Irma McPherson v. D.C. Housing Authority
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volum es go to press. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS No. 02-CV-296 IRMA M CP HERSON, A PPELLANT, v. D ISTRICT OF C OLUMBIA H OUSING A UTHORITY, A PPELLEE. Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of C olumbia (LT 638-02) (Hon. Zoe Bush, Trial Judge) (Argued September 16, 2003 Decided October 16, 2003) Daniel Habib, Law Student, D.C. Law Students in Court, with whom Dorene Haney, Supervising Attorney, and Ann Marie Hay, Executive Director, were on the brief, for appellant. Lisa J. Dessel for app ellee. Before R EID, Associate Judge, and N EWMAN and N EBEKER, Senior Judges. R EID, Associate Judge: Appellan t Debra M cPherson appeals fro m the trial court s denial of her motion for leav e to intervene, pursuant to Su per. Ct. Civ. R. 24 (a), 1 in a 1 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 24 (a) reads: Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) Wh en applicable law co nfers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the (contin ued...) 2 landlord and tenant matter to set aside a default judgment which had been entered against her deceased mother, Irma McPherson.2 On appeal, Ms. McPherson contends that the trial court erred by ruling on her motion without taking [] any evidence . . . , and raises other due process issues concerning the District of Columbia Housing Authority s ( DCHA ) handling of its complaint for possession of real estate. Persuaded by Ms. McPherson s arguments, we reverse the trial court s judgment and remand this matter with instructions to permit Ms. McPherson to intervene.3 FACTUAL SUMMARY According to the record on appeal, Ms. Irma McPherson, the contractual tenant of a public housing u nit located in th e Northe ast quadran t of the District o f Colum bia died in 1996. Notice of Ms. Irm a McP herson s d eath was timely given to the DCHA. The housing unit in which Ms. Irma McPherson had resided also was shared by Debra and Tiffany 1 (...continued) action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the app licant s ability to protect that in terest, unless the ap plicant s intere st is adequately represented by existing parties. 2 Debra McPherson stated that her mother died in 1996. The landlord filed a comp laint for p ossessio n of rea l estate o n Janu ary 8, 20 02. 3 Our opinion is limited to the question presented, whether Ms. McPherson had a right to intervene. We express no opinion on the underlying substantive issue. 3 McPherson,4 and other relatives, who continued to live there following Ms. Irma McPherso n s death. No new lease or lease agreement was executed by any of the remaining relatives and the DCH A. From 1996 thro ugh 200 1, Ms. D ebra M cPherson continued to recertify fo r the ho using u nit by sig ning th e nam e of the d ecede nt along with he r own . In April 2001, M s. McPherson was invited by the D CHA to a pply for head of househo ld status in order to determine her eligibility, and that of other relatives of the decedent, for the public housing unit in which they resided. Ms. McPherson s May 2001 application was preliminarily denied due to her alleged past criminal activity. Tw o letters from the DCHA to Ms. McPherson informing her of administrative mechanisms of redress available to her went unacknowledged.5 Ms. M cPherson claims she never received either communication. No other application for eligibility was initiated by any other occupant of the housin g unit. On January 8, 2002, the DCHA initiated an in rem action to recover possession of the housing unit. Ms. McPherson claims she was alerted to this action by a summons posted on 4 Debra McPherson is the daughter of Irma McPherson and the mother of Tiffany McPherson. 5 DCHA sent Ms. McPherson an August 2001, letter informing her that her case would be reviewed on August 16, 2001, and instructing her to bring witnesses and evidence in support of her case; and a December 2001, letter advising Ms. McPherson that her application had been withdrawn because she had not responded to the request for follow-up screening. That letter also indicated that she had the opportunity to file an administrative grievance contesting the withdrawal of her application. 4 the property on January 17, 2002, noting that eviction proceedings had begun against Ms. Irma McPherson. A default judgment was ordered on January 29, 2002. On January 30, 2002, Ms. McPherson filed a pro se motion for leave to intervene and to vacate the default judgme nt. 6 Her motion was denied for want of prosecution. Because her hospitalization for a kidney ailment had precluded her presence at a February 7, 2002, hearing on her motion, Ms. McP herson filed a motion fo r reconsideration on Feb ruary 15, 2002, which was granted. A new hearing was scheduled for Marc h 12, 200 2, but on F ebruary 2 8, 2002, a w rit of restitution was issued. However, Ms. McPherson successfully applied for a stay of the writ. Followin g a non-e videntiary h earing on M arch 19, 20 02, the trial cou rt denied Ms. McP herson s moti on to in tervene . ANAL YSIS Ms. McPh erson argu es that she h as a bon a fide interest in the property and the trial court erred in denying her motion for leave to intervene. In particular, Ms. McPherson claims that her occupancy status amounts to a protectable interest and she was entitled to due process rights. The DCHA asserts that Ms. McPherson is not a tenant, but merely a permissive occupant pursuant to [Ms. Irma McPherson s] tenancy. 6 Her pro se motion stated, in part: I must be named as defendant because the defendan t in this case, m y mothe r, died in 1996. I have an interest in the property because I ve been living there since her death in 1996. I ve recertified every year since her death. 5 The trial court s order denying the motion for leave to intervene as of right pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 24 (a), is app ealable to this co urt as a fin al order . Vale Props., Ltd. v. Canterbury Tales, Inc., 431 A.2d. 11, 14 (D.C. 1981) (citing Calvin-Humphrey v. District of Colum bia, 340 A.2d 795 (D.C. 1975)). To the extent that [the trial] court s ruling on a motion to intervene as a right is bas ed on qu estions of law, it is reviewed de novo; to the extent that it is ba sed on questio ns of fac t, it is ordin arily rev iewed for abu se of dis cretion. Mova Pharm . Corp . v. Shalala, 341 U.S. App . D.C. 355, 140 F .3d 1060, 1074 (1 998). Furthermore, [e]ven where intervention of right is sought under Rule 24 (a)(2), as here, the court must exe rcise its discretion in determining whether the application is timely made and whether the proposed intervenor s interest is adequately represented by existing parties. Hodgson v. United Mine Workers of America, 153 U.S. App. D.C. 407 414 n.36, 473 F.2d 118, 125 n.36 (citing J. M OORE, F EDERAL P RACTICE para. 24.13 [1] at 24-524 (2 d ed. 1969)). 7 Furthermore, this court examines the record and the trial court s determination for those indicia of rationality and fairness that will assure it that the trial cou rt s action was p roper. Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 362 (D.C. 197 7). The tran script of the M arch 19th hearing reveals only relatively brief c omm ents by the a ttorneys; no testimony was taken. Nor was any documen tary evidence introduced. Significantly, the trial court made no factual findings, nor conclusions of law. Indeed, at the conclusion of comments by the attorneys, the trial ju dge sai d crypt ically: A ll right, the motio n to inter vene is denied . 7 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 24 (a) is virtually iden tical to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (a). 6 In Calvin-Humphrey v. District of Colum bia, 340 A.2d 795 (D.C . 1975), w e set forth the factors that a trial court must con sider in determ ining wh ether to grant or deny a motion to intervene: (1) whether the person see king to intervene has an interest in the transaction which is the subject matter of the suit ; (2) whether the disposition of the suit may as a practical matter impair his [or her] ability to protect that interest ; and (3) whether his [or her] interest is adequately represented by existing parties. Id. at 798. See Super. Ct. Civ. R. 24 (a). W e adopted a broad reading of th e word interest, conc luding that the interest test is primarily a practical guid e to disposin g of lawsu its by involv ing as ma ny appar ently concerned persons as is comp atible with efficiency and due process. Id. at 799 (quoting Nuesse v. Camp, 128 U.S. App. D.C. 172, 178, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted). F urthermo re, we stated that: Prope rly applied, [ru le 24 (a)] sho uld promo te judicial economy by facilitating the resolution of related issu es in a single la wsuit, while preventin g litigation from becoming unmanageably complex. Id. at 799 (citing Smuck v. Hobson, 132 U.S. App. D.C. 372, 376, 408 F.2d 175, 179 (1969)). In short, [w]e have recognized that Rule 2 4 (a) should be liberally interpreted. Robinson v. First Nat l Bank of Chicago, 765 A.2d 543, 544 (D.C. 2001) (quoting Vale Props., Ltd., supra, 431 A.2d at 14). Therefore, with respect to the first factor, Ms. McPherson s interest in the transaction which is the subject m atter of [the law suit in this case], Calvin-Humphrey, supra, 340 A.2d at 798, her protectable interest need not be equivalent to the interest of Irma McPherson, the 7 contractual tenant. In moving to intervene, Ms. McPherson indicated that her interest arose from her continued occup ancy of the housing unit after her mother s death, and her yearly recertifications. The record reflects no d ispute about DC HA s awareness of the continuing occupancy, and the yearly recertifications. Moreover, DCHA made no allegation that it was not receiving re ntal paym ents. Further more, ev iction wou ld oust Ms. McPherson from the housing unit, and allowing the underlying eviction action to occur without Ms. McPherson as a party impairs or impedes her ability to protect that interest. Thus, she has alleged grounds showing that she satisfies the second factor in Calvin-Humphrey, supra. In addition, she satisfies the third factor articulated in Calvin-Humphrey since Ms. Irma McPherson was the original and sole nam ed defend ant, despite her death, and there are no other parties to the action w ho can protect M s. McP herson s interes t. On this record which is devoid o f any factua l findings by the trial court, w hat we sa id in Mokhib er v. Davis , 537 A.2d 1100, 11 14 (D.C . 1988), is equ ally true in this case: [I]n the [absence of] facts . . . , we can perce ive no ground fo r denying [Ms. McPherson] intervention as of right. . . . Mokhiber, supra, 537 A.2d at 1114. Based on our review of the record and applicable case law, we conclude that Ms. McPherson must be granted intervention as a matter o f right. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and reman d this ca se with instructio ns to gra nt the m otion to interven e. 8 So ordered.
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
