Lucas v. Lakin

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to request a rehearing. Also, opinions are subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at
anytime prior to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, because the
following slip opinion is being made available prior to the Court's final action in this matter,
it cannot be considered the final decision of the Court. The official copy of the following
opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's Reporter of Decisions in the Official
Reports advance sheets following final action by the Court.

Docket No. 80719--Agenda 31--September 1996.
RONALD "RINK" LUCAS, Appellant, v. L. THOMAS LAKIN et al.,
Appellees.
Opinion filed January 30, 1997.

JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
The question presented in this appeal is whether an individual
sheet of a nominating petition which is filed pursuant to section
7--10 of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/7--10 (West 1994)) is
rendered invalid if the address set forth within the circulator's
affidavit at the bottom of the petition sheet does not match the
address where the circulator of the sheet is registered to vote.
The fifth district of the appellate court answered this question
affirmatively. 278 Ill. App. 3d 163. We granted leave to appeal
(155 Ill. 2d R. 315) and now reverse the judgment of the appellate
court.

Background
On December 11, 1995, Ronald P. "Rink" Lucas (Lucas) filed a
nominating petition seeking to have his name placed on the ballot
for the March 19, 1996, Democratic primary for the office of
Madison County recorder. The nominating petition consisted of 20
individual sheets containing a total of 330 signatures. Two hundred
fifty-five valid signatures were required to secure a position on
the primary election ballot.
On December 22, 1995, L. Thomas Lakin (Lakin) filed an
objector's petition (see 10 ILCS 5/10--8 (West 1994)) in which he
contested the validity of numerous signatures on Lucas' nominating
petition and asserted that there was an insufficient number of
valid signatures remaining on the petition to warrant placing
Lucas' name on the primary election ballot. In the portion of the
objector's petition relevant here, Lakin alleged that the
circulator of the first sheet of Lucas' nominating petition, Aaron
Wanagat (Wanagat), was not registered to vote at the address listed
in the circulator's affidavit on that sheet. Thus, according to
Lakin, Wanagat was not a valid circulator and the sheet, which
contained 20 signatures, had to be stricken in its entirety.
On January 9, 1996, the Madison County officers electoral
board (the Board) held a hearing pursuant to section 10--9 of the
Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10--9 (West 1994)) to consider Lakin's
objections. In a written decision issued on January 11, 1996, the
Board found, inter alia, that Wanagat was a registered voter of
Madison County. However, the Board also found that Wanagat was
registered to vote at an address other than the one listed in the
circulator's affidavit on the petition sheet. The Board ruled that
Wanagat was therefore not a valid circulator and that the first
sheet of Lucas' nominating petition was void. As a result of this
ruling, and others made by the Board, Lucas' nominating petition
had only 244 valid signatures--11 short of the 255 required.
Accordingly, the Board ordered that Lucas' name not appear on the
ballot for the primary election.
Lucas sought judicial review of the Board's decision in the
circuit court of Madison County. See 10 ILCS 5/10--10.1 (West
1994). Following a hearing held on February 2, 1996, the circuit
court entered judgment reversing the Board's decision regarding the
validity of the first petition sheet. The circuit court based its
judgment on two appellate court decisions, Bass v. Hamblet, 266
Ill. App. 3d 1110 (1st Dist. 1994), and Whelan v. County Officers'
Electoral Board, 256 Ill. App. 3d 555 (2d Dist. 1994). Both of
these decisions held that the relevant provisions of the Election
Code do not require that the address in the circulator's affidavit
match the address where the circulator is registered to vote.
Because the circuit court's ruling restored 20 signatures to Lucas'
petition, the court ordered that Lucas' name be placed on the
primary election ballot.
Lakin appealed from the circuit court's judgment and, after
expedited review, the appellate court reversed the circuit court
and affirmed the original decision of the Board. The appellate
court expressly declined to follow Whelan and Bass, concluding that
those opinions were too restrictive in their reading of the
pertinent sections of the Election Code. The appellate court's
mandate was issued along with its opinion on March 14, 1996. On
Lucas' motion, this court stayed the appellate court's mandate
pending consideration of Lucas' petition for leave to appeal. On
March 19, 1996, the primary election took place. Lucas appeared on
the ballot and lost the election.

Analysis
We observe, at the outset, that while the primary election
which is at the heart of this appeal has already been held, this
cause is not moot. One exception to the mootness doctrine permits
a court to resolve an otherwise moot issue if that issue concerns
a substantial public interest. This public interest exception may
be applied if (1) the question presented is of a public nature, (2)
an authoritative resolution of the question is desirable for the
purpose of guiding public officers, and (3) the question is likely
to recur. Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 395 (1994). The instant appeal raises a question of election
law which, inherently, is a matter of public concern. In addition,
as noted above, the issue before us has created a split of
authority in our appellate court. Resolution of the question
presented in this appeal is therefore necessary, as the issue will
likely arise again in future elections. Accordingly, we reach the
merits in this cause.
The facts in this case are not in dispute. At some time prior
to circulating the first sheet of Lucas' nominating petition,
Wanagat moved from the Madison County address where he was
registered to vote to another address located within Madison
County. When he moved, Wanagat inadvertently failed to transfer his
voter registration to his new address. Subsequently, when asked to
provide his address in the circulator's affidavit at the bottom of
the petition sheet he was circulating, Wanagat simply listed,
without any intent to deceive or mislead, his new Madison County
address. The sole issue which the parties contest is whether, under
these facts, the relevant provisions of the Election Code require
that the petition sheet which Wanagat circulated be declared
invalid.
When construing the meaning of a disputed statute, this
court's primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the
intent of the legislature. People v. Zaremba, 158 Ill. 2d 36, 40
(1994). Legislative intent is best determined by examining the
statutory language, which must be given its plain and ordinary
meaning. People v. Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d 431, 435 (1995). Because the
construction of a statute is a question of law, our review is de
novo. Vuletich v. United States Steel Corp., 117 Ill. 2d 417, 421
(1987).
Section 7--10 of the Election Code sets out the requirements
for nominating petitions filed on behalf of political parties in
primary elections. The section states that the circulator's
affidavit must appear in the following form:
"At the bottom of each sheet of such petition shall be
added a statement signed by a registered voter of the
political division, who has been a registered voter at
all times he or she circulated the petition, for which
the candidate is seeking a nomination, stating the street
address or rural route number of the voter, as the case
may be, as well as the voter's city, village or town; and
certifying that the signatures on that sheet of the
petition were signed in his presence; [and indicating the
dates the sheet was circulated]; and certifying that the
signatures on the sheet are genuine, and certifying that
to the best of his knowledge and belief the persons so
signing were at the time of signing the petitions
qualified voters of the political party for which a
nomination is sought. Such statement shall be sworn to
before some officer authorized to administer oaths in
this State." 10 ILCS 5/7--10 (West 1994).
Lakin does not contest the Board's finding that Wanagat was
registered to vote in Madison County at the time he circulated the
petition, nor does he argue that Wanagat's failure to update his
registration address, by itself, invalidated his status as a
registered voter as a matter of law. It is also undisputed that
section 7--10 does not expressly require the address in the
circulator's affidavit to match the address where the circulator is
registered to vote. Lakin does not allege any other irregularities
with respect to Wanagat's affidavit. Therefore, we conclude that
Wanagat's affidavit was in compliance with the criteria set out in
section 7--10.
Lakin contends, however, that in addition to being governed by
section 7--10, Wanagat was also subject to the requirements of a
definition section of the Election Code, section 3--1.2 (10 ILCS
5/3--1.2 (West 1994)). Under the terms of this section, Lakin
argues, Wanagat was not a valid circulator of Lucas' nominating
petition. Section 3--1.2 of the Election Code provides:
"3--1.2. For the purpose of determining eligibility
to sign a nominating petition or a petition proposing a
public question the terms `voter', `registered voter',
`qualified voter', `legal voter', `elector', `qualified
elector', `primary elector' and `qualified primary
elector' as used in this Code or in another Statute shall
mean a person who is registered to vote at the address
shown opposite his signature on the petition or was
registered to vote at such address when he signed the
petition." (Emphasis added.) 10 ILCS 5/3--1.2 (West
1994).
Lakin maintains that the phrase "[f]or the purpose of
determining eligibility to sign a nominating petition" does not
refer solely to those individuals whose signatures count toward the
nominating petition's numerical signature requirement, but instead
refers to all the individuals who physically sign the petition,
including the circulator. From this, Lakin reasons that because the
address in Wanagat's affidavit was different from his voter
registration address, he was not a "registered voter" within the
meaning of section 3--1.2. Lakin notes that section 7--10 requires
circulators to be registered voters. Therefore, according to Lakin,
Wanagat was not a valid circulator and the Board was correct in
striking the petition sheet from Lucas' nominating petition. We
disagree.
To "sign" a nominating petition, in the plain and ordinary
sense of the word, means to add one's signature to the nominating
petition for the purpose of supporting the candidate whose name
appears on the petition. See Whelan, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 559; Bass,
266 Ill. App. 3d at 1112--13. We believe the legislature had this
commonly accepted meaning of the word "sign" in mind when it
enacted section 3--1.2. To hold otherwise would strain the language
of that section beyond its normal meaning. Section 3--1.2 speaks of
eligibility to sign a nominating petition, not of eligibility to
circulate one. By its own terms, section 3--1.2 does not govern the
actions of petition circulators.
Our conclusion that the phrase "eligibility to sign a
nominating petition" refers only to those individuals who sign the
petition as a means of endorsing the listed candidate is supported
by the remaining language of section 3--1.2 and by the language of
section 7--10. Section 3--1.2 defines "registered voter" as "a
person who is registered to vote at the address shown opposite his
signature on the petition." This definitional language parallels
the portion of section 7--10 describing the requirements which must
be met by the individuals signing the nominating petition:
"Such petition shall be signed by qualified primary
electors residing in the political division for which the
nominating is sought in their own proper persons only and
opposite the signature of each signer, his residence
address shall be written or printed. The residence
address required to be written or printed opposite each
qualified primary elector's name shall include the street
address or rural route number of the signer, as the case
may be, as well as the signer's city, village or town."
(Emphasis added.) 10 ILCS 5/7--10 (West 1994).
The portion of section 7--10 which describes the requirements
which petition circulators must meet states that the circulators
must provide their "street address or rural route number" and their
"city, village or town," but makes no reference to the circulator's
address appearing opposite his or her signature. Indeed, as the
sample form provided in section 7--10 shows, the circulator's
signature appears at the bottom of the petition sheet, underneath
the address and other information contained within the circulator's
affidavit. See 10 ILCS 5/7--10 (West 1994); see also T. Jaconetty
& S. Ruffolo, Ballot Access, in Election Law 1S.72 (Ill. Inst. for
Cont. Legal Educ. Supp. 1995) (containing a complete sample
nominating petition). Clearly, if the legislature had intended
section 3--1.2 to apply to petition circulators, it would not have
created a definition of "registered voter" which follows, narrowly
and exclusively, the portion of the statutory language and sample
form which applies only to the individuals who sign the nominating
petition as a means of endorsing the listed candidate.
Lakin also maintains, as did the appellate court below, that
his proposed construction of section 3--1.2 is necessary to
effectuate the legislative intent behind that provision. Lakin
notes that section 3--1.2 codified a 1983 appellate court decision,
Greene v. Board of Election Commissioners, 112 Ill. App. 3d 862
(1983). In Greene, the appellate court determined that section 10--
4 of the Election Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 46, par. 10--4)
required a person who signs a nominating petition to be registered
to vote at the address set forth on the nominating petition. The
court noted that it would be difficult to verify that an individual
is registered to vote, and is therefore qualified to sign the
nominating petition, if that individual was registered to vote at
an address other than the one shown on the petition. The court
concluded that its holding was therefore necessary to facilitate
the verification procedure and to preserve the integrity of the
election process. Greene, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 869.
Analogizing to Greene, Lakin maintains that it is difficult to
verify that a circulator has met the statutory requirement of being
registered to vote when the circulator's voter registration address
and the address given in the circulator's affidavit are not
identical. Lakin asserts that, as in Greene, this difficulty
provides a compelling justification for requiring that the address
listed in the circulator's affidavit and the circulator's voter
registration address match one another. Lakin concludes, therefore,
that the legislature must have intended for section 3--1.2 to apply
to circulators.
Contrary to Lakin's assertions, we do not believe that the
need to facilitate the process of verifying the voter registration
of petition circulators is necessarily as compelling as the need to
facilitate the verification process for those who sign the
nominating petition. First, unlike the individuals who sign the
nominating petition to endorse the listed candidate, the circulator
must make a sworn statement that he or she is a registered voter.
Thus, the circulator is subject to an additional constraint which,
by itself, helps ensure that the circulator is registered to vote.
In addition, in any nominating petition, there are far fewer
circulators than there are individuals signing that petition.
Therefore, as a practical matter, verifying the registration of
circulators is less burdensome than verifying the registration of
the individuals who sign the nominating petition. These factors, in
conjunction with the plain language of the statute, provide the
basis for concluding that the legislature intended to limit the
reach of section 3--1.2 to individuals who sign a nominating
petition in support of the listed candidate.
As the instant appeal demonstrates, Lakin's interpretation of
section 3--1.2 imposes a potentially harsh result upon the
individuals who sign the nominating petition. Under Lakin's
proposed construction, a registered circulator's inadvertent
failure to update his or her voter registration address may cancel
the otherwise valid signatures of the voters who sign the petition
sheet, thereby nullifying those voters' right to endorse the
candidate of their choice. See Bass, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 1113. We
are mindful of the need to tread cautiously when construing
statutory language which restricts the people's right to endorse
and nominate the candidate of their choice. See, e.g., Tully v.
Edgar, 171 Ill. 2d 297, 307 (1996) (legislation which limits the
people's right to nominate candidates implicates the fundamental
right to vote). Accordingly, in the absence of a clear legislative
statement to the contrary, we hold that the Election Code does not
require that the address in the circulator's affidavit on a
nominating petition filed pursuant to section 7--10 be identical to
the address where the circulator is registered to vote.
For the foregoing reasons we reverse the judgment of the
appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.