Attorney Grievance v. DeMaio
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 10 September Term, 2003 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. LOUIS J. DEMA IO Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Eldridge, John C. (retired, specially assigned) JJ. Opinion by Bell, C.J. File: February 17, 2004 The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, the petitioner, by Bar Counsel filed, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-7511 of the Maryland Rules of Proced ure, a Petition For Disciplinary Or Remedial Action, against Louis J. DeMaio, the responde nt, in 1 Rule 16-7 51 of the M aryland Rule s of Proce dure prov ides, as releva nt: (a) Commencement of Disciplinary or Remedial Action. Upon approval of the Commission, Bar Counsel shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Reme dial Ac tion in th e Cou rt of A ppeals . Upon the completion of an investigation by Bar Counsel, unless there is a recommendation pursuant to Rule 16-735 (dismissal of the complaint or termination of the proceeding w ithout discipline), Rule 16-736 (C onditional Diversion A greement), 16-737(reprimand) or Rules 16-771, 16-773, or 16-774 (immediate filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or R emedial A ction), Rule 1 6-734 (d) re quires that B ar Coun sel to file w ith the Commission a Statement of Charges with an election for peer review in accordance with Rule 16-741." Maryland Rule 16-741 governs the filing of statements of charges. It provides: (a) Filing of Statement of Charges. (1) Upo n comple tion of an in vestigation, B ar Coun sel shall file with the Commission a Statement of Charges if Bar Counse l determines that: (A) the attorney either engaged in conduct constituting p rofessiona l miscondu ct or is incapacitated; (B) the professional misconduct or the incapacity doe s not warra nt an imm ediate Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action; (C) a Co nditional D iversion A greemen t is either not appropriate under the circumstances or the parties were unable to agree on one; and (D) a reprimand is either not appropriate under the circumstances or (i) one was offered and rejected by the attorney, or (ii) a proposed reprimand was disapproved by the Commission and Bar Counsel was directed to file a Statem ent of C harges . which it was charged that the respondent violated Rules 1.1, Competence,2 3.1, Meritorious Claims and Co ntentions, 3 3.3, Cando r Towa rd the Tribu nal, 4 8.1, Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters,5 and 8.4, M isconduc t,6 of the M aryland Rule s of Professional C onduct, 2 Rule 1 .1 requi res a law yer to pro vide co mpete nt repre sentatio n to a clie nt.. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and prepar ation rea sonab ly necessa ry for the r eprese ntation. 3 Rule 3.1 provides: A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding , or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law . A lawyer m ay nevertheles s so defen d the proce eding as to require that eve ry elemen t of the m oving p arty s case be estab lished. 4 Rule 3.3 (a) (1) prohibits a lawyer from mak[ing] a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal. 5 Rule 8.1 p rovides, as re levant: An ap plicant for ad mission or re instatemen t to the bar, or a la wyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary ma tter, shall not: * * * * (b) fail to disc lose a fact n ecessary to corr ect a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for info rmation from an ad miss ions or disciplinar y auth ority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of inform ation oth erwise protecte d by Rul e 1.6. 6 Rule 8.4, as relevant, provides: It is professio nal miscon duct for a la wyer to: (a) violate o r attempt to v iolate the rules o f professio nal condu ct, knowingly assist or induce an other to do so through the acts of another; * * * * (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) en gage in condu ct that is p rejudici al to the a dminis tration o f justice . 2 as adopted by Maryland Rule 16-812. Bar Counsel also alleged that the respondent violated Maryland Code (1989, 1995 Replacement Volume) § 10-3067 of the Business and Occu pation A rticle. We referred the case to th e Hono rable Steph en M. W aldron, of th e Circuit Court for Harford County, for hearing . See 16-757. The respondent, although served with process, did not file an answer, prompting the entry of an order of default, and he neither appeared for, nor participated in the hearing. Following a hearing on the merits, at which testimony was elicited and exhibits consid ered, the hearing court m ade fin dings o f fact, see 16-757 (c), 8 and drew conclusions of law, as follows: Respondent Louis J. DeMaio, was admitted as a member of the Bar of the State of Maryland on July 1, 1964. In the course of his practice of law, he came to represent Thomas Oliva in a case wh ich was f iled in the Circuit Court for Hartford County, captioned Oliva v. ITT Hartford. Civil Case No. 12C-0030330C. In said case, Respondent, as attorney for the Plaintiff, filed a Motion to Strike, Motion for Summary Judgment, and Motion for Hearing. S aid 7 Maryland Code (1989, 1995 Replacement Volume) § 10-306 of the Business and Occupation Article provides: A lawyer may not use trust money for any purpose other than the purpose for which the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer. 8 Maryland Rule 16-757 (c) provides: (c) Findin gs and C onclusion s. The judg e shall prepa re and file o r dictate into the record a statement of the judge's findings of fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and con clusions of law. If dictated into the record, the statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless the time is extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record no later than 45 da ys after the con clusion of th e hearing. T he clerk sha ll mail a copy of t he statem ent to ea ch party. 3 Motion[s] [were] denie d by the Circuit Court on February 27, 2001. On or about March 12, 2001, Respondent noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. On October 5, 2001, the Court of Special Appeals, by Chief Judge Mu rphy, issued a Show Cause Order requiring Respondent's client, the Appellan t, to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as being premature. On or about October 19, 2001, the Respondent filed a response to the aforesaid Show Cause Order, claiming falsely that the said October 5, 2001, Order was "unsigned" by the Chief Judge. On December 13, 2001, Judge Deborah Eyler signed an Order dismissing the appeal, finding it to be a premature appeal fro m a non- final judgm ent. On January 7, 2002, Respondent filed a Motion to Modify or Rescind Order of Dismissal and M otion for Summ ary Judgme nt in the Court of Special Appeals. In said Motion, the Respondent made several frivolous and unfounded repr esen tatio ns, n ame ly: a. For the H arford C ounty Circuit C ourt and this panel refu sal to administer Maryland law has in essence granted immunity to the Appellee which is a violation of their oath of office and exceeds the authority of the Court. b. If the panel decides not to rescind the Order to Dismiss or refuses to modified [sic] its or der o r refuses to grant th e Ap pella nt's motion for Summary Judgment, this will be deemed as a denial of due process to the Appellant and a denial of due pr ocess to his attorney. For this panel to rely on void and illegal material to deny the Appellant's motion for Summary Judgment is a violation of their oath of of fice and it sh all be neces sary to have all p ublic officials involved in this proceedings [sic] to be held accountable and respon sible an d, if nec essary, rem oved f rom pu blic off ice. This Motion was denied on March 27, 2002, by Chief Judge Joseph F. Murp hy, Jr. No review of that d enial w as requ ested b y the Res ponde nt. On or abou t Dece mber 1 9, 2002 , the Responde nt filed a Pe tition to Remove in the Cou rt of App eals of M aryland, in which he sou ght, inter alia, to remove Chief Judge Joseph Murphy, Jr. forthwith from serving as Judge in any Cou rt of law perma nently. In said Petition, the Respondent made several false representations: a. In paragraph 4, the Respondent alleged that Chief Judge Joseph 4 Mu rphy, Jr. on his own in itiative . . . without review of the record, issued an unsigned Show Cause Order why the Appeal should no t be dismisse d and to respon d by 10-2 2-01. b. In paragraph 6, he represented that in essence, Chief Judge Joseph Murphy, Jr. personally interceded in this case and issued the Show Cause Order on behalf of the insurance industry, since ITT Hartford was not represented in the Cou rt of Spe cial A ppeals. F or Chief Judg e Jos eph Mu rphy, Jr. to issue a Show Cause Order under these circumstances had to possess some u lterior m otive. c. In parag raph 7, the R esponde nt further rep resented erro neously that it is grossly improper for Chief Judge Jos eph M urphy, Jr. to unilate rally contact the insurer, w ho is unrepresented, without notifying the Petitioner. If this transaction in volves an y monetary ben efit to Judg e Jos eph Mu rphy, Jr., to supplement his salary, it is reportab le income. Failure to pay federal, state, and local income tax on u nreported income is a criminal off ense. U.S. v. Spiro Agne w. d. In paragraph 8, the Respondent refers to a potential collusion between Judge Murphy and the Clerk of the Court to remove briefs from the legal process. e. In paragra ph 9, the R esponde nt alleges that c ertain orders which he deemed conflicting c ould have come ab out only as a result of the personal interces sion by C hief Ju dge Jo seph M urphy, Jr. f. In paragraph 11, the Respondent included the following unfounded inflammatory representation: the egrecious [sic] administering of the law coupled with th e aberra nt cond uct of C hief Ju dge Jo seph M urphy, Jr. in this case warrants c orrective actio n includin g removal from public office as a judge. This is not a situation of the exercise of judicial discretion but the personal involvement by a judge engag ed in a s chem e of un just enric hmen t. All of these aforesaid representations and allegations were made by the Respondent with reckless disregard as to the truth of the statements and knowing that they were false, misleading, and unfounded. Th e aforesaid Petition to Remove was denied by the Court of Appeals on December 30, 2002. On or about January 21, 2003, the Respondent filed a second Petition to Remove in the Court of Appeals of Maryland, this time seekin g, inter alia, 5 the removal of Chief Clerk Leslie D. Gradet from the position of Chief Clerk of the Court of Special Appeals. In said Petition, the Res ponden t once aga in asserted that Ch ief Jud ge Jose ph M urphy, Jr. had issued an unsigned Show Cause Order and further intimated that Chief Judge Murphy and the Clerk of the Court had colluded to remove briefs from the record. As a result of this behavior, Deputy Bar Counsel for the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland corresponded w ith the Resp ondent, advising him that the A ttorney Grievance Commission had docketed a complaint against him a nd reque sting that he p rovide spe cific evidence supporting the allegations that he had made against Chief Judge Murphy in the aforesaid Petition to Remove. Deputy Bar Counsel requested a response by letters dated January 23, 2003, February 27, 2003, and March 13, 2003. The Respondent declined to respond to any of these letters. On March 17, 2003, an investigator for the Attorney Grievance Commission o f Marylan d, na mely, Sterling Fletcher, co ntacted the Respondent by phone in order to arrange a meeting. Mr. Fletch er indicated to the Respondent that he had not responded to Bar C ounse l and he sugge sted tha t he do s o. The Respondent indicated to the investigator that he did not intend to respond and he further refused to meet with th e inves tigator. Having found the afore going facts by clear and convincing evidence, the hearing court concluded that the respondent had violated all of the charged Rules of Professional Condu ct: By filing a premature appeal and then by making the aforesaid spurious, knowin gly false, and inflammatory representations regarding Chief Judge Murphy and Chief Clerk [sic] Gradet in pleadings before the App ellate Courts, by requesting that all public o fficials invo lved in the proceeding be removed, and by filing the petitio ns to remo ve, the Res ponden t failed to provide competent representation to a client in violation of Rule 1.1. By making the afore said spurious, know ingly false, and inflammatory representations regarding Chief Judge Murphy and Chief Clerk [sic] Gradet, the Respondent violated Rules 3.1, 3.3. 8.2, and 8.4. By failing to respond to any of the letters from Bar Counsel and by failing to meet with the investigator for the Attorney Grievance Commission of 6 Marylan d, the R espon dent ha s violate d Rule 8.1. The petitioner took no exceptions to the findings and co nclusions of the hearing court and, as we have seen, the respondent did not particip ate in tho se proc eeding s. The petitioner has filed Petitioner s Recommendation for Sanction, in which it urges the respondent s disbarme nt. Noting the hearing court s findings that the respo ndent ma de know ingly false, spurious and inflammatory representations about the Chief Judge of the Court of Special Appea ls and the Clerk of that court, which it insists the record supports, and that the respondent refused to respond to Petitioner in any substantive way, both before and after this matter wa s filed in this C ourt, despite many opportunities to do so, it concludes that the respondent s conduct is unmitigated. Thus, it asserts, [t]he Respondent has given no reason for this Court to maintain him on the roll of those admitted to practice. The petitioner relies on Attorney Grievance Commission v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 418, 773 A.2d 463, 488 (2001). The respondent, like the petitioner, did not file exceptions to the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the hearing court; however, he filed a Response to the Petition for Recommendation for Sanction By the State of Maryland. In it, in addition to persisting in the representations as to Chief Judge Murphy and Clerk Gradet, he challenges the basis for the Commission s disbarment recommendation and characterizes the investigation leading to the filing of the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against him as mediocre and incomplete and deficient. As to the former, the respondent writes: 7 The Attorney G rievance C ommissio n filed the cu rrent Petition b efore this Court recommending the Respondent should be disbarred for intentional dishonest conduct. The Petition gives no particulars as to how, when, and where this intentiona l dishonest c onduct [o ccurred] o ther than to reference an attorney who was disbarred for admission to a crime, [Vanderlinde,] 364 Md. 376. For t he A ttorn ey Grievance Commission to equate criticism of the judicial proc ess w ith ad miss ion to a cr imin al ac t is no t only irresponsible but border s on inc ompe tency. Th e charg e is unsu bstantia ted and false. With respect to the investigation , the respond ent maintain ed that, not on ly did the petitioner fail to consider all the facts an d docum ents in the ca se underlying his allegations against Chief Judge M urphy, but it de voted all its efforts to the Respondent messenger and ignored the me ssage in the Re spond ent s pe tition pe rtaining to Chie f Judg e Mu rphy. The respondent s response to the petitioner s recommendation for sanction contained other unfoun ded and r eckless rep resentations a nd allegation s, two of w hich are just p lain bizarre. First, he takes th e Court to ta sk for the m anner in which it handled the respon dent s petition for the removal of Chief Judge Murphy. After noting that the Court dismissed the petition summarily, without a hearing or requiring the affidavit from Chief Judge Murphy that the petition urged be obtained as a condition precedent to his being retained, the respondent accused: On April 2 2, 2003, some four months [after the respondent s petition was dismissed], this Court directed the Attorney Grievance Comm ission to investigate the Respondent for any impropriety. This Cou rt refuse[d] to consider the merits of the Respondent s Petition but on its own initiative referred the Petition to the Grieva nce C omm ission. It is less understood why this referral was done four months after the Petition was denied. The Respondent questions th e ulterior mo tive of this Court. It app ears this is an act of reprisal for being critical of the invasive intrusion by Chief Judge Murphy in issuin g the Sh ow C ause O rder. This Court is suppose [d] to be en gaged in 8 resolving issues and n ot creating new issues. The Order of this Court is retaliatory and punitive in nature and contrary to the administration of due proces s. Next, the respondent presents the argument that The Maryland Court of Special Appea ls Is Dysfunc tional and P ossibly Illegal under the Maryland Constitution and a Denial of Due Process under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In support of the argumen t, he suggests that there are multiple courts and chief judges and, possibly illegal conduct e xtant: There are actually two Maryland C ourt of Special Appea ls, one in Annapolis and the other in T owson Maryland. T here appe ars to be two Chief Judges, Chief Judge Murphy and ex-Chief Judge Mu rphy. [9] The Show Cau se Order only states Chief Judge and does not specify which Chief Judge. If the Order is from ex Chief Judge, then it is clearly illegal. Anyone can use a rubber stamp stating Chief Judge. This perhaps explains why a signed Order was never furn ished to the R esponde nt. The Grievance Commission did not produce the rubber stamp, copy of the Show Cause Order- Exhibit - 1. It appears th[at] the Court of Special Appea ls has one court docket in Annapolis and no court docket in Towson Maryland. This bifurcated Court of Special Appeals does not properly service parties on appeal but only accom modates th e Chief Ju dge in som e ex parte manner especially when the case files are physically located in Annapolis, Maryland. If the ex-Chief Judge issued the Show Cause Order, this is an illegal order under the M aryland Con stitution, Article IV, section 5a regarding mandatory retirement, states an appellate court judge fall within the " elected to public office" and shall retire when he retains his s eventieth birthday. There 9 The only former Chief Judge Murphy of which this Court is aware is Robert C. Murphy, former Chief Judge of this Court. The respondent did not appear to know that Chief Judge Robert Murphy was deceased, which was confirmed when he was asked that question directly during the hearing. 9 are no exc eptions for appellate court judges. Retired appellate judges cannot engage in the judicial process after age 70. The Grievance Commission chose to ignore and failed to explore this important issue. If the ex-Chief Judge is of ficially retired and re ceives off ice space in Towson with free clerical and office supply and equipment, this is an econom ic fringe ben efit and is taxable for income tax purposes for both federal and state income taxes. The amount included in the income tax return is the fair yearly rental of comparable off ice with similar services. Failure to report this benefit is fraud in which the statute of limitation does not toll. If not disclosed and not rep orted as income, the taxpayer is liable for back taxes, interest and penalties. The Respondent has raised a proper issue in the validity of the Show Cause Order and deviated from the Maryland Rule, of Review, denied a copy of the signed order by the Chief Judge and the Chief Clerk that commence from a bifurcated Court of Special Appea ls that retains no court dock et, by an unknown, unsigned and unidentifiable Chief Judge that has priority over submitted briefs that denied the Respondent's client, Thomas Oliva, the right of revie w afte r the paym ent of th e requir ed filing fee an d cost o f briefs . The final argum ent advan ced by the resp ondent is th at it is a denial of due process under the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution not to have an electronic filing system in the Circuit Courts and in the Court of Special Appeals. He suggests in that argument that the absence of such a mandatory system is the ultimate reason that this case became necessary: had there been electronic filing, his client would have been granted the summary judgment for which he had moved, thus, presumably, obviating the need for appeal and, thus, the involvement of the Co urt of Spe cial Appe als, not to me ntion its Chief Judge or Clerk. Mem bers of the legal profession have a resp onsibility to refrain f rom eng aging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. See Attorney Grievance Comm n v. 10 Gilbert, 356 Md. 249, 257, 739 A.2d 1, 2 (1999 ); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Richardson, 350 Md. 354, 368-69, 712 A.2d 525, 532 (1998) Attorney Grievance C omm n v. Alison, 317 Md. 523, 538-39, 565 A.2d 660, 667 (1989). As to that, we have recognized that the courts have the po wer and duty to consider particular conduct of one who is an officer of the court, in relation to the privileges and duties of a public calling that sp ecially invites c omple te trust an d conf idence . Rhe b v. B ar A ss'n of Baltimore City, 186 Md. 200, 204, 46 A.2d 2 89, 291 (1946 ). Conduct similar to that involved in the case sub jud ice has r esulted in disba rment. In re Evans, 801 F.2d 703 (4 th Cir. 1986). In that case, a lawyer whose case had been dismissed on recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, wrote to that Magistrate Judge chargin g him w ith incom petenc e and/o r racial b ias, i.e., I feel that your Report was either the result of your incompetence in the matter or perhaps worse and reflected a Jewish bias in favor of the Kaplan f irm whose actions w ere in my judg ment inex cusable in this cause. If in f act it represents incompe tence I will d rop the ma tter but if it is a Jew ish bias, I will file a complaint under the Rules for Handling Complaints of Judicial Misconduct or Disability. Before I take such action I afford you an opportun ity of setting forth your reasons for you [sic] prejudiced and incom plete R eport. Id. at 704. The Magistrate Judge instituted disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in the district court s disciplinary committee writing to the attorney, informing him of the allegations made against him and advising him that it would await the disposition of the attorney s pending a ppeal to co nsider the d isciplinary matter. T his promp ted multiple 11 correspondence from the attorney, in which he repeated his allegations.10 Id. at 704-05. These repeated unfoun ded allegations, held the D istrict Court, warranted the attorney s disbarment, reasoning: The repeated assertions by Mr. Evans, even after the dispositive approving opinion of the Fo urth Circuit Court of Appeals in the v ery matters which M r. Evans contends were erro neously decided by the Magistrate, and his continued and unrelenting groundless assertions that the Magistrate acted out of bias, rather than in compliance with well-established rules of law, m ake it apparent that Mr. Evans acted originally, and continues to act, in a way that is prejudicial to the ad ministra tion of ju stice ... in a way which is undignified and discourteous and degrading to a tribunal in which he appea red in his professional capacity ... and that he has made accusations against a judge or other adjudicatory officer which he know o r should have k nown were f alse ... . In view of the circumstances outlined here, the undersigned member of this Court is of the view that the respondent lacks the necessary mental and character qualifications to continue to practice law in this Court. Id. at 705-06 . On app eal, the Fou rth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. It rejected the 10 On one occasion, the attorney wrote: In respect of the opportunity you have offered to set forth in writing any explanatio n I care to m ake, I stand o n the record in the abov e case as w ell as the record in the proce edings in the Fourth C ircuit Judicial C ouncil, copies of wh ich are e nclose d. I repeat my charge that Magistrate Smalkin was either incompetent or biased and I note he has failed to deny either charge. I desire an opportunity to call the Magistrate and examine him under oath if a hearing is held in this matter. I do not personally kn ow him and if there is to be a hea ring I desire a mple notic e so that I might in vestiga te his ba ckgrou nd and read op inions a uthore d by him . In re Evans, 801 F.2d 703, 70 4-05 (4 th Cir. 1986) . Subsequ ently, he added : I find the d ecision of th e Disciplina ry Comm ittee to defer a ny action in this matter until after the appeal has been resolved is incredible. I repeat my claim that M agistrate Sm alkin either w as grossly incom petent or bia sed in favor of the Jewish firm that represented the defendants Rogers in Brown v. Rogers, C.A. N o. JH-8 0-855 and ag ainst me and m y client Br own, o r both. I now repeat such charge and will continue to hold such belief and forthrightly make such claim notwithstanding the outcome of any appeal. 12 argument that the accusations were protected speech under the First Amendment, noting Evans letter, accusing Magistrate Smalkin of incompetence and/or religious and racial bias, w as unque stionably undignified, discourteous, and degrading. Moreover, it was written while the Brown case was on appeal to this Court and was thus prope rly viewed by the district court as an attempt to prejudice the admin istration o f justice in the co urse of the litigat ion. In addition, Evans accusation, which he repeated throughout the proceedings below and has continued to repeat on appeal, was based solely on the magistrate s single decision against appellant s client in the Brown case -- a decision which this Court ultimately affirmed. We note that Evans never took any action against the Kaplan firm, which he viewed as having acted without Brown s authorization. More significantly, Evans never made any attempt to investigate the magistrate s actions in other proceedings or otherwise establish a reasoned basis for the charges of incompetence or bias. Appellant s failure to substantiate charges as grave as the ones leveled here certainly constitute the making of accusations which he know or reasona bly should have known to be false. Fin ally, appellant s failure to investigate, coupled with his unrelenting reassertion of the charges even after this Court s affirmance in Brown, convincin gly demons trates his lack of integrity an d fitnes s to prac tice law . A person guilty of such p ractices is, as at le ast one court has commented: dangerous in any walk of life and is especially so when he occupies the responsible position of an attorney upon whose good faith, truthfulness, sense of propriety and e thical standar ds both co urts and litigan ts are entitle d to rely. Id. at 706 (quoting In the M atter of Gre enfield, 24 A.D.2d 651, 652, 262 N.Y.S.2d 349, 351 (N.Y.A pp.Div. 19 65). Furthe r, the court ob served: Judicial officers ... are not immune from suit or criticism; but, like every one else, they are protected against scandalous charges. To make a public, false and malicious attack on a judicial officer is more than an offen se against h im individu ally; it is an offen se against the dignity and integrity of the courts and of our judicial system. It may bring discredit upon the administration of justice amongst citizens who have no way of determining the truth of the charges. It tends to impair the respect and authority of the court. 13 Id. at 707 (qu oting Greenfield, 24 A.D.2d at 652, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 350-51, in turn quoting Matter of Bevans, 225 A.D. 427, 431, 233 N.Y.S. 439, 443 (N.Y. App. Div. 1929) (citations omitted)). See also In re Grimes, 364 F.2d 654, 656 (10th Cir. 196 6), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1035, 87 S. Ct. 775, 17 L. Ed. 2 d 682 ( 1967) . In re Daniel Friedland, 416 N.E.2d 433 (Ind. 1981). The record in this case supports the findings that the respondent made, an d recklessly so, false, spurious and inflammatory representations and allegations with respect to Chief Judge Murphy and Clerk Gradet. His propensity to make such representations and allegations, and his persistence in doing so in the absence of any basis or investigation, even when it was called to his attention, and inquiry as to the basis was made specifically, was demonstrated graphically and at length during the hearing. And it has been further confirmed by the respondent s submission in response to the petitioner s recommendation for sanction. That response raises other questions with respect to the responde nt s fitness to c ontinue in the practice of law . In addition to the represen tation conc erning this C ourt s motive in referring the case to the petitioner, as we have indicated, the allegations with respect to the existence of two intermediate a ppellate courts and two chief judges and elec tronic filing are quite bizarre . More than that, however, they suggest, at the least, that the respondent does not have any, certainly not a complete appreciation, of how the appellate process works and, at the worst, that he lacks the necessary mental and character qualifications to continue in the practice law. 14 We agree with the petitioner th at the appro priate sanction is disbarment. Making accusations in petitions to this Court seeking their removal, impugning the integrity of the Chief Judge of the Court of Special Appeals and the Clerk of that court, without justification or even an attempt at justification beyond conjecture and speculation, and repeating those accusations during the d isciplinary hearin g, again w ithout an attem pt at justification, are themselves, as they w ould be with re spect to any judg e or cler k, cause for disb armen t. It certainly is conduct that prejudices the admin istration of justic e seriously and mos t dire ctly. IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE A T T O RN E Y G R I E V A N CE COMMISSION AGAINST LOUIS J. DEMAIO. 15
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