Reed v. State

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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court denying Appellant's successive postconviction motion filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 seeking relief from his sentence of death pursuant to Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), holding that State v. Poole, 45 Fla. L. Weekly S41 (Fla. Jan. 23, 2020), was dispositive in this case.

Appellant's death sentence became final in 1990, before the Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). The Supreme Court subsequently decided Poole, pursuant to which there was no Hurst error in Appellant's case because a unanimous jury finding establishes the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the Supreme Court held that two of the four statutory aggravating circumstances found by the trial court - that the capital felony was committed during the commission of a sexual battery and for pecuniary gain - were established because Appellant's jury found him guilty of the contemporaneous crimes of sexual battery and robbery.

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Supreme Court of Florida ____________ No. SC19-714 ____________ GROVER B. REED, Appellant, vs. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. March 19, 2020 PER CURIAM. We have for review Grover B. Reed’s appeal of the trial court’s order denying Reed’s successive postconviction motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. In his motion, Reed sought relief from his sentence of death, raising claims predicated on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and this Court’s decision on remand in Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), receded from by State v. Poole, 45 Fla. L. Weekly S41 (Fla. Jan. 23, 2020). Reed’s sentence of death became final in 1990, before the Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). See Reed v. State, 560 So. 2d 203 (Fla.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 882 (1990). Accordingly, we ordered Reed to show cause as to why we should not affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to our decision in Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216, 217 (Fla.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017), which precludes the retroactive application of Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State to defendants (like Reed) whose sentences of death were final when Ring was decided. Since then, however, we decided Poole, 45 Fla. L. Weekly S41, which is dispositive here. Pursuant to Poole, there is no Hurst v. Florida or Hurst v. State error in Reed’s case because a unanimous jury finding establishes the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. See Poole, 45 Fla. L. Weekly at S48 (“reced[ing] from Hurst v. State except to the extent it requires a jury unanimously to find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt” as required by Hurst v. Florida); see also McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 707 (2020) (holding that, under Hurst v. Florida, “a jury must find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant death eligible,” but that a jury “is not constitutionally required to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances or to make the ultimate sentencing decision within the relevant sentencing range”). In Reed’s case, two of the four statutory aggravating circumstances found by the trial court—the capital felony was committed during the commission of a sexual battery and for pecuniary -2- gain—are established because Reed’s jury found him guilty of the contemporaneous crimes of sexual battery and robbery. See Reed, 560 So. 2d at 204, 205 n.1. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order denying relief. It is so ordered. CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LAWSON, and MUÑIZ, JJ., concur. LABARGA, J., concurs in result only with an opinion. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. LABARGA, J., concurring in result only. In Hitchcock v. State, 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 2017), where the defendant’s death sentence was final when Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), was decided, this Court denied the retroactive application of Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). In light of Hitchcock, Reed is similarly not entitled to the retroactive application of Hurst v. Florida. However, in denying relief, the majority relies on State v. Poole, 45 Fla. L. Weekly S41 (Fla. Jan. 23, 2020), a wrongfully decided opinion to which I strenuously dissented. Consequently, I can concur only in the result. An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County, Marianne L. Aho, Judge - Case No. 161986CF006123AXXXMA Martin J. McClain of McClain & McDermott, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Appellant -3- Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellee -4-

Primary Holding

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order denying Appellant's successive postconviction motion seeking relief from his sentence of death pursuant to Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State, holding that State v. Poole was dispositive in this case.

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