Agbaraji v. Aldridge

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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volum es go to press. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS No. 02-TX-652 V INCENT O. A GBARAJI, A PPELLANT, v. J AMES E. A LDRIDGE, A PPELLEE. Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of C olumbia (TAX 7996-02) (Hon. Jose M. Lopez, Trial Judge) (Submitted September 9, 2003 Decided September 10, 2003)* Vincent O . Agbaraji, pro se. Arabella W. Teal, Interim Corporation Counsel, with whom Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel at the time the brief was filed, and William J. Earl, Assistant Corporation Counsel, were on the brief, for appellee. Before: R UIZ and R EID, Associate Judges, and B ELSON, Senior Judge. B ELSON, Senior Judge: Appellant Agbaraji is the owner of real property in the District of Columbia that was cited for housing code deficiencies . Agbaraji was notified of the housing violations and given the opportunity either to correct the deficiencies or show cause why corrections were not warranted. See D.C. Code § 42-3131.03 (5) (2003 Supp.); 14 DCMR §§ 105.2 and 107.2 (1991). Agbaraji did neither, thus entitling the District to * The opinion in this case was originally released as a Memorandum Opinion and Judgment on September 10, 2003. 2 correct the deficiencies itself and assess the cost of such corrections as a tax against the property. See D.C. Code § 42-3131.01 (a) (2003 Supp.). The District of Columbia can collect such tax in the same manner as general taxes in said District are collected. Id. After correcting the deficiencies, which included trash removal and constructing barricades, the District imposed a tax lien of $1,617.00 on the property to recover its costs when Agbara ji failed to reimburse the District. Agbaraji then filed suit in the Civil Division of Superior Court seeking the removal of the tax lien.1 On the District s motion, the Civil Division trial court (J. Burgess) certified the case to the Tax Division. The Tax Division (J. Lopez) then granted the District s motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after conducting an evidentiary hearing on the jurisdictional issue, concluding that the anti-injunction statute, D.C. Code § 47-3307 (2001), prevented Agbaraji from filing suit to enjoin the assessment of a tax because he had neither paid the tax nor shown evidence of exceptional circumstances. Agbara ji now appeals that dismissal order on its merits, and further argues that he was denied an opportunity to present witnesses at the hearing. A Superior Court decision in a civil tax case, just as in any civil case tried w ithout a 1 The complaint named the D istrict of Columbia De partment of Co nsumer & Regulatory Affairs (DCRA) and its Housing Code Enforcement Chief, James E. Aldridge, as the only defendants. By order, the Civil Division trial court (J. Burgess) dismissed DCRA as a party because of its legal status as a non sui juris subordinate government agency. Aldridge was retaine d as a nam ed party sin ce the com plaint sought only injunctive relief. In fact, howe ver, the Dis trict is the only party against wh om Agb araji seeks relief. Therefore, other than in its caption, this opinion will refer to the District as the opposing party. 3 jury, may be set aside o nly if it is plainly w rong or w ithout evide nce to support it, or if the trial court has comm itted an error of law. School St. A ssocs. v. Distr ict of Colum bia, 764 A.2d 798, 805 (D.C. 2001) (en banc); District of Columbia v. Acme Reporting Co., 530 A.2d 708, 711-12 (D.C. 1987). In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the trial court conducts an independent review of the evidence relevant to jurisdiction and is not obliged to assume the truthfulness of the factual allegations in the compla int. Matth ews v. A utoma ted Bu s. Sys. & Servs., Inc., 558 A.2d 1175, 1178 (D.C. 1989). D.C. Code Section 47-3307 expressly provides that no suit shall b e filed to enjoin the assessment or collection by the District of Columbia or any of its officers, agents, or employees of any tax. This anti-injunction statute has been consistently interpreted as depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction over causes of action for equitable relief regarding District o f Colum bia taxe s, Barry v. A merican Tel. & Te l. Co., 563 A.2d 1069, 1073 & n.10 (D.C . 1989), and therefore precludes a court from suspending the collection of taxes by th e District except in extraordinary circumstances. District of Columbia v. United Jewish A ppeal Fed n, 672 A.2d 107 5, 1079 (D.C. 19 96). The trial court prop erly applied this statute. It wa s also correc t in its conclusion that it could not apply the extraordinary circumstances exception that could have justified injunctive relief. Such equitable relief may be granted only after a finding that (1) the 4 District could not p revail on the taxpayer s challenge to the tax under any circumstances; and (2) the taxpayer w ill suffer irreparab le harm, w ith no adeq uate legal reme dy, if his equita ble action is barred . District of C olumbia v. Eastern T rans-W aste of Maryland, Inc., 758 A.2d 1, 9 (D.C. 2000); Barry, supra, 563 A.2d at 1075. Agbaraji presented no evidence of such exceptional circumstances. Similarly, the trial court proper ly declin ed to ad judicate the case as a tax a ppeal. A person may appeal a tax assessment as long as the appeal is brought within six months of the assessment and the subject tax is paid. D.C. Code § 47-3303 (2001). Like the anti-injunction statute, Section 47 -3307, this statutory provision deprives the Superior Court of jurisdiction over a taxpa yer s ap peal if th e tax ha s not be en paid . First Interstate Credit Alliance, Inc. v. District of C olumbia , 604 A.2d 10, 11 (D.C. 1992). Section 47-3303 sets forth types of taxes as to which any ass essme nt may be app ealed, p rovide d the tax is first paid . While a tax upon real pro perty is n ot explic itly me ntioned , this court has applied § 47-3303 in cases involving real pro perty. See, e.g ., District of Columbia v. W. T. Galliher & Brother, Inc., 656 A.2d 296 (D.C. 199 5); District of Columbia v. New York Life Ins., Co., 650 A.2d 671 (D.C. 1994). Furthermore, as noted supra, the tax a t issue is tr eated a s a gene ral tax. See D.C. Code § 42-3131.01 (a) (2003 Supp .). Therefore, this matter is appropriately analyzed under Section 47-3303.2 Under th at section, the S uperior C ourt correctly decided th at it would not 2 Another section spe cifically applie s to appeals of real estate assessments, but the tax (contin ued...) 5 exercise jurisdiction over appellant s suit, both because the tax had not been paid and because more than six months had elapsed fro m the da te of the assessment until the filing of suit. Finally, as to Agbaraji s opportunity to call witnesses during the trial court s evidentiary hearing on the jurisdiction al issue, we n ote that Agbaraji has not met his burden to present a record which addresses this claim. Therefore, he has failed to overcom e the presumption of the co rrectne ss of the trial cou rt s proc eeding s. Cobb v. Standard Drug Co., 453 A.2d 110, 111 (D.C. 1982), accord, Bell v. United States, 806 A.2d 228, 232 (D.C. 2002). Affirmed. 2 (...continued) in this case does not seem to be of the type governed by that section . See D.C. Code § 473305 ( 2003 S upp.).

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