers had reasonable susp icion that the arrestee was carrying w eapons or drugs on his person); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 74 0-42 (8 th Cir. 1985) (strip search of the defendant, who was arrested for violating animal leash law, was unreasonable because the arrest was unrelated to drugs or weap ons); Giles, 746 F.2d at 617-18 (strip search of detainee was unreasonable because the minor offense, driving with expired automobile tags, did not give rise to reasonable suspicion that the detainee was carrying weapons or drugs at the time of arrest); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 393-94 (10th Cir. 1984) (strip searching detainees arrested for failing to appear on charges of speeding and violating a license restriction was held unconstitutio nal becau se the charg es were u nrelated to finding weapons or contraband in the individu al during the arrest); Dufrin, 712 F.2d at 1087; Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1273 (strip search conducted of individual arrested for p arking ticke ts and drivin g withou t a license held unconstitutional because the charges did not implicate a need to search for weapons or drugs); Loga n v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 101 3 (4 th Cir. 1981) (strip search of person arrested for driving while intoxicated was unreasonable because the arrest was for a minor offense a nd was n ot related to weapo ns or contra band); Helton v. United States, 191 F.Supp.2d 179, 184-85 (D.D.C. 2002) (strip searching arrestees charged with misdemea nors or other minor crimes is unreason able unless reasonab le suspicion exists that the a rrestee is carrying weapo ns or contra band at the time of arre st); Draper, 790 F.Supp. at 1559 (strip search of a person arrested for public intoxication held unreasonable because the office rs lacked reasonable suspicion that the arrestee was carrying weapons or contraband during the arrest); Kathriner v. City of Overland, 602 F.Supp. 124, 125 (E.D.Mo. 1984) (strip searches of individuals charged with a misdemeanor or ordinance violation was unreasonable because the charges w ere unrelated to weapo ns or drug s); Hunt v. P olk Coun ty, 551 F.Supp. 339, 34445 (S.D.Iowa 1982) (must have reasonable suspicion that a detainee is carrying weapon or drugs in order to strip search a person arrested fo r speeding and an outstanding warran t); (contin ued...) 24 In Edwar ds v. State, 759 N.E.2d 626 (Ind. 2001), the defendant, Michael Edwards, was arrested for giving police officers false information after being questioned abo ut his iden tity. Id. at 628. Subsequen t to the arrest, the officers transported Edwards to the police station, conducted a strip search, and fo und co caine p rotrudin g from Edw ards bu ttocks. Id. Edwards was later convicted for possession of cocaine and appealed arguing that the cocaine was se ized illeg ally. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Indiana held that the search was unreasonable as a search inciden t to arrest. Id. at 630. The court explained that because the strip search was incident to an arrest for a minor offense, the search must be justified by reasonable suspicion that Edwards was carrying w eapon s or con traband . Id. at 629-30. According to the Court, [t]here may be misdemeanor charges for which a body search is appropriate because of the reasonab le likel ihoo d of discovery of evidence, bu t, false inform ing, withou t more, is certainly not such a crime. Id. at 629. Because E dwards had o nly been arrested for a nonviolent misdeme anor, and th e circumsta nces surrou nding Ed wards arr est did not create the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct the search, the court held that the search was unreas onable . Id. at 630. 13 (...continued) Rankin v. Colman, 476 So.2d 234, 238 (Fla. App. 1985) (strip searches of in dividuals arrested for vehicle and traffic offenses are unreasonable because those offenses are unlikely to yield weapons or evide nce of crime). 25 C. Nieves Strip Search In the case sub judice, we are not dealing with a situatio n where institutional saf ety is at issue. The State has conceded that this case does not involve institutional policies of strip searching individuals prior to entering prison because the record is devoid of any evidence that Nieves was confined. Therefore, in the present case, where the person has been arrested for a minor traffic offense unrelated to drugs or violence, is a strip search justified, and what standard should be used to evaluate its reasonableness? It is clear that arrestees, such as Nieves, whether or not they face detention, may conceal weapons and contraband underneath their clothes and on their person, so that the traditional rationales underlying searches incident to arrest a pply. See Edwards, 415 U.S. at 805, 94 S.Ct. 1238 , 39 L.Ed.2 d at 776; Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235, 94 S.Ct. at 476, 38 L.Ed.2d at 440; Jenkins, 842 A.2d at 1151; Edwar ds v. State, 759 N.E.2d at 630; Jennings, 747 N.Y.S .2d at 23 6. Insofar as the stand ard to evalu ate reasonableness, our jurisprudence is replete with the use of reasonable, articulable suspicion to determine the reasonableness of searches condu cted in o ther con texts. See Ransome, 373 Md. at 106-07, 816 A.2d at 905 (applying the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard that the arrestee was concealing weapons or evidence to evaluate the reasonableness of a Terry frisk); Carter v. S tate, 367 Md. 447, 788 A.2d 64 6 (2002) (e valuating the search of a lunch bag incident to the defendant s arrest using reasonable, articulable suspicion to determine if the defendant was carrying weapons or evidence of a crime); Nathan, 370 Md. at 664-65, 805 A.2d at 1095-96 26 (assessing the reasonableness of a warrantless search of a vehicle passenger utilizing the reasonable, articulable su spicion stan dard); Stokes v. Sta te, 362 Md. 407, 765 A.2d 612 (2001) (requiring re asonable, a rticulable suspicion that the arrestee had comm itted a robbery in order to conduct an investig atory stop and w arrantle ss searc h). Accordingly, based upon our own jurisprudence and utilizing the ex perience a nd analyses o f many othe r courts addressing the reasonableness of strip searches, we hold that the reason able, articulab le suspicio n stand ard app lies in the strip sea rch incid ent to arr est con text. Using this s tandard, the strip search of Nieves was n ot reasonable. The ve ry nature of the minor tra ffic violations for which Nieves was apprehended did not create a suspicion that he was carrying weapons or contraband at the time of arrest. Rather, during the suppression hearing, Lieutenant Johnson testified that he ordered a strip search of Nieves for the following reasons: (1) because of Nieves prior drug arrests and (2) because at the time of his arres t, Nieves was driving the truck of a missing female, who had a history of drug involvement and was reported missing. When questioned during the hearing, Lieutenant Johnson explained that those two were the only justifications for ordering the strip search: Q: And what action, if any, did you take at that time? A: When they were doing the booking procedures obviously the search and subsequent fingerprint processing, photographs and so forth I indicated to them because of his prior drug activity and the knowledge that I had at that time that he needed to be strip searched. *** Q: And you gave tha t order? 27 A: Yes, I did. Q: Besides the information regarding the missing person and the prior history of drugs,....was there anything else that you based the order on or was tha t it? A: No, that was it at the time. Lieutenant Johnson s rationale falls sh ort of mee ting the reaso nable, articula ble suspicion standard. Prior drug a rrests do no t necessarily yield reasonable suspicion that an individual is secreting weapons or drugs on his person at the time of his arrest on a drug offense, because to allow the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard to be satisfied based upon a person s status, rather than an individualized assessment of the circumstances, would undermine the purpo se for requ iring office rs to justify their reasons for searching a particular individual. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 392-93, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 1420-21, 137 L.Ed.2d 615, 622 (1997) (stating, [i]f a per se exception were allowed for each category of criminal investigation that included a considera ble [] risk of danger to officers or destruction of evidence, the knock-and-announce element of the Fourth Am endment s reasonableness requirement would be meaningless ); see also State v. Lee, 374 Md. 275, 308, 821 A.2d 922, 941 (2003 ). Also, the fact tha t the defen dant was driving the tru ck of a m issing fem ale associated with drugs confuses the nature of the inquiry of whether there was reasonable, articulable suspicion that Nieves was carrying weapons or drugs. The circumstances surrounding another person cannot be imputed to the person who is the subject of the search because the inquiry mu st be particula rized and o bjectively based upon the person suspected 28 of carryin g wea pons o r contra band. See Nathan, 370 M d. at 663 , 805 A .2d at 10 95. The State, nevertheless, argues that the Court of Special Appeals opinion in Fontaine v. State, 135 Md. App. 471, 762 A.2d 1027 (2 000), is directly applicable. In Fontaine, the defendant was ar rested f or drivin g on a s uspen ded dri ver s lice nse. Id. at 475, 762 A.2d at 1030. The arresting officers, who recognized the defendant from a previous encounter for driving without a license and noticed the defendant making suspicious movements. Id. The intermediate appellate court applied the reasonable suspicion standard and the Wolfish balancing test to determine that the officer had at least reasonable suspicion to perform a strip search incident to [Fontaine s] arrest. Id. at 482, 762 A.2d at 1033. Because Fontaine was fidgeting during the police encounter, attempted to try to place an object in his pants, and the officer had prior information as to where Fontaine normally concealed contraband, the court found that the s trip searc h was reason able. Id. Unlike the defendant in Fontaine, the present record is devoid of additional indicia of susp icious mov ements an d attempts to conceal weapo ns or contra band; N ieves had consented to a pat down of his person and he was described as calm and relaxed. Under the circumstances of this case, the strip search conducted incident to arrest for a minor traffic violation was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment. Although there may be circumstances in which a strip search may be conducted incident to a lawful arrest, the strip search of Chris Nieves was not one of them. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED WITH COSTS. 29

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.