Pantazes v. State
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Circuit Co urt for Ch arles Cou nty Criminal No. K00-883 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 142 September Term, 2002 ______________________________________________ DEAN JAMES PANTAZES v. STATE OF MARYLAND _______________________________________________ Bell, C.J. Eldridge Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia, JJ. _______________________________________________ Opinion by Raker, J. ______________________________________________ Filed: August 29, 2003 Dean James Pantazes, appellant, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Charles Cou nty, Maryland, of the crimes of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, second degree murder, conspiracy to comm it murder, tw o counts o f solicitation to commit murder, and use of a handgun in the commission of murder. He was indic ted in Prince George s Coun ty, and the S tate f iled a notice of inten t to se ek th e dea th pe nalty. Pantazes e xercised his constitutional and statutory right by filing a Suggestion of Removal pursua nt to Ar ticle IV, § 8 1 of the Maryland Constitution and M aryland Rule 4-254(b)(1). 2 As a result, the trial was removed from Prince George s County to Charles County. Pantazes presents the follow ing two issu es in this appeal: did the trial court err in denying his second suggestion of removal under the Maryland Constitution, Art. IV § 8(b); and did the trial court 1 Md. Const. art. IV, § 8(b) reads as follows: In all cases of presentmen ts or indictments for offen ses that are punishable by death, on suggestion in writing under oath of either of the parties to the proceedings that the party cannot have a fair and impartial trial in the court in which the proceedings may be pending, the court shall order and direct the record of proceedings in the presentment or indictment to be transmitted to som e other c ourt ha ving ju risdiction in such case fo r trial. 2 Maryland Rule 4-254(b)(1) reads as follows: Capital Cases. When a defendant is charged with an offense for which the maximum penalty is death and either party files a suggestion under oa th that the party cannot have a fair and impartial trial in the court in which the action is pending, the court shall order that the action be transferred for trial to another court having jurisdiction. The Circuit Administrative Judge of the court ord ering remo val shall designate the county to which the case is to be rem oved. A suggestion by a defendant shall be under the defendant s personal oath. A suggestion filed by the State sh all be un der the o ath of th e State s Attorn ey. abuse its discretion in limiting his cross-examination of Kim Young, a key witness for the State, and excluding extrinsic evid ence prof fere d to c halle nge the w itnes s cre dibility. We shall answer both questions in the negative and affirm the judgments of conviction. I. Appellant was tried and conv icted on all counts before a jury in Charles County. Prior to sentencing, the State withdrew the notice of intent to seek the death penalty. The trial court sentenced appellant to life without the possibility of parole. He noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The Co urt of Spe cial Appe als reversed his conviction and remanded the case for a ne w trial in the Circ uit Cou rt for C harles C ounty. Pantazes v. State, 141 Md. App. 422, 785 A.2d 865 (2001 ), cert. denied, 368 Md. 241, 792 A.2d 1178 (2002). On May 10, 2002, prior to the s econd trial, appellant filed another Suggestion of Remov al. App ellan t argued that b ecau se the Sta te was no long er se ekin g the deat h penalty, the case shou ld be transfer red b ack t o Pri nce G eorg e s C ounty. Appellant also argued that media coverage of the trial had made it imp ossible to get an impartial jury and fair trial in Charles County. The court denied the motion, an d the case p roceeded to trial in the Circu it Court for Charles County on July 30, 2002.3 At trial, the State sought to prove that appellant hired a prostitute, Jermel Chambers, to murder his wife, Clara Pantazes. 3 The State s key witness was Chambers. All future re ferences to court proce edings w ill be to the seco nd trial. -2- In her testim ony, Chamb ers describe d the even ts that preced ed the murder of Mrs. Pantazes. Chambers recounted that she first met appellant in early 2000 near a 7-Eleven on Eastern Avenue, Washin gton, D.C ., when he picked he r up in his green Chevrolet Suburban. Appellant drove her to K Street and p aid Cham bers for sex ual services. A ppellant told Chambers that he would become her regular, and they exchanged telephone numbers. Appellant met Chambers approximately twelve times, six or eight times for sexual services. During their second encounter, appellant asked Cham bers about hiring her to kill someone. Appellan t, who referred to himself as Steve, identified the proposed victim as his boss wife. In early January 2000, appellant paid Chambers $5000.00 to commit the murder and promised her an additional $5000.00 for its successful completion. Chambers testified that appellant told her that he would pick her up, drive her to his boss house an d provide her with a gun, an d tha t he in struc ted h er to mak e the crim e loo k like a ro bbery. Chambers testified that the murder took place on March 30, 2000. That morning, appellant drove Chambers from the 7-Eleven on Eastern Av enue to appellant s family home in Upper Marlboro, Maryland. Appellant took Chambers into the garage and told her the gun was wrapped in a towel on top of the refrigerator. Before leaving, appellant instructed Chambers to make the mu rder look like a robbery by removing several valuable items from the scene. Ap pellant left C hambers in the garage with the door closed. When Mrs. Pantazes came into the garage, Chambers shot her three times, took her ring, watch and purse, and drove away in her c ar. Mrs. Pa ntazes died in the garag e. Cham bers then d rove back to -3- Washington, D.C., abandoning the car on Benning Road. Cham bers even tually agreed to enter a guilty plea to murder and unlawful use of a hand gun in a crim e of violen ce and to participate in the trial against app ellant in exch ange for th e State not se eking the d eath penalty. 4 At trial, the State called Kim Young to corroborate Chambers testimony. Young identified appellant as a person posing as Steve. Y oung, also a prostitute, first m et a man named Steve in December 1999 while engaging in prostitution near Paul s Liquor Store on Eastern Avenue. Young testified that, during this first sexual encounter, Steve talked about an old man he knew who needed to have this woman killed. Steve offered $ 10,000.00 to commit the murder. Young gave him a telephone number in the event he wanted another date. At a second meeting, appellant provided Young with details of the proposed mu rder, stating that the garage door would be left open and that Young should come to the house between 9:00 and 9 :30 a.m., wh en the inten ded victim would be leaving for work. Appellant assured Young that he wo uld provide the gun. Ac cording to Young, Steve gave the witness a scrap of yellow paper con taining his ho me addre ss, directions to his house an d his garage door code, providing access to the house to enable Young to find his home and to kill h is wife. Appellant instructed Young to take the victim s p urse, watch and car to make it look like a robbery. At various meetings over the next few months, Steve drove either his green Suburban or a Jeep Cherokee. Young did not agree to do the killing, but told Steve I find 4 Her sentence was life imprisonment plus twenty years. -4- somebody to do it for you. In response to the State s question as to whether Young ever got someo ne to do the mu rder, Y oung te stified No. According to the testimony, Young learned about the murder of Mrs. Pantazes on the local television news. Recognizing the similarities between the murder and the crime proposed by Steve, Young relayed the information to a police officer. Young went to the officer, anticipating questioning by the police because Steve had called Young s residence multiple times and Young didn t want to be involved in that mess. That evening, Young was interviewed by a Prince George s County police detective. Young gave a written stateme nt and id entified appella nt as the man k nown as Stev e. Prior to appellant s cross-examination of Young, he moved in limine to inquire ab out, and introduce before the jury evidence of, alleged prior conduct that did not result in a conviction . The trial judg e excused the jury to hear the parties arguments. Appellant then explained his theory of the crime tha t Chambers and Young murdered Mrs. Pantazes during a botched ro bbery and tha t they sought to shift blame for the murder onto him. Relying on Rules 5-608(b) and 5-6 16(b)(2)5 and (b)(3), appellant sought to es tablish Young s 5 Appellan t argued to th e trial court that R ule 5-616 (b)(2) perm itted the court to admit th e extrins ic evide nce ev en if tha t eviden ce relate d only to a collatera l matter. He argued that this Rule indicates that Maryland takes a more expansive view of the admissibility of extrinsic evidence than do the Federal Rules. The State, however, argued that the specific extrinsic evidence prohibition in Rule 5-608(b) trumped the more general langua ge of R ule 5-6 16(b)(2 ). See J. F. M urphy, Jr., Maryland Evidence Handbook § 1302(c), at 504 (3d ed. 1999 & 2002 Cum. Supp.) (noting that the general rule 5616(b)(2) yields to the express prohibition against extrinsic bad act impeachment eviden ce in 5 -608(b )). App ellant do es not a dvanc e his 5-6 16(b)(2 ) argum ents on appea l. -5- involvement in an incident in which Young allegedly arranged a robbery that led to murder which Young then blam ed an inno cent man to disguise Y oung s inv olvemen t. Appellan t told the court that he could produc e testimony to sh ow that Y oung co nfessed to participating in the 1995 murder of a District of Columbia police officer and misidentified the killer. The trial judge arranged for a hearing on the matter the following Monday. The judge asked appellant to provide at that hearing fac tual support for his proffe r: THE COURT: Well, I wanted to see something besides your mere allegations. You have three or four people. [DEFENSE COUNSEL ]: You want us to have them with us is what you are asking? Or documentation? THE COURT: You have to In other words you have to show me tha t there is [ an] actu al predic ate for th is testimo ny. During the hearing outside the presence of the jury, appellant contended that his proposed questions regarding Y oung s pr ior miscon duct were permissible under Maryland Rule 5608(b) to impeach the witness veracity and that extrinsic evidence was admissible under Rules 5-616(b)(2) or 616(b)(3) because it showed the witness bias and motive to lie. In support of his motion, appellant submitted affidavits from two individuals: James Bradley, an officer assigned to investigate the 1995 incident, and Trevor Hew ick, appellant s private investigator. A ccording to defense c ounsel, the affidav its established that Young was engaged in prostitution with an off-duty D.C. police officer on January 12, 1995 . During th eir Acco rdingly, w e do no t consid er them . -6- encounter, Young exited the officer s vehicle and made a dancing motion, whereupon two men approach ed the car a nd attemp ted to rob him. When the officer resisted, he was shot and killed. Young identified Brian Hargrove as the assailant. The government filed criminal charges against Hargrove, but these charges were eventually dropped.6 The defense argued that the affidavits provided a reasonable factual basis for asserting that Young s alleged 1995 misconduct occurred but also conceded that he expected the witness to deny any wrongdoing. Counse l told the cou rt: I have the right to press hard and get an answer to questions. And if she denies it, which I expect he r to. I would expect he r to tell the truth, but I understand the process, and she would probably not tell the truth. A nd then w e need to p rove this through extrinsic evidence. The State argued that the affidavits did not constitute a reasonable basis for questions about the 1995 incid ent. The trial judge disallowed questions about the 1995 incident and excluded the extrinsic evidence, stating that there was no basis for the questions and that there were no reasonab le allegations that Youn g had any bia s, prejudice, o r motive to testify falsely in this case. Later, during Youn g s cross-examination, defense counsel posed questions about the witness involvement in the murder of Mrs. Pantazes as follows: Q: Isn t it true that you were involved in Mrs. Pantazes death? 6 In May 1995, while Hargrove s case, No. F438-95, was pending in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, the prosecution dismissed the charges against Hargr ove. See Affidavits of Bradley and Hewick. -7- A: No. Q: Isn t it true, ma a m, that you conspired with Jermel Chambers to burglarize the Pantazes home? A: No. Q: Yo u had the d irections to his h ome, corre ct? A: Co rrect. Q: An d you even h ad the gara ge code, c orrect? A: Co rrect. Q: It wouldn t be beyond you to p lan to burglarize or rob somebo dy, would it? A: No. Q: It would or would not be beyond you? A: No , it wouldn t. I w ouldn t do that. Q: I am sorry? A: I wo uld not do that. Q: Yo u don t do that? A: No. Q: You don t plan robberies of people? A: No. Q: You don t plan burglaries of people? A: No. -8- Q: And you wouldn t frame someon e? You wouldn t do that? A: No. Q: And you wouldn t set anyone up at all? You just wo uldn t do that? A: N o. Appellant then renew ed his mo tion to questio n Youn g about the 1995 incid ent and to introduce extrinsic eviden ce. The trial judge again denied the motion, stating: I have already ruled. I don t think the basis for the questions a nd the cros s examina tion is sufficient. The trial continued, and the jury convicted appellant on all counts. The cou rt sentenced him to life without the possibility of paro le on the m urder cou nt. Appellant noted a tim ely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. This Court granted certiorari prior to con sideration by tha t court to consider the remov al and evidentiary issues. See Panta zes v. State, 374 Md. 81, 821 A.2d 369 (2003). We affirm and hold that the trial court correctly denied the Suggestion of Removal and did not abuse its discretion in limiting the cross-examination and impeachment evidence. II We first add ress app ellant s re mova l argum ent. Before this Court, appellant argues that the Circuit Court erred by denying his second Suggestion of Removal. Appellant argues that, in non-capital cases, the Maryland Constitution guarantees a defendant the right to be tried in his home jurisdiction absent an evidentiary showing that he or she w ould be un able -9- to procure a f air and imp artial jury in that jurisd iction. He argues that he has been deprived of this right because the trial court denied his suggestion of removal back to his home county Prince George s County. He states that removal of the possibility of imposition of the death penalty . . . should cause the parties and the case to revert to status quo a nte, in this instance, Prince Georg e s Coun ty. He main tains that any oth er result wo uld grant the State greater power than a defendant, in violation of state and federal due process and equal protection guarantees, and wo uld allow p rosecutors to abuse the system by forcing removal with out g enuinely i nten ding to seek th e dea th pe nalty. The State contends that the trial court properly denied appellant s removal motion because, once the trial court granted appellant s initial Suggestion of Removal, the action proceeded as if originally filed in the Circuit Court f or Charles County. Under no circumstances was app ellant entitled to a removal b ack to Prince George s County. Removal to any other loca le could be granted only upon a show ing, under Maryland R ule 4-254(b)(2), that he could not receive a fair and impartial trial in Charles County. Appellant does not argue that he can meet that standard. Article IV, § 8 of the Maryland Constitution provides for the removal of cases. Section 8(b) governs removal for offenses punishable by death and reads as follows: In all cases of p resentmen ts or indictments for offenses that are punishab le by death, on suggestion in writing under oath of either of the parties to the proceedings that the party cannot have a fair and impartial trial in the court in which the proceedings may be pending, the court shall order and direct the record of proceedings in the presentment or indictment to be transm itted to -10- some other court having jurisdiction in such case for trial. The right of rem oval for ca ses punish able by death is automatic, b ut neither pa rty is required to exercis e the righ t. See Redman v. State, 363 Md. 2 98, 313 , 768 A .2d 656 , 664 (2 001). A party may exercise the automatic removal right only onc e. See John son v. State , 303 Md. 487, 506, 495 A.2d 1, 10 (1985). We have explained the exercise of the right as follows: [W]here a defendant in a criminal case is subject to the death penalty, his [or her] right to remove a case is, in the first instance, absolute. Johnson v. State, 258 Md. 597, 600-01, 267 A.2d 152, 154 (1970 ). Further removal, we have stated, require s the party seeking the change to make a showing that there w ere reason able grounds to believe he cou ld not se cure a f air trial. Id. See also, Veney v. State, 251 Md. 182, 191, 246 A.2d 568, 573 (1966), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 948, 89 S. Ct. 1284, 22 L. Ed. 2d 482 (1969) ( the absolu te right of rem oval can b e exercised only once ); Lee v. State , 164 Md. 550, 552, 165 A. 614, 615, cert. denied, 290 U.S. 639, 54 S. Ct. 56, 78 L. Ed. 555 (1933) (and cases cited therein) ( the right [of removal] had been and can only be e xercise d once ). Id., 495 A .2d at 10 . Although the right of removal is autom atic in capital ca ses, it is discretiona ry in all other non-capital cases a nd in civ il cases. See Md. C onst. art. IV, § 8 (c); Redman, 363 at 305 n.7, 768 A .2d at 660 n .7. Article IV , § 8(c) prov ides as follow s: In all other cases of presentment or indictment, and in all suits or actions at law or issues from the Orphans Court pending in any of the courts of law in this State which have jurisdiction over the cause or cas e, in addition to the sugge stion in writin g of either of the parties to the cause or case that the party cannot have a fair and impartial trial in the court in which the cause or case may be pending, it shall be necessary for the party making the suggestion to make it sa tisfactorily appear to the court that the -11- suggestion is true, or that ther e is reasona ble ground for the same; and thereupon the court shall order and direct the record of the proceedings in the cause or ca se to be trans mitted to some other court, having jurisdiction in the cause or case, for trial. The right of removal also shall exist on sug gestion in a c ause or cas e in which all the judges of the court may be disqualified under the provisions of this Constitution to sit. The court to which the record of pro ceedin gs in su ch suit o r action, issue, presentment or indictment is transmitted, shall hear and determine that cause or case in the same manner as if it had been originally instituted in that Court. The General Assembly shall modify the existing law as may be nec essary to regula te and give force to this provisio n. In a non-capital case, the party seeking removal bears the burden of showing that a fair and impartial trial cannot be obta ined. See Md. Const. art. IV, § 8(c). Whether a case should be removed is a decision that rests within the soun d discretion o f the trial court. Shreffler v. Morris, 262 M d. 161, 1 65, 277 A.2d 6 2, 64 (1 971). The power of the court to grant a change of venue has been recognized as a critical means of promoting justice and fairness by elimina ting loca l prejud ices. See Hes lop v. State, 202 Md. 123, 126, 95 A.2d 880, 881 (1953). The Heslop Court noted that the right of removal has been considered so essential to the administration of justice that it has been incorporated into the o rganic la w of M aryland f or two centurie s. See id., 95 A.2d at 881. In Redman, we summarized the history detailed in Heslop: In January 1805, the Legislature passed an Act proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of 1 776 tha t, inter alia, gave courts discretion to remo ve crimina l cases wh ere any party suggeste d in writing that a fair and impartial trial could not be had in the court in which the case was pending. The Act was later confirme d, and a disc retionary right of removal in all -12- criminal cases became part of the Maryland Constitution. The Constitutional Conve ntion of 1851 revised this provision by eliminating the discretionary aspect and gave the right of removal to the defendant in every criminal case. Reports of gross abuse of the unlimited removal right led the Constitutional Convention of 1864 to return the power of removal to the court s discretion, and the Constitution was amended to so provide. The rule was again changed by the Constitutional Convention of 1867, removing once more the court's discretion and making the right automatic. In 1874, the Legislature, again hearing reports of abuse of the unlimited removal right, proposed an Amendment to the 1867 C onstitution to p rovide auto matic remo val only in those cases where the crime wa s punishab le by death. Th is Ame ndme nt was ratified b y the Ma ryland vo ters in 18 75 . . . . Redman, 363 Md. at 306-07, 768 A.2d at 660-61 (citations and footnote om itted). The right reached its current form following the 1874 constitutional amendment ratified by Maryland voters in 1875. The varying breadth of the right of removal in Maryland history demonstrates a shifting concern between having a broad right of removal and having a very limited right because of the abuse associated with requests for removal. Johnson v. State, 271 Md. 189, 194, 315 A .2d 524 , 527-2 8 (197 4). The present language, arising from a desire to narrow the right and to curb the abuse resulting from numerous removal requests, authorizes a utomatic removal only in criminal cases where the penalty may be death. See Redman, 363 Md. at 307, 768 A.2 d at 661; Johnson, 303 M d. at 506 , 495 A .2d at 10 . To be sure, in this S tate, a criminal tr ial must be held in the county (or in Baltimo re City) in which the crime was committed unless the d efendan t requests a change of venue. The short answer to appellant s argument that he had the right to be tried in his home jurisdiction -13- is that he was never denied that right he was indicted in Prince G eorge s County, his home county, and would have been tried there bu t for his requ est to have the case removed from that county. Once a party exercises the right of removal, further removal requires a showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the party could not receive a fair and impartial trial. See Md. Const. art.IV, § 8(c); Md. Rule 4-254(b)(2). The Constitution provides that upon removal, the court to which the record of proceedings in such suit or action, issue, presentment or indictment is transmitted, shall hear and determine that cause or case in the same manner as if it had been originally instituted in that court. Md . Const. art.IV, § 8(c). Appellant exercised his right of automatic removal and, in doing so, venue for the trial was proper in the Circ uit C ourt for C harles County, not in the Circuit Court for P rince George s Cou nty. The case then properly proceeded as if it had been instituted originally in Charles Cou nty. Once a case is removed properly from one jurisdiction, a nolle prosequi or reversal and remand for a new trial does not reinvest jurisdiction in the transferor court. In Smith v. Sta te, 31 Md. A pp. 106, 11 2, 355 A .2d 527, 53 1 (1976), th e Court of Special A ppeals cog ently noted as follows: As a general rule, the effect of a change of venue in a criminal case is to remove the cause absolutely from the jurisdiction of the court granting the change, except for curing irregularities or omissions in the rec ord. Further, the court to which the indictment has been transferred is not divested of jurisdiction by dismissal, nolle prose qui or mistrial, and it retains exclusive -14- jurisdiction to try the case afte r a new in dictment for the same offense has been returned. The court held that, once a defendant removed a case, the place of venue became proper in the new county for the original indictment and for all su bsequ ent indic tments. Id. at 112-13, 355 A.2d at 531-32; cf. Vogel v. Grant, 300 Md. 690, 698 n. 6, 481 A.2d 186, 190 n.6 (1984) (noting that where a party in the District Court is entitled to a jury trial, demands a jury trial thereby vesting jurisd iction in the circ uit court, and thereafter some ev ent occurs w hich, if it had occurred e arlier while the case ha d been in th e District Co urt, would have rendered the case inappropriate for a jury trial . . . . the circuit court should not remand the case to the District Court; instead the circuit court s jurisdiction ove r the case continues ). In the instant case, after the initial removal, venue was proper in Charles County, not Prince George s. The State s withdraw al of intent to s eek the de ath penalty did not reinvest jurisdiction in the Circuit Court for Princ e George s County. There is nothing pending in the Circuit Court fo r Prince G eorge s C ounty, and to g ain addition al removal, appellant was required to demonstrate that he could not receive a fair and impartia l trial in Charles C ounty. As a result of the change o f venue, th e Circuit C ourt for Charles County is ve sted with complete control and authority over the criminal case and its jurisdiction is not destroyed by the withdrawal of the death notice by the State. The dismissal of the death notice cannot reinvest jurisdiction in the Circuit Court for Prince George s County because, by appellant s exercise of his automatic right of removal and the subsequent change of venue, that court was divested of its jurisdiction . Appellan t was outsid e the constitutional automatic removal -15- provision and solely w ithin the discre tionary provision requirin g that he esta blish that he c ould not receive a fair an d impa rtial trial in C harles C ounty. Even if he had met that burden, which he does not contend that he did, the right of removal does not include the right to choose the new venue. Choice of venue lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Lee v. State, 161 Md. 430, 441-43, 157 A. 723, 727-28 (1931). In both capital and non-capital cases, Rule 4-254 provides that [t]he Circuit Administrative Judge of the court ordering removal shall designate th e county to which the case is to be removed. We hold that the trial court did not abu se its discretion in denying app ellant s motio n for furth er remova l. III. A. Maryland Rule 5-608(b) We next cons ider whe ther the trial cou rt properly limited th e cross-exa mination of Kim Young. Appellant relies primarily on Rule 5-608(b) as suppor t for his argument that the trial court erred in den ying his motion in limine to question Y oung ab out the 199 5 incident. That Rule prov ides as follow s: Impeachment by examination regarding witness s own prior conduct not resulting in con viction s. The court may permit any witness to be examined regarding the witness s own prior conduct that did not result in a conviction but that the court finds probative of a character trait of untruthfulness. Upon objection, however, the court m ay permit the inquiry only if the questioner, outside the hearing of the jury, establishes a reasonable factual basis for asserting that the conduct of the witness occurred. The condu ct may no t be pro ved by ex trinsic ev idence . -16- Appellant contends that the trial cou rt improperly lim ited his cross-examination of Young because the questions were relevant to the character trait for truth and veracity and because he provided, through affidavits, a reasonable factual basis that the alleged conduct occurred. The State argues that the trial court properly precluded the inquiry into the 1995 incident because appellant d id not satisfy the re asonable f actual basis re quiremen t of Rule 5608(b). The State maintains that appellant s affidavits did not establish Young s involvement in the 1 995 robb ery or that Y oung intentio nally misidentified the k iller. Appellan t did not, the State argues, establish a reasonable factual basis that Young s conduct actually occurred. During a hearing outside the presence of the jury, appellant sought to question the State s witness, Kim Young, about a 1995 incident in which the witness allegedly participated in a robbery that led to murder and blamed the murder on an innocent man to cover any involvem ent. The trial court denied the motion because appellant h ad not me t his burden to show that there was a reasonable factual basis that the alleged misconduct occurred. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting cross-examination in the absence o f a reasona ble factual b asis for the alle ged misco nduct. The Confro ntation Clau se of the S ixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantee a criminal defendant the right to confront the witnesses against him or her. See M erzbac her v. St ate, 346 Md. 391, 411-12, 697 A.2d 43 2, 442 (19 97). Centra l to that right is the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. One of the mo st effective m eans of atta cking the c redibility of a w itness is through cross- -17- examination. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974) (noting that [c]ross examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness an d the truth of his testimony are tested ). Thus, the defendant s right to cross- examine witnesses includes the right to impeach credibility, to establish bias, interest or expose a motiv e to testif y falsely. See, e.g., M arshall v. Sta te, 346 Md. 186, 192, 695 A.2d 184, 187 (199 7); Ebb v. State, 341 Md. 578, 587, 671 A.2d 974, 978 (1996). It has long been recognized that the exposure of a witness motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. Davis, 415 U.S. at 31617 , 94. S . Ct. at 11 10, 39 L . Ed. 2d 347. Nevertheless, a defendant s constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses is not boundless. The Confrontation Clause does not prevent a trial judge from imposing limits on cross-examination. See Delaw are v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986); Ebb, 341 Md. at 587, 671 A.2d at 978. Judges have wide latitude to establish reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassme nt, prejudice, c onfusion of the issue s, the witness safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or o nly marginally relevan t. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S. Ct. at 1435, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674; see Merzbacher, 346 Md. at 413, 697 A.2d at 443 (noting that the Court has said on num erous occ asions that trial c ourts retain w ide latitude in determining what evidence is material and relevant, and to that end, ma y limit, in their discretion , the extent to which a witness may be cross-examined for the purpose of showing bias ). The Supreme -18- Court has observed as follows: A defendant's right to present relevant evidence is not unlimited, but rather is subject to reasonable restrictions. A defendant s interest in presenting such evidence may thus bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. As a result, state and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials. Such rules do not abridge an accused s right to present a defense so long as they are not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. Moreover, we have found the exclusion of evidence to be unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only where it has infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1264, 140 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1998) (citations and footnote omitted). The scope of cross-examination lies within the sound discretion of the trial cou rt. See Walker v. State, 373 Md. 360, 394, 818 A.2d 10 78, 1098 (2003 ); Ebb, 341 Md. at 587, 671 A.2d at 978; Robinson v. State, 298 Md. 193, 201, 468 A.2d 328, 332 (1983). This discretion is exercised by balancing the probative value of an inquiry against the unfair prejudice that might inure to the witness. Otherwise, the inquiry can reduce itself to a discussion of collateral matters which will obscure the issue and lead to the fact finder s confusion. State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173, 178, 468 A.2d 319, 321 (1983); see Ebb, 341 Md. at 588, 671 A.2d at 979 (noting that a trial judge must balance the probative value of proposed evidence against the potential for undue prejudice, keeping in mind the possibility of embarrassment to or harassment of the witness and the po ssibility of und ue dela y or conf usion o f the issu es ). An undue restriction of the fundamental right of cross-examination may violate a defendant s -19- right to confrontation. Whether there has been an abuse of discretion depends on the particular circum stances of eac h indiv idual ca se. See Ebb, 341 Md. at 587-88, 671 A.2d at 978. On app ellate review , we determ ine wheth er the trial judge imposed limitations upon cross-examination that inhibited the ability of the defendant to receive a fair trial. See Merzbacher, 346 Md. at 413, 69 7 A.2d a t 443; see also Sm allwood v . State, 320 Md. 300, 307, 577 A.2d 356, 359 (1990) (noting that a trial court should not limit cross-examination until a de fenda nt has re ached the con stitutiona lly required thresho ld level o f inquir y). Rule 5-608(b) re presents an exception to the gene ral prohibition , embodie d in Rule 5404,7 against using evidence of charac ter to sho w pro pensity. See P. W. G rimm, Impeachment 7 Marylan d Rule 5-404 , Character e vidence not ad missible to prove c onduct; exceptions; other crimes, reads as follows: (a) Character evidence generally. (1) In general. Evidence of a person s character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular oc casion, exc ept: (A) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of an accused offered by the accused, or by the prosecutio n to rebut the same; (B) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a chara cter trait of peacefu lness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebu t evidence that the victim was the first aggressor; (C) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness with regard to credibility, as provided in Rules 5-607, 5-608 , and 5-6 09. (2) Definitions. For purposes of subsections (a) (1) (A) and (B) of this Rule, accused means a defendant in a criminal case and -20- and Rehabilitation Under the Maryland Rules of Evidence: An Attorney s Guide, 24 U. Ba lt. L. Rev. 95, 117 (1994). Rule 5-608(b), by its plain language, permits any witness to be crossexamined about his or her prior acts not evidenced by a criminal conviction that are probative of untruth fulnes s. See Md. R ule 5-608 (b); see also A. D. Hornstein, The New Maryland Rules of Evidence: Survey, Analysis and Critique, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1032, 1057-58 (1995). Upon objection, however, the proponent of the inquiry must establish a reasonable factual basis that the alleged conduct occurred. If the inquiry is permitted, a party is bound by the witness response because, according to the Rule, the conduct may not be provedby extrinsic evidence. This limitation is a safeguard intended to avoid dangers such as undue consumption of trial time, confusio n of the issu es, and unf air surprise . See J. W. Str ong, McCormick on Evidence, § 41, at 155-56 (5th ed. 1999 & 2003 Supp.); 3A J. H. W igmore , Evidence, § 979, at 826-27 (Chadbourn rev. 197 0). Even evidence that falls within the guidelines of 5-608(b) may be excluded pursuant to Rule 5-40 3 if its proba tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by a child alleged to be delinq uent in an a ction in juvenile court, and for purposes of subsection (a) (1) (B), crime includes a delinqu ent act a s defin ed by Co de, Co urts Ar ticle, § 3- 801. (b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to sho w ac tion in co nformity t here with . It ma y, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, oppor tunity, inten t, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. -21- considerations of undu e delay, waste o f time, or needless presentation of cumulative eviden ce. 8 Md. R ule 5-403 ; see 6 L. Mc Lain, Maryland Evidence, § 608.1, at 477 (2d ed. 2001 & 20 02 Supp.). Rule 5-608(b) c odified the commo n law rule a nd this Court s holdings in State v. Cox, 298 Md. 173, 468 A.2d 319 (1983) and Rau v. State, 133 Md. 613, 105 A. 867 (1919) (holding tha t defenda nt may not of fer extrinsic e vidence to support allegations of past false accusations). See Merzbacher, 346 Md. at 419, 697 A.2d at 446; 125th Rep ort of the Court of Appeals of Maryland Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Proc edure 11 9 (July 1993) (on file with Committee). In Cox, the defendant was convicted of rape in the first degree, a sexual offen se in the first deg ree and comm on law assault. Cox v. Sta te, 51 Md. App. 271, 273, 443 A.2d 607, 609 (1982). Cox s defense at trial was that he was not the assailant. Cox, 298 Md. at 176, 468 A.2d at 320. The victim s identification of Cox as the perpetrator constituted the only direct evidence linking him to the crim e. Id. at 177, 468 A.2d at 321. During cross-examination of the victim, Cox sought to establish that she was lying by questioning her about an alleged prior false accusation of an incident in which, under oath, she allegedly charged another person with criminal assault and recanted the charge during 8 Rule 5 -403, Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time, provides: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighe d by the dang er of unfa ir prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presen tation of cumu lative ev idence . -22- cross-examination. Id., 468 A.2d at 321. The trial court precluded the defendant from pursuing this line o f ques tioning . Id. at 177- 78, 468 A.2d a t 321. We held that the trial court committed reversible error in lim iting the cross-e xamin ation. Id. at 184-85, 468 A.2d at 32425. We reasoned that a witness may be cross-examined about prior bad acts which are relevant to the witness credibility, subject to the following limitations: [S]uch inquiry [may] be conducted when the trial judge is satisfied that there is a r easonab le basis for the question, that the primary purpose of the inquiry is not to harass or embarrass the witness, and that the re is little likelihood of obscuring the issue on trial. We recognize that in cases reg arding prio r miscond uct, the cross-examiner is bound by the witness answer and, upon the witness denial, may no t introduce e xtrinsic evide nce to contradict the witness or prov e the dis creditin g act. The witness is not disadvantaged b ecause there is nothing for him [or her] to rebut. Thus, the in quiry virtually stops w ith the question and answer, except to the extent that the trial judge may allow further cross-examination to refresh the witness recollection. We have also b een steadf ast in hold ing that mere accusations of crime or misconduct may not be used to impeach. The rationale for this viewp oint is obvio us. First of all, accusations of misconduct are still clothed with the presumption of innocence and receiving mere accusations for this purpose would be tantamou nt to accepting someone else s assertion of the witnes s guilt an d pure h earsay. Id. at 179-80, 468 A.2d at 321-22 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also 3A J. H. Wigmore, supra, § 980a, at 835-36. We also noted that, wh en a party is attem pting to impeach a witness in this regard, the relevant inquiry is not whether the witness has been accused of misconduct by some other person, but whether the witness actually committed the prior bad act. Id. at 181, 468 A.2d at 323 (emphasis ad ded). -23- In Robinson v. State, 298 Md. 193, 468 A.2d 32 8 (1983), a nother fou ndation fo r Rule 5-608(b) s reasonab le factual ba sis language, we again emphasized that inquiries into prior acts of witnesses are evaluated rigorously. Robinson was tried for murder and other offenses related to the killing of a woman during a burglary of her home. A key witness for the State had admitted to committing several burglaries and was a long-term resident of a mental hospital. Prior to his cross-examination, defense counsel sought to impeach the witness credibility by inquiring into his conduct at the mental hospital, including an attack on a fellow patient and three incidents of arson. The trial court precluded any inquiry into these incidents, remarking that they do n ot appear to be relevant. Id. at 196, 46 8 A.2d a t 330. On appeal, this Court reitera ted that a w itness may be c ross-exam ined abou t prior bad ac ts that are relevant to asses sing cre dibility. Id. at 197, 46 8 A.2d at 331. We highlighted, however, the difference between impeachment by cross-examination regarding prior conviction on the one hand and prior misconduct not resulting in conviction on the other. We noted: Because a conviction of a crime conclusively establishes the underlying misconduct, counsel may inquire into any final conviction which suggests that the witness is unworthy of belief. Howeve r, if the bad a cts are n ot co nclu sively dem onst rated by a conviction, the trial judge must exercise greater care in determining the proper scope of cross-examination. Id. at 200, 468 A.2d at 332. This Court remarked that a groundless inquiry into prior misconduct would be prejudicial, noting that only prior bad acts which a re very closely related to the witness veracity and for which counsel can demonstrate a firm basis for believing that the conduct in fact occurred would pass the trial judge s scrutiny. Id. at 201, -24- 468 A.2d at 332-33 (e mphasis added ). We held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the incidents at the mental hospital were not relevant and could not be used to impe ach the State s w itness. Id. at 198, 4 68 A.2 d at 331 . In Merzba cher v. State , 346 Md. 391, 697 A.2d 432 (1997), we addressed another limitation incorporated into Rule 5-608(b) the extrinsic eviden ce proh ibition. Merzbache r, a school teacher, was indicted and convicted of common law rape, sexual child abuse and other charges ste mming f rom allege d long-term sexual abu se of a fem ale student. On app eal, Merzbacher argued , inter alia, that the trial court erred by excluding testimonial evidence from a school o fficial as to whether the victim had reported alleged acts of sexual misconduct by other persons. He maintained that he should have been allowed to show the victim s proclivity for accusing people of sexual misconduct and that her accusations were not credible . Id. at 417, 697 A.2d at 445. This Court noted as follows: Merzbacher attempted to impeach [the victim s ] credibility through the introduction of highly speculative and unproven extrinsic testimony suggestive of her tendency to make such accusations. Merzbache r failed to produce evidence of a complaint made by [the victim] other than that made against Merz bache r, much less one that wa s false. Id. at 418, 697 A.2d at 44 5. We rea soned tha t Merzb acher wa s not entitled to introduce extrinsic testimony to support his attempted exploration of [the victim s] character through prior bad acts evidence. Id. at 419, 697 A.2d at 446. We held that, pursuant to Rule 5608(b), the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in e xcluding th e official s ex trinsic testimo ny. Id. at 419-20, 697 A.2d at 446. -25- In sum, the right to cross-examine witnesses regarding the witness own prior conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction is limited by Rule 5-608(b) in several ways. First, the trial judge must f ind that t he con duct is re levant, i.e., probative of untruthfulness. Second, upon objection, the court must hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury, and the questioner must establish a reasonable factual basis for asserting that the conduct of the witness occurred. Third, the questioner is bound by the witness answer and may not introduce extrinsic evid ence of th e asserted co nduct. Fina lly, as with all evidence, the court has the discretion to limit the examination, under Rule 5-403, if the court finds that the probative value of th e evidenc e is outweigh ed by unfair prejud ice. See 6 L. McLain, supra, § 608:1, at 477 (noting that a court may utilize its discretion under Maryland Rules 5-403 and 5-611(a) to exclude evidence that meets the requirements of Rule 5-608(b)); see also United States v. Flah arty, 295 F.3d 182, 19 1 (2d Cir. 2002) (disc ussing that under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), the court may restrict cross-examination about specific instances of prior conduct if it finds that the conduct is not probative of truthfulness and further, under Federal Rule 403, that the court may exclude even relevant evidence if it finds that the probative value of the testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence). Rule 5-608(b) provides no specific guidance as to what constitutes a reasonable factual basis, an d this Court has no t add ressed its mea ning in an y depth, although the Cox -26- Court indicated that a hearsay accusation of guilt was not sufficient. 298 Md. at 181, 468 A.2d at 323. Many courts that ha ve considered this requirem ent, or a similar one, have concluded that its purpose is to ensure that the questions are propounded in good faith and are not aimed to put before the jury unfairly prejudicial and unfounded information supported only by unrelia ble rum ors or in nuend o. See, e.g., United States v . Simon elli, 237 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2001) ; United States v. Ovalle-Márquez, 36 F.3d 212, 21 8-19 (1st Cir. 1994); State v. Pratt, 759 P.2d 676, 681 -85 (Colo . 1988); State v. Chance, 671 A.2d 323, 338 (Conn. 1996); People v. Alamo, 246 N.E.2d 496, 497 (N.Y. 1969); State v. Nes bit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 882 (Tenn. 1998) (stating that reasonable factual basis requireme nt of evide ntiary rule requires that questions be proposed in good faith); State v. Wyrick, 62 S.W.3d 751, 781 (Tenn. Crim. A pp. 200 1). It was with in the trial court s discretion to determine whether appellant established a reasonab le factual bas is for asserting that Youn g s alleged c onduct oc curred and to limit reasonab ly appellant s cross-examination regarding the 1995 incident. In our view, the trial court correctly satisfied the requirem ents of the R ule and did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Pantazes failed to establish a reasonable factual basis that the asserted conduct of the witness occurred. In order to determine whether there is a reasonable basis for the contention that the witness made a similar prior allegation, the trial court properly held a hearing outside of the presence of the jury. We conclude that the trial court s determination that there was an insufficient factual basis that the alleged conduct occurred was justified. -27- As we have indicated, this issue arose prior to the cross-examination of Kim Young. Insisting that the evidence amounted to a common scheme, a theory later abandoned, defense counsel proffered that he would produce several witnesses to testify about the 1995 incident. Based on cou nsel s proffer, the trial court remarked that counsel might have struck some gold, but re served rulin g on the issu e because the court w anted to see something besides . . . mere allegations. The judg e then said: In other words you have to show me that there is [ an] actu al predic ate for th is testimo ny. The next court d ay, appellant pro duced tw o affidav its and argu ed that the affid avits established that Young was involved in the robbery-turned-mu rder and tha t Young lied in identifying Brian Hargrove as the killer. The affidavit of investigating officer James Bradley read, in part, as follows: 7. Kevin Young, upon being discovered by the police, gave a statement identifying Brian Hargrove as the shooter of [the office r]. 8. Thereaf ter, Mr. Ha rgrove w as arrested an d charged with the murder in the District of Columbia. His arrest and charges w ere based upon the information supplied by Kevin Young to the police. 9. That same day, Detective Susan Blue of the Metropolitan Police Department, Homicide Division, received an anonymous call that Mr. H argrove w as not the pe rson wh o was res ponsible for the m urder o f [the o fficer]. 10. Based on this information that I received from Kevin Young that Mr. Hargrove was the shooter, I obtained an arrest warra nt for M r. Harg rove. -28- 11. T he wa rrant w as exec uted on or abou t Janua ry 14, 199 5. 12. Mr. Hargrov e remained in the cou rt system until May 1995, when his criminal charges [were] dismissed by the Gov ernment. Billy Pon ds repre sented Mr. H argrov e. The second a ffidavit, signed by private investigator Trevor Hewick, read in pertinent part as follows: 7. Kevin Young, upon being discovered by the police, gave a statement identifying Brian Hargrove as the shooter of [the officer]. 8. Thereafter, Mr. Hargrove was arrested and charged with the murder. His arrest and charges were based upon the information supplied by Kevin Young to the police. 9. That same day, Detective Susan Blue of the Metropolitan Police Departm ent, Homicide Division, received an anonymous call that Mr. H argrove w as not the pe rson wh o was res ponsible for the murder of [the of ficer]. I interviewed Detective Blue on August 1, 2002, wherein she supplied this information to me. 10. Thereafter, two individu als who were actually involve d in the rob bery and murde r were identifie d. 11. The detective in charge of the case was Detective James Bradley. Based on the info rmation he received f rom Ke vin Young that Hargro ve was th e shooter, he obtained an arrest warra nt for M r. Harg rove. 12. The warrant was executed on January 14, 1995. That same day the anonymous call was received that Hargrove was not the correct person to b e arrested, an d also the in formation supplied suggested where the authorities could look to find the actual shooter. 13. Mr. Hargrove remained in the court system until May 1995, when his criminal charges w ere dropped. Billy Ponds -29- represented Mr. Hargrove. 14. I also spoke to Billy Ponds, who verified the fact that Brian Hargr ove ha d been falsely ac cused o f the m urder. The Bradley affidavit does not establish that Young lied in identifying Hargrove nor does it say that Young set up the robbery. Appellant never indicated to the trial court that he could present any competent evidence to establish that Young had set up the robbery and falsely accused another of a crime. That the charges w ere dismissed by the Government does not alone est ablish th at You ng lied. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 686 P.2d 193, 200, 201 (Mont. 1984) (fin ding that the offered e vidence w ould not have been probative of verac ity, the court noted that [t]here was no competent evidence that the [witness previous allegations] were false . That the ch arges we re dismissed does not b y itself establish their falsity ). This is especially so in light of the prosecutor s proff er that he ha d spoken with Detective Bradley and the federa l prosecutor who had handled the 1 995 case. The S tate s Attorney proffered to the court that the federal prosecutor, who was in Maine but was willing to come to testify, said that she believed [Young]. She said they just didn t have enough evidence, anything to go f orward w ith. No corro boration. N o gun. N o [sic] anythin g recovered. And she said Bradley wanted to go forward. Bradley said [Young] did not have anything to do with the murder. The Hew ick aff idavit do es not f are any b etter. This affidavit also does not establish that Young was involved w ith the botched robbery or that Young lied about an identification. It contains no facts to support an allegation that Young lied when identifying Hargrove as the -30- killer. Hewic k s statemen t that Hargrove s attorney, Billy Ponds, verified that Hargrove had been fa lsely accused of murd er is nothin g more than a b ald con clusion . See Anderson, 686 P.2d at 200 (noting that a mere denial does not establish falsity and that the testimony of an attorney that his client denied an accusation of sexual assault would have been inadmissible hearsay ). The evidence appellant sought to introduce would not have been probative of Y oung s character trait for untruthfulness. With no factual support, appellant s proffer of evidence amounted to little more than mere accusations that Young w as involved in the 199 5 robbery and lied about the identity of the killer. The Cox Court emphasized that when impeachment is the aim, the re levant inqu iry is not whether the witness has been accused of misconduct by some other person, but whether the witness actually committed the prior bad act. A hearsay accusation of guilt has little logical relevance to the witness credibility. 298 Md. at 181, 468 A.2d at 323; see also 3A J. H. W igmore , supra, § 980a, at 8 35-36 (ob serving tha t [i]t should be understoo d by all courts tha t the only relevan t circumstan ce is actual cond uct, i.e., the fact, not the me re charg e, of ha ving m isbeha ved ). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in p recluding c ross-exam ination abo ut the 1995 incident. B. Maryland Rule 5-616(b)(3) At trial, appellant apparently realized that in order to avoid the exclu sionary mandate of Rule 5-608(b), he nee ded to f it the pro ffered extrinsic eviden ce with in Rule 5-616 (b). Rule -31- 5-616(b)(3) reads as follows: Extrinsic evidence of bias, preju dice, interest, or o ther motive to testify falsely may be admitted whether or not the witness has been examine d about the impeach ing fact an d has failed to admit it. The trial court refused to admit the extrinsic ev idence under R ule 5-616(b)(3) becau se there were no reasonable allegations of bias or motive to lie. The trial court concluded that the evidence proffered by appellant related, only marginally, to Young s character for truth and veracity, not to any bias or motive to lie in the case. Appellant contends before this Court that he was entitled to present extrinsic evidence of the 1995 incident pursuant t o Rule 5-6 16(b)(3). H e argues tha t the trial court erre d in excluding his proffered extrinsic evidence because the evidence, while relevan t to Young s character for truth and veracity, was relevant also to bias or motive to testify falsely. The evidence, he argues, demons trates that Yo ung had the capacity to plan robb eries and fa lsely accuse others to hide inv olvem ent in the crime. The State argues that the trial court properly excluded extrinsic evidence regarding the 1995 incident. Th e State ma intains that appellant s extrinsic evidence does not serve as evidence of bias or motive to testify falsely; therefo re, Rule 5-6 08(b) s restrictio n on extrins ic evidence is applicable. Moreov er, the State argues, even if the evidence falls within the scope of 5-616(b)(3), its potential for unfair prejudice and confusion of the is sues far ex ceeds its probat ive valu e. We hold that the trial co urt did not err in excluding extrinsic evid ence of th e 1995 -32- incident based on Rule 5-616. The extrinsic evidence, at best, related to Young s character trait for truth and veracity and did not provide evidence of bias or motive to lie in the instant case. It is well establish ed that the b ias, hostility or motives of a witness are relevant and proper subjec ts for im peach ment. See, e.g., Sm ith v. State, 371 Md. 496, 504, 810 A.2d 449, 454 (2002); Ebb, 341 M d. at 587-88 , 671 A.2d at 978-79 . Bias describ es the relation ship between a party and a witness which might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52, 105 S. Ct. 465, 469, 83 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1984). Bias includes [p]rejudice against the plaintiff, partiality towards the defendant, or an interest in the litigation . . . . J. F. M urph y, Jr., Maryland Evidence Handbook § 1302(E)(1) (3d ed. 1999 & 2002 Cum . Supp.); see 3A J. H. Wigmo re, supra, § 949 (noting that the range of circumstances from which bias may be inferred is infinite but generalizing that an intimate family relationship, an employment relationship, the pende ncy of civil litigation between witness and party, a pending charge against a witness, an d the witne ss occupa tion are com monly releva nt to bias). A motiv e to lie or testify falsely is also inc luded in the notio n of bia s. See Ford v. United States, 549 A.2d 1124, 1125 n .2 (D.C . 1988) . Proof of bias may be used to attack a witness veracity or the reliability of his or he r testimo ny. See J. F. M urphy, Jr., supra, § 1302 (E)(1). In the case sub judice, appellant makes no cogent argument as to how the proposed extrinsic testimony establishes bias or motive to lie. He sought to impeach Young with -33- specific instances of conduct allegedly lying about involvement in the 1995 robbery-turnedmurder and purposely m isidentifying the k iller an d argued that this misconduct established the witness propensity to lie. The alleged misconduct does not establish that the witness has a bias or motive to lie in this particular case. It does not uncover prejudice a gainst appe llant, partiality towards th e State, or an interest in this litigatio n. The trial court properly categorized the evidence of the 1995 incident as falling und er Rule 5-6 08(b) rathe r than Rule 5-616(b)(3). What appellant was trying to establish with extrinsic evidence was in reality an effort to present propensity evidence, or behavior in conformity with a character trait to lie, not evidence of motive or bias. As we hav e indicated, he came u p short under Ru le 5-608(b), and he is not rescued b y Rule 5-616(b)(3). Moreover, we obse rve that the trial c ourt permitted the de fense a fu ll opportunity to expose Young s potential bias and motive to lie. On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Young ab out financial compe nsation received from the State for providing evidence and testifying at trial, about the witness pending charge for prostitution, about the witness rela tionship w ith Chambers and the witness alleged involvement in the murder of Mrs. Pantazes, and about whether the witness reported information to the police to cast suspicio n onto a ppellan t. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. PAID BY APPELLANT. -34- COST S TO BE
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