Aja v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, No. 18-1026 (1st Cir. 2019)

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Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit No. 18-1026 DORITA AJA, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. OCWEN LOAN SERVICING LLC, Defendant, Appellee. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. F. Dennis Saylor, IV, U.S. District Judge] Before Thompson, Circuit Judge, Souter, Associate Justice,* and Lipez, Circuit Judge. Nelson P. Lovins and Lovins & Metcalf on brief for appellant. Marissa I. Delinks, Maura K. Culbertson LLP on brief for appellee. McKelvey, and Hinshaw February 26, 2019 *Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation. & Per Curiam. After carefully considering the parties' briefs and the record on appeal, we conclude that the district court's grant of summary judgment for Ocwen should be affirmed. We briefly explain our decision because our reasoning differs from the rationale articulated by the district court. See Audette v. Town of Plymouth, MA, 858 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 2017) (noting that we may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any basis supported by the record). On appeal, Aja contends that the district court erred in entering summary judgment for Ocwen on her two Chapter 93A1 claims because Ocwen "had a duty under the Consent Judgment or at common law to offer [her] a loan modification in good faith." On de novo review, we conclude that Ocwen did not have such a duty under the consent judgment. to loans The consent judgment on its face applies only "originated by Sand Option One Mortgage Corporation. Canyon [Corporation]," formerly It is undisputed that Aja's loan originated with Shamrock Financial Corporation. Therefore, Ocwen had no duty to offer a loan modification under the terms of the consent judgment. Aja has offered no legal or factual argument that would cause us to go beyond the consent judgment's plain language. 1 Nor has Aja pointed to any alternative basis for the Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, ยงยง 2(a), 9. - 2 - proposition modification. that Ocwen was required to offer her a loan See MacKenzie v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 738 F.3d 486, 493 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that a mortgagee has no general duty to modify a loan after default). Finally, even assuming Ocwen voluntarily assumed a duty to offer a loan modification in good faith when it extended modification offers to Aja, there is simply no evidence in the record that Ocwen's offers were so unfair or deceptive as to run afoul of Massachusetts law. See Cummings v. HPG Int'l, Inc., 244 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Conduct is unfair or deceptive [under Chapter 93A] if it is 'within at least the penumbra of some commonlaw, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness' or 'immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous.'" (quoting PMP Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 321 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Mass. 1975))). Affirmed. See 1st Cir. Rule 27.0(c). - 3 -