In re A.P.

In re A.P., No. 81022 (11/20/97)

NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after the filing of the
opinion to request a rehearing. Also, opinions are subject to modification, correction or
withdrawal at anytime prior to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court.
Therefore, because the following slip opinion is being made available prior to the
Court's final action in this matter, it cannot be considered the final decision of the
Court. The official copy of the following opinion will be published by the Supreme
Court's Reporter of Decisions in the Official Reports advance sheets following final
action by the Court.

Docket No. 81022--Agenda 8--May 1997.
In re A.P., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Anthony
P., Appellant).
Opinion filed November 20, 1997.

JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:
This appeal arises out of a petition for adjudication of wardship filed by
the State in the circuit court of Cook County requesting the court to adjudicate
A.P., a four-year-old female child, a ward of the court and to remove A.P. from
the home of her parents, Anthony P. and Louise B. After an adjudicatory hearing,
the circuit court found that A.P. had been sexually abused by her father, the
respondent. The circuit court subsequently found both parents to be unfit and that
it was in the best interest of A.P. to adjudicate her a ward of the court and remove
her from the custody of her parents. The court placed A.P. in the guardianship of
Gary T. Morgan, the Guardianship Administrator of the Department of Children
and Family Services (DCFS), with the right to place A.P. The respondent appealed
from the juvenile court's findings. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of
the circuit court. No. 1--94--1928 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule
23). We allowed the respondent's petition for leave to appeal (166 Ill. 2d R. 315;
134 Ill. 2d R. 660(b)). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the
appellate court.

FACTS
The issues presented in this appeal require that we discuss the facts in
some detail.
On March 24, 1993, a report was made to the DCFS child abuse hotline
that A.P. had been sexually abused. On April 5, 1993, the State filed a petition for
adjudication of wardship of A.P. pursuant to sections 2--3(2)(ii) and 2--3(2)(iii)
of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2--3(2)(ii), (2)(iii) (West 1992)),
alleging that there existed substantial risk of physical injury and sexual abuse to
A.P. On that same date, the circuit court granted the State temporary custody of
A.P. The court determined that there was probable cause that A.P. was abused and
that it was necessary to remove A.P. from her parents' home. The Cook County
public guardian was appointed as A.P.'s attorney and her guardian ad litem. An
adjudicatory hearing was subsequently held to consider the allegations in the
State's petition for adjudication of wardship. Such a proceeding is civil in nature
such that a finding of abuse need only be supported by a preponderance of the
evidence. 705 ILCS 405/2--18(1) (West 1992).
At the adjudicatory hearing, Michelle Weber testified that she and her
boyfriend, Michael Bell, A.P.'s uncle, baby-sat A.P. on the evening of March 24,
1993, at the one-bedroom apartment of A.P.'s parents. At some point during the
evening, A.P. went into the bathroom. While in the bathroom, A.P. called
Michelle and complained that "it hurt down there," pointing to her vagina.
Michelle assumed A.P. had a rash and looked for some Vaseline, but was unable
to find it. When it was time to put on A.P.'s pajamas, A.P. asked Michelle to first
put on new underwear because "it hurts down there." Michelle asked where A.P.
was hurting and A.P. again pointed to her vagina. A.P. indicated that she was hurt
"when daddy was inside by my belly button." When Michelle asked her to show
her where it hurt, A.P., who had her pants off, sat down on the floor, opened her
legs, and pointed to her vagina. Michelle noticed that A.P.'s vagina was red, and
the vaginal opening was about the size of a quarter.
A.P. then began to get excited and say things like "toe-toe" and "doe-doe,"
which Michelle did not understand. Michelle attempted to calm A.P. A.P. again
complained that her "peepee" hurt and that her father had hurt her down there
"when he was inside me." When Michelle asked who had hurt her, A.P. said
"daddy." Michelle then dressed A.P. for bed and laid her on her mattress, which
was next to her parents' mattress. Later in the evening, Michelle heard A.P. in the
bedroom screaming and calling out: "owie, owie, no, no," "daddy," and "it hurts,
it hurts." Michelle told Michael what had happened and Michael called his mother,
A.P.'s maternal grandmother. A.P. was later taken to the emergency room at the
hospital. After being released from the hospital, A.P. stayed with an aunt and
uncle for a couple of days. About two days after A.P.'s release from the hospital,
Michelle visited her. A.P. began saying "toe-toe" and "doe-doe" again. Michelle
asked her what that meant and A.P. pointed to her vagina and said "toe-toe."
Jennifer Daniels, the assistant director of the Children's Advocacy Center
of Northwest Cook County, testified that A.P.'s case was referred to her agency
following a hotline report to DCFS. Daniels interviewed A.P. on March 30 and
April 1, 1993. At the initial interview, Daniels asked A.P. if she knew why she
was at the center. A.P. responded that this was the place to talk about "daddy."
Daniels then asked A.P. if she had ever stayed with anybody besides her parents,
and A.P. stated that she had stayed with her aunt and uncle. When Daniels asked
A.P. if she had been to the hospital, A.P. stated that her uncle took her to the
hospital because "daddy hurt my peepee." Daniels questioned A.P. about how her
father had hurt her, and A.P. said: "Daddy took a knife and hit me on my peepee."
Daniels inquired about what A.P. was wearing when this happened. A.P.
responded that she was wearing a nightgown and that her father pulled up the
nightgown over her head but did not remove it.
During this initial interview, A.P. was asked to identify body parts on an
anatomically correct female doll, and she referred to the vagina as "peepee." A.P.
also identified body parts on an anatomically correct male doll, whose penis she
referred to as "peepee." When asked to demonstrate how her father had hurt her
on her peepee, A.P. hit the vagina of the doll, and said that the knife cut her.
There were play utensils in the interview room. A.P. took a play knife and used
it to hit the doll's vagina using the flat side of the blade. A.P. said the knife went
inside her. On cross-examination, Daniels admitted that A.P. stated that she had
not seen her father undressing or showering, and that her father had not shown her
his penis.
Also during the first interview, A.P. indicated to Daniels that she told her
Aunt Michelle what had happened. A.P. initially denied that she had told her
mother about the incident. Later, A.P. said that she had told her mother and that
her mother had sent her to her room. A.P. never stated when the incident with her
father happened. Daniels testified that A.P. never indicated that anyone other than
her father had abused her.
Daniels interviewed A.P. again on April 1, 1993. A.P. indicated that she
remembered talking previously with Daniels about her father. A.P. said she saw
her father after the interview on March 30 and that her father was mad that she
"told." A.P. subsequently became upset and refused to talk to Daniels any further
about her father.
Karen Beckelman, a child protection investigator for DCFS, testified that
she observed and listened to Jennifer Daniels interview A.P. on March 30 and
April 1, 1993. Beckelman heard A.P. make statements that she had been sexually
molested by her father. Throughout the interview on March 30, A.P. did not name
any other perpetrators. After the March 30 interview, Beckelman permitted A.P.'s
mother, Louise, to take A.P. home; however, she instructed her that A.P. was to
have no contact with the respondent. After observing the second interview of A.P.,
Beckelman learned that A.P. had contact with her father when he stayed overnight
at her mother's apartment. As a result of A.P.'s unauthorized contact with the
respondent, Beckelman sought protective custody of A.P.
Dr. Constance Blade, a pediatrician and expert on child abuse, examined
A.P. on April 1 and April 8, 1993. Using a special instrument, a colposcope,
which provides light and magnification, Dr. Blade examined A.P.'s anal and
genital anatomy. Dr. Blade found that A.P. had an abnormal hymen in that its
opening was enlarged and it had an irregular border. A.P.'s hymen indicated to Dr.
Blade that A.P. had suffered a previous trauma to the bottom part of her hymen,
where it was thickened. Further, the opening in A.P.'s hymen was about six or
seven millimeters. A girl of A.P.'s age usually has an opening of two millimeters
in diameter. According to Dr. Blade, the upper limit of normal for a girl A.P.'s
age was four millimeters. Dr. Blade also found a notch in A.P.'s hymen, which
she believed indicated that something had previously stretched the hymen beyond
its elasticity, causing it to tear.
Following her examinations of A.P., Dr. Blade diagnosed A.P. as having
been sexually abused. The examinations revealed a penetration, which she assessed
was caused by either a finger or a foreign object inserted into A.P.'s vagina.
However, Dr. Blade did not believe there had been penile penetration, because the
physical damage would have been far greater and there would be more
abnormalities in her genital examination. When she examined A.P., there was no
inflammation or evidence that there was current healing. Rather, A.P. had already
healed. Dr. Blade opined that the injury had been inflicted two weeks or more
before A.P.'s examination because that area of the anatomy heals quickly.
Dr. Blade further described that the hymen is well protected by its location,
which is recessed a full inch into the vagina. The hymen is also well protected by
the thigh muscles and the bones of the pelvis. Given that the hymen is located in
such a well-protected environment, Dr. Blade found that it was highly unlikely
that A.P. had sustained her injuries during a fall. Although a fall was a possible
cause, that fall would have had to entail her falling directly onto something that
was small enough to penetrate in between the muscles and pelvic bones to injure
the hymen. However, had A.P. fallen onto something small enough to cause injury
to her hymen, there would have been significant damage requiring emergency
care. Dr. Blade did not see any indication of such damage. Dr. Blade further
explained that it was unlikely that A.P. had injured herself through masturbation
because an injury like A.P.'s would have hurt when inflicted. Dr. Blade noted that
children who masturbate generally touch areas anterior to the hymen and do so in
such a way that it feels pleasurable. After considering all the possible
explanations, including the possibility of A.P.'s falling or masturbating, Dr. Blade
concluded that A.P. was sexually abused.
Dr. Blade examined the records of A.P.'s emergency room visit on March
24, 1993. Dr. Blade found that those records were not inconsistent with her
diagnosis of sexual abuse. Dr. Blade explained that although an emergency room
doctor therein noted that A.P.'s hymen was "intact," such terminology traditionally
meant "virginal," meaning no penile penetration. According to Dr. Blade, a minor
can have an "intact" hymen and there can still be evidence of sexual abuse by
digital penetration. Dr. Blade noted that the emergency room doctor had conducted
only an external examination, and had not conducted an internal examination using
a colposcope. The emergency room doctor had therefore missed evidence of
sexual abuse. Dr. Blade explained that emergency room doctors are not trained to
look closely for evidence of sexual abuse.
The final witness for the State was Ann Maria Caravello, A.P.'s aunt.
Caravello testified that A.P. and A.P.'s mother lived with her and her husband,
Brian, in Arlington Heights, Illinois, during the summer of 1991. Thereafter, A.P.
and her mother moved into a battered women's shelter in Evanston. Caravello
stated that she had a conversation with A.P. on March 25, 1993, after A.P. had
been in the emergency room. A.P. told her that her father had a long "peepee,"
that "doe-doe" was her father and that he had cut her "peepee" with a pair of
scissors.
The State rested its case. Neither the respondent nor A.P.'s mother
presented any witnesses. After considering the evidence, the circuit court found
that A.P. had been physically and sexually abused and that there was a substantial
risk of physical injury to her in the home of her parents. The court ultimately
entered an order finding that A.P. was sexually abused by the respondent.
Following a dispositional hearing, at which the court heard testimony from a
DCFS caseworker, the court found that A.P.'s parents were unfit and that it was
in the best interest of A.P. that she be adjudicated a ward of the court. The court
ordered that guardianship of A.P. be placed in Gary T. Morgan with the right to
place A.P. The court allowed scheduled visitation between A.P. and her parents
to continue.
The respondent appealed the circuit court's orders and the appellate court
affirmed. A.P.'s mother apparently did not appeal. The appellate court held that
the circuit court did not err in finding that the respondent sexually abused A.P.
because A.P. consistently identified him as her abuser. The appellate court
acknowledged that the only evidence that A.P.'s father was the person who
sexually abused her was A.P.'s hearsay statements to adult witnesses.
Nevertheless, the appellate court found that this hearsay evidence was corroborated
by medical evidence.

ANALYSIS
The respondent argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the
finding that he had abused A.P. because that evidence consisted solely of A.P.'s
uncorroborated hearsay statements. The respondent's contention in this regard is
twofold. First, he contends that the use of A.P.'s statements to support a finding
of abuse violated section 2--18(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2--
18(4)(c) (West 1992)) because the statements were not sufficiently corroborated.
Second, the respondent contends that A.P.'s hearsay statements were unreliable
and their use to support a finding of abuse therefore violated due process.

I
We first address the respondent's argument that the use of A.P.'s hearsay
statements to support a finding of abuse violated section 2--18(4)(c) because they
were not sufficiently corroborated.
Section 2--18(4)(c) of the Juvenile Court Act governs the use of a minor's
hearsay statements in a civil adjudicatory hearing to determine whether the minor
is abused or neglected. Section 2--18(4)(c) provides:
"Previous statements made by the minor relating to any
allegations of abuse or neglect shall be admissible in evidence.
However, no such statement, if uncorroborated and not subject to
cross-examination, shall be sufficient in itself to support a finding
of abuse or neglect." 705 ILCS 405/2--18(4)(c) (West 1992).
The respondent claims that, in order for hearsay statements to support a
finding of abuse, section 2--18(4)(c) requires that both the occurrence of the abuse
and the identity of the abuser be independently corroborated by other evidence.
In this case, the circuit court's finding of abuse by the respondent was premised
on the hearsay statements of A.P. The respondent argues that these statements
were not sufficiently corroborated because there was no corroboration of A.P.'s
identification of him as the abuser. Consequently, the respondent contends the
statements were insufficient to support a finding of abuse against him, pursuant
to section 2--18(4)(c).
There is a conflict among the districts of our appellate court regarding the
type of corroboration required by section 2--18(4)(c). The appellate court cases are
divided on what aspects of a minor's hearsay statement must be corroborated. One
district of the appellate court has held that the occurrence of the abuse and the
identity of the abuser must each be specifically corroborated. In re D.P., 176 Ill.
App. 3d 456 (3d Dist. 1988). Another district has held that section 2--18(4)(c)
requires corroboration only of the occurrence of the abuse. In re Walter B., 227
Ill. App. 3d 746 (1st Dist. 1992); In re C.C., 224 Ill. App. 3d 207 (1st Dist. 1991).
This conflict presents an issue of statutory construction. It is well settled
that in construing a statute, we must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
legislature. See Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 392 (1996); People v. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188, 195 (1993). The best evidence of legislative intent is the language of
the statute itself. See Nottage, 172 Ill. 2d at 392. Legislative intent may also be
discerned by a consideration of the reason and necessity for the statute, the evils
to be remedied, and the object to be obtained by the statute. See Bole, 155 Ill. 2d
at 195; People v. Garrett, 136 Ill. 2d 318, 329 (1990). We have a duty to avoid
a construction of the statute that would defeat the statute's purpose or yield an
absurd or unjust result. See Bole, 155 Ill. 2d at 195; Croissant v. Joliet Park
District, 141 Ill. 2d 449, 455 (1990).
We therefore begin our inquiry into legislative intent by examining the
language of section 2--18(4)(c). The first sentence allows a minor's out-of-court
statements relating to allegations of abuse or neglect to be admitted into evidence
at a civil adjudicatory hearing to determine whether the minor is abused or
neglected. This sentence thus creates a statutory exception in the context of abuse
and neglect cases involving minors to the general rule against hearsay. At issue
in this case is the meaning of the second sentence, which explains when such
hearsay statements are sufficient to support a finding of abuse or neglect.
Under the plain language of the second sentence, a minor's hearsay
statement is sufficient to support a finding of abuse or neglect where the statement
either is subject to cross-examination or is corroborated by other evidence.
Parenthetically, we note that the respondent does not suggest that this sentence
should be interpreted to require both cross-examination and corroboration. To
interpret section 2--18(4)(c) as always requiring cross-examination of the minor
as a prerequisite to allowing the minor's hearsay statements to support a finding
of abuse or neglect would defeat the underlying purpose of that provision. The
underlying purpose of section 2--18(4)(c) is to provide a means of proving abuse
or neglect in cases where the minor is reluctant or unable to testify. To require
that the minor be subject to cross-examination, that is, to testify, in order for the
minor's statements to be used to support an abuse or neglect finding would
entirely defeat that purpose. We therefore construe the second sentence of section
2--18(4)(c) as requiring either cross-examination of the minor who made the
statement or corroboration of the minor's hearsay statement. This construction
comports with the purpose of the statute and best effectuates the legislative intent.
The respondent's argument with regard to section 2--18(4)(c) is directed
to the amount of corroboration required under that section. The respondent
contends that section 2--18(4)(c) requires both corroboration of the sexual abuse
and of the identity of the abuser. We reject the respondent's contention.
Section 2--18(4)(c) is a provision contained in the Juvenile Court Act of
1987 (705 ILCS 405/1--1 et seq. (West 1992)). It is well-recognized that a statute
should be evaluated as a whole with each provision being construed in connection
with every other section. See Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 397 (1994). In section 1--2 of the Act, the legislature directed that the
purpose and policy of the Act is to serve and protect the best interests of minors.
705 ILCS 405/1--2(1), (3) (West 1992); see In re J.J., 142 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (1991). In
addition, the legislature instructed that the Act is to be liberally construed to carry
out its purpose and policy. 705 ILCS 405/1--2(4) (West 1992). Consequently, we
have a duty to construe section 2--18(4)(c) in a liberal manner so as not to defeat
the purpose and policy of the Act.
In section 2--18(4)(c), the legislature sought to balance the welfare interests
of minors and the rights of those accused of abuse or neglect. Specifically, as
noted earlier, section 2--18(4)(c) was intended to provide a means of proving
abuse or neglect where a minor is unable or unwilling to testify, such as where the
minor is very young. Corroboration is particularly important given the fact that the
minor who made the statement will not be subject to cross-examination. However,
to interpret section 2--18(4)(c) as the respondent urges, to require specific
corroboration of the identity of the abuser, would tip the balance far too heavily
against the interest of protecting minors. If corroboration of the identity of the
accused is required, practically speaking, use of the hearsay statements to support
an abuse finding will be allowed only in those rare cases where there is an
eyewitness to the abuse or the abuser confesses. While a medical examination and
other physical evidence can provide corroboration of the occurrence of the abuse,
it is unlikely that there would be physical evidence to corroborate the identity of
the abuser. Consequently, if the respondent's argument is adopted, the hearsay
exception set forth in section 2--18(4)(c) would be rendered meaningless. We find
that the purpose of section 2--18(4)(c) is best effectuated by requiring
corroboration only of the occurrence of the abuse, not of the identity of the
abuser. Requiring this amount of corroboration provides sufficient protection to
the interests of those accused of abuse, without severely diminishing the welfare
interests of the minor. We therefore reject the respondent's argument that section
2--18(4)(c) requires specific corroboration of the identity of the abuser.
Accordingly, we hold that hearsay statements of a minor admitted pursuant
to section 2--18(4)(c) may be sufficient to support a finding of abuse or neglect
as long as there is corroboration that the abuse or neglect occurred. It is not
necessary to independently corroborate the identity of the perpetrator. There is
sufficient corroboration of the identity of the perpetrator when there is
corroboration of the occurrence of the abuse or neglect and the minor consistently
identifies the perpetrator. Once abuse or neglect is corroborated by independent
evidence, it lends credence to the minor's recitation of the incident, including the
identification of the perpetrator. This interpretation of section 2--18(4)(c) best
effectuates the purpose and policy of the Juvenile Court Act, by protecting both
the rights of those accused and the welfare of minors.
Of course, whether there is sufficient corroboration under section 2--
18(4)(c) is a determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis. However,
in all cases, sufficient corroboration of the abuse or neglect requires more than just
witnesses testifying that a minor related claims of abuse or neglect to them.
Because the term "corroboration" is not defined in section 2--18(4)(c), we rely on
its plain and ordinary meaning. "To corroborate" means to add weight or
credibility to a thing by additional and confirming facts or evidence, and
"corroborating evidence" means evidence supplementary to that already given and
tending to strengthen or confirm it. See Black's Law Dictionary 344-45 (6th ed.
1990). Accordingly, in the context of section 2--18(4)(c), corroborating evidence
of the abuse or neglect requires there to be independent evidence which would
support a logical and reasonable inference that the act of abuse or neglect
described in the hearsay statement occurred. In essence, corroborating evidence
is evidence that makes it more probable that a minor was abused or neglected. The
form of corroboration will vary depending on the facts of each case and can
include physical or circumstantial evidence.
We next address whether there was sufficient corroboration of A.P.'s
hearsay statements regarding the sexual abuse. As noted in the facts, A.P.'s
hearsay statements are the source of proof that A.P. was abused by the respondent.
Here, the witnesses relating A.P.'s hearsay statements were subject to cross-
examination; however, A.P. was not subject to cross-examination because she did
not testify at the proceedings. Nevertheless, the hearsay statements made by A.P.
are admissible in evidence and, if corroborated, will support the circuit court's
finding of sexual abuse.
We find that A.P.'s hearsay statements that she was sexually abused were
sufficiently corroborated by the medical evidence. In her medical examination of
A.P., Dr. Blade observed that A.P. had an abnormal hymen. The hymen was
stretched past its point of elasticity and torn and its opening was larger than
normal for a girl her age. This finding indicated to Dr. Blade that A.P. had
suffered a prior trauma. Dr. Blade determined that A.P.'s vagina had been
penetrated. Dr. Blade ruled out the possibility of penile penetration. Instead, she
opined that A.P.'s vagina had been penetrated by the insertion of either a finger
or a foreign object. After considering her findings, Dr. Blade diagnosed A.P. as
having been sexually abused at least two weeks prior to her examination of A.P.
on April 1, 1993. This finding by Dr. Blade establishes the time of the abuse to
be in March of 1993 or earlier. At this time, A.P. was living with her mother and
the respondent. We find that Dr. Blade's testimony corroborated A.P.'s hearsay
statements. The medical evidence introduced by Dr. Blade corroborated A.P.'s
description of the abuse. In addition, Dr. Blade rendered a medical opinion that
A.P. was sexually abused. We reject the respondent's claim that the medical
evidence was weak and insufficient to support the abuse. The respondent claims
that Dr. Blade acknowledged on cross-examination that it was just as likely that
A.P. caused her own injuries or that they were caused by a fall. Although Dr.
Blade did testify that anything was possible, she further stated that it was highly
unlikely that A.P. caused the injuries herself or that the injuries were sustained
during a fall. After specifically considering these possibilities, Dr. Blade continued
to maintain that A.P. was sexually abused.
After considering the medical evidence, we find that it constitutes sufficient
corroboration of A.P.'s hearsay statements because it makes it more probable that
A.P. was sexually abused. Thus, pursuant to section 2--18(4)(c), A.P.'s hearsay
statements are sufficient to support a finding of abuse by the respondent.

II
The respondent also argues that he was denied due process of law because
the finding of abuse against him was based on hearsay statements by A.P. that
were not sufficiently reliable. The respondent contends that A.P.'s hearsay
statements were unreliable because the identification of him as the abuser was not
corroborated by independent evidence. As we held in section one of this analysis,
corroboration of the abuser's identification is not required under section 2--
18(4)(c). We are not persuaded that the lack of corroboration of the abuser's
identity renders the statements so unreliable that their use violates due process.
The respondent also claims that A.P.'s hearsay statements are unreliable because
they are inconsistent and contradictory. We disagree.
The totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of A.P.'s
statements indicates that the statements were sufficiently reliable to be used to
support a finding of abuse. A.P.'s statements to adults that she was sexually
abused by her father were spontaneous, repeated and consistent. The statements
were not made in response to any questioning of A.P. Rather, A.P. spontaneously
offered the statements to Michelle Weber. A.P. repeated the statements several
times to Michelle and then again to Jennifer Daniels. Further, A.P.'s accounts of
the abuse were consistent as to both the act and as to the identity of the abuser.
The respondent claims that A.P.'s statements were unreliable because they
contained inconsistencies. The respondent refers to Jennifer Daniels' testimony
that A.P. claimed to have never seen the respondent's penis; however, Ann
Caravello testified that A.P. told her that the respondent had a long "peepee."
Moreover, Michelle Weber stated that A.P. told her that the respondent was
"inside her belly button." In addition, the respondent points out that Jennifer
Daniels testified that A.P. told her that the respondent had hit her "peepee" with
a knife whereas Ann Caravello stated that A.P. indicated that the respondent had
cut her "peepee" with scissors. The respondent claims that these statements show
a lack of consistency and contradiction in the manner of abuse. We reject the
respondent's interpretation of A.P.'s statements. A.P. never stated that the
respondent abused her with his penis. A.P. stated to Jennifer Daniels that the
respondent pulled her nightgown over her head when he hurt her. This fact could
provide the reason for the minor discrepancy in A.P.'s statements regarding the
object that was inserted into her vagina. Nevertheless, these minor inconsistencies
do not require us to find that A.P.'s statements as a whole were inconsistent, as
advocated by the respondent, given that the statements were clear and consistent
in the fact of the abuse and A.P.'s identification of the respondent as the abuser.
The respondent further claims that A.P. may have been manipulated into
lying by her mother's family, who disliked him because he is an African-
American while they are Caucasians. In support of this claim, the respondent notes
that an allegation of sexual abuse made by A.P. against the respondent, two years
earlier, was determined to be unfounded. We disagree that the evidence
demonstrated that A.P. had a motive to lie. The respondent's contention in this
regard is purely speculative. Moreover, with regard to the prior allegation of
abuse, this circumstance was brought to the attention of the circuit court, which
nonetheless found A.P.'s statements to be reliable. There is no indication in the
record that A.P. fabricated her current statements or was coached to do so by her
mother's family. To the contrary, A.P.'s statements were spontaneously given.
In light of the foregoing factors, we reject the respondent's contention that
A.P.'s statements were too unreliable to be used to support a finding of abuse.
A.P.'s hearsay statements identifying the respondent as her abuser have been
shown to be reliable. The circuit court therefore did not infringe on the
respondent's constitutional right to due process by relying on A.P.'s statements to
support a finding of sexual abuse against the respondent. Parenthetically, we note
that the respondent attempts to bring this case within the purview of United States
Supreme Court decisions which address the requirements that the confrontation
clause imposes on the admissibility of hearsay statements in criminal cases. See
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 100 S. Ct. 2531 (1980); Idaho
v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 111 L. Ed. 2d 638, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990). The
respondent acknowledges that this is not a criminal case, but argues that these
cases should be applied because he has been found to have committed conduct
that could lead to criminal charges. We need not decide whether the confrontation
clause requirements must be satisfied in this noncriminal setting because, even if
those requirements applied, we would find them to be satisfied. Based on the
analysis above, we would find that the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the making of A.P.'s statements provides sufficient "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness" such that A.P.'s hearsay statements possess adequate "indicia of
reliability." See Wright, 497 U.S. at 819-23, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 655-57, 110 S. Ct. at 3148-51.
Aside from the respondent's claims regarding the reliability of A.P.'s
statements, he further contends that he was deprived of his right to due process
because the petition for adjudication did not identify him as the abuser. The
respondent insists that he was therefore prevented from defending himself and it
was unfair for the trial court to subsequently identify him as the abuser. This
contention is without merit. Although the State did not initially name the
respondent as the abuser in its petition, it joined the public guardian's request
following the adjudicatory hearing that the respondent be identified as the abuser.
The respondent was not deprived of the opportunity to defend himself, given that
he was on notice throughout the adjudicatory hearing that A.P. accused him of
sexually abusing her. It was clear throughout the proceedings that A.P. did not
name anyone as her abuser other than the respondent. Although fully aware that
A.P.'s allegations of sexual abuse were directed at him, the respondent chose not
to present evidence to rebut those allegations. Therefore, the respondent was not
denied due process on this basis.

III
As a final matter, we consider whether the evidence was sufficient for the
circuit court to find that the respondent abused A.P. and was therefore unfit as a
parent. The proceedings in this case are civil in nature such that a finding of abuse
need only be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 705 ILCS 405/2--
18(1) (West 1992). The circuit court's finding on whether abuse or neglect
occurred will not be disturbed on appeal unless contrary to the manifest weight
of the evidence. See In re Stilley, 66 Ill. 2d 515, 520 (1977).
In this case, the circuit court's finding of sexual abuse against the
respondent was based on A.P.'s statements. We have already determined that those
statements were both independently corroborated and reliable. The circuit court
was in the best position to determine the credibility and weight of the witnesses'
testimony and to resolve conflicts in their testimony because the circuit court had
the opportunity to observe their demeanor and conduct. See In re Stilley, 66 Ill. 2d at 520. Based on the testimony of A.P.'s relatives, caseworkers, and doctor, as
discussed above, we find that the circuit court's decision was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. A.P.'s actions toward a doll, reliability of her
statements identifying the respondent as her abuser, and the findings of her doctor
support the circuit court's finding that the respondent sexually abused A.P. Given
that A.P. was sexually abused by her father, the circuit court properly determined
that A.P. was an abused minor and that the respondent was an unfit parent. 705
ILCS 405/2--3(2)(iii), 2--27 (West 1992).

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court
affirming the juvenile court's finding that the respondent was an unfit parent
because he sexually abused A.P.

Affirmed.