State v. Alangcas
Annotate this CaseDefendant was indicted in counts I and III upon the charge of electronic enticement of a child in the first degree in violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. 707-756. Defendant moved to dismiss counts I and III, arguing that section 707-756 violates the dormant commerce clause and that the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The trial court denied the motions to dismiss. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) based upon the plain language of section 707-756, its legislative history, and principles of statutory construction, the felonious intent of the statute applies only to the agreement element of that statute; and (2) the statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague, and its application does not violate the dormant commerce clause.
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