Boca Invst Prtnshp, et al v. USA, No. 01-5429 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
Annotate this Case
The court issued a subsequent related opinion or order on March 28, 2003.
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued November 21, 2002 Decided January 10, 2003
No. 01-5429
Boca Investerings Partnership,
a Partnership and
American Home Products Corporation, Tax Matters Partner,
Appellees
v.
United States of America,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 97cv00602)
Mark V. Holmes, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were
Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, Richard Farber and
Edward T. Perelmuter, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Jus-
tice.
Christopher Kliefoth argued the cause for appellees. With
him on the brief were William L. Goldman and Diane L.
Cafritz. Melvin White entered an appearance.
Before: Sentelle, Henderson and Tatel, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.
Sentelle, Circuit Judge: In 1990, American Home Prod-
ucts (AHP), sold a subsidiary, Boyle-Midway, for a capital
gain of more than $605 million. Just before the sale, Merrill
Lynch approached AHP with an investment plan which would
enable AHP to claim paper tax losses of a comparable
amount, while generating only about $8 million in actual
losses. AHP was one of several Fortune 500 companies that
Merrill approached with this idea, and this is the third case
before us involving this particular type of scheme. See Saba
P'ship v. Comm'r, 273 F.3d 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2001); ASA
Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r, 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Following Merrill Lynch's proposal, AHP formed Boca Inves-
terings Partnership with another AHP subsidiary and two
foreign corporations. After completing the transactions pro-
posed by Merrill Lynch, AHP filed tax returns which re-
flected the losses offsetting its capital gains for 1990-1993.
After the Internal Revenue Service challenged these returns,
AHP filed a complaint in the district court contesting the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue's proposed adjustments to
its partnership returns, and on October 5, 2001, the district
court issued an opinion rejecting the Commissioner's adjust-
ments, and entering judgment in favor of Boca. See Boca
Investerings P'ship v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 2d 298
(D.D.C. 2001). We reverse the district court's decision as
inconsistent with ASA Investerings, 201 F.3d 505.
Background
We explored this Merrill Lynch-created tax shelter and the
regulation on which it depends at significant length in our
opinion in ASA Investerings, 201 F.3d at 506-08, and there-
fore will not belabor the details here. The plan proposed by
Merrill Lynch to AlliedSignal, the domestic corporation in-
volved in the ASA partnership, was virtually identical to the
one Merrill proposed to AHP in the case before us now. The
plan requires the formation of a partnership between a
United States corporation and a foreign corporation not sub-
ject to United States tax, combined with a series of invest-
ment transactions that exploit the terms of Temp. Treas. Reg.
s 15A.453-1(c)(3)(I) (26 C.F.R.). That regulation provides a
tax accounting rule for contingent installment sales. An
installment sale is defined in the code as "a disposition of
property where at least 1 payment is to be received after the
close of the taxable year in which the disposition occurs."
I.R.C. s 453(b)(1) (2001). A contingent installment sale is
one where the total purchase price is unknown at the time of
the transaction. Because the total price is unknown, the total
gain on the sale is likewise unknown. The regulation supplies
a general rule of "ratable basis recovery" for situations where
a seller at least knows the maximum period over which the
purchase price will be paid. The partnership formed between
the domestic entities and the foreign entities takes advantage
of this regulation by first buying, then immediately selling a
debt instrument on an installment basis.
As we noted in our opinion in Saba Partnership, which also
considered this regulation and another virtually identical ser-
ies of transactions, "[a]lthough the transaction is basically a
wash, generating hardly any economic gain or loss, Merrill
Lynch's lawyers' interpretation of the relevant provisions
allows the partnership to claim a massive tax gain, which is
allocated to the foreign partner, and a massive tax loss, which
the U.S. corporation keeps for itself." 273 F.3d at 1136.
This sentence essentially describes the transactions in which
AHP; its subsidiary; and its foreign partners, Syringa and
Addiscombe, engaged after forming the Boca partnership.
The massive loss AHP was able to claim for tax purposes was
then used to offset the tax gain it realized from the sale of its
subsidiary, Boyle-Midway.
The facts in this case are substantially similar to those in
ASA Investerings and Saba Partnership. In 1990, Merrill
Lynch representatives approached AHP, as it had also ap-
proached AlliedSignal and Brunswick, other Fortune 500
companies, with the idea for this scheme to shelter large
capital gains. After meeting with the representatives, Thom-
as Nee, AHP's vice-president for taxes prepared a memoran-
dum for AHP's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, John
Stafford, entitled, "Tax Planning Re: Sale of Boyle-Mid-
way." This memo outlined the proposal as follows, in perti-
nent part.
1) Formation of Partnership
The partnership would be formed in a favorable tax
jurisdiction such as the Netherlands, Antilles under the
New York general partnership law. The members of the
partnership would be AHPC, one of its domestic subsid-
iaries (henceforth referred to as AHPC) and an unrelated
foreign financial institution (XYZ). AHPC will contrib-
ute cash of $110 million (representing a 10% ownership)
and XYZ will contribute $990 million. Under the part-
nership agreement, all the income, gain, expense and loss
of the partnership will be allocated among the members
in proportion to their capital accounts. * * *
2) Purchase of Corporate Bonds
* * * [I]nvest $1.057 billion in [corporate bonds]* * *
3) Installment Sale
The Partnership will sell the Bonds to a financial institu-
tion in exchange for $898.5 million in cash and $158.5
million at fair market value, five year LIBOR installment
notes. * * *
4) Increase of AHPC's Partnership Interest
Following Step 3, AHPC will purchase a 45.5% interest
in the partnership from XYZ for $500 million in cash
bringing its total interest to 55.5% and XYZ's interest
down 44.5%.
5) Contribution of Assets to Partnership
AHPC will thereupon contribute assets with a fair mar-
ket value of $200 million to the partnership further
increasing its partnership interest to 62%. * * *
6) Partial Redemption of Partnership Interest
The partnership will distribute $159 million fair market
value installment note to AHPC and $96 million in cash
to XYZ. * * *
7) Sale of Installment Note
* * * $159 million in cash resulting in a $723.2 million
in capital loss
* * *
The memo also noted that, "[w]e believe that the above
transaction is technically sound. We expect it would be
vigorously attacked by the IRS. * * * Merrill Lynch is
requesting a fee of $8 million. Their contribution is signifi-
cant in that they identify XYZ, arrange for purchase of the
Corporate Assets (Bonds) and locate a buyer for the install-
ment notes."
AHP decided to accept Merrill Lynch's proposal and the
transaction took form by precisely following the steps laid out
in Nee's memo. Boca Investerings, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 319.
On April 19, 1990, the Boca partnership was formed between
partners AHP; another AHP subsidiary and two Netherlands
Antilles special purpose corporations, Addiscombe and Syrin-
ga, with initial partner contributions mirroring those antici-
pated in the memo. Id. Merrill Lynch received a $7 million
fee for structuring the transaction. On May 1 and 2, 1990,
Boca purchased $1.1 billion of private placement floating-rate
notes (PPNs) from two Japanese banks and PepsiCo. Boca
Investerings, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 329-30. A week after Boca
made the purchases, Merrill Lynch began arranging for the
sale of the PPNs. During one week in late May, 1990, Boca
sold over $1 billion of the PPNs for $880 million in cash, and
indefinite debt instruments known as LIBOR (London Inter-
bank Offering Rate) notes. Boca Investerings, 167 F. Supp. 2d
at 333-34. The district court found that this sale generated
transaction costs of $13 million, which was ultimately borne
by AHP, id. at 337, and that Boca received less than $7
million in interest on its $1.1 billion investment in the PPNs,
id. at 351.
On its 1990 partnership tax return, Boca treated the sale as
an installment sale under I.R.C. s 453(b). Id. at 362. Boca
reported a short-term capital gain of over $721 million from
the transaction, calculated by subtracting the ratably-
recovered basis from the $880 million in cash generated by
the sale of the PPNs. Id. Ten percent of the gain was
allocated to AHP and its domestic subsidiary, while the
remaining ninety percent was allocated to the foreign part-
ners, who were not subject to U.S. tax on the gain. Id.
ABN, a Netherlands bank which controlled the two foreign
partnerships, id. at 319, and was also involved in the Saba
Partnership and ASA Investerings transactions, see Saba
P'ship, 273 F.3d at 1138-40; ASA Investerings, 201 F.3d at
508-11, entered into interest-rate swaps with Addiscombe,
Syringa and Merrill Lynch to hedge the interest-rate risk on
the LIBOR notes. Boca Investerings, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 360,
361.
On July 20, 1990, the parties agreed that AHP would
purchase approximately 45% of Syringa's interest in Boca at a
$2.5 million above-book-value premium. Boca Investerings,
167 F. Supp. 2d at 338. This transaction left the foreign
partners with approximately a 45% ownership interest in
Boca. Id. at 339. In August 1990, Boca distributed $175
million in cash to the foreign partners and nearly $220 million
in LIBOR notes to the AHP partners. Id. at 341. In
September and October 1990, Boca redeemed more of the
foreign partners' interest, resulting in an 85% ownership
interest for the AHP partners. Id. at 343, 344. In Novem-
ber 1990, the AHP partners sold the LIBOR notes Boca had
distributed to them. Id. at 344-45. This disposition trig-
gered a paper loss of more than $770 million for AHP. Id. at
345. This loss offset the capital gains of AHP from the sale
of Boyle-Midway, and other gains from 1990 to 1993. Id. In
December 1990, AHP redeemed Syringa's remaining interest
in Boca for cash. Id. Finally, in September 1991, the foreign
partners were bought out of Boca entirely, with the cash
redemption of Addiscombe's remaining interest, which includ-
ed a premium of $2.2 million above book value. Id. at 346-47.
Following the government's audit of Boca's partnership tax
returns for 1990-1993, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
proposed different adjustments based on different theories.
Under one theory, the Commissioner found that the foreign
entities had not entered into a valid partnership with AHP,
and therefore recognized the Merrill Lynch transaction for
tax purposes, but allocated all the gains and losses reported
by Boca to AHP. Under a second theory, that the transac-
tion was an economic sham, the Commissioner eliminated any
gains and losses reported by Boca as resulting from the
transaction. AHP deposited with the Treasury the amount it
determined would be due as a result of the proposed adjust-
ments and filed suit in district court contesting the Commis-
sioner's proposals. The district court determined after a
lengthy trial that the Commissioner erred in proposing the
adjustments. See Boca Investerings, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 388.
The government's appeal is now before us.
We review the findings of fact of the district court under
the "clear error" standard. ASA Investerings, 201 F.3d at
511. "A finding is 'clearly errroneous' when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed." United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). The district
court, after a seventeen day trial, issued a well-documented
and cross-referenced 180 page opinion which included 392
separate findings of fact, as well as conclusions of law.
Analysis
At the outset, we reject two of the government's assign-
ments of error without difficulty. Although the district court
reached a different conclusion than other courts had on
previous occasions in cases with very similar facts, these
findings of fact do not constitute clear error by the district
court. The mere similarity of facts in two cases with differ-
ent litigants and different evidence provides no basis for a
finding of clear error on the part of either trial judge whose
findings differ from the other. This is particularly evident in
a case such as this in which many of the district court's
findings were based on the demeanor and believability of
witnesses at trial. See Boca Investerings, 167 F. Supp. 2d at
303. Nor did the district court err when it refused to admit
into evidence materials which did not relate to the parties in
this case and which the government argued should be admit-
ted principally because they were admitted as evidence in
ASA Investerings. However, our rejection of these assign-
ments of error does not mean we reject all assignments. We
reverse the judgment below because the district court erred
as a matter of law when it did not properly apply the holding
of ASA Investerings, requiring that a legitimate non-tax
business necessity exist for the creation of the otherwise
sham entity inserted into the partnership for tax avoidance
reasons in order to meet the intent test of Commissioner v.
Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949), as applied to this type of
partnership transaction.
The government argues that the district court erred in
determining that this case was materially different from the
case in ASA Investerings, in which we affirmed the Tax
Court's ruling that a very similar partnership between Allied-
Signal and ABN Bank was a sham for purposes of the
"business purpose doctrine." We agree. While the similarity
of facts in the two cases does not, in itself, invalidate the
district court's finding that Boca Investerings Partnership
was not a sham partnership, the district court's misapplica-
tion of ASA Investerings's instructions for interpreting trans-
actions such as these does constitute reversible error. As we
noted in Saba Partnership, "ASA makes clear that 'the
absence of a nontax business purpose is fatal' to the argument
that the Commissioner should respect an entity for federal
tax purposes." 273 F.3d at 1141 (quoting ASA Investerings,
201 F.3d at 512).
Boca claimed at oral argument and in a post-argument
submission that the government failed to raise the require-
ment stated in ASA Investerings that a partnership have a
non-tax need in order for it to be recognized for tax purposes.
Accordingly, Boca argues that we should not consider this
point on appeal, citing Flynn v. Commissioner, 269 F.3d 1064, 1068-69 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("generally an argument not
made in the lower tribunal is deemed forfeited and will not be
entertained absent exceptional circumstances.") However, as
the government rightly points out, its Memorandum of Points
and Authorities filed with the district court approximately
three months before trial expressly argues "given the sub-
stantial costs incurred, AHP's use of this elaborate 'partner-
ship' cannot be justified by a non-tax business purpose. The
factual similarity to the ASA Investerings partnership case is
obvious and undeniable."
The business purpose doctrine applied in ASA Investerings
establishes that while taxpayers are allowed to structure their
business transactions in such a way as to minimize their tax,
these transactions must have a legitimate non-tax avoidance
business purpose to be recognized as legitimate for tax pur-
poses. The reasoning behind this doctrine is readily applica-
ble to this case. As we noted in ASA Investerings:
A tax system of rather high rates gives a multitude of
clever individuals in the private sector powerful incen-
tives to game the system. Even the smartest drafters of
legislation and regulation cannot be expected to antici-
pate every device. The business purpose doctrine re-
duces the incentive to engage in such essentially wasteful
activity, and in addition helps achieve reasonable equity
among taxpayers who are similarly situated--in every
respect except for differing investments in tax avoidance.
201 F.3d at 513.
We then approved the Tax Court's approach to the Su-
preme Court's test set out in Culbertson which determined
that the existence of a partnership would depend on whether,
"considering all the facts ... the parties in good faith and
acting with a business purpose intended to join together in
the present conduct of the enterprise." ASA Investerings,
201 F.3d at 511 (quoting Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 742). We
stated that "the Tax Court was, we think, sound in its basic
inquiry, trying to decide whether, all facts considered, the
parties intended to join together as partners to conduct
business activity for a purpose other than tax avoidance." Id.
at 513. Finally, we affirmed the Tax Court's conclusion that
AlliedSignal and ABN did not have "the requisite intent to
join together for the purpose of carrying on a partnership."
Id. at 511 (quoting 76 T.C.M. at 335).
As the government argued, ASA Investerings set out fac-
tors which pointed to AlliedSignal's lack of a legitimate non-
tax business purpose for its transactions with the partnership.
"[T]his evidence says nothing about AlliedSignal's use of the
elaborate partnership--with a pair of partners concocted for
the occasion. There is no reason to believe that AlliedSignal
could not have realized [AlliedSignal's assistant treasurer]'s
interest rate play without the partnership at far, far lower
transactions costs." Id. at 516. In the current case, the
district court never made a finding of fact in regard to the
necessity of AHP's acquisition of foreign partners in order to
engage in the transactions. No official testified that AHP
needed a partnership with a foreign corporation to invest in
LIBOR notes or PPNs. AHP's participation in the partner-
ship defies common sense from an economic standpoint, since
it could have purchased the PPNs and the LIBOR notes
directly, and avoided millions in transaction costs, including
the $7 million fee it paid to Merrill Lynch and the "premi-
ums" paid to the foreign partners for the purchase of their
ownership interests.
Without a finding on the business need for the partnership
from AHP's standpoint in this transaction, the judgment
under review cannot stand. In addition, the foreign partners
Syringa and Addiscombe were, like the foreign entities in
ASA, "concocted" for the occasion--neither having existed
prior to the transaction's commencement, nor serving any
other purpose, and both being funded through loans from
ABN, the bank which we found to lack the requisite intent to
enter a legitimate business partnership with Allied Signal in
ASA. In fact, the parties stipulated in the court below that
both entities came into being only on April 19, 1990, the same
day that Boca was created. Stip. of Facts at p 29. Nothing
in the record indicates that AHP ever considered or weighed
the benefits of using a different type of transaction in order
to make these investments, including the option of purchasing
them directly.
Boca argues that the district court made the finding that
the parties "intended to, and did, organize Boca as a partner-
ship to share the income, expenses, gains and losses from
Boca's investments." Boca Investerings, 167 F. Supp. 2d at
349-50. This finding, contrary to the appellee's assertion,
does not satisfy the legal test for recognition of this type of
partnership for tax purposes, as we held in ASA Investerings.
In order to satisfy the legal test for this type of partnership,
the district court must have found a non-tax business purpose
need for the partnership in order to accomplish the goals of
the partners. In this case, there is no evidence of any need
for AHP to enter into the Boca partnership with the newly-
minted Addiscombe and Syringa in order to invest in the
LIBOR notes and PPNs. Nor is there even evidence of any
non-tax purpose in the use of the partnerships. The only
logical explanation then, for the partnership's formation was
the exploitation of Temp. Treas. Reg. s 15A.453-1(c)(3)(I)
and the gain of a paper tax loss to absorb its enormous capital
gains. The district court stated as its first conclusion of law
that
the transactions financing the purchase and sale of the
PPNs had economic substance, were not prearranged
and predetermined, and had a legitimate purpose. They
therefore should be recognized for federal income tax
purposes.
Boca Investerings, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 580. As the record
would not support a finding that the partnership form served
any non-tax business purpose, this conclusion is unsupported,
inconsistent with ASA Investerings, and constitutes revers-
ible error.
Boca argues that the clear error standard places a heavy
burden on the appellant upon review, and we agree that there
was ample evidence in the record to support the numerous
and well-documented findings of fact made by the district
court. As we stated above these findings are not the prob-
lem. The principal error is in the lack of findings on the non-
tax purpose for the partnership, but that error is determina-
tive. We do not of course suggest that in every transaction
using a partnership a taxpayer must justify that to form, but
as we made clear in both ASA Investerings and Saba Part-
nership, where taxpayers use an "elaborate partnership" with
entities created solely for the purpose of the questioned
transaction, "the absence of a non-tax business purpose" is
fatal to the recognition of the entity for the tax purposes.
ASA Investerings, 201 F.3d at 512. See also Saba P'ship, 273 F.3d at 1141. Because the district court did not find that a
legitimate, non-tax necessity existed for the formation of the
Boca partnership, and because the evidence of record would
not have supported such a finding if made, we reverse.
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued November 21, 2002 Decided January 10, 2003
No. 01-5429
Boca Investerings Partnership,
a Partnership and
American Home Products Corporation, Tax Matters Partner,
Appellees
v.
United States of America,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 97cv00602)
Mark V. Holmes, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,
argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were
Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, Richard Farber and
Edward T. Perelmuter, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Jus-
tice.
Christopher Kliefoth argued the cause for appellees. With
him on the brief were William L. Goldman and Diane L.
Cafritz. Melvin White entered an appearance.
Before: Sentelle, Henderson and Tatel, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.
Sentelle, Circuit Judge: In 1990, American Home Prod-
ucts (AHP), sold a subsidiary, Boyle-Midway, for a capital
gain of more than $605 million. Just before the sale, Merrill
Lynch approached AHP with an investment plan which would
enable AHP to claim paper tax losses of a comparable
amount, while generating only about $8 million in actual
losses. AHP was one of several Fortune 500 companies that
Merrill approached with this idea, and this is the third case
before us involving this particular type of scheme. See Saba
P'ship v. Comm'r, 273 F.3d 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2001); ASA
Investerings P'ship v. Comm'r, 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Following Merrill Lynch's proposal, AHP formed Boca Inves-
terings Partnership with another AHP subsidiary and two
foreign corporations. After completing the transactions pro-
posed by Merrill Lynch, AHP filed tax returns which re-
flected the losses offsetting its capital gains for 1990-1993.
After the Internal Revenue Service challenged these returns,
AHP filed a complaint in the district court contesting the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue's proposed adjustments to
its partnership returns, and on October 5, 2001, the district
court issued an opinion rejecting the Commissioner's adjust-
ments, and entering judgment in favor of Boca. See Boca
Investerings P'ship v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 2d 298
(D.D.C. 2001). We reverse the district court's decision as
inconsistent with ASA Investerings, 201 F.3d 505.
Background
We explored this Merrill Lynch-created tax shelter and the
regulation on which it depends at significant length in our
opinion in ASA Investerings, 201 F.3d at 506-08, and there-
fore will not belabor the details here. The plan proposed by
Merrill Lynch to AlliedSignal, the domestic corporation in-
volved in the ASA partnership, was virtually identical to the
one Merrill proposed to AHP in the case before us now. The
plan requires the formation of a partnership between a
United States corporation and a foreign corporation not sub-
ject to United States tax, combined with a series of invest-
ment transactions that exploit the terms of Temp. Treas. Reg.
s 15A.453-1(c)(3)(I) (26 C.F.R.). That regulation provides a
tax accounting rule for contingent installment sales. An
installment sale is defined in the code as "a disposition of
property where at least 1 payment is to be received after the
close of the taxable year in which the disposition occurs."
I.R.C. s 453(b)(1) (2001). A contingent installment sale is
one where the total purchase price is unknown at the time of
the transaction. Because the total price is unknown, the total
gain on the sale is likewise unknown. The regulation supplies
a general rule of "ratable basis recovery" for situations where
a seller at least knows the maximum period over which the
purchase price will be paid. The partnership formed between
the domestic entities and the foreign entities takes advantage
of this regulation by first buying, then immediately selling a
debt instrument on an installment basis.
As we noted in our opinion in Saba Partnership, which also
considered this regulation and another virtually identical ser-
ies of transactions, "[a]lthough the transaction is basically a
wash, generating hardly any economic gain or loss, Merrill
Lynch's lawyers' interpretation of the relevant provisions
allows the partnership to claim a massive tax gain, which is
allocated to the foreign partner, and a massive tax loss, which
the U.S. corporation keeps for itself." 273 F.3d at 1136.
This sentence essentially describes the transactions in which
AHP; its subsidiary; and its foreign partners, Syringa and
Addiscombe, engaged after forming the Boca partnership.
The massive loss AHP was able to claim for tax purposes was
then used to offset the tax gain it realized from the sale of its
subsidiary, Boyle-Midway.
The facts in this case are substantially similar to those in
ASA Investerings and Saba Partnership. In 1990, Merrill
Lynch representatives approached AHP, as it had also ap-
proached AlliedSignal and Brunswick, other Fortune 500
companies, with the idea for this scheme to shelter large
capital gains. After meeting with the representatives, Thom-
as Nee, AHP's vice-president for taxes prepared a memoran-
dum for AHP's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, John
Stafford, entitled, "Tax Planning Re: Sale of Boyle-Mid-
way." This memo outlined the proposal as follows, in perti-
nent part.
1) Formation of Partnership
The partnership would be formed in a favorable tax
jurisdiction such as the Netherlands, Antilles under the
New York general partnership law. The members of the
partnership would be AHPC, one of its domestic subsid-
iaries (henceforth referred to as AHPC) and an unrelated
foreign financial institution (XYZ). AHPC will contrib-
ute cash of $110 million (representing a 10% ownership)
and XYZ will contribute $990 million. Under the part-
nership agreement, all the income, gain, expense and loss
of the partnership will be allocated among the members
in proportion to their capital accounts. * * *
2) Purchase of Corporate Bonds
* * * [I]nvest $1.057 billion in [corporate bonds]* * *
3) Installment Sale
The Partnership will sell the Bonds to a financial institu-
tion in exchange for $898.5 million in cash and $158.5
million at fair market value, five year LIBOR installment
notes. * * *
4) Increase of AHPC's Partnership Interest
Following Step 3, AHPC will purchase a 45.5% interest
in the partnership from XYZ for $500 million in cash
bringing its total interest to 55.5% and XYZ's interest
down 44.5%.
5) Contribution of Assets to Partnership
AHPC will thereupon contribute assets with a fair mar-
ket value of $200 million to the partnership further
increasing its partnership interest to 62%. * * *
6) Partial Redemption of Partnership Interest
The partnership will distribute $159 million fair market
value installment note to AHPC and $96 million in cash
to XYZ. * * *
7) Sale of Installment Note
* * * $159 million in cash resulting in a $723.2 million
in capital loss
* * *
The memo also noted that, "[w]e believe that the above
transaction is technically sound. We expect it would be
vigorously attacked by the IRS. * * * Merrill Lynch is
requesting a fee of $8 million. Their contribution is signifi-
cant in that they identify XYZ, arrange for purchase of the
Corporate Assets (Bonds) and locate a buyer for the install-
ment notes."
AHP decided to accept Merrill Lynch's proposal and the
transaction took form by precisely following the steps laid out
in Nee's memo. Boca Investerings, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 319.
On April 19, 1990, the Boca partnership was formed between
partners AHP; another AHP subsidiary and two Netherlands
Antilles special purpose corporations, Addiscombe and Syrin-
ga, with initial partner contributions mirroring those antici-
pated in the memo. Id. Merrill Lynch received a $7 million
fee for structuring the transaction. On May 1 and 2, 1990,
Boca purchased $1.1 billion of private placement floating-rate
notes (PPNs) from two Japanese banks and PepsiCo. Boca
Investerings, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 329-30. A week after Boca
made the purchases, Merrill Lynch began arranging for the
sale of the PPNs. During one week in late May, 1990, Boca
sold over $1 billion of the PPNs for $880 million in cash, and
indefinite debt instruments known as LIBOR (London Inter-
bank Offering Rate) notes. Boca Investerings, 167 F. Supp. 2d
at 333-34. The district court found that this sale generated
transaction costs of $13 million, which was ultimately borne
by AHP, id. at 337, and that Boca received less than $7
million in interest on its $1.1 billion investment in the PPNs,
id. at 351.
On its 1990 partnership tax return, Boca treated the sale as
an installment sale under I.R.C. s 453(b). Id. at 362. Boca
reported a short-term capital gain of over $721 million from
the transaction, calculated by subtracting the ratably-
recovered basis from the $880 million in cash generated by
the sale of the PPNs. Id. Ten percent of the gain was
allocated to AHP and its domestic subsidiary, while the
remaining ninety percent was allocated to the foreign part-
ners, who were not subject to U.S. tax on the gain. Id.
ABN, a Netherlands bank which controlled the two foreign
partnerships, id. at 319, and was also involved in the Saba
Partnership and ASA Investerings transactions, see Saba
P'ship, 273 F.3d at 1138-40; ASA Investerings, 201 F.3d at
508-11, entered into interest-rate swaps with Addiscombe,
Syringa and Merrill Lynch to hedge the interest-rate risk on
the LIBOR notes. Boca Investerings, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 360,
361.
On July 20, 1990, the parties agreed that AHP would
purchase approximately 45% of Syringa's interest in Boca at a
$2.5 million above-book-value premium. Boca Investerings,
167 F. Supp. 2d at 338. This transaction left the foreign
partners with approximately a 45% ownership interest in
Boca. Id. at 339. In August 1990, Boca distributed $175
million in cash to the foreign partners and nearly $220 million
in LIBOR notes to the AHP partners. Id. at 341. In
September and October 1990, Boca redeemed more of the
foreign partners' interest, resulting in an 85% ownership
interest for the AHP partners. Id. at 343, 344. In Novem-
ber 1990, the AHP partners sold the LIBOR notes Boca had
distributed to them. Id. at 344-45. This disposition trig-
gered a paper loss of more than $770 million for AHP. Id. at
345. This loss offset the capital gains of AHP from the sale
of Boyle-Midway, and other gains from 1990 to 1993. Id. In
December 1990, AHP redeemed Syringa's remaining interest
in Boca for cash. Id. Finally, in September 1991, the foreign
partners were bought out of Boca entirely, with the cash
redemption of Addiscombe's remaining interest, which includ-
ed a premium of $2.2 million above book value. Id. at 346-47.
Following the government's audit of Boca's partnership tax
returns for 1990-1993, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
proposed different adjustments based on different theories.
Under one theory, the Commissioner found that the foreign
entities had not entered into a valid partnership with AHP,
and therefore recognized the Merrill Lynch transaction for
tax purposes, but allocated all the gains and losses reported
by Boca to AHP. Under a second theory, that the transac-
tion was an economic sham, the Commissioner eliminated any
gains and losses reported by Boca as resulting from the
transaction. AHP deposited with the Treasury the amount it
determined would be due as a result of the proposed adjust-
ments and filed suit in district court contesting the Commis-
sioner's proposals. The district court determined after a
lengthy trial that the Commissioner erred in proposing the
adjustments. See Boca Investerings, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 388.
The government's appeal is now before us.
We review the findings of fact of the district court under
the "clear error" standard. ASA Investerings, 201 F.3d at
511. "A finding is 'clearly errroneous' when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed." United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). The district
court, after a seventeen day trial, issued a well-documented
and cross-referenced 180 page opinion which included 392
separate findings of fact, as well as conclusions of law.
Analysis
At the outset, we reject two of the government's assign-
ments of error without difficulty. Although the district court
reached a different conclusion than other courts had on
previous occasions in cases with very similar facts, these
findings of fact do not constitute clear error by the district
court. The mere similarity of facts in two cases with differ-
ent litigants and different evidence provides no basis for a
finding of clear error on the part of either trial judge whose
findings differ from the other. This is particularly evident in
a case such as this in which many of the district court's
findings were based on the demeanor and believability of
witnesses at trial. See Boca Investerings, 167 F. Supp. 2d at
303. Nor did the district court err when it refused to admit
into evidence materials which did not relate to the parties in
this case and which the government argued should be admit-
ted principally because they were admitted as evidence in
ASA Investerings. However, our rejection of these assign-
ments of error does not mean we reject all assignments. We
reverse the judgment below because the district court erred
as a matter of law when it did not properly apply the holding
of ASA Investerings, requiring that a legitimate non-tax
business necessity exist for the creation of the otherwise
sham entity inserted into the partnership for tax avoidance
reasons in order to meet the intent test of Commissioner v.
Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949), as applied to this type of
partnership transaction.
The government argues that the district court erred in
determining that this case was materially different from the
case in ASA Investerings, in which we affirmed the Tax
Court's ruling that a very similar partnership between Allied-
Signal and ABN Bank was a sham for purposes of the
"business purpose doctrine." We agree. While the similarity
of facts in the two cases does not, in itself, invalidate the
district court's finding that Boca Investerings Partnership
was not a sham partnership, the district court's misapplica-
tion of ASA Investerings's instructions for interpreting trans-
actions such as these does constitute reversible error. As we
noted in Saba Partnership, "ASA makes clear that 'the
absence of a nontax business purpose is fatal' to the argument
that the Commissioner should respect an entity for federal
tax purposes." 273 F.3d at 1141 (quoting ASA Investerings,
201 F.3d at 512).
Boca claimed at oral argument and in a post-argument
submission that the government failed to raise the require-
ment stated in ASA Investerings that a partnership have a
non-tax need in order for it to be recognized for tax purposes.
Accordingly, Boca argues that we should not consider this
point on appeal, citing Flynn v. Commissioner, 269 F.3d 1064, 1068-69 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("generally an argument not
made in the lower tribunal is deemed forfeited and will not be
entertained absent exceptional circumstances.") However, as
the government rightly points out, its Memorandum of Points
and Authorities filed with the district court approximately
three months before trial expressly argues "given the sub-
stantial costs incurred, AHP's use of this elaborate 'partner-
ship' cannot be justified by a non-tax business purpose. The
factual similarity to the ASA Investerings partnership case is
obvious and undeniable."
The business purpose doctrine applied in ASA Investerings
establishes that while taxpayers are allowed to structure their
business transactions in such a way as to minimize their tax,
these transactions must have a legitimate non-tax avoidance
business purpose to be recognized as legitimate for tax pur-
poses. The reasoning behind this doctrine is readily applica-
ble to this case. As we noted in ASA Investerings:
A tax system of rather high rates gives a multitude of
clever individuals in the private sector powerful incen-
tives to game the system. Even the smartest drafters of
legislation and regulation cannot be expected to antici-
pate every device. The business purpose doctrine re-
duces the incentive to engage in such essentially wasteful
activity, and in addition helps achieve reasonable equity
among taxpayers who are similarly situated--in every
respect except for differing investments in tax avoidance.
201 F.3d at 513.
We then approved the Tax Court's approach to the Su-
preme Court's test set out in Culbertson which determined
that the existence of a partnership would depend on whether,
"considering all the facts ... the parties in good faith and
acting with a business purpose intended to join together in
the present conduct of the enterprise." ASA Investerings,
201 F.3d at 511 (quoting Culbertson, 337 U.S. at 742). We
stated that "the Tax Court was, we think, sound in its basic
inquiry, trying to decide whether, all facts considered, the
parties intended to join together as partners to conduct
business activity for a purpose other than tax avoidance." Id.
at 513. Finally, we affirmed the Tax Court's conclusion that
AlliedSignal and ABN did not have "the requisite intent to
join together for the purpose of carrying on a partnership."
Id. at 511 (quoting 76 T.C.M. at 335).
As the government argued, ASA Investerings set out fac-
tors which pointed to AlliedSignal's lack of a legitimate non-
tax business purpose for its transactions with the partnership.
"[T]his evidence says nothing about AlliedSignal's use of the
elaborate partnership--with a pair of partners concocted for
the occasion. There is no reason to believe that AlliedSignal
could not have realized [AlliedSignal's assistant treasurer]'s
interest rate play without the partnership at far, far lower
transactions costs." Id. at 516. In the current case, the
district court never made a finding of fact in regard to the
necessity of AHP's acquisition of foreign partners in order to
engage in the transactions. No official testified that AHP
needed a partnership with a foreign corporation to invest in
LIBOR notes or PPNs. AHP's participation in the partner-
ship defies common sense from an economic standpoint, since
it could have purchased the PPNs and the LIBOR notes
directly, and avoided millions in transaction costs, including
the $7 million fee it paid to Merrill Lynch and the "premi-
ums" paid to the foreign partners for the purchase of their
ownership interests.
Without a finding on the business need for the partnership
from AHP's standpoint in this transaction, the judgment
under review cannot stand. In addition, the foreign partners
Syringa and Addiscombe were, like the foreign entities in
ASA, "concocted" for the occasion--neither having existed
prior to the transaction's commencement, nor serving any
other purpose, and both being funded through loans from
ABN, the bank which we found to lack the requisite intent to
enter a legitimate business partnership with Allied Signal in
ASA. In fact, the parties stipulated in the court below that
both entities came into being only on April 19, 1990, the same
day that Boca was created. Stip. of Facts at p 29. Nothing
in the record indicates that AHP ever considered or weighed
the benefits of using a different type of transaction in order
to make these investments, including the option of purchasing
them directly.
Boca argues that the district court made the finding that
the parties "intended to, and did, organize Boca as a partner-
ship to share the income, expenses, gains and losses from
Boca's investments." Boca Investerings, 167 F. Supp. 2d at
349-50. This finding, contrary to the appellee's assertion,
does not satisfy the legal test for recognition of this type of
partnership for tax purposes, as we held in ASA Investerings.
In order to satisfy the legal test for this type of partnership,
the district court must have found a non-tax business purpose
need for the partnership in order to accomplish the goals of
the partners. In this case, there is no evidence of any need
for AHP to enter into the Boca partnership with the newly-
minted Addiscombe and Syringa in order to invest in the
LIBOR notes and PPNs. Nor is there even evidence of any
non-tax purpose in the use of the partnerships. The only
logical explanation then, for the partnership's formation was
the exploitation of Temp. Treas. Reg. s 15A.453-1(c)(3)(I)
and the gain of a paper tax loss to absorb its enormous capital
gains. The district court stated as its first conclusion of law
that
the transactions financing the purchase and sale of the
PPNs had economic substance, were not prearranged
and predetermined, and had a legitimate purpose. They
therefore should be recognized for federal income tax
purposes.
Boca Investerings, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 580. As the record
would not support a finding that the partnership form served
any non-tax business purpose, this conclusion is unsupported,
inconsistent with ASA Investerings, and constitutes revers-
ible error.
Boca argues that the clear error standard places a heavy
burden on the appellant upon review, and we agree that there
was ample evidence in the record to support the numerous
and well-documented findings of fact made by the district
court. As we stated above these findings are not the prob-
lem. The principal error is in the lack of findings on the non-
tax purpose for the partnership, but that error is determina-
tive. We do not of course suggest that in every transaction
using a partnership a taxpayer must justify that to form, but
as we made clear in both ASA Investerings and Saba Part-
nership, where taxpayers use an "elaborate partnership" with
entities created solely for the purpose of the questioned
transaction, "the absence of a non-tax business purpose" is
fatal to the recognition of the entity for the tax purposes.
ASA Investerings, 201 F.3d at 512. See also Saba P'ship, 273 F.3d at 1141. Because the district court did not find that a
legitimate, non-tax necessity existed for the formation of the
Boca partnership, and because the evidence of record would
not have supported such a finding if made, we reverse.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.