Sochor v. State

Annotate this Case
Justia Opinion Summary

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s third successive motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851, holding that the trial court’s failure to hold a case status conference was harmless error and that no evidentiary hearing was required because the motion was legally insufficient on its face and refuted by the record. Further, the trial court did not err by summarily denying Appellant’s claim based on newly discovered evidence and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

Download PDF
Supreme Court of Florida ____________ No. SC17-929 ____________ DENNIS SOCHOR, Appellant, vs. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. [March 1, 2018] PER CURIAM. We hereby affirm the denial of Appellant’s third successive motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. Because the motion was legally insufficient on its face and refuted by the record, we find that the trial court’s failure to hold a case status conference was harmless error, and that no evidentiary hearing was required. See Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985, 999 (Fla. 2009); Rutherford v. State, 926 So. 2d 1100, 1108 (Fla. 2006). Additionally, the trial court did not err by summarily denying his claim based on newly discovered evidence and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Sochor alleges that a recent declaration obtained from Marvin Droste details a confession from Gary Sochor, Appellant’s brother, that Gary was actually “more responsible than anyone else” for the murder of Patricia Gifford. However, the declaration itself is inadmissible because it does not fall within a hearsay exception. See Robinson v. State, 707 So. 2d 688, 691 (Fla. 1998); § 90.804(2), Fla. Stat. Accordingly, the declaration from Marvin Droste would not “probably produce an acquittal on retrial or yield a less severe sentence.” Kormondy v. State, 154 So. 3d 341, 353 (Fla. 2015). Therefore, the newly discovered evidence claim was properly denied. See id. Further, the new information obtained from Droste is not material under the Brady standard. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 28182 (1999). Viewing the declaration by Droste in the context of the entire record, the content of the impeachment evidence against Gary Sochor does not undermine our confidence. See Mordenti v. State, 894 So. 2d 161, 172 (Fla. 2004) (explaining that the materiality prong of Brady is satisfied if “there is a reasonable probability that this evidence ‘put[s] the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’ ” (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 435 (1995)). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief. It is so ordered. LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. -2- An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County, Paul L. Backman, Judge - Case No. 061986CF015270A88810 Neal Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Rachel Day, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Jessica Houston and Jason Kruszka, Staff Attorneys, Southern Region, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Appellant Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Donna M. Perry, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, Florida, for Appellee -3-

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.