Ehlers v. Jackson County Sheriff's Merit Comm'n
Annotate this Case
Ehlers v. Jackson County Sheriff's Merit Comm'n, No. 83949 (6/18/98)
Docket No. 83949--Agenda 17--March 1998.
KATE EHLERS, Appellee, v. THE JACKSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S MERIT
COMMISSION et al. (William Kilquist, Sheriff of Jackson County, Appellant).
Opinion filed June 18, 1998.
JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:
The plaintiff, Kate Ehlers, was employed as a sergeant at the Jackson
County jail. The Jackson County Merit Commission (Merit Commission)
terminated Sergeant Ehlers' employment for cause, acting upon a complaint filed
by the defendant William Kilquist, sheriff of Jackson County. On administrative
review, the circuit court of Jackson County confirmed Ehlers' dismissal. The
appellate court reversed and ordered Ehlers reinstated. 289 Ill. App. 3d 1118. We
allowed Sheriff Kilquist's petition for leave to appeal (166 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now
reverse the appellate court and affirm the circuit court.
FACTS
Ehlers began her full-time employment with the Jackson County sheriff's
department in March of 1986. She was a member of a collective-bargaining unit
represented by the Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council. There is no
dispute that a collective-bargaining agreement covered Ehlers and that her
employment could be terminated only for cause. The Merit Commission was the
entity empowered to determine whether cause for discharge existed.
On January 7, 1995, Sheriff Kilquist suspended Ehlers without pay and
filed a complaint with the Merit Commission seeking her discharge. The complaint
requested a hearing on three disciplinary charges against Ehlers. First, that on
January 3, 1995, Ehlers failed to fully or truthfully comply with an order directing
her to produce a report for the sheriff concerning visits by her husband at the jail
on December 26, 1994, and how much time she had spent outside the jail while
she was on duty on that date. Second, that on January 5, 1995, Ehlers presented
the sheriff with a second untruthful or inaccurate report regarding those matters.
Third, that on January 5, 1995, immediately after Ehlers delivered her second
report to the sheriff in his office, Ehlers refused to obey the sheriff's verbal order
that she remain in his office and talk with him about the foregoing matters.
The Merit Commission conducted a hearing on the three charges. The
evidence presented showed that, on December 26, 1994, Ehlers worked the day
shift at the jail. Ehlers' husband visited the jail sometime that afternoon, and they
went outside to smoke cigarettes for 10 to 20 minutes. They then returned to the
building and stood in the dispatch room for about 10 minutes before Ehlers
returned to her duties. Ehlers' husband remained in the area for a short time
speaking with other individuals whom he knew.
On January 3, 1995, Lieutenant Earl Jacquot, Ehlers' immediate
supervising officer, informed Ehlers that the sheriff wanted a written report from
her concerning how many times her husband had visited the jail on December 26
and how long he had stayed. Sheriff Kilquist explained in his testimony that he
wanted this statement because he had heard rumors that Ehlers had been out of
the jail for lengthy periods of time and that, as sheriff, he was required to look
into the matter. He directed Jacquot to obtain a detailed statement from Ehlers.
In response to Jacquot's request, Ehlers submitted the following statement
to the sheriff:
"This statement is being made as per ordered by Sheriff
Kilquist and as advised to me by Lt. Earl Jacquot.
On December 26, 1994, to the best of my knowledge and
recollection, my husband, Curt, came to the Jail one time during
the afternoon hours."
On January 5, 1995, Sheriff Kilquist instructed Jacquot to obtain a more
detailed report from Ehlers. When Jacquot asked Ehlers to rewrite the report to
provide additional details, she told him that she did not remember. Jacquot
nevertheless directed Ehlers to write another report. Ehlers submitted the following
as her second statement:
"On December 26, 1994, to the best of my knowledge and
recollection, my husband, Curt, came to the Jail one time during
the afternoon hours for a short period of time.
I was out of the Jail at 1255 hours and back in at 1305
hours and out at 1440 hours and back in at 1450 hours of the 26th
of December, 1994, as is recorded in the Central Control Officers
log (see attached) on that date. I would note that the portion of the
log from which these times are taken has been scribbled through
several times."
Beneath her signature, Ehlers wrote, "I am making these statements under duress."
Ehlers testified that, after writing her second statement, she attempted to
contact her union representative by telephone, but he was not available. Ehlers
wanted to speak to the union representative because she felt that disciplinary
action was going to be taken against her and she was concerned for her job.
Sheriff Kilquist then called Ehlers and requested her to bring the second
statement to his office. Ehlers told the sheriff over the telephone that she felt she
was being harassed, to which he responded that she was not. Ehlers asked Officer
George Schaefer to accompany her to the sheriff's office. Schaefer was the vice
president of her local union. Schaefer understood that Ehlers had requested him
to accompany her because of his union position. Ehlers stated that she felt she
needed a union representative present because she believed she "was going to
possibly be interrogated for disciplinary reasons." The sheriff testified that he had
"no intent whatsoever" to discipline Ehlers when he called her into his office, but
just "wanted to find out what was going on."
Ehlers, Schaefer, and Sheriff Kilquist all testified about their meeting, and
their testimony is the same in most respects. When Ehlers and Schaefer entered
the sheriff's office, the sheriff was in an adjoining room. Ehlers said that she was
placing the second report on his desk. The sheriff told Ehlers to sit down so he
could speak to her and asked Schaefer to leave. Ehlers did not sit down. Ehlers
testified she then told the sheriff that she wanted Schaefer present as her union
representative. The sheriff again told Schaefer to leave, and he did so. Ehlers then
told the sheriff that she would not speak to him without Schaefer present and
turned to leave. The sheriff informed Ehlers that he would fire her if she left. As
Ehlers left, she remarked that only the Merit Commission could fire her. The
sheriff told Ehlers to go home.
Schaefer testified that, shortly after the meeting, Sheriff Kilquist told him
that the meeting had started as "nothing," but was "totally blown up now." The
sheriff's own report, written directly after the incident, stated that he had "advised
Sergeant Ehlers that he was conducting an informal inquiry." Later, the sheriff
suspended Ehlers without pay and filed the complaint with the Merit Commission
seeking her dismissal.
The Merit Commission ultimately determined that the sheriff presented
insufficient evidence to sustain the first two charges of the complaint. Those
charges were dismissed and are not at issue in this appeal. The Merit Commission
found, however, that the last charge against Ehlers, concerning her refusal to obey
the sheriff's order that she sit in his office and speak with him, was sustained by
the evidence.
The Merit Commission held a second hearing to determine what type of
discipline to impose on Ehlers for the sustained charge. The Merit Commission
issued a decision via written order. Therein, the Merit Commission found that the
sheriff had lawfully ordered Ehlers to sit in his office and speak with him, and
that Ehlers' refusal to do so constituted insubordination. The Merit Commission
found in aggravation that Ehlers displayed no remorse for her insubordination, and
that she had been disciplined on one prior occasion for failing to obey an order.
The Merit Commission discharged Ehlers from her employment effective January
7, 1995.
Ehlers subsequently filed a complaint for administrative review with the
circuit court. The circuit court confirmed the Merit Commission's decision,
holding that the Merit Commission's discharge of Ehlers for her direct
disobedience of the sheriff's order was not arbitrary or unreasonable.
The appellate court reversed. Relying on National Labor Relations Board
v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 43 L. Ed. 2d 171, 95 S. Ct. 959 (1975), and
Departments of Central Management Services & Corrections (Gerald Morgan),
1 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2020, No. S--CA--54 (ISLRB September 13,
1985), the appellate court held that Ehlers had the right to have a union
representative present with her at the meeting with the sheriff. Consequently, the
appellate court reasoned, the sheriff's order to Ehlers that she remain in his office
and speak to him without union representation was an unlawful order and Ehlers
could not be discharged solely for disobeying an unlawful order. The appellate
court ordered that Ehlers be restored to her former employment status as of the
effective date of her discharge. We granted Sheriff Kilquist's petition for leave to
appeal. 166 Ill. 2d R. 315.
The sheriff filed a motion asking us to strike a portion of Ehlers' brief for
failure to cite sufficient authority. That motion, earlier ordered taken with the case,
is hereby denied.
ANALYSIS
This case comes to us on administrative review. The scope of a court's
review of an agency's decision to discharge is generally a two-step process. The
court first decides "whether the agency's finding of guilt is contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence." Walsh v. Board of Fire & Police
Commissioners, 96 Ill. 2d 101, 105 (1983). Here, the parties do not dispute the
Merit Commission's finding that Ehlers deliberately disobeyed the sheriff's order.
The parties' dispute centers on whether the order was lawful or unlawful. Our
inquiry thus concerns only the second step. Pursuant to the second step, we must
determine whether the Merit Commission's findings of fact supported its
conclusion that cause existed for Ehlers' discharge. See Walsh, 96 Ill. 2d at 105.
"Cause" has been defined as "some substantial shortcoming which renders
continuance in his office or employment in some way detrimental to the discipline
and efficiency of the service and something which the law and a sound public
opinion recognize as a good cause for his not longer occupying the place."
Fantozzi v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 27 Ill. 2d 357, 360 (1963). A
reviewing court shall respect an agency's finding of cause and shall not overturn
an agency's finding that cause for discharge exists unless that finding is
" `arbitrary and unreasonable or unrelated to the requirements of the service.' "
Launius v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 151 Ill. 2d 419, 435 (1992),
quoting Walsh, 96 Ill. 2d at 105.
The appellate court held that cause for Ehlers' discharge did not exist
because the sheriff's order to Ehlers that she remain in his office and speak to him
without union representation was an unlawful order. The appellate court based its
holding on the decisions in National Labor Relations Board v. J. Weingarten, Inc.,
420 U.S. 251, 43 L. Ed. 2d 171, 95 S. Ct. 959 (1975) (hereinafter Weingarten),
and Departments of Central Management Services & Corrections (Gerald
Morgan), 1 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2020, No. S--CA--54 (ISLRB
September 13, 1985) (hereinafter Morgan). We therefore begin our analysis with
a review of Weingarten and Morgan.
In Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251, 43 L. Ed. 2d 171, 95 S. Ct. 959, a private
sector employee requested but was denied the presence of a union representative
during an interrogation by her employer about suspected thefts at the employer's
store. The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB). The union asserted that the employer's action
constituted an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) (29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1) (1970)), in that it interfered with,
restrained, and coerced the individual right of the employee, protected by section
7 of the NLRA, "to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection" (29 U.S.C. 157 (1970)).
The NLRB agreed with the union. The NLRB construed section 7 as giving
employees covered under the NLRA the right to have a union representative
present during an employer's investigatory interview when the employee requests
union representation and reasonably fears that disciplinary action may result.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the NLRB's interpretation of
section 7. By this holding, the Court established what is now commonly called the
Weingarten rule or Weingarten rights. The Supreme Court explained that the
source of the Weingarten rule is statutory: it "inheres" in section 7's "guarantee
of the right of employees to act in concert for mutual aid and protection."
Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 256, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 177, 95 S. Ct. at 963. The Court
also set forth the general "contours and limits" of Weingarten rights, as previously
established by the NLRB. The "right arises only in situations where the employee
requests representation" and "where the employee reasonably believes the
investigation will result in disciplinary action." Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 257, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 178, 95 S. Ct. at 963-64. Moreover, the employee's exercise of the
right may not interfere with "legitimate employer prerogatives." Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 258, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 178, 95 S. Ct. at 964. For example, once Weingarten
rights are invoked, the employer may decline to continue the interview and opt to
conduct its investigation using only information gathered from sources other than
the employee. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 258-59, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 178-79, 95 S. Ct. at 964.
As stated, Weingarten rights apply to employees covered by the NLRA. In
Morgan, 1 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2020, No. S--CA--54 (ISLRB September
13, 1985), the Illinois State Labor Relations Board (State Board) extended
Weingarten rights to public employees covered by the Illinois Public Labor
Relations Act (the Act) (5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West 1992)). The State Board in
Morgan reasoned that Weingarten-type rights are inherent in section 6 of the Act,
which, mirroring section 7 of the NLRA, guarantees certain public employees the
right "to engage in *** concerted activities *** for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." Morgan, 1 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.)
par. 2020, No. S--CA--54, at VIII--120 (ISLRB September 13, 1985), quoting Ill.
Rev. Stat., 1983 Supp., ch. 48, par. 1606. According to the State Board, a public
employer's violation of a public employee's Weingarten-type rights could
constitute an unfair labor practice in violation of section 10 of the Act (Ill. Rev.
Stat., 1983 Supp., ch. 48, par. 1610). The Morgan decision was not appealed to
the courts.
The appellate court in the present case adopted and applied the State
Board's decision in Morgan and held that Ehlers, a public employee covered by
the Act, had Weingarten-type rights. The appellate court ordered Ehlers reinstated
after finding that the sheriff had violated those rights. To date, no other Illinois
court has adopted Weingarten or Morgan with regard to Weingarten-type rights.
Our research reveals, however, that, like the State Board, both the Illinois Local
Labor Relations Board and the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board have
found Weingarten-type rights to be implicit in the statutes that they administer.
City of Chicago (Police Department), 5 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 3025, No.
L--CA--89--094 (ILLRB August 23, 1989) (also interpreting the Illinois Public
Labor Relations Act); Summit Hill School District 161, 4 Pub. Employee Rep.
(Ill.) par. 1009, No. 86--CA--0090--C (IELRB December 1, 1987) (interpreting the
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (115 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 1992))).
Sheriff Kilquist contends that the appellate court erred in relying on
Weingarten and Morgan to set aside Ehlers' discharge. The sheriff maintains that
Weingarten-type rights should not be extended to public employees such as Ehlers.
He correctly points out that the State Board's decision in Morgan is not binding
on this court and urges us to reject Morgan's reasoning outright. According to the
sheriff, the Illinois General Assembly has never intended that public employees
have Weingarten-type rights. Sheriff Kilquist contends, in the alternative, that
Ehlers' own collective-bargaining agreement waived any Weingarten-type rights
that she had.
In response, Ehlers acknowledges that the Weingarten decision applies only
to employees covered by the NLRA. She contends, however, that the State Board
in Morgan properly construed the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act as extending
Weingarten-type rights to public employees covered under that Act.
We need not determine in this case whether Weingarten-type rights should
be extended to public employees such as Ehlers. Even assuming, arguendo, that
Ehlers had Weingarten-type rights, her own collective-bargaining agreement
expressly waived those rights here. The appellate court erroneously bestowed upon
Ehlers rights that her labor union had surrendered during the collective-bargaining
process.
A collective-bargaining agreement can waive Weingarten rights. Prudential
Insurance Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 661 F.2d 398, 400-01 (5th Cir.
1981). The reason for this rule has been stated as follows:
"A union is allowed a great deal of flexibility in serving its
bargaining unit during contract negotiations. It makes concessions
and accepts advantages it believes are in the best interest of the
employees it represents. [Citations.] This flexibility includes the
right of the union to waive some employee rights, even the
employee's individual statutory rights. *** The union should
therefore be able to waive the employee's Weingarten right for
other concessions during negotiations." Prudential Insurance Co.,
661 F.2d at 400-01.
Application of this waiver rule is illustrated in Prudential Insurance Co.
& Marie Spencer, 275 N.L.R.B. 208 (1985). There, an employee covered under
the NLRA requested union representation at an investigatory interview that she
reasonably believed could result in discipline. Her employer denied the request
and conducted the interview in reliance on the following clause of the employee's
collective-bargaining agreement:
" `The Union further agrees that neither the Union nor its
members shall interfere with the right of the Employer:
***
(b) To interview any Agent with respect to any phase of his
work without the grievance committee being present.' " Prudential
Insurance Co., 275 N.L.R.B. at 208.
The NLRB held that this clause constituted a clear and unmistakable waiver by
the union of the employee's Weingarten rights. The NLRB further explained that
it would not alter the plain meaning of this contractual provision, earlier agreed
upon, simply because one party to the contract was no longer happy with it.
Prudential Insurance Co., 275 N.L.R.B. at 210.
We are persuaded that, even if public employees have Weingarten-type
rights, their union can contractually waive those rights. Where a union
contractually waives the Weingarten-type rights of its members, a court must
enforce the contract as written.
In the present case, Ehlers' collective-bargaining agreement provided in
part:
"Whenever a law enforcement employee is under
investigation, or subjected to interrogation by the Sheriff's
Department, for any reason, which could lead to disciplinary action,
or dismissal, the investigation or interrogation shall be conducted
in accordance with the provision of the Uniform Peace Officers'
Disciplinary Act."
The parties agree that Ehlers was "a law enforcement employee" within the
meaning of the collective-bargaining agreement. As the sheriff asserts, the plain
language of the collective-bargaining agreement, above, required his
"investigation" of Ehlers to be "conducted in accordance with the provision of the
Uniform Peace Officers' Disciplinary Act" (Uniform Disciplinary Act) (50 ILCS
725/1 et seq. (West 1992)). This language in Ehlers' collective-bargaining
agreement expressly invoked the Uniform Disciplinary Act and mandated that any
investigation of Ehlers be conducted in accordance with its terms.
The Uniform Disciplinary Act contains a provision that specifically
concerns the presence of a union representative. It provides:
"If a collective bargaining agreement requires the presence
of a representative of the collective bargaining unit during
investigations, such representative shall be present during the
interrogation, unless this requirement is waived by the officer being
interrogated." 50 ILCS 725/3.9 (West 1992).
Under this provision, a union representative shall be present only (1) during an
"interrogation" (2) if the collective-bargaining agreement requires the presence of
a representative during investigations.
Significantly, as to the first requirement, the word "interrogation" is a term
of art. The Uniform Disciplinary Act defines "[i]nterrogation" as "the questioning
of an officer pursuant to the formal investigation procedures" but not "questioning
(1) as part of an informal inquiry or (2) relating to minor infractions of agency
rules which may be noted on the officer's record but which may not in themselves
result in removal, discharge or suspension in excess of 3 days." 50 ILCS 725/2(d)
(West 1992). A "[f]ormal investigation" is defined as "the process of investigation
ordered by a commanding officer during which the questioning of an officer is
intended to gather evidence of misconduct which may be the basis for filing
charges seeking his or her removal, discharge or suspension in excess of 3 days."
50 ILCS 725/(2)(c) (West 1992). In contrast, an "informal inquiry" is "a meeting
by supervisory or command personnel with an officer upon whom an allegation
of misconduct has come to the attention of such supervisory or command
personnel, the purpose of which meeting is to *** discuss the facts to determine
whether a formal investigation should be commenced." 50 ILCS 725/2(b) (West
1992). The Uniform Disciplinary Act therefore provides that, under its terms, law
enforcement officers are not entitled to union representation unless they are
undergoing an "interrogation" as opposed to an "informal inquiry," as those terms
are defined therein.
We now turn to a discussion of the second requirement, whether the
collective-bargaining agreement requires the presence of a union representative
during investigations. Ehlers points out that her collective-bargaining agreement
contains additional language addressing her right to a union representative. That
language provides:
"At the request of the employee under interrogation, [the employee]
shall have the right to be represented by a representative of the
[union] who shall be allowed to be present at all times during the
interrogation."
Like the Uniform Disciplinary Act itself, this sentence in the collective-bargaining
agreement clearly grants Ehlers the right to a union representative only during an
"interrogation." We conclude that, by providing the right to a union representative
only during an interrogation, Ehlers' collective-bargaining agreement necessarily
withheld the right to union representation in all other circumstances. The
dispositive inquiry here thus becomes whether Ehlers was being subjected to an
interrogation.
The evidence in this case reveals that Ehlers was not subjected to an
interrogation within the meaning of the Uniform Disciplinary Act. The sheriff
testified that, when he asked Ehlers to speak with him, he was only seeking to
find out what happened on December 26, 1994, and that he had no intention
whatsoever of disciplining Ehlers when he first called her into his office. The
sheriff was seeking only to "find out what was going on." The Uniform
Disciplinary Act expressly distinguishes between formal "interrogations" and
"informal inquiries," as noted above. The sheriff's intended interview of Ehlers
was an informal inquiry under the Uniform Disciplinary Act's definitions. There
was a meeting between the sheriff and Ehlers, regarding whom rumors of
misconduct had come to the sheriff's attention, and the meeting's purpose was to
discuss the facts to determine whether a formal investigation of Ehlers was
necessary. See 50 ILCS 725/2(b) (West 1992). Ehlers' refusal to obey the sheriff's
orders upon entering his office did not work to transform his informal inquiry of
her into a formal interrogation. Because Ehlers was not being subjected to an
interrogation within the meaning of the Uniform Disciplinary Act, she had no right
to a union representative under the terms of her own collective-bargaining
agreement. Ehlers' collective-bargaining agreement thus waived any Weingarten-
type rights that she otherwise may have had during an informal inquiry such as
that which occurred here.
Accordingly, we hold that Ehlers' collective-bargaining agreement waived
any possible Weingarten-type rights that she may have had to the presence of a
union representative while undergoing the sheriff's informal inquiry. The appellate
court therefore erred in granting Ehlers this right. Since the appellate court's
setting aside of Ehlers' discharge was premised solely on the existence of this
right, the appellate court's decision must be reversed. We find no other basis for
upholding the appellate court's decision. Consequently, we affirm the circuit court,
which confirmed the Merit Commission's determination that cause for Ehlers'
discharge existed. The Merit Commission's determination that cause for Ehlers'
discharge existed is not arbitrary and unreasonable or unrelated to the
requirements of her service.
Having resolved this appeal, we need not address Sheriff Kilquist's
remaining contentions.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given, the appellate court's decision is reversed. The circuit
court's decision, confirming the ruling of the Jackson County Merit Commission,
is hereby affirmed.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
Section 2 of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act provides:
"It is the public policy of the State of Illinois to grant public
employees full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing for the
purpose of negotiating wages, hours and other conditions of
employment or other mutual aid or protection." 5 ILCS 315/2
(West 1992).
In accordance with this policy, the General Assembly has determined that
"Employees of the State and any political subdivision of the
State, excluding employees of the General Assembly of the State
of Illinois, have, and are protected in the exercise of, the right of
self-organization, and may form, join or assist any labor
organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing on questions of wages, hours and other conditions of
employment, not excluded by Section 4 of this Act, and to engage
in other concerted activities not otherwise prohibited by law for the
purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
free from interference, restraint or coercion." 5 ILCS 315/6 (West
1992).
This statute parallels section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (29
U.S.C. 157 (1994)). The National Labor Relations Board has construed section
7 to create "a statutory right in an employee to refuse to submit without union
representation to an interview which [the employee] reasonably fears may result
in his discipline." National Labor Relations Board v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 256, 43 L. Ed. 2d 171, 177, 95 S. Ct. 959, 963 (1975). The United States
Supreme Court has upheld the NLRB's construction, declaring that it "plainly
effectuates the most fundamental purposes of the Act" (Weingarten, 420 U.S. at
261, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 180, 95 S. Ct. at 966), "gives recognition to the right when
it is most useful to both employee and employer" (Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 262,
43 L. Ed. 2d at 181, 95 S. Ct. at 966), and "is in full harmony with actual
industrial practice" (Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 267, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 183, 95 S. Ct.
at 968).
Shortly after the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act was promulgated, the
Illinois State Labor Relations Board adopted the approach taken by the NLRB and
the United States Supreme Court in Weingarten and held that Illinois Public Labor
Relations Act's guarantee to employees of the right "to engage in *** concerted
activities *** for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection" (5 ILCS 315/6 (West 1992)) likewise "encompasses the right to refuse
to submit to an investigatory interview without union representation where the
employee reasonably fears that the interview might result in discipline."
Departments of Central Management Services & Corrections (Gerald Morgan),
1 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2020, No. S--CA--54, at VIII--120 (ISLRB
September 13, 1985) (hereinafter Morgan). Under Morgan,
"if the employee requests [union] representation and the request is
denied, the employer cannot continue the interview without
violating the [Illinois Public Labor Relations] Act. If [the
employer] disciplines the employee for refusing to continue in the
absence of representation, the employer is, in effect, retaliating
against the employee because he has engaged in protected
concerted activity, and such conduct is clearly [an unfair labor
practice] violative of Section 10(a)(1) of the Act." Morgan, 1 Pub.
Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2020, No. S--CA--54, at VIII--120
(ISLRB September 13, 1985).
The Weingarten rule, adopted by Morgan, was followed by the Illinois
Local Labor Relations Board in a case involving a peace officer (Chicago Police
Department (James E. Kostro), 4 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 3006, Nos. L--
CA--87--191, L--CA--87--208 (ILLRB February 26, 1988)) and was properly
adopted by the appellate court in the matter before us today.
In urging a contrary conclusion, Sheriff Kilquist asserts that the Weingarten
rule should not be extended to public employees because they enjoy protection not
shared by employees in the private sector. This argument is untenable. Taken to
its logical conclusion, it would mean that public employees should not even be
permitted to organize and bargain collectively. While a current majority of this
court may regard that as a good idea (see, e.g., City of Belvidere v. Illinois State
Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191 (1998); Chief Judge of the Sixteenth
Judicial Circuit v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 178 Ill. 2d 333 (1997);
American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Department of
Central Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 299 (1996); Office of the Cook County
State's Attorney v. Illinois Local Labor Relations Board, 166 Ill. 2d 296 (1995),
such anti-union bias reflects a value system that was expressly rejected by the
people of Illinois through their elected representatives when they enacted the
Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.
Having no legitimate basis for assailing the appellate court's conclusion
that the Weingarten rule is applicable to public employees under the Illinois Public
Labor Relations Act, but incapable of overcoming its innate hostility to union
activities by public employees, the majority takes the only course left open to it.
It resorts to the doctrine of waiver.
The threshold problem with the majority's approach is that Sergeant Ehlers,
herself, waived nothing. To the contrary, her invocation of the right to union
representation under Weingarten was timely, clear, and definite. Accordingly, the
majority is forced to argue that Ehlers' Weingarten rights were actually waived
by her union when it negotiated the collective-bargaining agreement. This
contention is contrary to the facts and the law.
As previously indicated, the Weingarten doctrine is statutory in nature. As
adopted in Illinois, it is encompassed within the Illinois Public Labor Relations
Act's guarantee to employees of the right "to engage in *** concerted activities
*** for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection"
(5 ILCS 315/6 (West 1996)). Under fundamental principles of labor law, waiver
of a statutorily protected right must be stated clearly and unmistakably. The
language sustaining the waiver must be specific and evince an unequivocal intent
to relinquish the right. Waiver is never presumed. See American Federation of
State, County & Municipal Employees v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 274
Ill. App. 3d 327, 334 (1995); County of Cook v. Illinois Local Labor Relations
Board, 214 Ill. App. 3d 979, 987 (1991).
In what is a stretch even for this court, the majority asserts that the
employees' Weingarten rights were expressly waived by the collective-bargaining
agreement here. That is patently untrue. An express waiver would be the kind
included in the collective-bargaining agreement at issue in the Prudential
Insurance Co. case cited by the majority, where the employer was given the
explicit right to interview employees outside of the presence of members of the
union grievance committee. There is nothing in the collective-bargaining
agreement here remotely analogous to that provision.
In an argument that can charitably be characterized as convoluted, the
majority tries to tease a waiver out of the collective-bargaining agreement's
incorporation of the Uniform Peace Officers' Disciplinary Act (50 ILCS 725/1 et
seq. (West 1992)). To anyone viewing the collective-bargaining agreement
objectively, however, it is clear that the purpose of the provisions incorporating
the Uniform Disciplinary Act is not to forgo any right to union representation in
informal proceedings, but to ensure that employees enjoy the maximum protection
possible during formal investigations. As the appellate court correctly reasoned,
"[t]he standard announced in Weingarten and adopted in Morgan
is different from and in addition to the guaranteed right of union
representation set forth in section 3.9 of the Disciplinary Act. The
Disciplinary Act does not subtract Ehlers' Weingarten right to
union representation upon request in an informal inquiry but merely
adds an additional guarantee of union representation in formal
investigations." 289 Ill. App. 3d at 1127.
In sum, I would hold that the Weingarten doctrine applies to public
employees covered by the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, that Weingarten
rights were not waived by the collective-bargaining agreement at issue in this case,
and that Sergeant Ehlers properly invoked her Weingarten rights when questioned
by Sheriff Kilquist. Under Morgan, the termination of Ehlers for refusing to
continue in the absence of representation constitutes an unfair labor practice. The
judgement of the appellate court reversing the circuit court's affirmance of the
Merit Commission's decision discharging Ehlers for cause should therefore be
affirmed, and Ehlers should be reinstated to her former position with back pay and
benefits.
Docket No. 83949--Agenda 17--March 1998.
KATE EHLERS, Appellee, v. THE JACKSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S MERIT
COMMISSION et al. (William Kilquist, Sheriff of Jackson County, Appellant).
Opinion filed June 18, 1998.
JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:
The plaintiff, Kate Ehlers, was employed as a sergeant at the Jackson
County jail. The Jackson County Merit Commission (Merit Commission)
terminated Sergeant Ehlers' employment for cause, acting upon a complaint filed
by the defendant William Kilquist, sheriff of Jackson County. On administrative
review, the circuit court of Jackson County confirmed Ehlers' dismissal. The
appellate court reversed and ordered Ehlers reinstated. 289 Ill. App. 3d 1118. We
allowed Sheriff Kilquist's petition for leave to appeal (166 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now
reverse the appellate court and affirm the circuit court.
FACTS
Ehlers began her full-time employment with the Jackson County sheriff's
department in March of 1986. She was a member of a collective-bargaining unit
represented by the Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council. There is no
dispute that a collective-bargaining agreement covered Ehlers and that her
employment could be terminated only for cause. The Merit Commission was the
entity empowered to determine whether cause for discharge existed.
On January 7, 1995, Sheriff Kilquist suspended Ehlers without pay and
filed a complaint with the Merit Commission seeking her discharge. The complaint
requested a hearing on three disciplinary charges against Ehlers. First, that on
January 3, 1995, Ehlers failed to fully or truthfully comply with an order directing
her to produce a report for the sheriff concerning visits by her husband at the jail
on December 26, 1994, and how much time she had spent outside the jail while
she was on duty on that date. Second, that on January 5, 1995, Ehlers presented
the sheriff with a second untruthful or inaccurate report regarding those matters.
Third, that on January 5, 1995, immediately after Ehlers delivered her second
report to the sheriff in his office, Ehlers refused to obey the sheriff's verbal order
that she remain in his office and talk with him about the foregoing matters.
The Merit Commission conducted a hearing on the three charges. The
evidence presented showed that, on December 26, 1994, Ehlers worked the day
shift at the jail. Ehlers' husband visited the jail sometime that afternoon, and they
went outside to smoke cigarettes for 10 to 20 minutes. They then returned to the
building and stood in the dispatch room for about 10 minutes before Ehlers
returned to her duties. Ehlers' husband remained in the area for a short time
speaking with other individuals whom he knew.
On January 3, 1995, Lieutenant Earl Jacquot, Ehlers' immediate
supervising officer, informed Ehlers that the sheriff wanted a written report from
her concerning how many times her husband had visited the jail on December 26
and how long he had stayed. Sheriff Kilquist explained in his testimony that he
wanted this statement because he had heard rumors that Ehlers had been out of
the jail for lengthy periods of time and that, as sheriff, he was required to look
into the matter. He directed Jacquot to obtain a detailed statement from Ehlers.
In response to Jacquot's request, Ehlers submitted the following statement
to the sheriff:
"This statement is being made as per ordered by Sheriff
Kilquist and as advised to me by Lt. Earl Jacquot.
On December 26, 1994, to the best of my knowledge and
recollection, my husband, Curt, came to the Jail one time during
the afternoon hours."
On January 5, 1995, Sheriff Kilquist instructed Jacquot to obtain a more
detailed report from Ehlers. When Jacquot asked Ehlers to rewrite the report to
provide additional details, she told him that she did not remember. Jacquot
nevertheless directed Ehlers to write another report. Ehlers submitted the following
as her second statement:
"On December 26, 1994, to the best of my knowledge and
recollection, my husband, Curt, came to the Jail one time during
the afternoon hours for a short period of time.
I was out of the Jail at 1255 hours and back in at 1305
hours and out at 1440 hours and back in at 1450 hours of the 26th
of December, 1994, as is recorded in the Central Control Officers
log (see attached) on that date. I would note that the portion of the
log from which these times are taken has been scribbled through
several times."
Beneath her signature, Ehlers wrote, "I am making these statements under duress."
Ehlers testified that, after writing her second statement, she attempted to
contact her union representative by telephone, but he was not available. Ehlers
wanted to speak to the union representative because she felt that disciplinary
action was going to be taken against her and she was concerned for her job.
Sheriff Kilquist then called Ehlers and requested her to bring the second
statement to his office. Ehlers told the sheriff over the telephone that she felt she
was being harassed, to which he responded that she was not. Ehlers asked Officer
George Schaefer to accompany her to the sheriff's office. Schaefer was the vice
president of her local union. Schaefer understood that Ehlers had requested him
to accompany her because of his union position. Ehlers stated that she felt she
needed a union representative present because she believed she "was going to
possibly be interrogated for disciplinary reasons." The sheriff testified that he had
"no intent whatsoever" to discipline Ehlers when he called her into his office, but
just "wanted to find out what was going on."
Ehlers, Schaefer, and Sheriff Kilquist all testified about their meeting, and
their testimony is the same in most respects. When Ehlers and Schaefer entered
the sheriff's office, the sheriff was in an adjoining room. Ehlers said that she was
placing the second report on his desk. The sheriff told Ehlers to sit down so he
could speak to her and asked Schaefer to leave. Ehlers did not sit down. Ehlers
testified she then told the sheriff that she wanted Schaefer present as her union
representative. The sheriff again told Schaefer to leave, and he did so. Ehlers then
told the sheriff that she would not speak to him without Schaefer present and
turned to leave. The sheriff informed Ehlers that he would fire her if she left. As
Ehlers left, she remarked that only the Merit Commission could fire her. The
sheriff told Ehlers to go home.
Schaefer testified that, shortly after the meeting, Sheriff Kilquist told him
that the meeting had started as "nothing," but was "totally blown up now." The
sheriff's own report, written directly after the incident, stated that he had "advised
Sergeant Ehlers that he was conducting an informal inquiry." Later, the sheriff
suspended Ehlers without pay and filed the complaint with the Merit Commission
seeking her dismissal.
The Merit Commission ultimately determined that the sheriff presented
insufficient evidence to sustain the first two charges of the complaint. Those
charges were dismissed and are not at issue in this appeal. The Merit Commission
found, however, that the last charge against Ehlers, concerning her refusal to obey
the sheriff's order that she sit in his office and speak with him, was sustained by
the evidence.
The Merit Commission held a second hearing to determine what type of
discipline to impose on Ehlers for the sustained charge. The Merit Commission
issued a decision via written order. Therein, the Merit Commission found that the
sheriff had lawfully ordered Ehlers to sit in his office and speak with him, and
that Ehlers' refusal to do so constituted insubordination. The Merit Commission
found in aggravation that Ehlers displayed no remorse for her insubordination, and
that she had been disciplined on one prior occasion for failing to obey an order.
The Merit Commission discharged Ehlers from her employment effective January
7, 1995.
Ehlers subsequently filed a complaint for administrative review with the
circuit court. The circuit court confirmed the Merit Commission's decision,
holding that the Merit Commission's discharge of Ehlers for her direct
disobedience of the sheriff's order was not arbitrary or unreasonable.
The appellate court reversed. Relying on National Labor Relations Board
v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 43 L. Ed. 2d 171, 95 S. Ct. 959 (1975), and
Departments of Central Management Services & Corrections (Gerald Morgan),
1 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2020, No. S--CA--54 (ISLRB September 13,
1985), the appellate court held that Ehlers had the right to have a union
representative present with her at the meeting with the sheriff. Consequently, the
appellate court reasoned, the sheriff's order to Ehlers that she remain in his office
and speak to him without union representation was an unlawful order and Ehlers
could not be discharged solely for disobeying an unlawful order. The appellate
court ordered that Ehlers be restored to her former employment status as of the
effective date of her discharge. We granted Sheriff Kilquist's petition for leave to
appeal. 166 Ill. 2d R. 315.
The sheriff filed a motion asking us to strike a portion of Ehlers' brief for
failure to cite sufficient authority. That motion, earlier ordered taken with the case,
is hereby denied.
ANALYSIS
This case comes to us on administrative review. The scope of a court's
review of an agency's decision to discharge is generally a two-step process. The
court first decides "whether the agency's finding of guilt is contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence." Walsh v. Board of Fire & Police
Commissioners, 96 Ill. 2d 101, 105 (1983). Here, the parties do not dispute the
Merit Commission's finding that Ehlers deliberately disobeyed the sheriff's order.
The parties' dispute centers on whether the order was lawful or unlawful. Our
inquiry thus concerns only the second step. Pursuant to the second step, we must
determine whether the Merit Commission's findings of fact supported its
conclusion that cause existed for Ehlers' discharge. See Walsh, 96 Ill. 2d at 105.
"Cause" has been defined as "some substantial shortcoming which renders
continuance in his office or employment in some way detrimental to the discipline
and efficiency of the service and something which the law and a sound public
opinion recognize as a good cause for his not longer occupying the place."
Fantozzi v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 27 Ill. 2d 357, 360 (1963). A
reviewing court shall respect an agency's finding of cause and shall not overturn
an agency's finding that cause for discharge exists unless that finding is
" `arbitrary and unreasonable or unrelated to the requirements of the service.' "
Launius v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 151 Ill. 2d 419, 435 (1992),
quoting Walsh, 96 Ill. 2d at 105.
The appellate court held that cause for Ehlers' discharge did not exist
because the sheriff's order to Ehlers that she remain in his office and speak to him
without union representation was an unlawful order. The appellate court based its
holding on the decisions in National Labor Relations Board v. J. Weingarten, Inc.,
420 U.S. 251, 43 L. Ed. 2d 171, 95 S. Ct. 959 (1975) (hereinafter Weingarten),
and Departments of Central Management Services & Corrections (Gerald
Morgan), 1 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2020, No. S--CA--54 (ISLRB
September 13, 1985) (hereinafter Morgan). We therefore begin our analysis with
a review of Weingarten and Morgan.
In Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251, 43 L. Ed. 2d 171, 95 S. Ct. 959, a private
sector employee requested but was denied the presence of a union representative
during an interrogation by her employer about suspected thefts at the employer's
store. The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB). The union asserted that the employer's action
constituted an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) (29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1) (1970)), in that it interfered with,
restrained, and coerced the individual right of the employee, protected by section
7 of the NLRA, "to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection" (29 U.S.C. 157 (1970)).
The NLRB agreed with the union. The NLRB construed section 7 as giving
employees covered under the NLRA the right to have a union representative
present during an employer's investigatory interview when the employee requests
union representation and reasonably fears that disciplinary action may result.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the NLRB's interpretation of
section 7. By this holding, the Court established what is now commonly called the
Weingarten rule or Weingarten rights. The Supreme Court explained that the
source of the Weingarten rule is statutory: it "inheres" in section 7's "guarantee
of the right of employees to act in concert for mutual aid and protection."
Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 256, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 177, 95 S. Ct. at 963. The Court
also set forth the general "contours and limits" of Weingarten rights, as previously
established by the NLRB. The "right arises only in situations where the employee
requests representation" and "where the employee reasonably believes the
investigation will result in disciplinary action." Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 257, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 178, 95 S. Ct. at 963-64. Moreover, the employee's exercise of the
right may not interfere with "legitimate employer prerogatives." Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 258, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 178, 95 S. Ct. at 964. For example, once Weingarten
rights are invoked, the employer may decline to continue the interview and opt to
conduct its investigation using only information gathered from sources other than
the employee. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 258-59, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 178-79, 95 S. Ct. at 964.
As stated, Weingarten rights apply to employees covered by the NLRA. In
Morgan, 1 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2020, No. S--CA--54 (ISLRB September
13, 1985), the Illinois State Labor Relations Board (State Board) extended
Weingarten rights to public employees covered by the Illinois Public Labor
Relations Act (the Act) (5 ILCS 315/1 et seq. (West 1992)). The State Board in
Morgan reasoned that Weingarten-type rights are inherent in section 6 of the Act,
which, mirroring section 7 of the NLRA, guarantees certain public employees the
right "to engage in *** concerted activities *** for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." Morgan, 1 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.)
par. 2020, No. S--CA--54, at VIII--120 (ISLRB September 13, 1985), quoting Ill.
Rev. Stat., 1983 Supp., ch. 48, par. 1606. According to the State Board, a public
employer's violation of a public employee's Weingarten-type rights could
constitute an unfair labor practice in violation of section 10 of the Act (Ill. Rev.
Stat., 1983 Supp., ch. 48, par. 1610). The Morgan decision was not appealed to
the courts.
The appellate court in the present case adopted and applied the State
Board's decision in Morgan and held that Ehlers, a public employee covered by
the Act, had Weingarten-type rights. The appellate court ordered Ehlers reinstated
after finding that the sheriff had violated those rights. To date, no other Illinois
court has adopted Weingarten or Morgan with regard to Weingarten-type rights.
Our research reveals, however, that, like the State Board, both the Illinois Local
Labor Relations Board and the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board have
found Weingarten-type rights to be implicit in the statutes that they administer.
City of Chicago (Police Department), 5 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 3025, No.
L--CA--89--094 (ILLRB August 23, 1989) (also interpreting the Illinois Public
Labor Relations Act); Summit Hill School District 161, 4 Pub. Employee Rep.
(Ill.) par. 1009, No. 86--CA--0090--C (IELRB December 1, 1987) (interpreting the
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (115 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 1992))).
Sheriff Kilquist contends that the appellate court erred in relying on
Weingarten and Morgan to set aside Ehlers' discharge. The sheriff maintains that
Weingarten-type rights should not be extended to public employees such as Ehlers.
He correctly points out that the State Board's decision in Morgan is not binding
on this court and urges us to reject Morgan's reasoning outright. According to the
sheriff, the Illinois General Assembly has never intended that public employees
have Weingarten-type rights. Sheriff Kilquist contends, in the alternative, that
Ehlers' own collective-bargaining agreement waived any Weingarten-type rights
that she had.
In response, Ehlers acknowledges that the Weingarten decision applies only
to employees covered by the NLRA. She contends, however, that the State Board
in Morgan properly construed the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act as extending
Weingarten-type rights to public employees covered under that Act.
We need not determine in this case whether Weingarten-type rights should
be extended to public employees such as Ehlers. Even assuming, arguendo, that
Ehlers had Weingarten-type rights, her own collective-bargaining agreement
expressly waived those rights here. The appellate court erroneously bestowed upon
Ehlers rights that her labor union had surrendered during the collective-bargaining
process.
A collective-bargaining agreement can waive Weingarten rights. Prudential
Insurance Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 661 F.2d 398, 400-01 (5th Cir.
1981). The reason for this rule has been stated as follows:
"A union is allowed a great deal of flexibility in serving its
bargaining unit during contract negotiations. It makes concessions
and accepts advantages it believes are in the best interest of the
employees it represents. [Citations.] This flexibility includes the
right of the union to waive some employee rights, even the
employee's individual statutory rights. *** The union should
therefore be able to waive the employee's Weingarten right for
other concessions during negotiations." Prudential Insurance Co.,
661 F.2d at 400-01.
Application of this waiver rule is illustrated in Prudential Insurance Co.
& Marie Spencer, 275 N.L.R.B. 208 (1985). There, an employee covered under
the NLRA requested union representation at an investigatory interview that she
reasonably believed could result in discipline. Her employer denied the request
and conducted the interview in reliance on the following clause of the employee's
collective-bargaining agreement:
" `The Union further agrees that neither the Union nor its
members shall interfere with the right of the Employer:
***
(b) To interview any Agent with respect to any phase of his
work without the grievance committee being present.' " Prudential
Insurance Co., 275 N.L.R.B. at 208.
The NLRB held that this clause constituted a clear and unmistakable waiver by
the union of the employee's Weingarten rights. The NLRB further explained that
it would not alter the plain meaning of this contractual provision, earlier agreed
upon, simply because one party to the contract was no longer happy with it.
Prudential Insurance Co., 275 N.L.R.B. at 210.
We are persuaded that, even if public employees have Weingarten-type
rights, their union can contractually waive those rights. Where a union
contractually waives the Weingarten-type rights of its members, a court must
enforce the contract as written.
In the present case, Ehlers' collective-bargaining agreement provided in
part:
"Whenever a law enforcement employee is under
investigation, or subjected to interrogation by the Sheriff's
Department, for any reason, which could lead to disciplinary action,
or dismissal, the investigation or interrogation shall be conducted
in accordance with the provision of the Uniform Peace Officers'
Disciplinary Act."
The parties agree that Ehlers was "a law enforcement employee" within the
meaning of the collective-bargaining agreement. As the sheriff asserts, the plain
language of the collective-bargaining agreement, above, required his
"investigation" of Ehlers to be "conducted in accordance with the provision of the
Uniform Peace Officers' Disciplinary Act" (Uniform Disciplinary Act) (50 ILCS
725/1 et seq. (West 1992)). This language in Ehlers' collective-bargaining
agreement expressly invoked the Uniform Disciplinary Act and mandated that any
investigation of Ehlers be conducted in accordance with its terms.
The Uniform Disciplinary Act contains a provision that specifically
concerns the presence of a union representative. It provides:
"If a collective bargaining agreement requires the presence
of a representative of the collective bargaining unit during
investigations, such representative shall be present during the
interrogation, unless this requirement is waived by the officer being
interrogated." 50 ILCS 725/3.9 (West 1992).
Under this provision, a union representative shall be present only (1) during an
"interrogation" (2) if the collective-bargaining agreement requires the presence of
a representative during investigations.
Significantly, as to the first requirement, the word "interrogation" is a term
of art. The Uniform Disciplinary Act defines "[i]nterrogation" as "the questioning
of an officer pursuant to the formal investigation procedures" but not "questioning
(1) as part of an informal inquiry or (2) relating to minor infractions of agency
rules which may be noted on the officer's record but which may not in themselves
result in removal, discharge or suspension in excess of 3 days." 50 ILCS 725/2(d)
(West 1992). A "[f]ormal investigation" is defined as "the process of investigation
ordered by a commanding officer during which the questioning of an officer is
intended to gather evidence of misconduct which may be the basis for filing
charges seeking his or her removal, discharge or suspension in excess of 3 days."
50 ILCS 725/(2)(c) (West 1992). In contrast, an "informal inquiry" is "a meeting
by supervisory or command personnel with an officer upon whom an allegation
of misconduct has come to the attention of such supervisory or command
personnel, the purpose of which meeting is to *** discuss the facts to determine
whether a formal investigation should be commenced." 50 ILCS 725/2(b) (West
1992). The Uniform Disciplinary Act therefore provides that, under its terms, law
enforcement officers are not entitled to union representation unless they are
undergoing an "interrogation" as opposed to an "informal inquiry," as those terms
are defined therein.
We now turn to a discussion of the second requirement, whether the
collective-bargaining agreement requires the presence of a union representative
during investigations. Ehlers points out that her collective-bargaining agreement
contains additional language addressing her right to a union representative. That
language provides:
"At the request of the employee under interrogation, [the employee]
shall have the right to be represented by a representative of the
[union] who shall be allowed to be present at all times during the
interrogation."
Like the Uniform Disciplinary Act itself, this sentence in the collective-bargaining
agreement clearly grants Ehlers the right to a union representative only during an
"interrogation." We conclude that, by providing the right to a union representative
only during an interrogation, Ehlers' collective-bargaining agreement necessarily
withheld the right to union representation in all other circumstances. The
dispositive inquiry here thus becomes whether Ehlers was being subjected to an
interrogation.
The evidence in this case reveals that Ehlers was not subjected to an
interrogation within the meaning of the Uniform Disciplinary Act. The sheriff
testified that, when he asked Ehlers to speak with him, he was only seeking to
find out what happened on December 26, 1994, and that he had no intention
whatsoever of disciplining Ehlers when he first called her into his office. The
sheriff was seeking only to "find out what was going on." The Uniform
Disciplinary Act expressly distinguishes between formal "interrogations" and
"informal inquiries," as noted above. The sheriff's intended interview of Ehlers
was an informal inquiry under the Uniform Disciplinary Act's definitions. There
was a meeting between the sheriff and Ehlers, regarding whom rumors of
misconduct had come to the sheriff's attention, and the meeting's purpose was to
discuss the facts to determine whether a formal investigation of Ehlers was
necessary. See 50 ILCS 725/2(b) (West 1992). Ehlers' refusal to obey the sheriff's
orders upon entering his office did not work to transform his informal inquiry of
her into a formal interrogation. Because Ehlers was not being subjected to an
interrogation within the meaning of the Uniform Disciplinary Act, she had no right
to a union representative under the terms of her own collective-bargaining
agreement. Ehlers' collective-bargaining agreement thus waived any Weingarten-
type rights that she otherwise may have had during an informal inquiry such as
that which occurred here.
Accordingly, we hold that Ehlers' collective-bargaining agreement waived
any possible Weingarten-type rights that she may have had to the presence of a
union representative while undergoing the sheriff's informal inquiry. The appellate
court therefore erred in granting Ehlers this right. Since the appellate court's
setting aside of Ehlers' discharge was premised solely on the existence of this
right, the appellate court's decision must be reversed. We find no other basis for
upholding the appellate court's decision. Consequently, we affirm the circuit court,
which confirmed the Merit Commission's determination that cause for Ehlers'
discharge existed. The Merit Commission's determination that cause for Ehlers'
discharge existed is not arbitrary and unreasonable or unrelated to the
requirements of her service.
Having resolved this appeal, we need not address Sheriff Kilquist's
remaining contentions.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given, the appellate court's decision is reversed. The circuit
court's decision, confirming the ruling of the Jackson County Merit Commission,
is hereby affirmed.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
Section 2 of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act provides:
"It is the public policy of the State of Illinois to grant public
employees full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing for the
purpose of negotiating wages, hours and other conditions of
employment or other mutual aid or protection." 5 ILCS 315/2
(West 1992).
In accordance with this policy, the General Assembly has determined that
"Employees of the State and any political subdivision of the
State, excluding employees of the General Assembly of the State
of Illinois, have, and are protected in the exercise of, the right of
self-organization, and may form, join or assist any labor
organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing on questions of wages, hours and other conditions of
employment, not excluded by Section 4 of this Act, and to engage
in other concerted activities not otherwise prohibited by law for the
purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
free from interference, restraint or coercion." 5 ILCS 315/6 (West
1992).
This statute parallels section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (29
U.S.C. 157 (1994)). The National Labor Relations Board has construed section
7 to create "a statutory right in an employee to refuse to submit without union
representation to an interview which [the employee] reasonably fears may result
in his discipline." National Labor Relations Board v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 256, 43 L. Ed. 2d 171, 177, 95 S. Ct. 959, 963 (1975). The United States
Supreme Court has upheld the NLRB's construction, declaring that it "plainly
effectuates the most fundamental purposes of the Act" (Weingarten, 420 U.S. at
261, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 180, 95 S. Ct. at 966), "gives recognition to the right when
it is most useful to both employee and employer" (Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 262,
43 L. Ed. 2d at 181, 95 S. Ct. at 966), and "is in full harmony with actual
industrial practice" (Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 267, 43 L. Ed. 2d at 183, 95 S. Ct.
at 968).
Shortly after the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act was promulgated, the
Illinois State Labor Relations Board adopted the approach taken by the NLRB and
the United States Supreme Court in Weingarten and held that Illinois Public Labor
Relations Act's guarantee to employees of the right "to engage in *** concerted
activities *** for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection" (5 ILCS 315/6 (West 1992)) likewise "encompasses the right to refuse
to submit to an investigatory interview without union representation where the
employee reasonably fears that the interview might result in discipline."
Departments of Central Management Services & Corrections (Gerald Morgan),
1 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2020, No. S--CA--54, at VIII--120 (ISLRB
September 13, 1985) (hereinafter Morgan). Under Morgan,
"if the employee requests [union] representation and the request is
denied, the employer cannot continue the interview without
violating the [Illinois Public Labor Relations] Act. If [the
employer] disciplines the employee for refusing to continue in the
absence of representation, the employer is, in effect, retaliating
against the employee because he has engaged in protected
concerted activity, and such conduct is clearly [an unfair labor
practice] violative of Section 10(a)(1) of the Act." Morgan, 1 Pub.
Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2020, No. S--CA--54, at VIII--120
(ISLRB September 13, 1985).
The Weingarten rule, adopted by Morgan, was followed by the Illinois
Local Labor Relations Board in a case involving a peace officer (Chicago Police
Department (James E. Kostro), 4 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 3006, Nos. L--
CA--87--191, L--CA--87--208 (ILLRB February 26, 1988)) and was properly
adopted by the appellate court in the matter before us today.
In urging a contrary conclusion, Sheriff Kilquist asserts that the Weingarten
rule should not be extended to public employees because they enjoy protection not
shared by employees in the private sector. This argument is untenable. Taken to
its logical conclusion, it would mean that public employees should not even be
permitted to organize and bargain collectively. While a current majority of this
court may regard that as a good idea (see, e.g., City of Belvidere v. Illinois State
Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191 (1998); Chief Judge of the Sixteenth
Judicial Circuit v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 178 Ill. 2d 333 (1997);
American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Department of
Central Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 299 (1996); Office of the Cook County
State's Attorney v. Illinois Local Labor Relations Board, 166 Ill. 2d 296 (1995),
such anti-union bias reflects a value system that was expressly rejected by the
people of Illinois through their elected representatives when they enacted the
Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.
Having no legitimate basis for assailing the appellate court's conclusion
that the Weingarten rule is applicable to public employees under the Illinois Public
Labor Relations Act, but incapable of overcoming its innate hostility to union
activities by public employees, the majority takes the only course left open to it.
It resorts to the doctrine of waiver.
The threshold problem with the majority's approach is that Sergeant Ehlers,
herself, waived nothing. To the contrary, her invocation of the right to union
representation under Weingarten was timely, clear, and definite. Accordingly, the
majority is forced to argue that Ehlers' Weingarten rights were actually waived
by her union when it negotiated the collective-bargaining agreement. This
contention is contrary to the facts and the law.
As previously indicated, the Weingarten doctrine is statutory in nature. As
adopted in Illinois, it is encompassed within the Illinois Public Labor Relations
Act's guarantee to employees of the right "to engage in *** concerted activities
*** for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection"
(5 ILCS 315/6 (West 1996)). Under fundamental principles of labor law, waiver
of a statutorily protected right must be stated clearly and unmistakably. The
language sustaining the waiver must be specific and evince an unequivocal intent
to relinquish the right. Waiver is never presumed. See American Federation of
State, County & Municipal Employees v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 274
Ill. App. 3d 327, 334 (1995); County of Cook v. Illinois Local Labor Relations
Board, 214 Ill. App. 3d 979, 987 (1991).
In what is a stretch even for this court, the majority asserts that the
employees' Weingarten rights were expressly waived by the collective-bargaining
agreement here. That is patently untrue. An express waiver would be the kind
included in the collective-bargaining agreement at issue in the Prudential
Insurance Co. case cited by the majority, where the employer was given the
explicit right to interview employees outside of the presence of members of the
union grievance committee. There is nothing in the collective-bargaining
agreement here remotely analogous to that provision.
In an argument that can charitably be characterized as convoluted, the
majority tries to tease a waiver out of the collective-bargaining agreement's
incorporation of the Uniform Peace Officers' Disciplinary Act (50 ILCS 725/1 et
seq. (West 1992)). To anyone viewing the collective-bargaining agreement
objectively, however, it is clear that the purpose of the provisions incorporating
the Uniform Disciplinary Act is not to forgo any right to union representation in
informal proceedings, but to ensure that employees enjoy the maximum protection
possible during formal investigations. As the appellate court correctly reasoned,
"[t]he standard announced in Weingarten and adopted in Morgan
is different from and in addition to the guaranteed right of union
representation set forth in section 3.9 of the Disciplinary Act. The
Disciplinary Act does not subtract Ehlers' Weingarten right to
union representation upon request in an informal inquiry but merely
adds an additional guarantee of union representation in formal
investigations." 289 Ill. App. 3d at 1127.
In sum, I would hold that the Weingarten doctrine applies to public
employees covered by the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, that Weingarten
rights were not waived by the collective-bargaining agreement at issue in this case,
and that Sergeant Ehlers properly invoked her Weingarten rights when questioned
by Sheriff Kilquist. Under Morgan, the termination of Ehlers for refusing to
continue in the absence of representation constitutes an unfair labor practice. The
judgement of the appellate court reversing the circuit court's affirmance of the
Merit Commission's decision discharging Ehlers for cause should therefore be
affirmed, and Ehlers should be reinstated to her former position with back pay and
benefits.
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