Christopher v. Montgomery County

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Luella D. Christoph er v. Montgom ery County Department of Health and Human Services, No. 103 September Term, 2003. [Food Stamps Excess Shelter Cost Deduction; Held: Food stamp recipients, aside from veterans, must be eld erly or actually receivin g disability benefits in order to be entitled to an uncapped excess shelter cost deduc tion. ] [Food Stamps Appeal; Held: A food stamp recipient who appeals he r disability determination is not penalized by the Food Stamp Program s requirement that disabled recipients actually receive d isability benefits; therefore, no equal protection principles w ere violated .] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 103 September Term 2003 __________________________________ LUELLA D. CHRISTOPHER V. MONTGOMERY C OUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES __________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Battaglia, J. Filed: May 12, 2004 This case requires us to consider whether a food stamp recipient must be receiving disability benefits in order to be entitled to an uncapped excess shelter cost deduction under the Maryland Food Stamp Program. Determining that receives means actual receipt, we conclude that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter the ALJ ) that the appellant m ust actually be rec eiving disab ility benefits to be entitled to the uncapped excess shelter cost deduction was correct, and we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, which had affirmed the ALJ s decision. I. Background A. Facts Louella Christopher, the appellant, worked for the Library of Congress as a foreign affairs analyst until she was terminated on December 23, 1994 for reasons of disability. Christopher has challenged the Library of Congress determination, maintaining that she is not disabled and that she should be reinstated to her former position. Christopher has not received any disability benefits and alleges that her appeal of her termination has prevented her fro m reco vering such b enefits . Christopher took a part-tim e job with G eneral Nu trition Centers and, in 1995, also began receiving food stamps for an assistance unit of one person. When Christopher first applied for food stamps with the Montgomery County Department of Health and Human Social Services (hereinafter the Department ), she received an uncapped excess shelter cost deduction of $1000.98, which, when combined with her average monthly earned income of $713.93, qualified her for food stamps. 1 In April 2002, the Department determined that Christopher was eligible to continue to receive food stamps, and approved her for $135 per month for a six month period. On May 18, 2002, the Depa rtment sent C hristopher a notice info rming her that it had changed her food stamp payment to $110, explaining that the $135 amount was incorrect because Christopher was erroneously receiving an uncapped shelter deduction based upon disability. In its notice to C hristopher, the Departm ent stated that, in order to receive the uncapped shelter cost deduction, food stamp recipients must either be at least 60 years old or be receiving disability benefits. Christopher was 57 at the time and was not receiving disability benefits. Arbitration proceedings are still pending to resolve w hether Ch ristopher w as properly terminated based on her alleged disability. Christopher continues to work at General Nutrition Centers on a part-time basis. She does not consider herself disabled and has not received any form of disability income or pension since she first challenged the Library of Congress determina tion to terminate her employment. If she is unsuccessful at arbitration, 1 As we explain in more detail infra, the excess shelter cost deduction allows applicants to subtract from their gross income a limited or capped amount o f allowab le shelter costs, which include, inter alia, heating and cooking fuel, electricity, and water expenses adding up to more than half of the household s income. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2014(e)(6)(A) (West Su pp. 2003 ). The am ount of the excess she lter cost dedu ction is capped for most food stam p applicants. Elderly or disabled hou seholds, howev er, are eligible for an unlimited or uncapped deduction, which allows them to subtract all of their exce ss shelte r costs f rom the ir gross in come . 7 U.S.C .A. § 20 14(e)(6 )(B). -2- she claims she w ould be en titled to no less than $1,346 p er month in disability benefits based on a general statement of benefits she received from the Library of Congress before she was terminated.2 B. Procedural History On August 6 , 2002, Christopher requested an administrative hearing regarding the Department s decision to reduce her food stamp allotment, contending that the D epartment s determination countermand [ed] the spirit of the law w hich is to provide certain benef its such as the uncapped shelter deduction to disabled individuals instead of denying [the] same on a tec hnicality. A hearing was held on September 24, 2002 before Administrative Law Judge Eleanor Wilkinson, who heard testimony from Christopher and a representative from the De partme nt. ALJ Wilkinson conc luded that the Depa rtment correctly reduced Chri stopher s allotment when it determined that she was not eligible for the uncapped shelter deduction. Under COM AR 07.03.07 .43I(3), 3 the ALJ explained, a food stamp recipient is entitled to the 2 The section Christopher cites from her Statement of Benefits, titled Disa bility Retireme nt, reads: If you have 5 or more years of Federal civilian service and become totally disabled, your monthly pension under CSRS would be about $1,346 starting when you separate from service or your pay sta tus term inates, and conti nues as long as you remain disabled and unable to work, even for life. 3 COMAR 07.03.17.43, Calculation of Household Food Stamp Net Monthly Income, provides how local departments must compute a food stamp applicant s net monthly income. Section I(3) of the provision states: If the household contains an elderly or disabled member -3- uncapped shelter cost deduction if he or she is at least 60 years old or disabled. The ALJ then pointed out that disabled is defined by COMAR 07.03.07.02B(6), which defines disabled as an individual who receives or is receiving Supplemental Security Income benefits, federal or sta te disability benef its under the Social S ecurity Act, disab ility retirement benefits, interim assista nce bene fits pending receipt of S uppleme ntal Security Income, or disability-related federal medical assistance.4 Because Christopher was not receiving any of the disability benefits req uired by the de finition of d isabled fou nd in COMAR 07.03.07.02B(6), ALJ Wilkinson concluded that Christopher was not e ntitled to the uncapped shelter cost deduction: There is simply no provision under governing regulations that permits an individual who is not receiving some form of disability ben efit to qualify as disabled and receive the uncapped shelter deduction. as described in Regulation .02B of this chapter, the total amount of the excess shelter cost is subtracted. 4 COMAR 07.03.17.02B(6) defines disabled as an individual who: (a)Receives Supplemental Security Income benefits or other federal or State-adm inistered paym ents when e ligibility to receive the benefits is based upon the disability or blindness criteria of the S ocial Secu rity Act; *** (f) Is receiving a disability retiremen t benefit from a government agency because of a disability considered permanent under the Social Sec urity Act; *** (h) Is receiving interim assistance benefits pending receipt of Supplemental Security Income; or (i) Is receiving disability-related federal medical assistance. (The omitted sections ref er to veterans or railroad retirees.) -4- Christopher filed a timely petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Montgom ery Coun ty, alleging that the Department improperly reduced her food stamp benefits. On June 9, 2003, the Circuit Court affirmed the ALJ s decision. Observing that Christopher admitted she did not qualify as an individual entitled to benefits as illustrated in [COMAR ] 07.03.07.02B(6), the court determined that the ALJ properly ruled that Christopher cannot be considered disabled for the purposes of receiving the uncapped excess shelter cost deduction. Christopher noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, and this Court issued, on its own initiativ e, a writ of c ertiorari, Christoph er v. Dept. o f Health, 379 Md. 98, 839 A.2d 741 (2004), prior to any proceedings in the intermediate appellate court. Christopher presents the following questions for our review: 1. Whether [the Department s] decision that COMAR 07.03.17.43I(3) which permits an uncapped shelter deduction for individuals receiving federal disability benefits precludes an uncap ped de duction for [C hristoph er], who was deemed eligible to receive federal disability benefits b ut has not ac tually received them because the disability determination is under appeal, is arbitrary and capricious because it penalizes an individual for exercisin g her right to a ppeal and arbitrarily distinguishes between individuals who are eligible to receive disability benefits based on whether they appeal their disability determinations. 2. Whether [the Department s] denial of an uncapped deduction to [Christopher] under COMAR 07.03.17.43I(3) deprives her of equal protection under the 14th Amen dment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights because there is no rational b asis for distinguishing among individuals d etermined to be entitled to disability -5- benefits based on whether they appeal the ir disability determinations. We conclude that the ALJ s decision was correct and affirm the judgmen t of the Circ uit Cou rt for Mo ntgo mery Cou nty. II. Standard of Review We observe at the outset that Christopher conflates two different standards of review when she contends that the Department erred as a matter of law because its interpretation of COMAR 07.03.17.43I(3) and COMAR 07.03.17.02B(6) is arbitrary and capricious as it penalizes her for exercising her legal right to appeal her disability determination. As we shall explain, the statutory standards allowing reviewing courts to reverse or modify agency decisions are different depending upon the agenc y s action. See Spen cer v. Ma ryland Sta te Bd. of Pharmacy, No. 36, 2004 WL 43 9310, at *6 (Md. M arch 11, 20 04). Con trary to Christopher s contention, if the Department erred as a matter of law, the question is not whether the Department abused its discretion by acting arbitrarily and capriciously, but wheth er the ag ency inter preted a nd app lied the la w corr ectly. Our review o f administra tive agency de cisions ma de by the M ontgom ery County Department of Health and Human Services, which adm inisters state social services for Montgom ery County, is governed by Section 10-203(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafte r the APA ).5 Maryland C ode, § 10-2 03(d) of th e State Go vernmen t Article 5 Maryland C ode, Art. 88 A, § 13A (b)(1) (195 7, 2003 R epl. Vol.) pro vides: -6- (1984, 1999 Repl.Vol.). When we consider an administrative agency decision, we review the agency s decision applying the same statutory standards as used by the preceding reviewin g court. Spencer, 2004 W L 4393 10, at *4; Watkins v. Dept. of Public Safety and Corr. Service s, 377 M d. 34, 46 , 831 A.2d 1079, 1086 (2003); Maryland Div. of Labor and Industry v. Triangle General Contractors, Inc., 366 Md. 407, 41 6, 784 A.2d 53 4, 539 (2001); Gigeous v. Eastern C orrectiona l Inst., 363 Md. 481, 495-96, 769 A.2d 912, 921 (2001) (citing Public Serv. Com'n v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 273 Md. 357, 362, 329 A.2d 691, 694-9 5 (197 4)). The statutory standards allowing reviewing courts to reverse or modify agency decisions are fou nd in S ection 1 0-222 (h)(3) o f the A PA. U nder th e provi sion, agency decisions may be reve rsed or mo dified if the c ourt conclu des that an a gency findin g, conclusion , or decision: (i) is unconstitu tional; (ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the final decision ma ker; (iii) results from an unlawful procedure; (iv) is affected by any other error of law; (v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted; or (vi) is arb itrary or cap ricious. In Montgomery County, there is no local department of social services. In Mon tgomery Co unty, State social service and public assistance programs administered by a local department shall be administered by the Montgom ery County go vernmen t. -7- As we explained in Spencer, 2004 WL 439310 , at *6, the six stan dards ma y be groupe d into three categories: conclu sions o f law, f inding s of fac t, or discr etionary a ction. See also Department of Health a nd Men tal Hygien e v. Cam pbell, 364 Md. 108, 118, 771 A.2d 1051, 1057 (2001)(explaining that the issue for the reviewing court is whether the administrative agency committed an error of law, or whether its decision is supported by substantial evidence, or is arbitrary or capricious ). The first four standards apply when an agency makes a conclusion of law. The fifth standard applies when an agency makes a finding of fact. The sixth standard applies when an agency acts in its discretionary capacity. Spencer, 2004 WL 43 9310, at *6 ; see also Maryland Transp. Authority v. King, 369 Md. 274, 799 A.2d 1246 (2002) (discussing the arbitrary and capricious standard). The tests differ for each category. Determining whether an age ncy s conclusions of law are correct is always, on judicial review, the court s prerogative, although we ordinarily respect the agency s expertise and give weight to its interpretation of a statute that it administers. Watkins, 377 Md. at 46, 831 A.2d at 1086 (quoting Baltimore Lutheran High School v. Employment Sec. Admin., 302 Md. 649, 662, 490 A.2d 701, 708 (1985)); see also Total Audio-Visual Sys., Inc. v. Dept. of Labor, 360 Md. 387, 394, 758 A.2d 124, 127-28 (2000). Of course, even though an agency s interpretation of a statute is often persuasive, the reviewing court must apply the law as it understands it to be. Supervisor of Assessments of Baltimore City v. Chase Assocs., 306 Md. 568, 574, 510 A.2d 568, 571 (1986 ). Nev ertheless, an adm inistrativ e age ncy's interpretation -8- and application of the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerab le weight by reviewing courts. Board of Physician Quality Assurance v. Banks, 354 M d. 59, 69 , 729 A .2d 376 , 381 (1 999). With respect to an agency s findings of fact, a reviewing court applies the substantial evidence test, determining "whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached." Id. at 68, 72 9 A.2d at 380 (quoting Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apts., 283 Md. 505, 512, 390 A.2d 1119, 1123 (1978)). Again, the reviewing court generally defers to the agency, appraising its fact-finding and subsequent inferences from that fact-findin g, if suppo rted by the reco rd, in a light mo st favorab le to the age ncy. Id. at 68, 729 A.2d at 381 (citing CBS v. Comptroller, 319 Md. 687, 698, 575 A.2d 324, 329 (1990)). Fina lly, the court ap plies the arbitra ry and capric ious standard when it reviews an agency s discretionary functions. As we observed in Spencer, when an agency ac ts in its discretionary capacity, it is taking actions that are specific to its mandate and expertise and, unlike conclusions of law or findings of fact, have a non-judicial nature. For this reason, we owe a higher level of deference to functions spe cifically committed to the agency s discretion. Spencer, 200 4 WL 43 9310, at * 7. [ A]s long as an adm inistrativ e age ncy's exercise of discretion does not violate regulations, statutes, common law principles, due process and other constitutional require ments, it is ordina rily unrev iewab le by the co urts. Maryland State Police v. Zeigler, 330 Md. 540, 557, 625 A.2d 914, 922 (1993). Courts thus -9- generally only intervene when an agency exercises its discretion arbitrarily or capriciously. Id. at 558, 625 A.2d at 922. III. Discussion The basis of Christo pher s a rgume nt rests o n her as sumpt ion that, had she not appealed the Library of Congress s termination of her employment for reasons of disability, she would be eligible to receive disability benefits and, consequently, would be deemed disabled for the purposes of receiving the entire or uncapped excess shelter cost deduction as opposed to the limited or capped deduction. We shall assume, for the sake of this discussion, that the fact-finder had a basis for concluding that Christopher, indeed, would h ave been entitled to disab ility benefits had s he not take n her app eal. Claiming, thus, that she f orfeited dis abili ty benefits she would have received otherwise in order to appeal her employer s termination decision, Christopher go es on to maintain that the Department erred as a matter of law for two reasons when it denied her the uncapped excess shelter cost deduction. According to Christopher, the Dep artment s interpretation of COMAR 07.03.17.43I(3) and 07.03.17.0 2B(6) is arbitrary and capricious . . . because it pe nalizes Ch ristopher fo r exercising h er legal right to appeal her disability determination . . . . [and] impermissibly distinguishes between individuals who have been determined to be disabled based on whether the individual has appealed that decision . . . . Christopher thus urges that she should be deeme d to be con structively receivin g disability benefits under the relevant COMAR regulations. Furthermore, in Christopher s view, -10- constructive receipt means that [she] is re ceiving be nefits for pu rposes of th e statute and regulation, but the amoun t of the ben efits actually received is zero due to [her appeal of the Library o f Con gress d isability det ermina tion]. Christopher also contends that the Department deprived her of equal protection of the laws under both the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights because a distinction between individuals who have been determined to be disabled, based on whether the individual has appealed that decision, is not rationally related to any legitimate government interest. She maintains that there is no rational government interest inherent in placing an individual who has been determined to be disabled, and therefore lost job and compensation, in a position of where that individual must forego the right to appeal that determination or otherwise receive lower food stamp assistance than other disabled individuals who choose not to appeal their disability determinations. The State argues that the ALJ correctly found that Christopher was not entitled to the uncapped excess shelter cost deduction because she is not disabled as defined by state and federal law. According to the State, under COMAR 07.03.17.02B(6), the definition of disabled for the purposes of the uncapped excess shelter cost deduction turns on whether the individual actually receives a disability benefit. Moreover, in the State s view, there is no catch-all definition o f disabled th at would permit an individual who receives no type of compensation for a disability but whom an employer has terminated on the basis of a -11- disability to be considered a disabled household member. Because the ALJ adhered to the plain meaning of the words defining disabled, the State maintains that the ALJ cannot be con sidered to have acted a rbitrarily or c apriciou sly. The State also contests Christopher s argument that, by appealing her termination from the Library of Congress, she receives a smaller food stamp benefit than if she had declined to appe al. The State disputes C hristopher s c laim that she is constructively entitled to zero benefits while her employm ent matter is o n appeal. It arg ues instead that, if Christopher were to be awarded disability benefits o f $1,346 p er month, a nd if she were to receive such, the be nefits wo uld count a s income which w ould have only been pa rtially offset by the uncapped shelter deduction. As such, according the State, the amount of food stamps Christopher would be entitled to receive would decrease to approx imately $71.00 per month. The State thus rejects Christopher s argument that she is penalized for appealing her disability d etermin ation. Fina lly, the State maintains that the equal p rotection gu arantees un der Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Fo urteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution are not violated by the requireme nt that individu als receive disa bility benefits in order to be considered disabled for the purposes of the uncapped excess shelter cost deduction. The definition of disabled required for the uncapped excess shelter cost deduction, in the State s view, is ration ally related to the legitimate g overnm ent interest in treating those wh o receive d isability income d ifferently than those who do not for the purpose -12- of calculating food stamp benefits. As the State explains it, because additional income ordinarily reduces an individual s food stamp allotment, the uncapped excess shelter cost deduction is a means of offse tting or mitigat[ing] the negative effect of that income when the inco me is dis ability ben efits. A. The ALJ s Decision 1. The Food Stamp Program The Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. §§2011, et. seq., is a state administered program funded by the federal government to provide low-income individuals with an opportun ity to obtain a more nutritious diet. 7 U .S.C.A. § 2013(a) (W est 1999); see West v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 1122, 1124 (3d Cir. 1989). The Secretary of Agriculture prescribes the standards for eligibility for food stamps, but state agencies are authoriz ed to mak e individua l eligibility determinations and to distribute the food stamps to eligible households, which may use them to purchase food from approved, retail food stores. Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 117, 105 S.Ct. 2520, 2523, 86 L.Ed.2d 81, 85 (1985)(foo tnote omitted); see 7 U.S.C.A. § 2014(b) (West Supp. 2003). In order to participate in the Foo d Stamp Program , states must co mply with the Food Stamp Act and the Secretary s regulations. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2020(a), 2025 (West 1999). Maryland law requires the Department to implement the program in conform ity with federal and state law an d regulation s. Maryland C ode, Art. 88A, § 13A(e) (1957, 2003 Repl. Vol.)(stating th at the adm inistration of S tate program s by Montg omery Cou nty shall -13- . . . be governed by State and fe deral regulations ). 6 Eligibility for food stamps is larg ely determined by a househ old s income. Section 2014(a) of the Food Stamp A ct provides : Participation in the food stamp program shall be limited to those households whose incomes and other f inancial reso urces, held s ingly or in joint ownership, are determ ined to be a substantial lim iting factor in p ermitting them to obtain a more nutritiou s diet. See als o Kne bel v. H ein, 429 U.S. 288, 289, 97 S.Ct. 549, 551, 50 L.Ed.2d 485, 488 (1977). As a general rule, the recipient s food stamp allotment decreases when his or he r incom e increa ses. See West, 879 F.2d at 1124. Although [h]ouse hold income f or purpos es of the fo od stamp program shall include all income from whatever source, see 7 U.S.C.A. § 2014(d) (West Su pp. 2003 )(emphas is added), ce rtain exclusions (regarding incoming revenue) and deductions (regarding expenses) apply. For example, federal energy assistance payments may be excluded from the income calculation. See West v. Sullivan, 973 F.2d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 1992). Benefits, such as social security disability benefits, are not excluded under the program, however, and thus ordinarily constitute income.7 See Stevens v. Jackson, 800 F. Supp. 344, 345 (W.D. Va. 6 The Department of Human R esources (hereinafter D HR ) adm inisters Maryland s Food Stamp Program. Maryland Code, Art. 88A, § 15 (1957, 2003 Repl. Vol.). Section 13 of Article 88A requ ires D HR to create loca l dep artm ents of so cial s ervices in eac h county, except for Montgomery County, and Baltimore City in order to administer the program on a local level. Pu rsuant to Se ction 13A of Article 8 8A, M ontgom ery County, where Christopher resides, administers the program instead of a local department of social services. 7 Because benefits increasing a recipient s household income may not be offset by other factors, the benefits may actually re duce th e recipie nt s foo d stamp allotme nt. Id.; see also 2A S OCIAL S ECURITY: L AW AND P RACTICE § 34:75 (2003). Ultimately, as shall become -14- 1992)(explaining how a household s food stamp allotment was reduced because the household received social security disability benefits). In addition to excluding certain incoming revenue from the applicant s total income calculation, certain d eductio ns also a pply. 7 U .S.C.A . § 2014 (e). Deductions serve to account for many of the a pplican t s nece ssary exp enses, see Kn ebel, 429 U.S . at 296, 97 S .Ct. at 554, 50 L.Ed.2d at 492, thus reducing the applicant s total income calculation and increasing the amount of food stamps for which his or her household is eligible. Some of the allowable deductions include child care expenses, medical expenses, and excess shelter costs. 7 U.S.C .A. § 20 14(e). COMAR 07.03.17.4 3 outlines ho w net m onthly incom e is to be calculated in Maryland pursuant to federal law.8 Under the regulation, net income is the applicant s gross more apparent infra, Christopher has argue d she is entitled to zero benefits because she wants to receive the benefit of a deduction without suffering the consequences of the corresponding increase in income, which would decrease her total food stamp allotm ent. 8 COMAR 07.03.17.43, Calculation of Household Food Stamp Net Monthly Income, provides: The local department shall compute net monthly income in the following man ner: A. Compute gross monthly income; B. Subtract from the gross self-employment income the amount allowed by Regulation .39B and C o f this chapter; C. Subtract an earned income deduction of 20 percent of gross monthly earned income; D. Subtract a standard deduction in the am ount stated in Schedule E of Regulation .45 of this ch apter; E. Subtract that portion o f medica l expenses as defined in Regulation .33 of this chapter in excess of $35 per month incurred by a househ old mem ber who is elderly or disable d as -15- incom e minu s certain deduc tions. The deduction at issue here is the excess shelter cost deduction, which allows applicants to subtract fro m their gros s income a limited or capp ed amo unt of allow able excess shelter costs. 7. U.S.C.A. § 20 14(e)(6)(A). 9 Allowable excess shelter costs include, inter alia, monthly utility costs su ch as heatin g and coo king fuel, ele ctricity, and water described in Regu lation .02B of this chapter; F. Subtract payments for the actual co st paid by the ho usehold to someone outside the household for the care of a child or other dependent as described in Regulation .34 of this chapter not to exceed the maximums in Schedules J and K in Regulation .45 of this chapter; G. Subtra ct payments for child support for an individual living outside the home as set forth in Regulation .35 o f this chapter; H. Subtract a h omeless sh elter allowan ce as descr ibed in Regulation .36 of this chapter for homeless households in the amount stated in Schedule L in Regulation .45 of this ch apter; and I. Subtract any excess shelter cost as follows: (1) Excess shelter cost is calculated as the amount of the shelter cost, as described in Regulation .37 of this chapter, which exceeds 50 percent of the amount of income remaining after the deductions in §§A-H of this regulation are allowed, (2) Subtract the excess shelter cost not to exceed the maximum in Schedule F of Regulation .45 of this chapter, and (3) If the household contains an elderly or disabled member as described in Regulation .02B of this chapter, the total amount of the exc ess she lter cost is subtrac ted. 9 Section 20 14(e)(6)(A ) of Title 7 o f the U.S. C ode prov ides: A household shall be entitled, with respect to expenses other than expenses paid on behalf of the househo ld by a third party, to an excess shelter expense deduction to the extent that the monthly amo unt e xpended by a household for shelter exceeds an amount equal to 50 percent of monthly household income after all other applica ble ded uctions have b een allo wed. -16- adding up to more than half of the household s income. CO MAR 07.03.17.4 3I; see also M ARYLAND D EPARTMENT OF H UMAN R ESOURCES F OOD S TAMP M ANUAL § 212.3 available at http://www.dhr.md.us/stamp/manual (last visited May 10, 2004). Although the amount of the excess s helter cost deduction is capped for most food stamp applicants at approxim ately $378,10 elderly or disabled households are eligible for an unlimited or uncapped deduction , which allo ws them to subtract all of their excess shelter costs from their gross in come . 7. U.S.C.A. § 201 4(e)(6)(B). 11 Specifically, COM AR 07.03.17 .43I(3), 10 The Food an d Nutrition S ervices of th e United S tates Depa rtment of Agriculture provides example s of incom e calculation s under the program and lists the current cap for the excess shelter cost d eductio n as $3 78. See Fact Sheet on Resources, Income,andBenefits, available at http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/applicant_recipients/ fs_Res_Be n_Elig.htm (last visited Ma y 10, 2004). 11 Section 20 14(e)(6)(B ) of Title 7 o f the Unite d States C ode prov ides: In the case of a household that does not contain an elderly or disabled individual, in the 48 contiguous States and the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and the Virgin Islands of the United States, the excess shelter expense deduction shall not exceed-(i) for the period beginning on August 22, 1996, and ending on December 31, 1996, $247, $429, $353, $3 00, a nd $182 per m onth , resp ectiv ely; (ii) for the period beginning on January 1, 1997, and ending on September 30, 1998, $250, $434, $357, $3 04, a nd $184 per m onth , resp ectiv ely; (iii) for fiscal year 1999, $275, $478, $393, $334, and $203 per month, r espe ctive ly; (iv) for fiscal year 2000, $280, $483, $398, $339, and $208 per month, r espe ctive ly; (v) for fiscal year 2001, $340, $543, $458, $399, and $268 per month, respectively; and (vi) for f iscal year 2002 and each subsequent fiscal year, the applicable amount during the -17- which is derived from 7 C .F.R. § 273.9(d)(6)(ii), 12 provides: If the household contains an elderly or disabled member as described in Regulation .02B of this chapter, the total amount of the excess shelter cost is subtracted. In short, elderly and disabled applicants are eligible for the uncapped e xcess shelte r cost dedu ction, whic h allows th em to ded uct all of their excess shelter expe nses, while all other applicants are eligible only for a capped amount. The consequ ence of th is regulation is th at elderly and disabled fo od stamp recipients receive a greater be nefit unde r the excess shelter cost deduction than other applicants do because, by subtracting all of their allowable shelter costs from their gross income instead of just the limited, capped amo unt, their net income is reduc ed to a greater extent. See Huberman v. Perales, 884 F.2d 62, 64 (2d Cir. 1989)(explaining h ow a disabled w oman s food stamp allotment increased significantly because she was eligible for the uncapped shelter deduction instead of the capped one). Lower net incom e, as we ha ve noted, g enerally preceding fiscal year, as adjusted to reflect changes for the 12-month period ending the preceding November 30 in the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labo r. 12 Section 27 3.9(d)(6)(ii) of Title 7 of the Code o f Federal R egulations p rovides: Excess shelter deduction. Monthly shelter expenses in excess of 50 percent of the house hold's incom e after all other deductions in paragraphs (d)(1) through (d)(5) of this section have been allowed. If the househo ld does not contain an elderly or disabled member, as defined in § 271.2 of this chapter, the shelter deduction cannot exceed the maximum shelter deduction limit establish ed for th e area. . . . -18- results in an incre ased fo od stam p allotm ent. See 7 U.S.C .A. § 20 14. In order to receive the uncapped excess shelter cost deduction, food stamp recip ients must be 60 years of age or older or disabled. Section 2012(r)(2) of the Food Stamp Act defines a "disabled member" of a household eligible for food stamps in terms of someone who receives benefits. Under the provision, an elderly or disabled member includes someon e who: (A) receives supplemental security income be nefits . . . or (B) receives Federally or State administered supplemental assistance . . . , interim assistance pending r e c e i p t o f s u p p l e m e n t a l s e c u ri t y i n c o me , disability-related medical assistance . . . , or disability-b ased S tate gen eral assis tance b enefits . . . ; (3) receives disability or blindness payments . . . or receives disability retirement b enefits from a governmental agency because of a disabil ity considered permanent under section 221(i) o f the So cial Sec urity Act ( 42 U.S .C. 421 (i)) . . . . Section 271.2 of Title 7 of the Code of Federal Regulations states that elderly or disabled member for the purposes of the Food S tamp Pro gram inclu des a mem ber of a ho usehold who: (2) Receive s supplem ental security inco me bene fits under title XVI of the Social Security Act or disability or blindness payments under titles I, II, X, XIV, or XVI of the Social Security Act; (3) Receives federally or State-administered supplemental benefits under section 1616(a) of the Social Security Act provided that the eligibility to receive the benefits is based upon the disability or blindness criteria used under title XVI of the Social Sec urity Act; -19- (4) Receives federally or State-administered supplemental benefits under section 212(a) of Pub.L. 93-66; (5) Receives disability retirement benefits from a governmental agency because of a disability considered permanent under section 221 (i) of the So cial Security A ct. *** (10) Receives an annu ity payment under . . . the Railroad Retirem ent Ac t . . . (11) Is a recipient of interim assistance benefits pending the receipt of Supplemented Security Income, a recipient of disability related medical assistance under title XIX of the Social Security Act, or a recipient o f disability-based State general assistance benefits provided that the eligibility to receive any of these benefits is based upon disability or blindness criteria established by the State agency w hich are at least as stringent as those use d under title XVI of the Social Security Act (as set forth at 20 CFR part 416, subpart I, Determining Disability and Blindness as def ined in Title XVI). 13 COMAR 07.03.17.02B(6) defines disabled similarly. In Maryland, a disabled person for the purposes of the Food Stamp Program is someone who: (a) Receives Supplem ental Secu rity Income be nefits or oth er federal or State-administered payments when eligibility to receive the benefits is based upon the disability or blindness criteria of the S ocial Secu rity Act; *** (f) Is receiving a disability retirement benefit from a government agency because of a disability considered permanent under the Social Sec urity Act; (g) Is rec eiving a railroad retireme nt disab ility annuity . . . ; (h) Is receiving in terim assistanc e benefits pending receipt of Supplemental Security Income; or (i) Is receiving disability-related federal medical assistance.14 13 The omitted sections apply to veterans and their families. 14 The omitted sections apply to veterans and their families. -20- In sum, for the purposes of the Food Stamp Program generally and the uncapped shelter cost deduction specifically, an individual is disa bled if he o r she receive s certain disab ility benef its. 2. The ALJ s Conclusion of Law In defining whether receiving disability means actual receipt in COMAR 07.03.17.02B(6), we beg in the analysis by noting that the principles governing our interpretation of a statute apply when we interpret an agency rule or regu lation. Maryland Com m'n on Human Relations v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 295 Md. 586, 592-93, 457 A.2d 1146, 1149-50 (198 3); Carriage Hill Cabin John, Inc. v. Maryland Health Resources Planning Com m'n, 125 Md.App. 183, 248-249, 724 A.2d 745, 778 (1999). A s we hav e said many times, a statute s plain langua ge is itse lf the be st evide nce of its own mean ing. Total Audio-Visual, 360 Md. at 395, 758 A.2d at 128. [W]hen the language is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ordinarily ends there. Drew v. First Guar. Mortgage Corp., 379 Md. 318, 327, 842 A.2d 1, 6 (2003). We, of course, read statutory language w ithin the context of the statuto ry scheme, an d thus our a pproach is a comm onsensica l one designed to effectuate the "purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body." Id. at 327-28, 842 A.2d at 6-7. Under COMAR 07.03.17.02B(6), aside from the pro visions relating to vetera ns, a food stamp applicant may be considered disabled in five different ways, all of which depend on whether the applican t is receiving or receives benefits. The M eriam-Webster s -21- Collegiate Dictionary de fines receive as to co me into the pos session of: acq uire. M ERIAM-W EBSTER S C OLLEGIATE D ICTIONARY 975 (10th ed. 1 995). Sim ilarly, Black s Law Dictionary defines receipt as the act of receiving something. BLACK S L AW D ICTIONARY 1274 (7 th ed. 1999). In both definitions, receives unambiguously means the actual possession of something. W e, therefore, conclude that a plain reading of COMAR 07.03.17.02B reveals that, un less the individ ual is a veteran, the definition of disabled for the purposes of the food stamp program requires the individual to receive some kind of disability-related benef it. See 1 A MERICANS W ITH D ISABILITIES P RACTICE & C OMPLIANCE M ANUAL § 1:177 (2003)(explaining that a disabled member of a household is defined as someone who has been awarded and receives disability payments); see also Burnett v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 621 , 628 n.4 (8 th Cir. 1985)(noting that, in the context of Supplemental Security Income payments, [u]nearned income like disability benefits is considered incom e for S SI purp oses . . . bu t canno t be cou nted un til actually re ceived ). In a case similar to the case sub judice, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has read the term receives in Section 2012(r) of the Food Stamp Act as actual receipt. West, 879 F.2d at 1126-2 7. In West, a woman applied for food stamps and Social Security disability b enefits at the sam e time. Id. at 1124-25. Her food stamp application was held until the Social Security Administration determin ed that she w as entitled to d isability benefits. Id. Two years passed until the Social Security Administration deemed that she was entitled to disability benef its, and the w oman cla imed she w as entitled to the tw o years of -22- food stamp payments she did not receive during this interim period. Id. at 1125. The cou rt disagreed, concluding that receives means actual receipt under Section 2012(r)(2), and the woman could not receive back payments of f ood stam ps becau se she had not actually receiv ed he r disabilit y benefits during the two -year perio d. Id. at 1126 -27. Our sister court in Iowa also has interpreted the term disabled for the purposes of the Food Stamp Program as requiring the actual receipt of benefits. In Lundy v . Iowa D ept. of Human Services, 389 N.W.2d 392, 393 (Iowa 1986), Lundy s household, which was receiving food stamps, became ineligible for food stamps because he acquired a new truck that exceeded in value the household s maximum resource level. Lundy argued that he needed the new tru ck becau se of his disa bility, and that the value of the vehicle should be excluded, pursuant to federal regulations, from his household s assets because the truck was necessary to transport a phyically disabled household member. Id. at 394. After examining the definition of disabled in 7 C.F.R. § 271.2, which is derived from Section 2012(r)(2), the Iowa Supreme Court determined that Lundy was not disabled for the purposes of the Food Stamp Program because, even though he had applied for disability benefits, he did not receive them: [Section 271.2] defines a disabled member as an individual receiving social security dis ability benefits. How ever, Lun dy does not m eet these criteria because at the time of the administrative proceedings Lundy has filed fo r, but not yet received, social security disability benefits. Id. (interna l citations omitted ). Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that disabled for the purposes of the Food Stamp -23- Program plainly turns on the rece ipt of disability ben efits, Christop her argues that she sho uld be deemed to have constructively received disability benefits because her appeal has prevented her from receiving the disability benefits she might otherwise be entitled to. We disagre e. If we accepted Christopher s argument, we would be expanding the definition of disabled beyond the confines of a state regulation that is derived from federal law. States must adhere to federal standards when implementing food stamp programs. 7 U.S.C .A. § 2014. Not only are [s]tate or local policies or practice inconsistent with federal statutes or regulations . . . invalid, Harrington v. Blum, 483 F.Supp. 1015, 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), but states may be f inancia lly liable fo r nonco mplian ce. See 7 CFR §§ 276.1-276.7 (establishing state agency liabilities for not complying with federal guidelines). A state agency that fails to comply with federal law and regulations may result in [the Federal Nutrition Service] seeking injunctive relief to compel compliance and/or a suspension or disallowance of the Federal share of the State agency's administrative funds. 7 C.F.R. § 276.1(a)(4). Section 276.2 of Title 7 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides, among other thin gs, that [s]tate agencies sh all be strictly liable for . . . [t]he value of coupons overissued and coupons issued with out authoriz ation . . . . 7 C.F.R . § 276.2(b) (1)(iii); see Pennsylvania v. United States, 781 F.2d 334, 338 (3d Cir. 1986)(stating that states are liable for issuanc e errors resulting in financial loss, which includes errors where individuals receive benefits to which they are not entitled ). Given tha t States mus t comply with federal gu idelines and risk -24- financial penalty by not doing so, we are no t inclined to im pose co nstructive rec eipt onto the Maryland regulation, which must conform with federal law, when there is no federal (or state, for that m atter) preced ent for read ing receiv es constru ctively in this conte xt. 15 Constructive receipt also contravenes the "purpose, aim, or policy of the Food Stamp Program as it has be en estab lished in federa l law. See Knebel, 429 U.S. at 289, 97 S.Ct. at 551, 50 L.Ed.2d at 488; West, 879 F.2d at 1124. As we explained supra, the Food Stamp Program s overall purpose is to assist individuals with limited financial resources. Eligibility for food stamps, logically enough, depends upon a hou sehold s net inc ome, a quantifiable, bottom-line amount. See COM AR 07 .03.17.43 (o utlining how net month ly income is calculated under the Food Stamp Program). Factoring constructive benefits in to that amount a s Christoph er urges, ho wever, w ould create a net income that is inaccurate. It would not reflect the household s actual financial status, thus defeating the pro gram s purpose to distribute food stamps based on a household s actual financial need. 15 We observe that courts have recognized constructive dividends in the federal income tax context when some kind of economic benefit is conferred. 10 M ERTENS L AW OF F EDERAL INCOME T AXATION § 38B :44 (20 04). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained, [i]n determining whether a constructive dividend has been made, (t)he crucial concept . . . is that the corporation conferred an econo mic bene fit on the stockholder without expectation of repayment. " Ireland v. United States, 621 F.2d 731, 735 (5 th Cir. 1980)(emphasis added). E xamples of conferred economic benefits include a taxpayer s use of a company car for personal purposes, use of a boat purchased by a company and used for personal purposes, and use of a residence furnished by the corporation. Id. In other words, before a court recognizes a constructive dividend, the taxpayer must have received some kin d of econ omic benefit amounting to a value more than zero. We, thus, are unable to accept tha t Christopher has constructively received zero when there is no indicatio n that sh e has re ceived anything , econo mic or o therwi se. -25- Christopher s contention that she should be deemed to be constructively receiving zero benefits does not cha nge our view. If the program s purpose is to distribute food stamps based on income, then it is income, indeed, that should be calculated: zero constructive benefits does not change Christopher s net income for the purposes of the Food Stamp Program in any way. Piling legal fiction (constructive benefits) upon legal fiction (constructive benefits of zero ) only obfuscates the program s goal of calculating income as accurately as po ssible in orde r to distribute the appropriate allotment of food stamps based upon the individual s financial need. We cannot accept such an approach.16 For the above reasons, w e reject Chr istopher s co ntention tha t she is con structively receiving zero benefits. Therefore, the ALJ did not err as a matter of law when she 16 Indeed, the admin istrative proble ms that certa inly would follow if we adopted Christopher s view reveals why the uncapped excess shelter cost deduction turns on the receipt of disability benefits rather than their constructive receipt. Determining constructive receipt would place the Department in the position of eval uatin g on a cas e-bybase basis whe ther an app licant is likely to receiv e disability benefits, an evaluation that would consist of the Department predicting, based on its own estimation of an applicant s disability, whether or not an applicant might receive disability benefits. Because the Social Security Administration requires an interview and medical documentation, among other things, from the individual applying for disability benefits, and also issues a tome entitled Disability Evaluation Under S ocial Secu rity that lists the medical criteria it uses to determine disability, we do not believe this would be a simple task. Nor is th ere any indicatio n that it is wi thin the D epar tmen t s sc ope of re spon sibility or e xpertise to ev alua te dis abili ty. Furthermore, we observe that, under the approach Christopher advocates, every food stamp applicant an d recipient w aiting to be d eemed e ligible for disa bility benefits pote ntially could be entitled to the uncapped excess shelter cost deduction. Some of those disability applicants inev itabl y will be denied disability benefits, yet they will have received neverthele ss a deduc tion for the in terim period for whic h they applied . We, thus, are able to see, for this reason as well, why the Food Stamp Program requires actual receipt of disability b enefits in orde r to avo id such an adm inistrativ e quag mire. -26- determined that receive s means actual receipt for the purpo ses of the d isability requirement for the uncapped excess shelter cost deduction. 3. Arbitrary and Capricious As we explained supra, [w]hen the agenc y is acting in a fact-finding or quasi-judicial capa city, we review its decision to determine "whether the contested decision was rendered in an illegal, arbitrary, capricious, oppressive or fraudulent manner." Giant Food, Inc. v. Dept. of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, 356 Md. 180, 18 5, 738 A.2d 85 6, 858 (1999). According to Christopher, the ALJ acted arbitrarily and capriciously because she refused to recognize that Christopher was disabled for the purposes of the uncapped excess shelter cost deduction. Christopher also maintains that the ALJ penalized her for exercising her right to appeal th e Library of C ongress d ecision to term inate her for rea sons of disability. With respect to Christopher s contention that the ALJ improperly failed to deem her disabled based on her termination status from the Library of Congress, we conclude, based on our decision that receives means actual receipt, that the ALJ did not abuse her discretion when she found that Christopher was disabled because she did not have the discretion to conclude otherwise in the first place . As we e xplained in Spencer, [w]hether an action is in fact deemed arbitrary or capricious will vary depending upon the amount of discretion granted an age ncy, a matter of substantive law. 2004 WL 439310, at *8. Here, regarding the uncapped excess shelter cost deduction, the ALJ had no discretion as a matter of substantive law because disabled so clearly turns on whether the applicant receives -27- certain disability benefits. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted, the definition of disabled found in Section 2012(r)(2) of the Food Stamp Act requires no discretion or judgment of officials in [a] food stamp program. Huberman, 884 F.2d at 66 (involving a case where the effective date of the uncapped shelter cost deduction was at issue). The disability determination under the Food Stamp Act, thus, is a straightforward one: either an individual receives disability benefits or he/she do es not. The ALJ did not act arbitrarily or capriciously because she applied the regu lation to the letter. With respect to Christopher s argument that she has been penalized for taking an appeal, Christopher seems to suggest that she has been singled out, in an arbitrary and capricious manner, because she chose to appe al. She provides no fa ctual support for her assertion; rather, she seems to base her argument on the fact that, because her appeal allegedly places her disability status in question, she has been penalized unfairly by the ALJ. We do not accept Christopher s logic. There is no evidence in the record that the ALJ treated Christopher any differently from any other applicant claiming to be disabled, acted inco nsistentl y, or deviated from prior policies relating to disability determinations under the Food Stamp Progra m. See Montgomery C ounty v. Anastasi, 77 Md. App. 126, 137, 549 A.2d 753, 758 (1988)(stating that, in the context of an agency s change in promotion procedures, "[a]n agency cha nging its cou rse must su pply a reasone d analysis indicating that prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not casually ignored, and if any agency glosses over or sw erves from prior preced ents without discussion it may cross the line from -28- tolerably terse to intolerably mute"). Christopher s arbitrary and ca pricious claim thus fails in this regard a s well. B. Equal Protection Christopher argues that the Depa rtment s interpretation of COMAR 07.03.17.43I(3) so as to deny an u ncapped shelter dedu ction to Ch ristopher an d individuals similarly situated violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the equal protection component of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.17 Acknowledging that Christopher is not in a pro tected class re quiring strict scr utiny, Christoph er claims that the Department has no ra tional gove rnment inte rest in distingu ishing betw een indiv iduals receiving disability benefits and those who do not when determining whether an individual is disabl ed und er the F ood S tamp P rogram . Christopher asserts that she is not mounting a facial challenge to the regulation, and she conceded at oral argument that, if we were to determine that receives requires actual receipt, her equal protection argument based on the Department s application or interpretation of the regulation autom atically would f ail. In other w ords, if rece ipt requires actual receipt, the regulation cannot be said to have been applied to her 17 Section I of the Fo urteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution includes the following guarantee: "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law s." Althou gh Article 24 [of the Maryland Declaration of Rights] does not contain an express equal protection clause, the concept of equal protection nevertheless is embodied in the Article." Frankel v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Maryland System , 361 Md. 298, 312 -13, 761 A.2d 3 24, 332 (2000). -29- unconstitutio nally because we will have concluded that she doe s not fall with in its ambit in the first place.18 Cf. Bruce v. Director, Dept. of Chesapeake Bay Affairs, 261 Md. 585, 600, 276 A.2d 200, 208 (1971)(stating that we are mindful that if a law is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand so as to make unjust discriminations between persons in s imilar circumstances, material to their rights, such denial of equal justice is within the prohibition of the Constitution )(internal quotations omitted). Because we have concluded that receives means actual receipt, Christopher, as was pointed out in oral argument, is thus left with a facial challenge to the regulation and wo uld have to 18 Regarding Christopher s argument that the uncapped shelter cost deduction, which turns on the receipt of disability benefits, penalizes her for exercising her appeal of her termination, we believe that Lyng v. Int l Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agriculture Implement Workers of America, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 108 S.Ct. 1184, 99 L.Ed. 2d 380 (1988) is analogous. In Lyng, union members argued, inter alia, that a provision under the Food Stamp Act prohibiting households from becoming eligible for food stamps during the time w hen any me mber of th e househ old is on strike violated the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth A mend ment. Id. at 364, 108 S.Ct. at 1188, 99 L.Ed.2d at 387. The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that it had little trou ble in concluding that [the provision] is rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of avoiding undue favoritism to one side or the other in private labor disputes. Id. at 371, 108 S.Ct. at 1192, 99 L.Ed.2d at 392. The Court acknowledged that the provision work[ed] at least some discrimination against strikers as compared to voluntary quitters, but explained that, under th e rational bas is test, even if th e statute prov ides only rough justice, its treatment . . . is far from irrational. Id. at 371-72, 108 S.Ct. at 1192-93, 99 L.Ed.2d at 392 (quoting Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory , 431 U.S. 471, 97 S.Ct. 1898, 52 L.Ed.2d 513 (1977 ))(internal quotations omitted). In short, although the food stamp policy may have n egatively affe cted strikers, the Court nev ertheless dec lined to find that strikers were entitled to food stamps on the basis that the provision penalized them, to use Christopher s words, fo r exercising th eir right to strike. We believ e the same rationale applies here and hold that Christopher s equal protection rights were not violated because she is arguably pe nalized by the Food Sta mp Prog ram for ex ercising her r ight to appe al. -30- argue that it, as written, violates the Equal Protection Clause, something she declined to do. We, therefore, n eed not co nsider this issu e, as we a dhere[ ] to the established principle that a court will not decide a constitutional issue when a case can properly be disposed of on a non-constitutional ground." Murrell v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 376 Md. 170, 191 n.8, 829 A.2d 548, 560 n.8 (2003)(quoting Jordan v . Hebbville , 369 Md. 439, 461 n.20, 800 A .2d 768 , 781 n.2 0 (200 2)). IV. Conclusion Under the Food Sta mp Ac t, and under COMAR 07.03.17.02B(6) specifically, a food stamp recipient must be receivin g disability bene fits in order to b e entitled to an uncapped excess shelter cost deduction. The ALJ, thus, properly denied Christopher s uncapped excess shelter cost deduction in this case. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT. -31-

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