Richardson v. Rock Island County Officers Electoral Board
Annotate this Case
Richardson v. Rock Island County Officers Electoral Bd., No. 82136
(11/20/97)
NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after the
filing of the opinion to request a rehearing. Also, opinions are subject to
modification, correction or withdrawal at anytime prior to issuance of the
mandate by the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, because the following slip
opinion is being made available prior to the Court's final action in this
matter, it cannot be considered the final decision of the Court. The official
copy of the following opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's
Reporter of Decisions in the Official Reports advance sheets following final
action by the Court.
Docket No. 82136--Agenda 19--September 1997.
MICHAEL RICHARDSON, Appellee, v. THE ROCK ISLAND
COUNTY OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD et al. (Susan Carpentier
et al., Appellants).
Opinion filed November 20, 1997.
JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court:
The dispute in this constitutional law case centered on the
number of signatures required to place a referendum on the ballot to
dissolve a township. The Illinois Constitution provides that townships
may be dissolved, "when approved by a referendum in the total area in
which township officers are elected." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, sec. 5.
The Constitution, however, has left it to the General Assembly to
prescribe by statute the procedure for determining the validity and
sufficiency of a petition to initiate a referendum. Specifically on the
issue of signatures, the Township Code, at the time the petitions were
circulated, provided:
"Upon the petition of at least 10% of the legal voters
of any county, as determined on the date the petition is
filed, that has adopted township organization, the county
board shall certify and cause to be submitted to the voters
of the county, at the next general election, the question of
the continuance of township organization." (Emphasis
added.) 60 ILCS 1/25--5 (West 1996).
The circuit court of Rock Island County held that this provision of the
Township Code was unconstitutionally vague and uncertain, because a
petitioner could not ascertain the number of signatures required prior
to filing since the minimum number of signatures was "determined on
the date the petition is filed," and thus created a moving target.
This case is before this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
302(a)(1), which authorizes direct appeals to this court from final
judgments of the circuit court in cases where a state statute is held
invalid. 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)(1). The parties asked us to decide whether
the circuit court erred in holding that (1) the signature requirement in
the Township Code was unconstitutionally vague and (2) the prior law
therefore controlled the disposition of the case. For the reasons that
follow, we dismiss the appeal.
I
Michael Richardson filed a petition to add a referendum to the
November 5, 1996, election ballot which would have allowed the general
population to vote on whether township government should be dissolved
in Rock Island County. Richardson had collected 9,913 signatures in
support of his petition. Susan Carpentier and six other individuals filed
an objection to the petition, challenging 2,484 of the signatures. After a
hearing, the Rock Island County Officers Electoral Board (Board)
concluded that the Township Code required a petitioner to collect 9,023
signatures to place a referendum on the ballot. The Board sustained
objections to 1,445 signatures in Richardson's petition and denied
Richardson's petition--with 8,468 valid signatures--because of an
insufficient number of signatures.
Richardson filed a petition for judicial review. After a hearing, the
circuit court held that the language of the Township Code (60 ILCS
1/25--5 (West 1996)) which fixed the number of required signatures to
10% of the registered voters as of the day the petition is filed was
unconstitutionally vague. In the absence of a valid Township Code
provision, the circuit court applied the following provision from the
Election Code:
"Whenever this Code or another Statute requires
that a nominating petition or a petition proposing a public
question shall be signed by a specified percentage of the
registered voters *** the total number of voters to which
the percentage is applied shall be the number of voters
who are registered *** on the date registration closed
before the regular election next preceding the last day on
which such petition may be filed in accordance with the
general election law." 10 ILCS 5/3--1.3 (West 1996).
Under this formula, 9,020 signatures were required; the petition
contained only 8,468 valid signatures, and accordingly the circuit court
confirmed the Board's decision.
Richardson filed a motion for reconsideration and argued that the
previous version of section 25--5 of the Township Code should be applied
rather than the Election Code. The circuit court agreed and set aside the
Board's decision. Under the earlier version of the Township Code, the
number of signatures required to place a referendum on the ballot was
10% of the votes cast in the preceding presidential election. Under this
formula, only 7,373 signatures were required. The circuit court ordered
that the referendum be placed on the ballot; Carpentier and the Board
filed a notice of appeal. The appellate court stayed the circuit court's
order and transferred the cause to this court under Supreme Court Rule
365, which permits the transfer of cases between the supreme court and
the appellate court when a case is appealed to the wrong court. 155 Ill.
2d R. 365. The case is properly before this court on a direct appeal from
a final judgment of the circuit court holding a state statute invalid. 134
Ill. 2d R. 302(a). Because of the stay order, the petition to abolish
township government in Rock Island County did not appear on the
November 5, 1996, ballot.
II
This appeal is now moot. The function of this court is to decide
controverted issues between real parties. An appeal is considered moot
when it " `presents or involves no actual controversy, interests or rights
of the parties, or where the issues have ceased to exist.' " First National
Bank v. Kusper, 98 Ill. 2d 226, 233 (1983), quoting People v. Redlich, 402 Ill. 270, 278-79 (1949). The test for mootness is whether " `the issues
involved in the trial court no longer exist' because intervening events
*** [have] render[ed] it impossible for the [reviewing] court to grant the
complaining party effectual relief." In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 255
(1989).
Here, the referendum in question did not appear on the ballot and
the election has long since come and past; there is then no relief which
this court can offer these parties. This fact alone would not necessarily
doom the appeal, however, because we review moot issues under the
public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. Where there is a
substantial public or private question involved, where there is a need for
an authoritative determination for future guidance, and where the issue
is likely to recur, review is indicated. See People ex rel. Wallace v.
Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 622 (1952); Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 513
(1997). None of these factors, however, are present here. Since this
controversy arose, the Illinois General Assembly amended the provision
of the Township Code which was held invalid by the circuit court. The
Township Code now reads:
"Upon the petition of at least 10% of the registered
voters of each township of a county, as determined on the
date registration closed before the regular election next
preceding the last day on which the petition may be filed,
that has adopted township organization, the county board
shall certify and cause to be submitted to the voters of the
county, at the next general election, the question of the
continuance of township organization." (Emphasis added.)
Pub. Act 90--112, eff. January 1, 1998 (amending 60 ILCS
1/25--5).
Where a challenged statute is amended to remove or to alter the
ostensibly unconstitutional language while the cause is pending, the
constitutional challenge to the statute becomes moot. Johnson v. Edgar,
176 Ill. 2d at 511. Moreover, this amendment to the statute forecloses
the possibility that the issues presented in this appeal will recur in a
future case. Accordingly, this case is moot and does not fall within the
public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
(11/20/97)
NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after the
filing of the opinion to request a rehearing. Also, opinions are subject to
modification, correction or withdrawal at anytime prior to issuance of the
mandate by the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, because the following slip
opinion is being made available prior to the Court's final action in this
matter, it cannot be considered the final decision of the Court. The official
copy of the following opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's
Reporter of Decisions in the Official Reports advance sheets following final
action by the Court.
Docket No. 82136--Agenda 19--September 1997.
MICHAEL RICHARDSON, Appellee, v. THE ROCK ISLAND
COUNTY OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD et al. (Susan Carpentier
et al., Appellants).
Opinion filed November 20, 1997.
JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court:
The dispute in this constitutional law case centered on the
number of signatures required to place a referendum on the ballot to
dissolve a township. The Illinois Constitution provides that townships
may be dissolved, "when approved by a referendum in the total area in
which township officers are elected." Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, sec. 5.
The Constitution, however, has left it to the General Assembly to
prescribe by statute the procedure for determining the validity and
sufficiency of a petition to initiate a referendum. Specifically on the
issue of signatures, the Township Code, at the time the petitions were
circulated, provided:
"Upon the petition of at least 10% of the legal voters
of any county, as determined on the date the petition is
filed, that has adopted township organization, the county
board shall certify and cause to be submitted to the voters
of the county, at the next general election, the question of
the continuance of township organization." (Emphasis
added.) 60 ILCS 1/25--5 (West 1996).
The circuit court of Rock Island County held that this provision of the
Township Code was unconstitutionally vague and uncertain, because a
petitioner could not ascertain the number of signatures required prior
to filing since the minimum number of signatures was "determined on
the date the petition is filed," and thus created a moving target.
This case is before this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
302(a)(1), which authorizes direct appeals to this court from final
judgments of the circuit court in cases where a state statute is held
invalid. 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a)(1). The parties asked us to decide whether
the circuit court erred in holding that (1) the signature requirement in
the Township Code was unconstitutionally vague and (2) the prior law
therefore controlled the disposition of the case. For the reasons that
follow, we dismiss the appeal.
I
Michael Richardson filed a petition to add a referendum to the
November 5, 1996, election ballot which would have allowed the general
population to vote on whether township government should be dissolved
in Rock Island County. Richardson had collected 9,913 signatures in
support of his petition. Susan Carpentier and six other individuals filed
an objection to the petition, challenging 2,484 of the signatures. After a
hearing, the Rock Island County Officers Electoral Board (Board)
concluded that the Township Code required a petitioner to collect 9,023
signatures to place a referendum on the ballot. The Board sustained
objections to 1,445 signatures in Richardson's petition and denied
Richardson's petition--with 8,468 valid signatures--because of an
insufficient number of signatures.
Richardson filed a petition for judicial review. After a hearing, the
circuit court held that the language of the Township Code (60 ILCS
1/25--5 (West 1996)) which fixed the number of required signatures to
10% of the registered voters as of the day the petition is filed was
unconstitutionally vague. In the absence of a valid Township Code
provision, the circuit court applied the following provision from the
Election Code:
"Whenever this Code or another Statute requires
that a nominating petition or a petition proposing a public
question shall be signed by a specified percentage of the
registered voters *** the total number of voters to which
the percentage is applied shall be the number of voters
who are registered *** on the date registration closed
before the regular election next preceding the last day on
which such petition may be filed in accordance with the
general election law." 10 ILCS 5/3--1.3 (West 1996).
Under this formula, 9,020 signatures were required; the petition
contained only 8,468 valid signatures, and accordingly the circuit court
confirmed the Board's decision.
Richardson filed a motion for reconsideration and argued that the
previous version of section 25--5 of the Township Code should be applied
rather than the Election Code. The circuit court agreed and set aside the
Board's decision. Under the earlier version of the Township Code, the
number of signatures required to place a referendum on the ballot was
10% of the votes cast in the preceding presidential election. Under this
formula, only 7,373 signatures were required. The circuit court ordered
that the referendum be placed on the ballot; Carpentier and the Board
filed a notice of appeal. The appellate court stayed the circuit court's
order and transferred the cause to this court under Supreme Court Rule
365, which permits the transfer of cases between the supreme court and
the appellate court when a case is appealed to the wrong court. 155 Ill.
2d R. 365. The case is properly before this court on a direct appeal from
a final judgment of the circuit court holding a state statute invalid. 134
Ill. 2d R. 302(a). Because of the stay order, the petition to abolish
township government in Rock Island County did not appear on the
November 5, 1996, ballot.
II
This appeal is now moot. The function of this court is to decide
controverted issues between real parties. An appeal is considered moot
when it " `presents or involves no actual controversy, interests or rights
of the parties, or where the issues have ceased to exist.' " First National
Bank v. Kusper, 98 Ill. 2d 226, 233 (1983), quoting People v. Redlich, 402 Ill. 270, 278-79 (1949). The test for mootness is whether " `the issues
involved in the trial court no longer exist' because intervening events
*** [have] render[ed] it impossible for the [reviewing] court to grant the
complaining party effectual relief." In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 255
(1989).
Here, the referendum in question did not appear on the ballot and
the election has long since come and past; there is then no relief which
this court can offer these parties. This fact alone would not necessarily
doom the appeal, however, because we review moot issues under the
public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. Where there is a
substantial public or private question involved, where there is a need for
an authoritative determination for future guidance, and where the issue
is likely to recur, review is indicated. See People ex rel. Wallace v.
Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 622 (1952); Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 513
(1997). None of these factors, however, are present here. Since this
controversy arose, the Illinois General Assembly amended the provision
of the Township Code which was held invalid by the circuit court. The
Township Code now reads:
"Upon the petition of at least 10% of the registered
voters of each township of a county, as determined on the
date registration closed before the regular election next
preceding the last day on which the petition may be filed,
that has adopted township organization, the county board
shall certify and cause to be submitted to the voters of the
county, at the next general election, the question of the
continuance of township organization." (Emphasis added.)
Pub. Act 90--112, eff. January 1, 1998 (amending 60 ILCS
1/25--5).
Where a challenged statute is amended to remove or to alter the
ostensibly unconstitutional language while the cause is pending, the
constitutional challenge to the statute becomes moot. Johnson v. Edgar,
176 Ill. 2d at 511. Moreover, this amendment to the statute forecloses
the possibility that the issues presented in this appeal will recur in a
future case. Accordingly, this case is moot and does not fall within the
public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
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