People v. Williams

People v. Williams,

Docket No. 82333--Agenda 12--September 1997.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
ADRIAN K. WILLIAMS, Appellant.
Opinion filed December 18, 1997.

JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Adrian K. Williams, was charged with burglary and retail theft.
720 ILCS 5/19--1, 16A--3(a) (West 1994). Defendant subsequently entered into
a plea agreement with the State. Pursuant to the agreement, defendant pled guilty
to retail theft, in exchange for which the State dropped the burglary charge and
recommended a sentencing cap of seven years' imprisonment. The circuit court
of Tazewell County accepted defendant's written plea. The circuit court then
sentenced defendant to three years in prison, followed by 40 months' probation.
Defendant filed a timely motion to reconsider sentence, asserting that the 40-
month probation term exceeded the statutory maximum. Defendant also challenged
the imposition of consecutive sentences of prison and probation for a single
offense. After a hearing on the motion, the circuit court reduced defendant's
probation to 30 months, but rejected defendant's argument that the imposition of
consecutive sentences of prison and probation for a single offense was improper.
Defendant appealed, challenging the mixed sentence. The appellate court
affirmed the circuit court, holding that such sentence is authorized under the
sentencing provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections (the Code) (730 ILCS
5/5--1--1 et seq. (West 1994)), and People v. Wendt, 163 Ill. 2d 346 (1994). 284
Ill. App. 3d 681. This court allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315 (166 Ill. 2d R. 315). We now reverse the
appellate and circuit courts.

ANALYSIS
Initially, the State raises a procedural issue, arguing that defendant was
required to withdraw his guilty plea before he could challenge the sentence he
received pursuant to the plea agreement. As the defendant failed to move to
withdraw his guilty plea, the State contends that he should be barred from
protesting his sentence now. In People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996), we held
that a defendant who pleads guilty in exchange for a specific sentence must move
to withdraw his guilty plea before challenging his sentence. In Evans, however,
the sentences were within statutory limits and the defendants only asserted that
their sentences were excessive. In the instant case, the defendant does not contend
that his sentence was excessive; rather, he argues that the court imposed a
sentence which, under the statute, it had no authority to impose. Thus, Evans is
inapplicable and cannot bar defendant's claim that his sentence was void because
it does not conform with the statute. People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995).
Turning to the merits, the issue before the court is whether a defendant
may be sentenced to both prison and probation for a single offense. The State
argues that such a combination is authorized under the Code and Wendt. In Wendt,
the trial court imposed sentence on four separate offenses. The sentences consisted
of three concurrent prison terms and one consecutive term of probation. In
affirming the sentences, this court discussed section 5--5--3 of the Code, which
sets forth allowable sentencing dispositions as follows:
"(b) The following options shall be appropriate dispositions,
alone or in combination, for all felonies and misdemeanors other
than those identified in subsection (c) of this Section:
(1) A period of probation.
* * *
(4) A term of imprisonment." 730 ILCS 5/5--5--
3(b)(1), (b)(4) (West 1994).
In Wendt, we held that section 5--5--3 specifically authorizes the
imposition of a sentence of probation in combination with a term of imprisonment.
Wendt, 163 Ill. 2d at 354. We also noted that section 5--6--2 of the Code, which
requires multiple periods of probation to run concurrently, gave the legislature the
opportunity to prohibit the imposition of a sentence of probation consecutive to
a sentence of imprisonment. We held that the fact that the legislature did not
prohibit such a combination indicates that it is allowed. Wendt, 163 Ill. 2d at 353-
54; 730 ILCS 5/5--6--2 (West 1994). This court further found that no part of the
Code specifically prohibits a sentence of probation to be served consecutively to
a sentence of imprisonment. We concluded that section 5--5--3 of the Code,
construed in light of section 5--6--2, authorizes the imposition of a sentence of
probation consecutive to a sentence to imprisonment. Wendt, 163 Ill. 2d at 354.
The State urges this court to affirm the appellate court, which held that Wendt
must be read to allow the imposition of a sentence of probation consecutive to a
sentence of imprisonment for a single offense.
Defendant counters, however, that the trial court exceeded its authority
when it sentenced him to a mixed sentence of prison and probation for a single
conviction. He urges the court to adopt the reasoning of People v. Patterson, 276
Ill. App. 3d 107 (1995). In Patterson, the defendant was convicted of one count
of forgery and was sentenced to two years in prison and a consecutive 30-month
term of probation. Patterson distinguished Wendt, noting that although Wendt
approved consecutive sentences of prison and probation, each sentence in Wendt
was supported by a separate conviction. Patterson held that, although no section
of the Code specifically prohibits a sentence for a single offense that includes both
imprisonment and probation, section 5--8--4 of the Code, which allows
consecutive sentences of imprisonment under certain circumstances, "[b]y its
simple plural terms," requires convictions for multiple offenses if consecutive
sentences are to be imposed. Patterson, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 110; 730 ILCS 5/5--8--
4 (West 1994).
We agree with defendant. There is no specific provision in the Code that
either allows or disallows a sentence of probation imposed to be served
consecutively to a sentence of imprisonment. In Wendt, we held that such a
disposition is permissible where each sentence is supported by a separate offense.
The instant case, however, differs from Wendt. Here there is only one offense. We
hold that for a single offense, a sentence of probation may not be imposed
consecutive to a period of incarceration. While the Code provides no explicit
guidance in this decision, the fact that the defendant is being sentenced for only
one offense makes any other conclusion illogical. Imposing consecutive sentences
for a single conviction constitutes two consecutive punishments for one offense.
Where there is no clear indication of a legislative intent to increase a punishment,
the ambiguity must be construed in favor of the defendant. Fitzsimmons v. Norgle,
104 Ill. 2d 369, 374 (1984) (commenting on a statute that provided for the
enhancement of a penalty); People v. Hobbs, 86 Ill. 2d 242, 246 (1981) ("any
ambiguity in a criminal statute should be construed in favor of lenity"). Here, to
sanction sentences of both prison and probation for one crime, without definite
authorization in the Code, would impermissibly increase the penalty for that
offense. Patterson, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 110; see also Wendt, 163 Ill. 2d at 355
(noting that in that case "[t]he sentence of probation was for a separate offense
and did not increase the penalty for any of the charges").
Furthermore, the inconsistent character of the two sentences makes it
incongruous to assign both as punishments for the same offense. Probation is a
substitute for imprisonment that gives offenders an opportunity for reformation
while allowing them to retain their freedom. People ex rel. Barrett v. Bardens,
394 Ill. 511, 516-17 (1946). A prison sentence, however, is imposed upon those
whose crime and past behavior necessitate removal from society. This is illustrated
by section 5--6--1(a) of the Code, which directs a court to impose a sentence of
probation unless it is convinced that imprisonment is necessary for the protection
of the public or that probation would depreciate the seriousness of the offense. 730
ILCS 5/5--6--1(a) (West 1994). In other words, a defendant may be sentenced to
probation provided the court is satisfied that such sentence will reform the
defendant and serve the interests of society. A defendant guilty of a single offense
cannot fulfill the criteria necessitating prison time, yet simultaneously qualify for
probation under the Code. The nature of the offense and the history of the
offender either justify prison time or warrant probation. Both punishments cannot
be used.
In that we have decided that the mixed sentence imposed by the trial court
was improper, we need not address defendant's alternative argument that such
sentence could not be imposed because he was not admonished as to the
possibility of such a sentence at the time of his guilty plea.
A sentence not authorized by statute is void. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d at 113. In
the instant case, neither the sentence of probation nor the sentence of
imprisonment by itself was impermissible; rather, it was the joint imposition of
the two consecutive sentences for a single offense that exceeded statutory
restrictions. We therefore hold the entire sentence void. The judgment of the
appellate court is reversed, the sentence entered by the circuit court is vacated, and
the cause remanded to the circuit court for resentencing.

Appellate court judgment reversed;
sentence vacated;
cause remanded with directions.

JUSTICE NICKELS, specially concurring:
I agree with the majority's conclusion that the Unified Code of Corrections
does not authorize consecutive sentences of imprisonment and probation for a
single conviction. However, I do not agree with the manner in which the majority
reaches the merits of defendant's sentencing challenge.
The State argues that defendant waived the right to challenge his sentence
by failing to move to withdraw his guilty plea in the trial court. See People v.
Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996). The majority determines that defendant cannot
waive this claim because his sentence is contrary to the sentencing provisions of
the Unified Code of Corrections and is therefore "void." In support of the finding
that defendant's sentence is void, the majority cites to People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107 (1995). I dissented in Arna and I continue to believe that case was wrongly
decided. See People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d at 115 (Nickels, J., dissenting); see also
People v. Garcia, Nos. 81246, 81248, 81274, slip op. at 20 (October 23, 1997)
(Nickels, J., dissenting, joined by Harrison and McMorrow, JJ.).
This case is distinguishable from Arna. In Arna, the trial court imposed
concurrent sentences on the defendant pursuant to section 5--8--4(a) of the Unified
Code (730 ILCS 5/5--8--4(a) (West 1992)). The trial court therefore possessed the
statutory authority to impose concurrent sentences if it found that the offenses
were not committed as part of a single course of conduct or that there was a
substantial change in criminal objective. On appeal, this court in Arna came to a
different factual conclusion in order to determine that the concurrent sentences
were contrary to the statute and therefore "void." In this way, the majority was
able to sidestep our rules which provide that the State may not appeal sentencing
issues (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)) and that a defendant may not have his sentence
increased on appeal (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)). In contrast, the trial court in the
instant case had no statutory authority to impose consecutive sentences of
imprisonment and probation for one offense. Moreover, there are no rules that
prohibit a defendant from appealing sentencing issues or having a sentence
reduced on appeal.
Putting aside the propriety of Arna, I agree with the majority's decision to
address this case on the merits. This court has held that the traditional waiver
analysis does not apply to a defendant's challenge of a court's statutory authority
to impose a particular sentence. See People v. Singleton, 103 Ill. 2d 339, 346
(1984). A sentence imposed without statutory authority is plain error. I therefore
concur in the judgment reversing defendant's sentence.

JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this special concurrence.