People v. Falaster
Annotate this Case
NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after the filing of
the opinion to request a rehearing. Also, opinions are subject to
modification, correction or withdrawal at anytime prior to issuance of the
mandate by the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, because the following slip
opinion is being made available prior to the Court's final action in this
matter, it cannot be considered the final decision of the Court. The official
copy of the following opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's
Reporter of Decisions in the Official Reports advance sheets following final
action by the Court.
Docket No. 79571--Agenda 6--March 1996.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. FREDDIE FALASTER,
Appellant.
Opinion filed May 31, 1996.
JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Jackson County, the
defendant, Freddie Falaster, was convicted of two counts of aggravated
criminal sexual assault, one count of criminal sexual assault, and one count
of unlawful distribution of harmful material. The trial judge sentenced the
defendant to various terms of imprisonment for those offenses. The appellate
court affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentences. 273 Ill. App. 3d
694. We allowed the defendant's petition for leave to appeal (155 Ill. 2d R.
315(a)), and we now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
The defendant makes no challenge to the strength of the evidence
used to convict him on the charges, and therefore only a brief summary of the
trial testimony is necessary. The victim in this case, A.F., was the
defendant's daughter. According to the testimony of the victim, who was 14
years old at the time of the defendant's trial, in 1994, the defendant began
sexually abusing her when she was eight or nine years old; the abuse lasted
until June or July 1993, when the victim reported it to the authorities. The
victim stated that the defendant initially asked her masturbate him or
perform fellatio on him; later, the defendant told her to engage in sexual
intercourse. The victim testified to specific instances in which she had
intercourse with the defendant. The victim also said that the defendant had
given her a nude photograph of himself and a pornographic magazine called
Three Way Lust.
At trial, the State also presented the testimony of Mary Williams,
a registered nurse who obtained a history from the victim prior to a physical
examination in August 1993. Williams testified that the victim reported that
she had been sexually abused by the defendant since she was eight years old,
that oral and vaginal sex had occurred, and that she had never bled as a
result of that activity. Williams stated that the absence of bleeding was not
unusual.
The defendant was questioned by authorities following the victim's
report of the misconduct, and the defendant's statements were introduced into
evidence at his trial. The defendant admitted to a police officer and an
investigator from the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) that
he had sexually abused the victim. The defendant said that he had directed
his daughter to participate in masturbation, fellatio, and intercourse with
him over a period of several years. The defendant initially said that they
had sexual relations once or twice, then estimated that it occurred two or
three times a week, and finally said that he could not be certain how many
times the conduct had occurred.
The State also presented physical evidence corroborating the
victim's account. A forensic serologist was able to detect deposits of semen
on the carpet next to the bed in the master bedroom where, the victim said,
the defendant would often ejaculate when they engaged in sexual activity. The
serologist determined that the semen stains were consistent with the
defendant's blood type. In addition, a police officer testified that the nude
photograph and pornographic magazine given by the defendant to the victim
were recovered from a trunk in the victim's bedroom, where she said she had
kept the items.
The defendant testified in his own behalf at trial. He denied
engaging in sexual activity with the victim or giving her the photograph and
magazine. The defendant acknowledged that he had been questioned by a police
officer and a DCFS investigator following the victim's report of the abuse,
but he denied making the inculpatory statements they attributed to him.
Called to testify as a defense witness at trial was Dr. Deanna St. Germaine,
the physician who performed the physical examination of the victim in August
1993. Dr. St. Germaine stated that she did not find any physical evidence of
sexual abuse. She also testified, however, that because of the victim's age
and physical development, it would be unusual to find such evidence unless
the abuse had been forceful.
Following the close of evidence, the jury returned verdicts finding
the defendant guilty of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, one
count of criminal sexual assault, and one count of unlawful distribution of
harmful material. The trial judge later sentenced the defendant to terms of
15 years' imprisonment on each conviction for aggravated criminal sexual
assault, to five years' imprisonment for the conviction for criminal sexual
assault, and to 364 days' imprisonment for the conviction for unlawful
distribution of harmful material, with all four sentences to run
concurrently. The judge also ordered the defendant to pay two fines of $100
each pursuant to sections 5--9--1.5 and 5--9--1.7 of the Unified Code of
Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5--9--1.5, 5--9--1.7 (West 1994)), and to pay $2,000
toward counseling costs incurred by the victim, as authorized by section 5--
5--6(g) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5--5--6(g) (West
1992)).
The appellate court affirmed the defendant's convictions and
sentences. 273 Ill. App. 3d 694. The court rejected the defendant's arguments
that the trial judge improperly excluded several spectators from a portion of
the proceedings, that the judge erred in permitting nurse Williams to testify
to the victim's identification of the defendant as her abuser, and that the
judge erred in asking a question of a prosecution witness. We allowed the
defendant's petition for leave to appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and we now
affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
The defendant renews here the three allegations of error he raised
in the appellate court. The defendant first contends that the trial judge
improperly excluded certain spectators from the courtroom during the
testimony of the victim. The persons excluded from the courtroom by the
judge's order were two nephews of the defendant and the grandfather of one of
the nephews. In granting the State's request that the persons be excluded,
the judge invoked section 115--11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963
(725 ILCS 5/115--11 (West 1992)), which permits the exclusion of certain
spectators from the court during testimony of a minor victim in specified
prosecutions.
The defendant argues that this partial closure of the proceedings
during the victim's testimony violated his federal and state constitutional
rights to a public trial. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970,
art. I, 8. Citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31, 104 S. Ct. 2210 (1984), Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 78 L. Ed. 2d 629, 104 S. Ct. 819 (1984), and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
457 U.S. 596, 73 L. Ed. 2d 248, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982), the defendant
contends that the exclusion order imposed in the present case failed to
satisfy the limitations prescribed by the United States Supreme Court for the
closing of judicial proceedings. Those cases severely limit the circumstances
in which a judge may bar the press and general public from judicial
proceedings. Although the defendant failed to include this contention in his
post-trial motion, we will address the merits of the issue, given the general
importance of the question and the division of appellate court authority on
the subject. See Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223 (1967).
In excluding the three spectators from the courtroom in the present
case, the trial judge relied on section 115--11 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963, which provided, at the time of trial:
"In a prosecution for a criminal offense defined in
Article 11 or in Section 12--13, 12--14, 12--15 or 12--16 of
the `Criminal Code of 1961', where the alleged victim of the
offense is a minor under 18 years of age, the court may
exclude from the proceedings while the victim is testifying,
all persons, who, in the opinion of the court, do not have a
direct interest in the case, except the media." 725 ILCS
5/115--11 (West 1992).
The statute was applicable to the proceedings in this case, for the defendant
was charged with criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual
assault, violations of sections 12--13 and 12--14 of the Criminal Code of
1961 (720 ILCS 5/12--13, 12--14 (West 1992)), and the victim of the offenses
was under the age of 18.
The defendant argues that the trial judge's order excluding
spectators from the proceeding must satisfy not only the requirements of
section 115--11 but also the more stringent limitations established by the
United States Supreme Court for the closure of judicial proceedings to the
press and public. The State contends that the order entered in the present
case was valid if it met the statutory requirements alone. Both parties cite
People v. Holveck, 141 Ill. 2d 84 (1990), in support of their respective
arguments. We note that the decisions of the appellate court are divided on
this issue. Compare People v. Garrett, 264 Ill. App. 3d 1089 (1994)
(exclusion order imposed under section 115--11 must also satisfy more
stringent requirements limiting closure of judicial proceedings), with People
v. Benson, 251 Ill. App. 3d 144 (1993) (exclusion order imposed under section
115--11 must satisfy only requirements of statute). We agree with the State
that the trial judge's order here needed to satisfy only the requirements of
section 115--11.
Although Holveck, a case involving an order excluding spectators
pursuant to section 115--11, contains a discussion of the Supreme Court's
requirements concerning the closure of judicial proceedings to the press and
public, we do not believe that the opinion should be construed as imposing
those requirements in cases in which an order is entered pursuant to the
statute. The court observed that, "[b]y allowing the media to attend, the
judge preserved the defendant's sixth amendment right to a public trial. The
trial judge considered that the media presence is, in effect, the presence of
the public." Holveck, 141 Ill. 2d at 101. The court proceeded to reject the
defendant's argument that section 115--11 was unconstitutional because, among
other things, it denied the defendant his right to a public trial. Discussing
the provisions of section 115--11, the Holveck court explained:
"The statute provides that the judge may use his discretion in
connection with the exclusion of those persons who, in his
opinion, are not directly interested in the case. Unlike the
statute in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court (1982), 457 U.S. 596, 73 L. Ed. 2d 248, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (statute excluded
the press and the general public), our statute is limited to
discretionary closure in a criminal trial and does not allow
the media to be excluded. Too, the statute provides guidelines
to ensure that the judge does not overstep the authority
conferred. The statute provides that closure can be effected
only in the narrow instance when a minor is testifying and it
will be limited to the time when the child is testifying. The
trial court properly involved section 115--11, which does not
violate the constitutions." Holveck, 141 Ill. 2d at 102-03.
We agree with the State that the strict limitations prescribed by
the United States Supreme Court for instances in which the press and public
are barred from judicial proceedings are not applicable in this case. The
trial judge did not close the present defendant's trial; acting pursuant to
section 115--11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the judge instead ordered
the removal of several spectators from the courtroom during the testimony of
the 14-year-old victim. The persons who were temporarily excluded from the
proceedings were not members of the defendant's immediate family and thus did
not have a direct interest in the outcome of the case. The judge did not
impose any restrictions on the media, which were still allowed full and
uninhibited access to the proceedings; thus, none of the evils of closed
trials are implicated in the present case. Because section 115--11 is
constitutional (Holveck, 141 Ill. 2d 84) and because the trial judge in the
present case fully complied with its requirements, we must conclude that the
order excluding three spectators from the court during the victim's testimony
was valid.
The defendant next argues that the trial judge erred in permitting
a witness to provide hearsay evidence of the victim's identification of the
defendant as her abuser. The issue arose during the testimony of Mary
Williams, a registered nurse in the office of Dr. St. Germaine, who conducted
an examination of the victim in late August 1993, following the victim's
report of the abuse to authorities. Prior to the doctor's examination, the
nurse obtained a history from the victim. Williams testified that the victim
described the sexual abuse and identified the defendant as the offender. The
defendant objected to this testimony on hearsay grounds. The State cited
section 115--13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115--13
(West 1992)) in support of the witness' testimony, and the trial judge
overruled the defendant's objection.
At the time of the defendant's trial, section 115--13 provided:
"In a prosecution for violation of Section 12--13, 12--
14, 12--15 or 12--16 of the `Criminal Code of 1961',
statements made by the victim to medical personnel for
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment including
descriptions of the cause of symptom, pain or sensations, or
the inception or general character of the cause or external
source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay
rule."
The present defendant was being tried for criminal sexual assault and
aggravated criminal sexual assault, violations of sections 12--13 and 12--14
of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12--13, 12--14 (West 1992)). The
statute is a narrow codification of the common law rule permitting the
hearsay use of information revealed in medical treatment. See People v. Roy,
201 Ill. App. 3d 166, 179 (1990).
The defendant contends that section 115--13 is inapplicable in this
case and did not authorize the hearsay use of the nurse's testimony because
the victim was not at the doctor's office "for purposes of medical diagnosis
or treatment," as the statute requires; in the defendant's view, the victim
underwent the examination solely as a means of developing evidence for use in
a subsequent prosecution. We do not agree with the defendant that the
diagnostic purpose of the examination would be incompatible with its
investigatory function. We note, moreover, that the statute does not
distinguish between examining physicians and treating physicians. See Roy,
201 Ill. App. 3d at 178; People v. Rushing, 192 Ill. App. 3d 444, 453 (1989).
We conclude that the examination conducted in the present case was for a
purpose within the scope of the statute.
The defendant separately contends that section 115--13 did not
authorize the nurse to testify to the victim's identification of the offender
because the identification was irrelevant to the victim's diagnosis and
treatment. See People v. Hall, 235 Ill. App. 3d 418, 435 (1992); People v.
Hudson, 198 Ill. App. 3d 915, 922 (1990); see also M. Graham, Cleary &
Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence 803.8, at 722 (6th ed. 1994). We must
reject this contention as well. We believe that, at least in the family
setting, a victim's identification of a family member as the offender is
closely related to the victim's diagnosis and treatment in cases involving
allegations of sexual abuse, and thus we agree with those decisions that have
permitted the admission of such hearsay evidence. People v. Morgan, 259 Ill.
App. 3d 770, 781-82 (1994); see also United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430,
437 (8th Cir. 1985) ("[C]hild abuse involves more than physical injury; the
physician must be attentive to treating the emotional and psychological
injuries which accompany this crime. [Citations.] The exact nature and extent
of the psychological problems which ensue from child abuse often depend on
the identity of the abuser"). As the appellate court below explained in
upholding the admission of the nurse's testimony:
"Here, AF's identification of defendant was reasonably
pertinent to a proper diagnosis because defendant is AF's
father. Defendant was living with AF while the sexual abuse
occurred. AF's physical and emotional health, now and in the
future, will be affected by her relationship with defendant.
Defendant is not a stranger whom AF will never see again, but
he is her father. That fact was significant in diagnosing or
treating AF at the time of the abuse and will remain an
important fact for future treatment." 273 Ill. App. 3d at 702-
03.
We believe that the nurse's testimony relating the minor's identification of
the defendant as the abuser was properly admitted under the terms of section
115--13.
In his final allegation of error, the defendant argues that the
trial judge erred in asking a question of one of the prosecution's witnesses,
Dr. Virginia Hoffman. Testifying in rebuttal, Dr. Hoffman, a psychologist,
described the nature and characteristics of child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome. In the course of her testimony, Dr. Hoffman drew an analogy to a
driver's recollection of an automobile accident. At first a driver will
generally provide only a few details of the accident; as time passes, the
driver will be more forthcoming and will reveal more information about the
mishap. At the conclusion of Dr. Hoffman's testimony, the following colloquy
ensued:
"THE COURT: I have a question, Doctor. Let's talk about
disclosure. Would you expect in a situation such as a 13-year-
old who is allegedly the victim of sex abuse to be more
inaccurate in her initial disclosure as opposed to later
disclosures?
THE WITNESS: Yes, very much. It is like the car accident
example I gave.
THE COURT: Well, that's the reason I asked the question.
Thank you."
The defendant notes that one of the principal issues at trial was the
credibility of the victim, and the defendant contends that the court's
question improperly bolstered the prosecution's argument that her testimony
was truthful.
"A trial judge has the right to question witnesses in order to
elicit the truth or to bring enlightenment on material issues which seem
obscure." People v. Wesley, 18 Ill. 2d 138, 154-55 (1959). It is improper,
however, for the judge to assume the role of an advocate (People v. Hopkins,
29 Ill. 2d 260, 265 (1963); People v. Bernstein, 250 Ill. 63, 67 (1911)) or
to suggest through comments or questions an opinion regarding the facts of
the case or the credibility of witnesses (People v. Marino, 414 Ill. 445, 450
(1953)). The appropriate scope of questioning by the court depends on the
facts and circumstances of the case and lies largely within the trial judge's
discretion. People v. Williams, No. 76907, slip op. at 22 (May 31, 1996);
People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill. 2d 423, 456 (1990); People v. Trefonas, 9 Ill. 2d 92, 100 (1956).
Applying these principles to the case at bar, we do not believe
that the trial judge abused his discretion in asking the question of the
witness. The brief inquiry helped clarify a matter that the judge, and
perhaps the jurors, too, found to be somewhat obscure. The judge did not
indicate by his question or his succeeding comments any view on the facts of
the case or the credibility of the witnesses. Moreover, the jurors received
the standard instruction directing them not to construe any of the judge's
rulings or remarks as an opinion on the facts or preferred verdict in the
case. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.01 (3d ed. 1992).
The cases cited by the defendant in support of this contention (People v.
Rush, 250 Ill. App. 3d 530 (1993); People v. Brown, 200 Ill. App. 3d 566
(1990); People v. Crane, 34 Ill. App. 3d 850 (1976)) are distinguishable. In
each of those cases, the trial judge breached the bounds of impartiality by
making remarks or asking questions that would have been construed by the jury
as an opinion on the credibility of a particular witness. The trial judge in
the present case, in contrast, did not comment on the strength of the
evidence or the credibility of witnesses. His single question merely
clarified a point that he believed had been left somewhat unclear by the
witness' testimony. We cannot say on this record that the trial judge abused
his discretion in asking the question of the witness.
Finding no reversible error in the trial proceedings, we decline to
disturb the defendant's convictions or sentences. For the reasons stated, the
judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the judgment of the circuit
court of Jackson County, is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE HARRISON, specially concurring:
Contrary to my colleagues, I would hold that the trial judge erred
in permitting nurse Williams to testify that the victim had identified
defendant as her abuser. Nurse Williams' testimony was plainly hearsay. As
such, it was admissible only to the extent that it fell within the hearsay
exception set forth in section 115--13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1963 (725 ILCS 5/115--13 (West 1992)). That exception, however, cannot be
invoked here.
Section 115--13 does authorize medical personnel to testify as to
statements made by a victim of sexual assault, but only when the statements
were made by the victim to the medical personnel "for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment." This is a codification of a common law rule (see
People v. Giles, 261 Ill. App. 3d 833, 841-42 (1994)) which was based on the
notion that an injured individual is presumed not to "prevaricate at the very
instant of his injury or while he is stating his physical condition to a
physician from whom he expects and hopes to receive medical aid" (Greinke v.
Chicago City Ry. Co., 234 Ill. 564, 572 (1908)).
In this case, the challenged statement was not made at the time of
the victim's injury and had nothing to do with her "diagnosis and treatment."
Dr. St. Germaine was not the victim's physician, and the victim did not go to
her office because she needed help in identifying some medical condition so
that it could be cured. The victim was taken to Dr. St. Germaine's office,
accompanied by an assistant State's Attorney according to the doctor's
account, for the sole purpose of bolstering the State's case against the
defendant.
No genuine medical purpose can reasonably be imputed to the
examination. By the time nurse Williams interviewed the victim in Dr. St.
Germaine's office, any physical trauma had long since healed. There was
nothing medically wrong with the victim, she had no physical symptoms
requiring treatment, and she did not claim that she needed to be treated.
The interview with nurse Williams was likewise unrelated to care of
the victim's mental health. While identification of the perpetrator is
undeniably important in dealing with the child's psychological condition,
there was no uncertainty as to who was responsible here. The victim had
already identified defendant as her abuser, he had already admitted the abuse
and the police had already arrested him for it.
Because the victim was examined for investigatory purposes and not
to obtain medical care, the presumption of trustworthiness underlying the
exception to the hearsay rule was absent and the statute, by its terms, did
not apply. To hold otherwise would mean that the State could evade the
prohibition against hearsay testimony in every child abuse case simply by
using licensed medical professionals to conduct their interrogations. In my
view, such a result was not intended by the legislature and represents a
radical and unwarranted departure from established principles of evidence.
Although the circuit court should not have admitted nurse Williams'
hearsay testimony, I agree that the appellate court was correct in affirming
the circuit court's judgment. This court has held that reversal is mandatory
when the trial court has erroneously admitted evidence unless the record
clearly shows that the error was not prejudicial. People v. Lawler, 142 Ill. 2d 548, 562 (1991); People v. Carlson, 92 Ill. 2d 440, 449 (1982). I believe
that the record before us does clearly show that admission of nurse Williams'
testimony did not prejudice the defendant. As the majority's review of the
facts indicates, the properly admitted evidence was so overwhelming that no
fair-minded jury could reasonably have voted to acquit.
JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this special concurrence.
the opinion to request a rehearing. Also, opinions are subject to
modification, correction or withdrawal at anytime prior to issuance of the
mandate by the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, because the following slip
opinion is being made available prior to the Court's final action in this
matter, it cannot be considered the final decision of the Court. The official
copy of the following opinion will be published by the Supreme Court's
Reporter of Decisions in the Official Reports advance sheets following final
action by the Court.
Docket No. 79571--Agenda 6--March 1996.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. FREDDIE FALASTER,
Appellant.
Opinion filed May 31, 1996.
JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Jackson County, the
defendant, Freddie Falaster, was convicted of two counts of aggravated
criminal sexual assault, one count of criminal sexual assault, and one count
of unlawful distribution of harmful material. The trial judge sentenced the
defendant to various terms of imprisonment for those offenses. The appellate
court affirmed the defendant's convictions and sentences. 273 Ill. App. 3d
694. We allowed the defendant's petition for leave to appeal (155 Ill. 2d R.
315(a)), and we now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
The defendant makes no challenge to the strength of the evidence
used to convict him on the charges, and therefore only a brief summary of the
trial testimony is necessary. The victim in this case, A.F., was the
defendant's daughter. According to the testimony of the victim, who was 14
years old at the time of the defendant's trial, in 1994, the defendant began
sexually abusing her when she was eight or nine years old; the abuse lasted
until June or July 1993, when the victim reported it to the authorities. The
victim stated that the defendant initially asked her masturbate him or
perform fellatio on him; later, the defendant told her to engage in sexual
intercourse. The victim testified to specific instances in which she had
intercourse with the defendant. The victim also said that the defendant had
given her a nude photograph of himself and a pornographic magazine called
Three Way Lust.
At trial, the State also presented the testimony of Mary Williams,
a registered nurse who obtained a history from the victim prior to a physical
examination in August 1993. Williams testified that the victim reported that
she had been sexually abused by the defendant since she was eight years old,
that oral and vaginal sex had occurred, and that she had never bled as a
result of that activity. Williams stated that the absence of bleeding was not
unusual.
The defendant was questioned by authorities following the victim's
report of the misconduct, and the defendant's statements were introduced into
evidence at his trial. The defendant admitted to a police officer and an
investigator from the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) that
he had sexually abused the victim. The defendant said that he had directed
his daughter to participate in masturbation, fellatio, and intercourse with
him over a period of several years. The defendant initially said that they
had sexual relations once or twice, then estimated that it occurred two or
three times a week, and finally said that he could not be certain how many
times the conduct had occurred.
The State also presented physical evidence corroborating the
victim's account. A forensic serologist was able to detect deposits of semen
on the carpet next to the bed in the master bedroom where, the victim said,
the defendant would often ejaculate when they engaged in sexual activity. The
serologist determined that the semen stains were consistent with the
defendant's blood type. In addition, a police officer testified that the nude
photograph and pornographic magazine given by the defendant to the victim
were recovered from a trunk in the victim's bedroom, where she said she had
kept the items.
The defendant testified in his own behalf at trial. He denied
engaging in sexual activity with the victim or giving her the photograph and
magazine. The defendant acknowledged that he had been questioned by a police
officer and a DCFS investigator following the victim's report of the abuse,
but he denied making the inculpatory statements they attributed to him.
Called to testify as a defense witness at trial was Dr. Deanna St. Germaine,
the physician who performed the physical examination of the victim in August
1993. Dr. St. Germaine stated that she did not find any physical evidence of
sexual abuse. She also testified, however, that because of the victim's age
and physical development, it would be unusual to find such evidence unless
the abuse had been forceful.
Following the close of evidence, the jury returned verdicts finding
the defendant guilty of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, one
count of criminal sexual assault, and one count of unlawful distribution of
harmful material. The trial judge later sentenced the defendant to terms of
15 years' imprisonment on each conviction for aggravated criminal sexual
assault, to five years' imprisonment for the conviction for criminal sexual
assault, and to 364 days' imprisonment for the conviction for unlawful
distribution of harmful material, with all four sentences to run
concurrently. The judge also ordered the defendant to pay two fines of $100
each pursuant to sections 5--9--1.5 and 5--9--1.7 of the Unified Code of
Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5--9--1.5, 5--9--1.7 (West 1994)), and to pay $2,000
toward counseling costs incurred by the victim, as authorized by section 5--
5--6(g) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5--5--6(g) (West
1992)).
The appellate court affirmed the defendant's convictions and
sentences. 273 Ill. App. 3d 694. The court rejected the defendant's arguments
that the trial judge improperly excluded several spectators from a portion of
the proceedings, that the judge erred in permitting nurse Williams to testify
to the victim's identification of the defendant as her abuser, and that the
judge erred in asking a question of a prosecution witness. We allowed the
defendant's petition for leave to appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and we now
affirm the judgment of the appellate court.
The defendant renews here the three allegations of error he raised
in the appellate court. The defendant first contends that the trial judge
improperly excluded certain spectators from the courtroom during the
testimony of the victim. The persons excluded from the courtroom by the
judge's order were two nephews of the defendant and the grandfather of one of
the nephews. In granting the State's request that the persons be excluded,
the judge invoked section 115--11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963
(725 ILCS 5/115--11 (West 1992)), which permits the exclusion of certain
spectators from the court during testimony of a minor victim in specified
prosecutions.
The defendant argues that this partial closure of the proceedings
during the victim's testimony violated his federal and state constitutional
rights to a public trial. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970,
art. I, 8. Citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31, 104 S. Ct. 2210 (1984), Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 78 L. Ed. 2d 629, 104 S. Ct. 819 (1984), and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
457 U.S. 596, 73 L. Ed. 2d 248, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982), the defendant
contends that the exclusion order imposed in the present case failed to
satisfy the limitations prescribed by the United States Supreme Court for the
closing of judicial proceedings. Those cases severely limit the circumstances
in which a judge may bar the press and general public from judicial
proceedings. Although the defendant failed to include this contention in his
post-trial motion, we will address the merits of the issue, given the general
importance of the question and the division of appellate court authority on
the subject. See Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223 (1967).
In excluding the three spectators from the courtroom in the present
case, the trial judge relied on section 115--11 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963, which provided, at the time of trial:
"In a prosecution for a criminal offense defined in
Article 11 or in Section 12--13, 12--14, 12--15 or 12--16 of
the `Criminal Code of 1961', where the alleged victim of the
offense is a minor under 18 years of age, the court may
exclude from the proceedings while the victim is testifying,
all persons, who, in the opinion of the court, do not have a
direct interest in the case, except the media." 725 ILCS
5/115--11 (West 1992).
The statute was applicable to the proceedings in this case, for the defendant
was charged with criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual
assault, violations of sections 12--13 and 12--14 of the Criminal Code of
1961 (720 ILCS 5/12--13, 12--14 (West 1992)), and the victim of the offenses
was under the age of 18.
The defendant argues that the trial judge's order excluding
spectators from the proceeding must satisfy not only the requirements of
section 115--11 but also the more stringent limitations established by the
United States Supreme Court for the closure of judicial proceedings to the
press and public. The State contends that the order entered in the present
case was valid if it met the statutory requirements alone. Both parties cite
People v. Holveck, 141 Ill. 2d 84 (1990), in support of their respective
arguments. We note that the decisions of the appellate court are divided on
this issue. Compare People v. Garrett, 264 Ill. App. 3d 1089 (1994)
(exclusion order imposed under section 115--11 must also satisfy more
stringent requirements limiting closure of judicial proceedings), with People
v. Benson, 251 Ill. App. 3d 144 (1993) (exclusion order imposed under section
115--11 must satisfy only requirements of statute). We agree with the State
that the trial judge's order here needed to satisfy only the requirements of
section 115--11.
Although Holveck, a case involving an order excluding spectators
pursuant to section 115--11, contains a discussion of the Supreme Court's
requirements concerning the closure of judicial proceedings to the press and
public, we do not believe that the opinion should be construed as imposing
those requirements in cases in which an order is entered pursuant to the
statute. The court observed that, "[b]y allowing the media to attend, the
judge preserved the defendant's sixth amendment right to a public trial. The
trial judge considered that the media presence is, in effect, the presence of
the public." Holveck, 141 Ill. 2d at 101. The court proceeded to reject the
defendant's argument that section 115--11 was unconstitutional because, among
other things, it denied the defendant his right to a public trial. Discussing
the provisions of section 115--11, the Holveck court explained:
"The statute provides that the judge may use his discretion in
connection with the exclusion of those persons who, in his
opinion, are not directly interested in the case. Unlike the
statute in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court (1982), 457 U.S. 596, 73 L. Ed. 2d 248, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (statute excluded
the press and the general public), our statute is limited to
discretionary closure in a criminal trial and does not allow
the media to be excluded. Too, the statute provides guidelines
to ensure that the judge does not overstep the authority
conferred. The statute provides that closure can be effected
only in the narrow instance when a minor is testifying and it
will be limited to the time when the child is testifying. The
trial court properly involved section 115--11, which does not
violate the constitutions." Holveck, 141 Ill. 2d at 102-03.
We agree with the State that the strict limitations prescribed by
the United States Supreme Court for instances in which the press and public
are barred from judicial proceedings are not applicable in this case. The
trial judge did not close the present defendant's trial; acting pursuant to
section 115--11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the judge instead ordered
the removal of several spectators from the courtroom during the testimony of
the 14-year-old victim. The persons who were temporarily excluded from the
proceedings were not members of the defendant's immediate family and thus did
not have a direct interest in the outcome of the case. The judge did not
impose any restrictions on the media, which were still allowed full and
uninhibited access to the proceedings; thus, none of the evils of closed
trials are implicated in the present case. Because section 115--11 is
constitutional (Holveck, 141 Ill. 2d 84) and because the trial judge in the
present case fully complied with its requirements, we must conclude that the
order excluding three spectators from the court during the victim's testimony
was valid.
The defendant next argues that the trial judge erred in permitting
a witness to provide hearsay evidence of the victim's identification of the
defendant as her abuser. The issue arose during the testimony of Mary
Williams, a registered nurse in the office of Dr. St. Germaine, who conducted
an examination of the victim in late August 1993, following the victim's
report of the abuse to authorities. Prior to the doctor's examination, the
nurse obtained a history from the victim. Williams testified that the victim
described the sexual abuse and identified the defendant as the offender. The
defendant objected to this testimony on hearsay grounds. The State cited
section 115--13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115--13
(West 1992)) in support of the witness' testimony, and the trial judge
overruled the defendant's objection.
At the time of the defendant's trial, section 115--13 provided:
"In a prosecution for violation of Section 12--13, 12--
14, 12--15 or 12--16 of the `Criminal Code of 1961',
statements made by the victim to medical personnel for
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment including
descriptions of the cause of symptom, pain or sensations, or
the inception or general character of the cause or external
source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment shall be admitted as an exception to the hearsay
rule."
The present defendant was being tried for criminal sexual assault and
aggravated criminal sexual assault, violations of sections 12--13 and 12--14
of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/12--13, 12--14 (West 1992)). The
statute is a narrow codification of the common law rule permitting the
hearsay use of information revealed in medical treatment. See People v. Roy,
201 Ill. App. 3d 166, 179 (1990).
The defendant contends that section 115--13 is inapplicable in this
case and did not authorize the hearsay use of the nurse's testimony because
the victim was not at the doctor's office "for purposes of medical diagnosis
or treatment," as the statute requires; in the defendant's view, the victim
underwent the examination solely as a means of developing evidence for use in
a subsequent prosecution. We do not agree with the defendant that the
diagnostic purpose of the examination would be incompatible with its
investigatory function. We note, moreover, that the statute does not
distinguish between examining physicians and treating physicians. See Roy,
201 Ill. App. 3d at 178; People v. Rushing, 192 Ill. App. 3d 444, 453 (1989).
We conclude that the examination conducted in the present case was for a
purpose within the scope of the statute.
The defendant separately contends that section 115--13 did not
authorize the nurse to testify to the victim's identification of the offender
because the identification was irrelevant to the victim's diagnosis and
treatment. See People v. Hall, 235 Ill. App. 3d 418, 435 (1992); People v.
Hudson, 198 Ill. App. 3d 915, 922 (1990); see also M. Graham, Cleary &
Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence 803.8, at 722 (6th ed. 1994). We must
reject this contention as well. We believe that, at least in the family
setting, a victim's identification of a family member as the offender is
closely related to the victim's diagnosis and treatment in cases involving
allegations of sexual abuse, and thus we agree with those decisions that have
permitted the admission of such hearsay evidence. People v. Morgan, 259 Ill.
App. 3d 770, 781-82 (1994); see also United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430,
437 (8th Cir. 1985) ("[C]hild abuse involves more than physical injury; the
physician must be attentive to treating the emotional and psychological
injuries which accompany this crime. [Citations.] The exact nature and extent
of the psychological problems which ensue from child abuse often depend on
the identity of the abuser"). As the appellate court below explained in
upholding the admission of the nurse's testimony:
"Here, AF's identification of defendant was reasonably
pertinent to a proper diagnosis because defendant is AF's
father. Defendant was living with AF while the sexual abuse
occurred. AF's physical and emotional health, now and in the
future, will be affected by her relationship with defendant.
Defendant is not a stranger whom AF will never see again, but
he is her father. That fact was significant in diagnosing or
treating AF at the time of the abuse and will remain an
important fact for future treatment." 273 Ill. App. 3d at 702-
03.
We believe that the nurse's testimony relating the minor's identification of
the defendant as the abuser was properly admitted under the terms of section
115--13.
In his final allegation of error, the defendant argues that the
trial judge erred in asking a question of one of the prosecution's witnesses,
Dr. Virginia Hoffman. Testifying in rebuttal, Dr. Hoffman, a psychologist,
described the nature and characteristics of child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome. In the course of her testimony, Dr. Hoffman drew an analogy to a
driver's recollection of an automobile accident. At first a driver will
generally provide only a few details of the accident; as time passes, the
driver will be more forthcoming and will reveal more information about the
mishap. At the conclusion of Dr. Hoffman's testimony, the following colloquy
ensued:
"THE COURT: I have a question, Doctor. Let's talk about
disclosure. Would you expect in a situation such as a 13-year-
old who is allegedly the victim of sex abuse to be more
inaccurate in her initial disclosure as opposed to later
disclosures?
THE WITNESS: Yes, very much. It is like the car accident
example I gave.
THE COURT: Well, that's the reason I asked the question.
Thank you."
The defendant notes that one of the principal issues at trial was the
credibility of the victim, and the defendant contends that the court's
question improperly bolstered the prosecution's argument that her testimony
was truthful.
"A trial judge has the right to question witnesses in order to
elicit the truth or to bring enlightenment on material issues which seem
obscure." People v. Wesley, 18 Ill. 2d 138, 154-55 (1959). It is improper,
however, for the judge to assume the role of an advocate (People v. Hopkins,
29 Ill. 2d 260, 265 (1963); People v. Bernstein, 250 Ill. 63, 67 (1911)) or
to suggest through comments or questions an opinion regarding the facts of
the case or the credibility of witnesses (People v. Marino, 414 Ill. 445, 450
(1953)). The appropriate scope of questioning by the court depends on the
facts and circumstances of the case and lies largely within the trial judge's
discretion. People v. Williams, No. 76907, slip op. at 22 (May 31, 1996);
People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill. 2d 423, 456 (1990); People v. Trefonas, 9 Ill. 2d 92, 100 (1956).
Applying these principles to the case at bar, we do not believe
that the trial judge abused his discretion in asking the question of the
witness. The brief inquiry helped clarify a matter that the judge, and
perhaps the jurors, too, found to be somewhat obscure. The judge did not
indicate by his question or his succeeding comments any view on the facts of
the case or the credibility of the witnesses. Moreover, the jurors received
the standard instruction directing them not to construe any of the judge's
rulings or remarks as an opinion on the facts or preferred verdict in the
case. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.01 (3d ed. 1992).
The cases cited by the defendant in support of this contention (People v.
Rush, 250 Ill. App. 3d 530 (1993); People v. Brown, 200 Ill. App. 3d 566
(1990); People v. Crane, 34 Ill. App. 3d 850 (1976)) are distinguishable. In
each of those cases, the trial judge breached the bounds of impartiality by
making remarks or asking questions that would have been construed by the jury
as an opinion on the credibility of a particular witness. The trial judge in
the present case, in contrast, did not comment on the strength of the
evidence or the credibility of witnesses. His single question merely
clarified a point that he believed had been left somewhat unclear by the
witness' testimony. We cannot say on this record that the trial judge abused
his discretion in asking the question of the witness.
Finding no reversible error in the trial proceedings, we decline to
disturb the defendant's convictions or sentences. For the reasons stated, the
judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the judgment of the circuit
court of Jackson County, is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
JUSTICE HARRISON, specially concurring:
Contrary to my colleagues, I would hold that the trial judge erred
in permitting nurse Williams to testify that the victim had identified
defendant as her abuser. Nurse Williams' testimony was plainly hearsay. As
such, it was admissible only to the extent that it fell within the hearsay
exception set forth in section 115--13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1963 (725 ILCS 5/115--13 (West 1992)). That exception, however, cannot be
invoked here.
Section 115--13 does authorize medical personnel to testify as to
statements made by a victim of sexual assault, but only when the statements
were made by the victim to the medical personnel "for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment." This is a codification of a common law rule (see
People v. Giles, 261 Ill. App. 3d 833, 841-42 (1994)) which was based on the
notion that an injured individual is presumed not to "prevaricate at the very
instant of his injury or while he is stating his physical condition to a
physician from whom he expects and hopes to receive medical aid" (Greinke v.
Chicago City Ry. Co., 234 Ill. 564, 572 (1908)).
In this case, the challenged statement was not made at the time of
the victim's injury and had nothing to do with her "diagnosis and treatment."
Dr. St. Germaine was not the victim's physician, and the victim did not go to
her office because she needed help in identifying some medical condition so
that it could be cured. The victim was taken to Dr. St. Germaine's office,
accompanied by an assistant State's Attorney according to the doctor's
account, for the sole purpose of bolstering the State's case against the
defendant.
No genuine medical purpose can reasonably be imputed to the
examination. By the time nurse Williams interviewed the victim in Dr. St.
Germaine's office, any physical trauma had long since healed. There was
nothing medically wrong with the victim, she had no physical symptoms
requiring treatment, and she did not claim that she needed to be treated.
The interview with nurse Williams was likewise unrelated to care of
the victim's mental health. While identification of the perpetrator is
undeniably important in dealing with the child's psychological condition,
there was no uncertainty as to who was responsible here. The victim had
already identified defendant as her abuser, he had already admitted the abuse
and the police had already arrested him for it.
Because the victim was examined for investigatory purposes and not
to obtain medical care, the presumption of trustworthiness underlying the
exception to the hearsay rule was absent and the statute, by its terms, did
not apply. To hold otherwise would mean that the State could evade the
prohibition against hearsay testimony in every child abuse case simply by
using licensed medical professionals to conduct their interrogations. In my
view, such a result was not intended by the legislature and represents a
radical and unwarranted departure from established principles of evidence.
Although the circuit court should not have admitted nurse Williams'
hearsay testimony, I agree that the appellate court was correct in affirming
the circuit court's judgment. This court has held that reversal is mandatory
when the trial court has erroneously admitted evidence unless the record
clearly shows that the error was not prejudicial. People v. Lawler, 142 Ill. 2d 548, 562 (1991); People v. Carlson, 92 Ill. 2d 440, 449 (1982). I believe
that the record before us does clearly show that admission of nurse Williams'
testimony did not prejudice the defendant. As the majority's review of the
facts indicates, the properly admitted evidence was so overwhelming that no
fair-minded jury could reasonably have voted to acquit.
JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this special concurrence.
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