Robbins v. Board of Trustees of the Carbondale Police Pension Fund
Annotate this Case
Robbins v. Carbondale Police Pension Fund, No. 82028
(10/17/97)
NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days
after the filing of the opinion to request a rehearing.
Also, opinions are subject to modification, correction or
withdrawal at anytime prior to issuance of the mandate by
the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, because the following
slip opinion is being made available prior to the Court's
final action in this matter, it cannot be considered the
final decision of the Court. The official copy of the
following opinion will be published by the Supreme
Court's Reporter of Decisions in the Official Reports
advance sheets following final action by the Court.
Docket No. 82028--Agenda 20--May 1997.
DONNIE ROBBINS, Appellee, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF
THE CARBONDALE POLICE PENSION FUND OF THE CITY OF
CARBONDALE, ILLINOIS, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 17, 1997.
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the
court:
Donnie Robbins petitioned the Carbondale Police
Pension Fund for a disability pension pursuant to article
III of the Illinois Pension Code. 40 ILCS 5/3--101 et
seq. (West 1992). The fund's board of trustees (Board)
denied Robbins a line-of-duty disability pension, but
granted him a nonduty disability pension.
On administrative review, the circuit court of
Jackson County confirmed the Board's decision. However,
the appellate court reversed and entered judgment in
favor of Robbins for a line-of-duty disability pension.
283 Ill. App. 3d 823. We allowed the Board's petition for
leave to appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)) and now reverse
the appellate court.
BACKGROUND
The appellate court detailed the evidence in this
case. 283 Ill. App. 3d at 824-26. Therefore, we will
repeat only those facts necessary for our disposition of
this appeal. Briefly, in 1970, Robbins began working for
the Carbondale police department. From 1970 to 1979, he
worked as a patrol officer. From 1979 to 1988, he worked
as an evidence custodian. In 1988, at age 42, Robbins was
reassigned to patrol duty.
After his reassignment to patrol duty, Robbins'
performance caused him stress. The several stressful
aspects of Robbins' job generally stemmed from: (1) his
supervisor's criticism of the timeliness and quality of
his reports, and (2) his anxiety that his fellow patrol
officers were younger and better trained. The record also
contains evidence that, on January 1, 1990, Robbins was
particularly stressed while responding to a domestic
violence call. During that incident, Robbins witnessed a
man commit suicide by shooting himself in the face with
a shotgun.
Robbins continued working patrol duty until April
1992, when he injured his hand. In October 1992, he
returned to patrol duty. Two weeks later, the Carbondale
chief of police put Robbins on administrative leave
pending a psychological examination. Dr. Eric Ostrov
opined that Robbins was not mentally fit for duty. At the
end of November 1992, the police chief suspended Robbins
from duty.
In December 1992, Robbins petitioned the Carbondale
Police Pension Fund for a nonduty disability pension,
which amounted to 50% of the salary attached to his rank
on the force on the date of his suspension. See 40 ILCS
5/3--114.2 (West 1992). In January 1994, Robbins amended
his petition to add a claim for a line-of-duty disability
pension, which amounted to 65% of the salary attached to
his rank on the date of his suspension. See 40 ILCS 5/3--
114.1 (West 1992).
In March 1994, Robbins testified before the Board
and submitted three psychological evaluations. The Board
subsequently received the evidence deposition of Dr.
Ostrov. On September 22, 1994, the Board denied Robbins
a line-of-duty disability pension, but granted him a
nonduty disability pension.
Robbins filed a complaint in the circuit court of
Jackson County seeking administrative review of the
Board's denial of a line-of-duty pension. The circuit
court confirmed the Board's decision. However, the
appellate court reversed the circuit court and the Board.
The appellate court entered judgment in favor of Robbins
for a line-of-duty disability pension. The Board appeals.
DISCUSSION
We explain at the outset our standard of review.
Article III of the Pension Code provides that judicial
review of the Board's decisions be in accordance with the
Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3--101 et seq.
(West 1994)). 40 ILCS 5/3--148 (West 1994). The
Administrative Review Law provides that our review
extends to all questions of law and fact presented by the
entire record. The statute limits our review to the
record before us; we may not hear new or additional
evidence. The statute also mandates that the "findings
and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions
of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and
correct." 735 ILCS 5/3--110 (West 1994).
On administrative review, a court's function is to
ascertain whether the findings and decision of the agency
are against the manifest weight of the evidence. An
administrative agency decision is against the manifest
weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is
clearly evident. The mere fact that an opposite
conclusion is reasonable or that the reviewing court
might have ruled differently will not justify reversal of
the administrative findings. If the record contains
evidence that supports the agency's decision, it should
be upheld. Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of
Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88 (1992).
In this case, the appellate court stated that it was
not deciding whether the Board's decision was against the
manifest weight of the evidence, but rather, whether the
Board and the circuit court properly applied the law to
the facts. 283 Ill. App. 3d at 827. The rule that an
administrative agency's findings of fact should not be
disturbed unless they are against the manifest weight of
the evidence does not apply where the question involved
is one of law, such as the proper interpretation of a
statute. Rather, in such a case, the Board's finding is
not binding on the court. Envirite Corp. v. Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency, 158 Ill. 2d 210, 214
(1994); DiFoggio v. Retirement Board of the County
Employees Annuity & Benefit Fund, 156 Ill. 2d 377, 380-81
(1993).
Section 3--114.1 of the Pension Code provides for a
line-of-duty disability pension as follows:
"Disability pension--Line of Duty. If a
police officer as the result of sickness,
accident or injury incurred in or resulting
from the performance of an act of duty, is
found to be physically or mentally disabled
for service in the police department, so as to
render necessary his or her suspension or
retirement from the police service, the police
officer shall be entitled to a disability
retirement pension of 65% of the salary
attached to the rank on the police force held
by the officer at the date of suspension of
duty or retirement. A police officer shall be
considered `on duty', while on any assignment
approved by the chief of the police department
of the municipality he or she serves, whether
the assignment is within or outside the
municipality." 40 ILCS 5/3--114.1 (West 1994).
In contrast, Pension Code section 3--114.2 provides
for a nonduty pension. Under this section, a nonduty
pension shall be granted to "a police officer who becomes
disabled as a result of any cause other than the
performance of an act of duty, and who is found to be
physically or mentally disabled so as to render necessary
his or her suspension or retirement from police service
in the police department." A nonduty disability pension
amounts to "50% of the salary attached to the officer's
rank on the police force at the date of suspension of
duty or retirement." 40 ILCS 5/3--114.2 (West 1994).
The controlling principles are familiar:
"The primary rule of statutory interpretation
is that a court should ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the legislature.
The legislative intent should be sought
primarily from the language used in the
statute. [Citation.] The statute should be
evaluated as a whole; each provision should be
construed in connection with every other
section. [Citation.] `Where the language of
the act is certain and unambiguous the only
legitimate function of the courts is to
enforce the law as enacted by the
legislature.' [Citation.]" Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 91.
"An Act of Duty"
Pension Code section 3--114.1 requires, inter alia,
that the officer's disability result from "an act of
duty." 40 ILCS 5/3--114.1 (West 1994). That phrase is not
defined in that section or anywhere in article III of the
Pension Code. However, that phrase is defined in article
V of the Code. 40 ILCS 5/5--113 (West 1994). Article III
of the Code pertains to police pension funds in
municipalities with populations under 500,000, while
article V pertains to the same subject in municipalities
with populations exceeding 500,000. Compare 40 ILCS 5/3--
101 et seq. (West 1994) with 40 ILCS 5/5--101 et seq.
(West 1994).
We may look to article V of the Pension Code for a
definition of language used in article III of the Code.
We emphasize that:
"the intent of the legislature in enacting a
statute must be determined by examining the
entire statute and by construing each material
part of the legislation together. [Citation.]
A court should consider each part or section
of a legislative act in connection with every
other part or section, and not each part
alone, in determining the purpose or intent of
the legislature." (Emphasis in original.)
Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 318 (1989).
Accord Huckaba v. Cox, 14 Ill. 2d 126, 131 (1958).
"Moreover, when an act defines its terms, those terms
must be construed according to the definitions contained
in the act." People ex rel. Scott v. Schwulst Building
Center, Inc., 89 Ill. 2d 365, 371 (1982); accord Garza v.
Navistar International Transportation Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 379 (1996).
We note that the appellate court has specifically
used Pension Code section 5--113 as a guide to interpret
the phrase "act of duty" in section 3--114.1. Trettenero
v. Police Pension Fund, 268 Ill. App. 3d 58, 64-65
(1994); Olson v. City of Wheaton Police Pension Board,
153 Ill. App. 3d 595, 598-99 (1987). However, in Worth v.
Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund, 230 Ill.
App. 3d 349, 354-55 (1992), the appellate court
criticized this analysis. The court in Worth relied on
Pension Code section 5--102, which provides that the
terms used in article V shall have the meaning ascribed
to them by the definitional sections in article V. 40
ILCS 5/5--102 (West 1994). Based on this section, the
Worth court reasoned that the definition of an "act of
duty" in article V of the Code applied only to cases
brought under article V. Thus, the Worth court concluded
that the definition of "act of duty" in article V of the
Code could not be used in a case arising under article
III.
We disagree with this reasoning in Worth. Initially,
just because the legislature provided that a phrase used
in article V, e.g., "act of duty," is to have the meaning
ascribed to it in that article does not mean that the
legislature intended the identical phrase in article III
to have a different meaning. It is fundamental that where
a word or phrase is used in different sections of the
same legislative act, a court presumes that the word or
phrase is used with the same meaning throughout the act,
unless a contrary legislative intent is clearly
expressed. Schwulst Building Center, 89 Ill. 2d at 372;
Moran v. Katsinas, 16 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1959). Based on
this principle, this court has approved the use of
definitions of phrases in article V of the Pension Code
in cases arising under article III. Borg v. Village of
Schiller Park Police Pension Board, 99 Ill. 2d 376, 381
(1984).
Moreover, the legislature expressly provided that
article, division, or section headings in the Pension
Code do not "govern, limit, modify or in any manner
affect the scope, meaning or intent of the provisions of
any Article, Division or Section hereof." 40 ILCS 5/1--
103 (West 1994). The reasoning in Worth on this point is
erroneous and is not to be followed.
Pension Code section 5--113 defines an "act of duty"
as follows:
"Act of Duty. `Act of duty': Any act of
police duty inherently involving special risk,
not ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the
ordinary walks of life, imposed on a policeman
by the statutes of this State or by the
ordinances or police regulations of the city
in which this Article is in effect or by a
special assignment; or any act of heroism
performed in the city having for its direct
purpose the saving of the life or property of
a person other than the policeman." 40 ILCS
5/5--113 (West 1994).
We agree with the following principles that have
developed in applying Pension Code section 3--114.1, read
together with section 5--113, to claims of duty-related
stress:
"In examining claims of duty-related
stress like the one made in the instant case,
courts have required that plaintiff-police
officers demonstrate their disabilities are
the result of a specific, identifiable act of
duty unique to police work. (Ryndak v. River
Grove Police Pension Board (1993), 248 Ill.
App. 3d 486, 490; Wall v. Police Pension Board
(1988), 178 Ill. App. 3d 438, 444; Olson v.
City of Wheaton Police Pension Board (1987),
153 Ill. App. 3d 595 (cited with approval in
Ryndak and Wall).) Conversely, where the
disability is traceable only to the `general
nature of being a police officer' and not to a
specific act of police service, line-of-duty
disability pensions are denied. (See Ryndak,
248 Ill. App. 3d at 490.) Similarly, where the
causes of the stress are not unique to police
work, line-of-duty disability pensions are
also denied. (See Wall, 178 Ill. App. 3d at
444; Ryndak, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 490.) These
general rules are an outgrowth of judicial
attempts to define and apply the term `act of
duty' to cases involving claimed psychological
disabilities." Trettenero, 268 Ill. App. 3d at
63-64.
Courts reason that civilians regularly suffer stress
in many aspects of their jobs. Thus, to be eligible for
a line-of-duty disability pension based on stress, a
police officer's psychological disability must result
from "a `special risk, not ordinarily assumed by a
citizen in the ordinary walks of life.' " Olson, 153 Ill.
App. 3d at 599, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 108«,
par. 5--113, now codified at 40 ILCS 5/5--113 (West
1994); accord Batka v. Board of Trustees of the Village
of Orland Park Police Pension Fund, 186 Ill. App. 3d 715,
724 (1989).
In reversing the circuit court and the Board in this
case, the appellate court did not address these
principles. The appellate court began its reasoning with
the phrase from section 3--114.1: "incurred in or
resulting from the performance of an act of duty." 40
ILCS 5/3--114.1 (West 1994). The court reasoned that the
words "incur" and "resulting from" were equivalent to the
word "cause." The court then reasoned that the tort
concept of proximate cause allows for more than one cause
of an injury. Thus, the court concluded that a disabled
police officer should not be deprived of a line-of-duty
disability pension as long as one of the causes of the
disability resulted from an act of duty. 283 Ill. App. 3d
at 827-28. The appellate court entered judgment in favor
of Robbins for a line-of-duty disability pension because
"Robbins' debilitating mental condition was caused, at
least in part, by his on-duty functions as a police
officer." 283 Ill. App. 3d at 829.
This circuitous reasoning and its conclusion are
erroneous. The appellate court awarded Robbins a line-of-
duty disability pension based on generalized police
stress of multiple origins that caused his disability.
The court based this conclusion on the common law
concepts of negligence and proximate cause, and not on
the plain language of the Pension Code. "However, a court
should not attempt to read a statute other than in the
manner in which it was written. In applying plain and
unambiguous language, it is not necessary for a court to
search for any subtle or not readily apparent intention
of the legislature." DiFoggio, 156 Ill. 2d at 383; see
Laborer's International Union of North America, Local
1280 v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 154 Ill.
App. 3d 1045, 1057-60 (1987).
As the Board notes, this is a statutory action with
explicit requirements and not a common law negligence
action. The appellate court had to look no further than
the plain language of the Pension Code, which requires
that the line-of-duty disability result from an act of
duty.
The Present Case
It is undisputed that Robbins suffered from stress,
which in turn led to, inter alia, depression and alcohol
abuse. What is disputed is the source of the stress. In
his brief before this court, Robbins claims that his
mental disability "resulted from an act of duty and was
not a result of generalized stress." He argues that the
report of the Board's psychologist, Dr. Ostrov, and the
reports of his three psychologists, Drs. David Gilliam,
James Peterson, and Michael Althoff, all "indicate
conclusively" that his disability resulted from
witnessing the January 1, 1990, shotgun suicide.
Robbins misreads the record. The Board's
psychologist, Dr. Ostrov, concluded that while Robbins'
stress was related to his police work, the stress was not
connected to any specific act of Robbins as a police
officer. The conclusions of Robbins' own three
psychologists accord with that of Dr. Ostrov. Drs.
Althoff and Peterson each concluded that Robbins had
significant daily stress beginning with his reassignment
to patrol duty in 1988. Dr. Gilliam specifically
concluded: "1. Mr. Robbins' past exposure to occasional
violence was not problematic for him. 2. His continuous
exposure to possible violence, as well as the pace of his
duties in general, were of considerable stress."
(Emphasis added.) The Board found that this record
contained insufficient evidence that the stress resulted
from the performance of an act of duty.
We cannot say that the Board's decision was against
the manifest weight of the evidence. Rather, this record
contains ample evidence that Robbins' stress was the
result of his anxiety over his job performance, which
civilians regularly suffer, and not the performance of a
specific act of duty. See, e.g., Trettenero, 268 Ill.
App. 3d at 68-69 (and cases cited therein).
This is not a case where a police officer's injury
resulted from the performance of a specific act of duty.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's
Annuity & Benefit Fund, 114 Ill. 2d 518 (1986). Also, our
decision here does not mean that a police officer can
never receive a line-of-duty disability pension for a
psychological disability. Of course, Robbins still
receives a nonduty disability pension. See 40 ILCS 5/3--
114.2 (West 1994).
CONCLUSION
Courts liberally construe pension laws in favor of
those to be benefitted. Colton v. Board of Trustees of
the Firemen's Pension Fund, 287 Ill. 56, 61 (1919); Hahn
v. Police Pension Fund, 138 Ill. App. 3d 206, 211 (1985).
However:
"[w]hile a pension act should be liberally
construed to effect the object sought to be
accomplished, yet if the legislative intention
is obvious from the language used that
intention must be made effective, and the
judiciary will not be warranted in giving the
act a meaning not expressed in it." Sup v.
Cervenka, 331 Ill. 459, 463 (1928).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
appellate court is reversed, and the judgment of the
circuit court of Jackson County is affirmed.
Appellate court reversed;
circuit court affirmed.
JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
The appellate court viewed this case as presenting
the question of whether a police officer should receive
a line-of-duty pension where injuries arising from an act
of duty were one cause of his disability, but not the
sole cause. If that view were correct, resolution of this
case would be straightforward. There is no "sole cause"
requirement. The Illinois Pension Code states simply that
the disability must have resulted from sickness, accident
or injury incurred in or resulting from the performance
of an act of duty. 40 ILCS 5/3--114.1 (West 1992). Under
this statute, the duty-related incident need not have
been the originating or primary cause of the disabling
injury. Barber v. Board of Trustees of the Village of
South Barrington Police Pension Fund, 256 Ill. App. 3d
814, 818 (1993). In order to qualify for a line-of-duty
pension, a police officer need only show that a duty-
related injury contributed to his disability (Wilfert v.
Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund,
263 Ill. App. 3d 539, 543 (1994)), i.e., that the injury
was a cause of the disability (Wilfert, 263 Ill. App. 3d
at 545).
The matter before us today poses a more fundamental
question. The real issue here, as my colleagues correctly
recognize, is whether any part of the injury that caused
plaintiff's disability can be characterized as having
resulted from performance of an "act of duty."
There is no dispute that what disabled plaintiff was
psychological stress. There is likewise no dispute that
the stress is causally related to plaintiff's employment
as a police officer. The reason the Pension Board and my
colleagues nevertheless conclude that plaintiff is
ineligible for a line-of-duty pension has to do with the
source of plaintiff's stress.
The majority correctly holds that for a police
officer to qualify for a line-of-duty pension based on
psychological stress, the disability must result from a
"special risk, not ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the
ordinary walks of life" (40 ILCS 5/5--113 (West 1994)).
Slip op. at 7. The majority is wrong, however, in the way
it applies that limitation to the facts of this case.
The majority asserts that the statute was not
satisfied here because what disabled plaintiff is anxiety
over job performance, an affliction "civilians regularly
suffer." Slip op. at 9. At first blush this
characterization appears entirely reasonable. Working for
a police department can pose many of the same challenges
and demands as working in any other hierarchical
organization. In terms of factors such as bureaucracy,
paperwork, dealing with supervisors, competition for
promotion, lack of recognition, and dissatisfaction with
scheduling, little may differentiate law enforcement from
civilian occupations.
The problem is that the plaintiff's problems here
involved more than these generic organizational
stressors. Difficulty keeping up with reports and
criticism over the timeliness and accuracy of those
reports unquestionably played a role in plaintiff's
condition. At the heart of plaintiff's problem, however,
was something far more serious. What precipitated
plaintiff's disability was his transfer back to patrol
duty.
The dangers and physical demands of patrol duty have
no analogue in civilian life. They are qualitatively
different from those attendant to civilian occupations.
Civilians may be concerned about their ability to perform
their jobs and how well they are keeping up with their
coworkers, but how many of them have the power to save or
to take lives, as patrol officers do? How many face the
possibility of being shot every time they go to work, as
patrol officers do? How many are required to confront
disaster and violence and tragedy and death, as patrol
officers are?
These were not abstractions for plaintiff. He had
faced death on the job, and the evidence established that
the continuous exposure to possible violence was
something he could no longer tolerate. To dismiss this as
the kind of job performance anxiety that "civilians
regularly suffer" diminishes the scope of the pressures
facing plaintiff and is an affront to law enforcement
professionals.
Even if my colleague's comparison were apt, which it
is not, their analysis would still be flawed. The fact
that a police officer was disabled as the result of
factors common to other occupations is not dispositive of
his right to a line-of-duty pension. Rather, "[t]he crux
is the capacity in which the police officer is acting."
Johnson v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity &
Benefit Fund, 114 Ill. 2d 518, 522 (1986). As long as the
disabling events occurred while the officer was
performing his duties as a patrolman, the provisions of
section 3--114.1 of the Pension Code apply, and the
officer qualifies for a line-of-duty pension. Johnson,
114 Ill. 2d at 522.
Such a conclusion does not ignore the statutory
requirement that "special risk" be involved. Rather, it
acknowledges that "special risk" inheres in all police
work. Even the most mundane activities, such a crossing
the street, have an added dimension when done in the
context of law enforcement. That is why we adopted the
view, taken in other jurisdictions, that " `[a] policeman
is actually engaged in the performance of his duty for
the protection of life and property whenever he is
carrying out the official orders or requirements of his
office.' " Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 523, quoting Blanchard
v. New Orleans Police Department, 210 So. 2d 585, 588
(La. App. 1968). See also 40 ILCS 5/3--114.1 (West 1994)
(police officer considered "on duty" while on any
assignment approved by the chief of police).
As an additional basis for its decision, the
majority suggests that plaintiff is ineligible for a
line-of-duty pension because his disability cannot be
traced to any single, specific incident. Although this
approach has support in the line of appellate court
decisions represented by Trettenero v. Police Pension
Fund, 268 Ill. App. 3d 58 (1994), which the majority
cites, there is nothing in the Pension Code itself
imposing such a requirement.
To engraft this restriction on the Pension Code is
beyond our authority as judges and would yield results
that make no sense. Under the majority's "single
incident" rule, if a police officer was involved in a
particular incident that was so traumatic that he could
no longer perform his work, the officer could collect a
line-of-duty pension. If, however, the officer's
debilitating trauma did not come until after a series of
lesser events, none of which was significant by itself,
but whose cumulative effect was every bit as serious, a
line-of-duty pension would be denied.
Underlying the majority's view is the notion that
line-of-duty pensions are appropriate only where an
officer has been wounded in a shoot-out, or injured
during a high-speed pursuit, or otherwise incapacitated
during some obviously dangerous clash with criminal
elements. What my colleagues forget is that we have
previously addressed this view and specifically rejected
it as "overly restrictive and unrealistic." Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 522-23. I see no reason to take a contrary
position now.
The principle that pension laws are to be construed
liberally in favor of those to be benefitted (see, e.g.,
Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 521; Kozak v. Retirement Board of
the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 95 Ill. 2d 211, 217
(1983)) should be the cornerstone of the majority's
analysis. Instead, it did not merit even a passing
reference until the very end of the majority's opinion.
This omission is a telling one and is indicative, I
think, of a fundamental hostility to plaintiff's claim.
On any given day at any given place or time, a
policeman on the beat has more power over the citizens he
encounters than the President of the United States. This
is an awesome and profound responsibility. Inevitably
some will find the pressure overwhelming. When that
happens, when they can no longer go on, the General
Assembly has seen to it, through the Illinois Pension
Code, that they will be afforded some measure of relief
for their efforts. We should be grateful to them for
their service and happy to see that they receive as much
as the law allows. Donnie Robbins should receive the
line-of-duty pension to which he is entitled. I therefore
dissent.
(10/17/97)
NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days
after the filing of the opinion to request a rehearing.
Also, opinions are subject to modification, correction or
withdrawal at anytime prior to issuance of the mandate by
the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, because the following
slip opinion is being made available prior to the Court's
final action in this matter, it cannot be considered the
final decision of the Court. The official copy of the
following opinion will be published by the Supreme
Court's Reporter of Decisions in the Official Reports
advance sheets following final action by the Court.
Docket No. 82028--Agenda 20--May 1997.
DONNIE ROBBINS, Appellee, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF
THE CARBONDALE POLICE PENSION FUND OF THE CITY OF
CARBONDALE, ILLINOIS, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 17, 1997.
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the
court:
Donnie Robbins petitioned the Carbondale Police
Pension Fund for a disability pension pursuant to article
III of the Illinois Pension Code. 40 ILCS 5/3--101 et
seq. (West 1992). The fund's board of trustees (Board)
denied Robbins a line-of-duty disability pension, but
granted him a nonduty disability pension.
On administrative review, the circuit court of
Jackson County confirmed the Board's decision. However,
the appellate court reversed and entered judgment in
favor of Robbins for a line-of-duty disability pension.
283 Ill. App. 3d 823. We allowed the Board's petition for
leave to appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)) and now reverse
the appellate court.
BACKGROUND
The appellate court detailed the evidence in this
case. 283 Ill. App. 3d at 824-26. Therefore, we will
repeat only those facts necessary for our disposition of
this appeal. Briefly, in 1970, Robbins began working for
the Carbondale police department. From 1970 to 1979, he
worked as a patrol officer. From 1979 to 1988, he worked
as an evidence custodian. In 1988, at age 42, Robbins was
reassigned to patrol duty.
After his reassignment to patrol duty, Robbins'
performance caused him stress. The several stressful
aspects of Robbins' job generally stemmed from: (1) his
supervisor's criticism of the timeliness and quality of
his reports, and (2) his anxiety that his fellow patrol
officers were younger and better trained. The record also
contains evidence that, on January 1, 1990, Robbins was
particularly stressed while responding to a domestic
violence call. During that incident, Robbins witnessed a
man commit suicide by shooting himself in the face with
a shotgun.
Robbins continued working patrol duty until April
1992, when he injured his hand. In October 1992, he
returned to patrol duty. Two weeks later, the Carbondale
chief of police put Robbins on administrative leave
pending a psychological examination. Dr. Eric Ostrov
opined that Robbins was not mentally fit for duty. At the
end of November 1992, the police chief suspended Robbins
from duty.
In December 1992, Robbins petitioned the Carbondale
Police Pension Fund for a nonduty disability pension,
which amounted to 50% of the salary attached to his rank
on the force on the date of his suspension. See 40 ILCS
5/3--114.2 (West 1992). In January 1994, Robbins amended
his petition to add a claim for a line-of-duty disability
pension, which amounted to 65% of the salary attached to
his rank on the date of his suspension. See 40 ILCS 5/3--
114.1 (West 1992).
In March 1994, Robbins testified before the Board
and submitted three psychological evaluations. The Board
subsequently received the evidence deposition of Dr.
Ostrov. On September 22, 1994, the Board denied Robbins
a line-of-duty disability pension, but granted him a
nonduty disability pension.
Robbins filed a complaint in the circuit court of
Jackson County seeking administrative review of the
Board's denial of a line-of-duty pension. The circuit
court confirmed the Board's decision. However, the
appellate court reversed the circuit court and the Board.
The appellate court entered judgment in favor of Robbins
for a line-of-duty disability pension. The Board appeals.
DISCUSSION
We explain at the outset our standard of review.
Article III of the Pension Code provides that judicial
review of the Board's decisions be in accordance with the
Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3--101 et seq.
(West 1994)). 40 ILCS 5/3--148 (West 1994). The
Administrative Review Law provides that our review
extends to all questions of law and fact presented by the
entire record. The statute limits our review to the
record before us; we may not hear new or additional
evidence. The statute also mandates that the "findings
and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions
of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and
correct." 735 ILCS 5/3--110 (West 1994).
On administrative review, a court's function is to
ascertain whether the findings and decision of the agency
are against the manifest weight of the evidence. An
administrative agency decision is against the manifest
weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is
clearly evident. The mere fact that an opposite
conclusion is reasonable or that the reviewing court
might have ruled differently will not justify reversal of
the administrative findings. If the record contains
evidence that supports the agency's decision, it should
be upheld. Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of
Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88 (1992).
In this case, the appellate court stated that it was
not deciding whether the Board's decision was against the
manifest weight of the evidence, but rather, whether the
Board and the circuit court properly applied the law to
the facts. 283 Ill. App. 3d at 827. The rule that an
administrative agency's findings of fact should not be
disturbed unless they are against the manifest weight of
the evidence does not apply where the question involved
is one of law, such as the proper interpretation of a
statute. Rather, in such a case, the Board's finding is
not binding on the court. Envirite Corp. v. Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency, 158 Ill. 2d 210, 214
(1994); DiFoggio v. Retirement Board of the County
Employees Annuity & Benefit Fund, 156 Ill. 2d 377, 380-81
(1993).
Section 3--114.1 of the Pension Code provides for a
line-of-duty disability pension as follows:
"Disability pension--Line of Duty. If a
police officer as the result of sickness,
accident or injury incurred in or resulting
from the performance of an act of duty, is
found to be physically or mentally disabled
for service in the police department, so as to
render necessary his or her suspension or
retirement from the police service, the police
officer shall be entitled to a disability
retirement pension of 65% of the salary
attached to the rank on the police force held
by the officer at the date of suspension of
duty or retirement. A police officer shall be
considered `on duty', while on any assignment
approved by the chief of the police department
of the municipality he or she serves, whether
the assignment is within or outside the
municipality." 40 ILCS 5/3--114.1 (West 1994).
In contrast, Pension Code section 3--114.2 provides
for a nonduty pension. Under this section, a nonduty
pension shall be granted to "a police officer who becomes
disabled as a result of any cause other than the
performance of an act of duty, and who is found to be
physically or mentally disabled so as to render necessary
his or her suspension or retirement from police service
in the police department." A nonduty disability pension
amounts to "50% of the salary attached to the officer's
rank on the police force at the date of suspension of
duty or retirement." 40 ILCS 5/3--114.2 (West 1994).
The controlling principles are familiar:
"The primary rule of statutory interpretation
is that a court should ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the legislature.
The legislative intent should be sought
primarily from the language used in the
statute. [Citation.] The statute should be
evaluated as a whole; each provision should be
construed in connection with every other
section. [Citation.] `Where the language of
the act is certain and unambiguous the only
legitimate function of the courts is to
enforce the law as enacted by the
legislature.' [Citation.]" Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 91.
"An Act of Duty"
Pension Code section 3--114.1 requires, inter alia,
that the officer's disability result from "an act of
duty." 40 ILCS 5/3--114.1 (West 1994). That phrase is not
defined in that section or anywhere in article III of the
Pension Code. However, that phrase is defined in article
V of the Code. 40 ILCS 5/5--113 (West 1994). Article III
of the Code pertains to police pension funds in
municipalities with populations under 500,000, while
article V pertains to the same subject in municipalities
with populations exceeding 500,000. Compare 40 ILCS 5/3--
101 et seq. (West 1994) with 40 ILCS 5/5--101 et seq.
(West 1994).
We may look to article V of the Pension Code for a
definition of language used in article III of the Code.
We emphasize that:
"the intent of the legislature in enacting a
statute must be determined by examining the
entire statute and by construing each material
part of the legislation together. [Citation.]
A court should consider each part or section
of a legislative act in connection with every
other part or section, and not each part
alone, in determining the purpose or intent of
the legislature." (Emphasis in original.)
Castaneda v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 318 (1989).
Accord Huckaba v. Cox, 14 Ill. 2d 126, 131 (1958).
"Moreover, when an act defines its terms, those terms
must be construed according to the definitions contained
in the act." People ex rel. Scott v. Schwulst Building
Center, Inc., 89 Ill. 2d 365, 371 (1982); accord Garza v.
Navistar International Transportation Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 379 (1996).
We note that the appellate court has specifically
used Pension Code section 5--113 as a guide to interpret
the phrase "act of duty" in section 3--114.1. Trettenero
v. Police Pension Fund, 268 Ill. App. 3d 58, 64-65
(1994); Olson v. City of Wheaton Police Pension Board,
153 Ill. App. 3d 595, 598-99 (1987). However, in Worth v.
Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund, 230 Ill.
App. 3d 349, 354-55 (1992), the appellate court
criticized this analysis. The court in Worth relied on
Pension Code section 5--102, which provides that the
terms used in article V shall have the meaning ascribed
to them by the definitional sections in article V. 40
ILCS 5/5--102 (West 1994). Based on this section, the
Worth court reasoned that the definition of an "act of
duty" in article V of the Code applied only to cases
brought under article V. Thus, the Worth court concluded
that the definition of "act of duty" in article V of the
Code could not be used in a case arising under article
III.
We disagree with this reasoning in Worth. Initially,
just because the legislature provided that a phrase used
in article V, e.g., "act of duty," is to have the meaning
ascribed to it in that article does not mean that the
legislature intended the identical phrase in article III
to have a different meaning. It is fundamental that where
a word or phrase is used in different sections of the
same legislative act, a court presumes that the word or
phrase is used with the same meaning throughout the act,
unless a contrary legislative intent is clearly
expressed. Schwulst Building Center, 89 Ill. 2d at 372;
Moran v. Katsinas, 16 Ill. 2d 169, 174 (1959). Based on
this principle, this court has approved the use of
definitions of phrases in article V of the Pension Code
in cases arising under article III. Borg v. Village of
Schiller Park Police Pension Board, 99 Ill. 2d 376, 381
(1984).
Moreover, the legislature expressly provided that
article, division, or section headings in the Pension
Code do not "govern, limit, modify or in any manner
affect the scope, meaning or intent of the provisions of
any Article, Division or Section hereof." 40 ILCS 5/1--
103 (West 1994). The reasoning in Worth on this point is
erroneous and is not to be followed.
Pension Code section 5--113 defines an "act of duty"
as follows:
"Act of Duty. `Act of duty': Any act of
police duty inherently involving special risk,
not ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the
ordinary walks of life, imposed on a policeman
by the statutes of this State or by the
ordinances or police regulations of the city
in which this Article is in effect or by a
special assignment; or any act of heroism
performed in the city having for its direct
purpose the saving of the life or property of
a person other than the policeman." 40 ILCS
5/5--113 (West 1994).
We agree with the following principles that have
developed in applying Pension Code section 3--114.1, read
together with section 5--113, to claims of duty-related
stress:
"In examining claims of duty-related
stress like the one made in the instant case,
courts have required that plaintiff-police
officers demonstrate their disabilities are
the result of a specific, identifiable act of
duty unique to police work. (Ryndak v. River
Grove Police Pension Board (1993), 248 Ill.
App. 3d 486, 490; Wall v. Police Pension Board
(1988), 178 Ill. App. 3d 438, 444; Olson v.
City of Wheaton Police Pension Board (1987),
153 Ill. App. 3d 595 (cited with approval in
Ryndak and Wall).) Conversely, where the
disability is traceable only to the `general
nature of being a police officer' and not to a
specific act of police service, line-of-duty
disability pensions are denied. (See Ryndak,
248 Ill. App. 3d at 490.) Similarly, where the
causes of the stress are not unique to police
work, line-of-duty disability pensions are
also denied. (See Wall, 178 Ill. App. 3d at
444; Ryndak, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 490.) These
general rules are an outgrowth of judicial
attempts to define and apply the term `act of
duty' to cases involving claimed psychological
disabilities." Trettenero, 268 Ill. App. 3d at
63-64.
Courts reason that civilians regularly suffer stress
in many aspects of their jobs. Thus, to be eligible for
a line-of-duty disability pension based on stress, a
police officer's psychological disability must result
from "a `special risk, not ordinarily assumed by a
citizen in the ordinary walks of life.' " Olson, 153 Ill.
App. 3d at 599, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 108«,
par. 5--113, now codified at 40 ILCS 5/5--113 (West
1994); accord Batka v. Board of Trustees of the Village
of Orland Park Police Pension Fund, 186 Ill. App. 3d 715,
724 (1989).
In reversing the circuit court and the Board in this
case, the appellate court did not address these
principles. The appellate court began its reasoning with
the phrase from section 3--114.1: "incurred in or
resulting from the performance of an act of duty." 40
ILCS 5/3--114.1 (West 1994). The court reasoned that the
words "incur" and "resulting from" were equivalent to the
word "cause." The court then reasoned that the tort
concept of proximate cause allows for more than one cause
of an injury. Thus, the court concluded that a disabled
police officer should not be deprived of a line-of-duty
disability pension as long as one of the causes of the
disability resulted from an act of duty. 283 Ill. App. 3d
at 827-28. The appellate court entered judgment in favor
of Robbins for a line-of-duty disability pension because
"Robbins' debilitating mental condition was caused, at
least in part, by his on-duty functions as a police
officer." 283 Ill. App. 3d at 829.
This circuitous reasoning and its conclusion are
erroneous. The appellate court awarded Robbins a line-of-
duty disability pension based on generalized police
stress of multiple origins that caused his disability.
The court based this conclusion on the common law
concepts of negligence and proximate cause, and not on
the plain language of the Pension Code. "However, a court
should not attempt to read a statute other than in the
manner in which it was written. In applying plain and
unambiguous language, it is not necessary for a court to
search for any subtle or not readily apparent intention
of the legislature." DiFoggio, 156 Ill. 2d at 383; see
Laborer's International Union of North America, Local
1280 v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 154 Ill.
App. 3d 1045, 1057-60 (1987).
As the Board notes, this is a statutory action with
explicit requirements and not a common law negligence
action. The appellate court had to look no further than
the plain language of the Pension Code, which requires
that the line-of-duty disability result from an act of
duty.
The Present Case
It is undisputed that Robbins suffered from stress,
which in turn led to, inter alia, depression and alcohol
abuse. What is disputed is the source of the stress. In
his brief before this court, Robbins claims that his
mental disability "resulted from an act of duty and was
not a result of generalized stress." He argues that the
report of the Board's psychologist, Dr. Ostrov, and the
reports of his three psychologists, Drs. David Gilliam,
James Peterson, and Michael Althoff, all "indicate
conclusively" that his disability resulted from
witnessing the January 1, 1990, shotgun suicide.
Robbins misreads the record. The Board's
psychologist, Dr. Ostrov, concluded that while Robbins'
stress was related to his police work, the stress was not
connected to any specific act of Robbins as a police
officer. The conclusions of Robbins' own three
psychologists accord with that of Dr. Ostrov. Drs.
Althoff and Peterson each concluded that Robbins had
significant daily stress beginning with his reassignment
to patrol duty in 1988. Dr. Gilliam specifically
concluded: "1. Mr. Robbins' past exposure to occasional
violence was not problematic for him. 2. His continuous
exposure to possible violence, as well as the pace of his
duties in general, were of considerable stress."
(Emphasis added.) The Board found that this record
contained insufficient evidence that the stress resulted
from the performance of an act of duty.
We cannot say that the Board's decision was against
the manifest weight of the evidence. Rather, this record
contains ample evidence that Robbins' stress was the
result of his anxiety over his job performance, which
civilians regularly suffer, and not the performance of a
specific act of duty. See, e.g., Trettenero, 268 Ill.
App. 3d at 68-69 (and cases cited therein).
This is not a case where a police officer's injury
resulted from the performance of a specific act of duty.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's
Annuity & Benefit Fund, 114 Ill. 2d 518 (1986). Also, our
decision here does not mean that a police officer can
never receive a line-of-duty disability pension for a
psychological disability. Of course, Robbins still
receives a nonduty disability pension. See 40 ILCS 5/3--
114.2 (West 1994).
CONCLUSION
Courts liberally construe pension laws in favor of
those to be benefitted. Colton v. Board of Trustees of
the Firemen's Pension Fund, 287 Ill. 56, 61 (1919); Hahn
v. Police Pension Fund, 138 Ill. App. 3d 206, 211 (1985).
However:
"[w]hile a pension act should be liberally
construed to effect the object sought to be
accomplished, yet if the legislative intention
is obvious from the language used that
intention must be made effective, and the
judiciary will not be warranted in giving the
act a meaning not expressed in it." Sup v.
Cervenka, 331 Ill. 459, 463 (1928).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
appellate court is reversed, and the judgment of the
circuit court of Jackson County is affirmed.
Appellate court reversed;
circuit court affirmed.
JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
The appellate court viewed this case as presenting
the question of whether a police officer should receive
a line-of-duty pension where injuries arising from an act
of duty were one cause of his disability, but not the
sole cause. If that view were correct, resolution of this
case would be straightforward. There is no "sole cause"
requirement. The Illinois Pension Code states simply that
the disability must have resulted from sickness, accident
or injury incurred in or resulting from the performance
of an act of duty. 40 ILCS 5/3--114.1 (West 1992). Under
this statute, the duty-related incident need not have
been the originating or primary cause of the disabling
injury. Barber v. Board of Trustees of the Village of
South Barrington Police Pension Fund, 256 Ill. App. 3d
814, 818 (1993). In order to qualify for a line-of-duty
pension, a police officer need only show that a duty-
related injury contributed to his disability (Wilfert v.
Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund,
263 Ill. App. 3d 539, 543 (1994)), i.e., that the injury
was a cause of the disability (Wilfert, 263 Ill. App. 3d
at 545).
The matter before us today poses a more fundamental
question. The real issue here, as my colleagues correctly
recognize, is whether any part of the injury that caused
plaintiff's disability can be characterized as having
resulted from performance of an "act of duty."
There is no dispute that what disabled plaintiff was
psychological stress. There is likewise no dispute that
the stress is causally related to plaintiff's employment
as a police officer. The reason the Pension Board and my
colleagues nevertheless conclude that plaintiff is
ineligible for a line-of-duty pension has to do with the
source of plaintiff's stress.
The majority correctly holds that for a police
officer to qualify for a line-of-duty pension based on
psychological stress, the disability must result from a
"special risk, not ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the
ordinary walks of life" (40 ILCS 5/5--113 (West 1994)).
Slip op. at 7. The majority is wrong, however, in the way
it applies that limitation to the facts of this case.
The majority asserts that the statute was not
satisfied here because what disabled plaintiff is anxiety
over job performance, an affliction "civilians regularly
suffer." Slip op. at 9. At first blush this
characterization appears entirely reasonable. Working for
a police department can pose many of the same challenges
and demands as working in any other hierarchical
organization. In terms of factors such as bureaucracy,
paperwork, dealing with supervisors, competition for
promotion, lack of recognition, and dissatisfaction with
scheduling, little may differentiate law enforcement from
civilian occupations.
The problem is that the plaintiff's problems here
involved more than these generic organizational
stressors. Difficulty keeping up with reports and
criticism over the timeliness and accuracy of those
reports unquestionably played a role in plaintiff's
condition. At the heart of plaintiff's problem, however,
was something far more serious. What precipitated
plaintiff's disability was his transfer back to patrol
duty.
The dangers and physical demands of patrol duty have
no analogue in civilian life. They are qualitatively
different from those attendant to civilian occupations.
Civilians may be concerned about their ability to perform
their jobs and how well they are keeping up with their
coworkers, but how many of them have the power to save or
to take lives, as patrol officers do? How many face the
possibility of being shot every time they go to work, as
patrol officers do? How many are required to confront
disaster and violence and tragedy and death, as patrol
officers are?
These were not abstractions for plaintiff. He had
faced death on the job, and the evidence established that
the continuous exposure to possible violence was
something he could no longer tolerate. To dismiss this as
the kind of job performance anxiety that "civilians
regularly suffer" diminishes the scope of the pressures
facing plaintiff and is an affront to law enforcement
professionals.
Even if my colleague's comparison were apt, which it
is not, their analysis would still be flawed. The fact
that a police officer was disabled as the result of
factors common to other occupations is not dispositive of
his right to a line-of-duty pension. Rather, "[t]he crux
is the capacity in which the police officer is acting."
Johnson v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity &
Benefit Fund, 114 Ill. 2d 518, 522 (1986). As long as the
disabling events occurred while the officer was
performing his duties as a patrolman, the provisions of
section 3--114.1 of the Pension Code apply, and the
officer qualifies for a line-of-duty pension. Johnson,
114 Ill. 2d at 522.
Such a conclusion does not ignore the statutory
requirement that "special risk" be involved. Rather, it
acknowledges that "special risk" inheres in all police
work. Even the most mundane activities, such a crossing
the street, have an added dimension when done in the
context of law enforcement. That is why we adopted the
view, taken in other jurisdictions, that " `[a] policeman
is actually engaged in the performance of his duty for
the protection of life and property whenever he is
carrying out the official orders or requirements of his
office.' " Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 523, quoting Blanchard
v. New Orleans Police Department, 210 So. 2d 585, 588
(La. App. 1968). See also 40 ILCS 5/3--114.1 (West 1994)
(police officer considered "on duty" while on any
assignment approved by the chief of police).
As an additional basis for its decision, the
majority suggests that plaintiff is ineligible for a
line-of-duty pension because his disability cannot be
traced to any single, specific incident. Although this
approach has support in the line of appellate court
decisions represented by Trettenero v. Police Pension
Fund, 268 Ill. App. 3d 58 (1994), which the majority
cites, there is nothing in the Pension Code itself
imposing such a requirement.
To engraft this restriction on the Pension Code is
beyond our authority as judges and would yield results
that make no sense. Under the majority's "single
incident" rule, if a police officer was involved in a
particular incident that was so traumatic that he could
no longer perform his work, the officer could collect a
line-of-duty pension. If, however, the officer's
debilitating trauma did not come until after a series of
lesser events, none of which was significant by itself,
but whose cumulative effect was every bit as serious, a
line-of-duty pension would be denied.
Underlying the majority's view is the notion that
line-of-duty pensions are appropriate only where an
officer has been wounded in a shoot-out, or injured
during a high-speed pursuit, or otherwise incapacitated
during some obviously dangerous clash with criminal
elements. What my colleagues forget is that we have
previously addressed this view and specifically rejected
it as "overly restrictive and unrealistic." Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 522-23. I see no reason to take a contrary
position now.
The principle that pension laws are to be construed
liberally in favor of those to be benefitted (see, e.g.,
Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 521; Kozak v. Retirement Board of
the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 95 Ill. 2d 211, 217
(1983)) should be the cornerstone of the majority's
analysis. Instead, it did not merit even a passing
reference until the very end of the majority's opinion.
This omission is a telling one and is indicative, I
think, of a fundamental hostility to plaintiff's claim.
On any given day at any given place or time, a
policeman on the beat has more power over the citizens he
encounters than the President of the United States. This
is an awesome and profound responsibility. Inevitably
some will find the pressure overwhelming. When that
happens, when they can no longer go on, the General
Assembly has seen to it, through the Illinois Pension
Code, that they will be afforded some measure of relief
for their efforts. We should be grateful to them for
their service and happy to see that they receive as much
as the law allows. Donnie Robbins should receive the
line-of-duty pension to which he is entitled. I therefore
dissent.
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