Nathaniel Resper Jr. v. United States
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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volum es go to press. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS Nos. 97-CF-426, 99-CO-1655 N ATHANIEL R ESPER, J R., A PPELLANT, v. U NITED S TATES, A PPELLEE. Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of C olumbia (F324-96) (Hon. Paul R. Webber III, Trial Judge) (Argued June 19, 2001 Decided March 14, 2002) Licha M. Nyiendo, appointed by the court, with whom Jeffrey T. Green was on the brief, for appe llant. Marc O. Litt, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Wilma A. Lewis , United States Attorney at the time the brief was file d, John R. Fisher, Elizabeth Trosman, and William M. Sullivan, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee. Before W AGNER, Chief Judge, and TERRY and R EID, Associate Judges. R EID, Associate Judge: Nathaniel Resper, Jr. was indicted for the shooting death of Everett Turner on Ma rch 12, 199 4, in violatio n of D .C. Co de §§ 2 2-240 1, -320 2 (199 6). A jury found him gu ilty of the lesser included crime of second-degree murder while armed; possession of a firearm during the c omm ission of a crim e of violenc e, in violation of D.C. Code § 22-3204 (b); and carrying a pistol without a license, in violation of D.C. Code § 223204 (a). 1 1 Mr. Resper was sentenced to a term of fifteen years to life on the murder charge, five to fifteen for the firearm possession (to ru n consecutively w ith the murder sentenc e), and one to three years fo r carrying a p istol withou t a license (to ru n concur rently with the other senten ces). 2 On appeal, Mr. Resp er contends that the trial court comm itted reversible error in two of its rulings.2 First, he argu es that the trial co urt violated h is Fourth and Fifth Amendment constitutional rights by refusing to suppress statements that he made during a police interview on March 15, 1994, three days after the shooting. Second, he maintains that the trial court violated his constitutionally protected right to present a complete defense when it refused to a llow him to present ev idence that o ther persons had a motive to commit the murder with which h e was ch arged. De tecting no v iolation of the Fourth an d Fifth Amen dments since the police made a permissible Terry 3 stop of Mr. Resper and he was neither in custody nor interrogated on the day of the stop; and further, discern ing no erro r in the exclusion of evidence regarding the motives of others to murder Mr. Turner, we affirm.4 FACTUAL SUMMARY The government's evidence and the trial court's findings show that on March 12, 1994, at about 12:20 p.m., Mr. Turner was in the front passenger seat of a Ford Taurus station wagon driven by Ms. Kisha Harley, the mother of his two children. The car had stopped for a red light at Fifth Street and Rhode Island Avenue in the Northeast quadrant of the District of Columbia. Su ddenly, a m an ran up to the passe nger side w indow a nd shot nin e bullets 2 Although an appeal was filed from the denial of Mr. R esper s new trial motion, h e did not contest that ruling either in his brief or at oral argument. Therefore, we do not consider the denial of the new trial motion in this opinion. 3 4 Terry v. O hio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968 ). Following oral argu ment in this case, we rem anded the record to the trial court in June 2001 for a fuller statement of the factual findings on which it based its denial of the suppression motion. We received those findings in September 2001. Neither party filed a supplemental brief in response to the trial court's augmented findings and conclusions. 3 into Mr. Turner s body. Ms. Harley saw the shooter s torso, but was unable to see his face from her vantage point. The sho oter fled. M s. Harley im mediately drove the c ar to Provid ence H ospital, w here M r. Turne r was p ronou nced d ead. On the same day of Mr. Turner's murder, a man drove into the parking lot of a nearby fire station where gunshots had been heard moments earlier. The motorist explained to two firemen that he had just witnessed a shooting. He described a blue 82 Oldsmobile Cutlass and gave a license tag number, 650-646, which one of the firemen wrote down. The firemen did not obtain the motorist s name or any other information, and the motorist left quickly. Also on the same day, an unidentified person called 911 at 12:2 8 p.m. and said that he had witnessed someone getting out of a 77 blue or black Monte Carlo and firing shots into a Tauru s station wago n. A partial license n umber w as given w hich was consistent w ith that recorded by the fireman. Based on the information provided by these two individuals and subsequent investigation, the police determined that the license number belonged to a 82 Pontiac Grand P rix registered to Mr. Resp er.5 Three days after Mr. Turne r's murd er, a United States Park Police officer saw the car bearing the license n umber 6 50-646. P ark Police n otified Dete ctive Pam ela M. Reed of the Metropolitan Police Department who had been assigned as the lead detective in the investigation of Mr. Turner's mu rder; and they also staked o ut the car. Near the scene w ere approxim ately four police cruisers and two unmarked police vehicles. Detective Reed was in one of the unmarked vehicles, about two blocks away from Mr. Resper's vehicle. When 5 There was testimony at trial that the three cars -- Monte Carlo, Oldsmobile Cutlass, and Pontiac Grand Prix -- have similar body types and size, so the descriptions were not incons istent. 4 police officers saw Mr. Resper approach the car and drive it away, they stopped it "a short distance from where it had been parked." In ad dition to Mr. Resper, the ca r was occupied by Mr. Eli Alexa nder. "W ith their weapo ns drawn , the officers dire cted the tw o individua ls to step out of the vehicle." Both men acquiesced, and "were patted down for weapons." Detective Reed testified that she was not present when the stop took place, but she arrived "almost imm ediately" thereafter. Including Detective Reed's, "at least four or five" police cars -- "there could have bee n one or two m ore" -- participated in the stop of M r. Resper's car. She "saw Mr. Resper standing next to a U.S. Park Police officer near a marked police car." Mr. Resper had been frisked for weapons, but he was not handcuffed when she arrived, nor was he handcuffed at any point afterw ards, to h er know ledge. Detective Reed told Mr. Resper that his car was being impounded because of the reports that it had been involved in Mr. Turner's mu rder. She requested that he accompany her to the police station for questio ning. She explained her desire to speak with him concerning "information she had that linked h is vehic le to a crim e, and th at he w as not u nder ar rest." 6 Furthermore, "[s]he said that she was interested in tracing the movements of his car on that date and was interested in whatever information Mr. Resper could provide in that regard." H e agreed to speak w ith Detective Reed, as did Mr. Alexander. When asked on cross-examination w hether Mr. Resper was then a suspect, Detective Reed explained: "Well, I w ould have to say that I would suspect an ybody in the car. But, then until I asked them who had the car, [how] do I know that it was not a friend? I don t know who has the car until I ask them." On redire ct, she explained: "I should put it this way. The car was a suspect." 6 A warrant for Mr. Resper's arrest in connection with Mr. Turner's murder was not issued until July 5, 1994. 5 According to the trial court s factual findings on rem and, Detective Ree d told Mr. Resper "that the police w ould seize h is car. . . .," and that bo th men w ould be tran sported to her office in different cars. "She instructed the transporting officer that Mr. Resper was not under arrest and that he was not to be handcuffed." After their arrival at her office, Detective Reed questioned the men s eparate ly. She told Mr. Resper that his car had been seen at the site of "the shooting of Everick (sic) 'DJ' Turne r." Mr. Resper said "that he knew 'DJ' and that he had heard that some person shot 'DJ' but denied that he was involved in the shooting." Mr. Resper provided the name of an alibi witnes s. Mr. Resper's account of his stop on March 15th was at odds with that of Detective Reed. He testified that there were two or three police cars behind his car, two on each side of the intersection, a tow truck and a helicopter flying above with a flashing light. Armed police officers ordered him to get out of his car, placed him on the ground with his face down, put handcuffs on him and searched his person. When Detective Reed asked whether he would speak with her at her office, h e said h e could not do i t at that tim e. He requested her business card and telephone number, telling her he would "get back" to her. Detective Reed said she would find something on which to arrest him. Still in handcuffs, he was transported to the police station and handcuffed to a desk. He was at the station for three or four hours, and could not leave. At the time, he was represented by an attorney in another pending case. H e advised D etective Reed that he had his attorney's b usiness card in his pocket, but was not allowed to call him. Mr. Resper said that he had been with a woman at the Motel 8 on New York Avenue, not far from the crime scene, on the morning of March 6 12th. They left th e motel at a bout 12:3 0 p.m., pic ked up Mr. Alexander, and drove to the nearby Wendy's for lunch. Then they drove to the woman's apartment, where Mr. Resper stayed for the rest of th e afternoon ; his car was parked o utside of he r apartme nt. 7 During h is questioning by Detective Reed, Mr. Resper declined to give a written statement, but agreed to be photographed. Prior to trial, M r. Resper moved to suppress the stateme nts that he m ade during his questioning by Detective Reed. After hearing the matter, the trial judge credited Detective Reed's testimony , saying that "h er deme anor on th e witness sta nd cause d the court to conclude that she was a credible witness." However, the court declared that Mr. Resper "was not, for the mo st part, a credible witness." The judge added, "this court did not and does not credit his testimony at any po int where it was at variance with that of Detective Reed on any material issue." In denying Mr. Resper's motion to suppress, the trial judge found that Mr. Resper and Mr. Alexander w ere at Detective Reed's office for less than one hour. Mr. Resper was not handcuffed, never asked that the interview be stopped, never requested a lawyer, and "was free to refuse to participate in the interview or to terminate the interview at any tim e." In addition, the trial court fo und that "b oth men departed Detective Reed's office" after the 7 At trial, the prosecution noted the discrepancies between Mr. Resper's account and that of others. W hile Mr. Resper w as at the station on Marc h 15th, Mr. Alexander was also being questioned by Detective Reed. Mr. Ale xander told a similar but not identical story. He could not say for sure whether they had gone to Wendy's. In addition, he insisted that he, not Mr. Resper, kept Mr. Resper's car for the rest of the afternoon after Mr. Resper and the woman returned to her apa rtment. A t trial, the wom an testified that s he had no t gone to Wendy's. Rather, Mr. Resper and Mr. Alexander had dropped her off at her apartment alone after they left the motel. She further testified that Mr. Resper had later asked her to be an alibi for him. 7 interview. Mr. Resper had had previous contact with the criminal ju stice system and had been informed of his Miranda rights on those occasions.8 The trial court also concluded that Mr. Resper "was not unlawfully seized at the time of the initial stop," and that "[t]he seizure of the vehicle and its occupants was reasonable, brief, minimally intrusive and, therefore, lawful." Furthermore, the trial court found: Mr. Resper was not in custody at any time between the initial stop and his departure from Detective Reed's office. There was no formal arrest nor restraint on freedom of move ment o f the deg ree asso ciated w ith a form al arrest . . . . Mr. Resper was not interrogated at any time between the time of the initial stop and his arrival at Detective Reed's office. Mr. Resper was interrogated at Detective Reed's office. All of M r. Re sper 's statemen ts there were made voluntarily and were not the product of coercion, threats or intimidation. Mr. Resper voluntarily agreed to be interviewed by Detective Reed at her office on March 15, 1994. The circumstances of the interrogation, Mr. Resper's age and prior experience with the criminal justice system, a nd Mr. Resper's responses all indicate that the statements that he made were voluntarily made and were not the result of police overre aching , coercio n, threats or intim idation. ANAL YSIS We turn first t o M r. Re sper 's argument that his Fifth A mendm ent rights were violated because he was placed in custody and interrogated on March 15th, witho ut being giv en his 8 He was convicted of a Bail Reform Act violation in 1990, transporting a firearm across State lines in 1992, and carrying a pistol without a license in 1993. At the time of his 1994 questioning in this matter, he was almost 23 years of age. 8 Miranda 9 warnings. He takes the position that under the totality of the circumstances - - the police display of weapons, the helicopter flying above, the frisk and handcuffs, and the incommunicado interrogation - - he was no t free to leave. The govern ment contends that Miranda warnings were not required becau se Mr. R esper volu ntarily agree d to participate in a non-custodial interview, fully realizing that he was not under arrest at that time. As the Supreme C ourt held in Miranda, supra, and reaffirmed in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), a suspect must be given certain warnings prior to custodial interrogation so as to preserve his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The Court has explained that custodial police interrogation, by its very nature, isolates and pressures the indiv idual, . . . [and] [e]ven without employing brutality, the 'third degree' or [other] specific stratage ms, . . . custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals. Dickerson, supra, 530 U.S. at 435 (quoting Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 455) (first alteration added). Accordingly, ever since the Miranda decision was handed down, the police have been required to first inform a suspect in custody that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Miranda, supra, note 9, 384 U.S. at 479. If these warnings are not given, any statements given by the suspect may be deemed inadmissible in evidence against him, regard less of w hether th ey we re given volunt arily. Dickerson, supra, 530 U .S. at 443 -44. The Miranda requirements are only applicable, however, when a suspect is in custody. 9 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (19 66). 9 See Jones v. United States, 779 A.2d 277, 280 (D.C. 2001) (en banc). Custody is imposed once the investigating officer physically deprives the suspect of his freedom of action in any significant way or, under the circumstances, leads him to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so deprived. Miley v. United States, 477 A.2d 720, 722 (D.C. 1984) (citations omitted). More specifically, custody is recognized wh en there [is] a forma l arrest or restraint on free dom of movem ent of the de gree assoc iated with forma l arrest." Stansbury v. Califor nia, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) (per curiam) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This is an o bjective test, determined by "how a reas onable [pers on] in the susp ect's position would have u nderstood [his or her] situation ." Berkem er v. McC arty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (foo tnote om itted). A cou rt examin es the "totality o f the circum stances," an d its evaluation must be "informed by the underlying purpose of the Miranda rule, name ly to protect individuals from compelled self-incrimination." United States v. Turner, 761 A.2d 845, 851 (D.C. 2000) (quoting Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 640 (7th Cir.) (citation omitte d), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 854 (19 96)). On appeal from the trial court s denial of a suppression motion on Miranda grounds, "our role is to ensu re that the trial co urt had a su bstantial basis for concluding that no [constitutiona l] violation occurred." McIntyr e v. United States, 634 A.2d 940, 943 (D.C. 1993) (citations omitted) (alteration in original). We review the trial court s underlying factual findings deferentially, and we will not set them aside unless they are c learly erroneous, that is, unless they lack substantial support in the record . Morris v. United States, 728 A.2d 12 10, 1215 (D.C. 199 9) (citations omitted). We review de novo the tr ial co urt's legal conclusions as to whether the defendant was in custody and whether the facts established a Miranda violatio n. Id. In making these determinations, we view the record in 10 the light most favorable to the party that prevailed in the trial court, and will sustain any reasonab le inferen ce that th e trial jud ge has d rawn f rom th e evide nce. Id. (referencing Peay v. United States, 597 A .2d 131 8, 1320 (D.C. 1 991) (e n banc )). We do not discern here any basis for disturbing the trial court's factual findings or its ultimate conclu sion tha t Mr. R esper w as not in custod y. We recognize the marked discrepancies between the defendant's description of the March 15th stop and interview and Detective Reed's. H oweve r, those discrep ancies hav e been ad dressed by the trial court's findings of fa ct and cred ibility determ inations. It is clearly within the province of the trial court to make the credibility determinations needed to resolve conflicts in witnesses' testimo ny. See, e.g., Payne v. United States, 516 A.2d 484, 493 (D.C. 1986) (per cu riam). Here, the trial judge did not credit certain allegations made by Mr. Resper at the pretrial hearing. Instead, the judge said unequivocally, "this court did not and does not credit [Mr. Resper's] testimony at any point where it was at variance with that of Detective Reed on any material issue." Because the record inclu des s ubst antia l evid ence to su pport the trial c ourt's factual findings, we canno t conclude that they are clearly erroneous; therefore we owe them deferen ce. See Mo rris, supra, 728 A .2d at 12 15. The court's legal conclusions followed rationally from its factual findings. Mr. Resper was not formally arrested on March 15th and knew that he had not been placed un der arrest. Nor would a reasonable person in his situa tion hav e unde rstood th at he w as und er arrest. See Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at 442. In effect, Mr. Resper would have us conclude that he had no choice but to "agree" to go to the station. We are not persuaded. The trial court neither credited Mr. Resper's claim that Detective R eed actually threatened him with arrest if he did 11 not submit to an interview , nor his assertio n that he w as handc uffed from the time tha t his car was stopped until the interview at the station ended. The record shows that Mr. Resper knew that he had been stop ped beca use of his car. He v olun tarily wen t to D etec tive R eed's office without bodily restraints, and agreed to speak with Detective Reed. After the interview, Mr. Resper left Detective Reed's office.10 Under th e circum stances, no r easonab le person, knowing as Mr. Resper did that he was not under arrest, would have thought that he was being detained for interrogation against his will. In short, the trial court did n ot err in concluding that Mr. Resper was not subjected to custodial interrogation, and thus, the administration of Miranda warnin gs wa s not req uired. Mr. Resper also argues that his seizure on March 15th took place in violation of the Fourth Amendment and, consequently his subsequent statements must be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1 963). He alleges that the trial court could not have found that he was exposed merely to a brief investigative detention followed by his voluntary submission to a police interview. Our standard of review for resolving this issue is effectively the sam e as for the denial of a motion based on Miranda. See Womack v. United States, 673 A.2d 603 , 607 (D.C. 1996 ), cert. denied, 519 U .S. 115 6 (199 7). We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the police executed a 10 The reco rd show s that the polic e did not have p robable ca use to arrest Mr. R esper until May 20, 1994, when an eyewitness to the shooting was interviewed; a wa rrant for Mr. Resper's arrest was not signed until July 5, 1994; and he was not actually a rrested until January 1996. 12 permissib le Terry stop. As we have previously observed, [t]he measure of the scope of permissib le police action in any investigative stop depends on whether the police conduct was reasonable under the circumstances." In re M.E.B., 638 A.2d 1123, 1127 (D.C. 1993) (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 68 2 (198 5)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 883 (1994 ). "The cases unifo rmly hold that the officers sa fety is a significa nt factor to be weighed in determining whether the restraint chosen by the officers converts that stop to an arrest. Id. Given the way in which Mr. Turner was murdered, it was not u nreasona ble for the po lice to proceed with great caution once they found and stopped the car associated with the killing. As the trial cou rt found , their pre caution s did no t transfo rm this stop into an arres t. We understand M r. Resper to a rgue, in add ition, that he w as arrested w ithin the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because he was seized for subsequent custodial interrogation. Mr. Resper relies on Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), to show that his seizure must be viewed as an arrest. S uch an arre st would h ave violated the Fourth Amendment if, as appellant asserts, the police lacked probable cause to arrest him. It is not necessary for us to address the probable cause issue, however, because Dunaway is not controlling under these facts. In Dunaway, police officers went to a neighbor's home to pick up a murde r suspect an d take him to the polic e station for interr ogation . Id. at 203. The underlying premise of the Supreme Court's analysis was that the seizure ocurred when the appellant was tak en to the police s tation ag ainst his will. Id. at 207 ("There can be little doubt that petitioner was 'seized' in the Fourth Amendment sense when he was taken involuntarily to the police station" (footnote omitted)). Here, Mr. Resper went to Detective Ree d's offic e voluntarily , and as he was told clea rly, th e off icers ' immediate p urpose in making the stop was to investigate the car's role in the murder. He was not arrested at that 13 time and left Detective Reed's office "without hindrance." See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). Consequently, the trial court did not err in viewing the stop as permissible, and conc luding that M r. Resper co nsented to p articipate in the police interview. We turn next to Mr. Resper's evidentiary argument that he was im properly precluded from presenting evidence that other persons had a motive to kill Mr. Turner. During it s opening statement at trial, the defense indicated that it wanted to tell the whole story behind the murder by presenting evidence about, for example, how Mr. Turner earned a living and why [he was] in that area [that day]. Immediately after the jury was excused, the prosec ution o bjected . It conceded Mr. Turner has a little bit of a wild background but argued that evidence about an y drugs or any other v arious activity would not be relevant in this trial. Mr. Resper responded that he was entitled to bring out somewhat, others that had a motiv e. . . . Basically, what it is about Mr. Turner is that there were many people that were feuding w ith Everett Turner. And that s because he allegedly killed at least three pe ople, two in Maryland, one in Edgewood in 93 in a hallway and then another fourth on New York Avenue in 91 and 92. And had robbed people consta ntly. What it is basically is Mr. Turner . . . was a p redator. And there were many people that didn t like Mr. Turner. And I think it s relevant to bring out through Ms. Harley and even his moth er, wha t Mr. T urner d id for a liv ing . . . . I don t want to give away the defens e. But . . . if they re truthful, [at least] Ms. Harley will [say that Mr. Turner robbed and kille d peop le]. The prosecution argued that such evidence should be excluded because the defense h ad to 14 have somethin g more th an suppo sitions. There s got to be a clear link or a reas onable link. Defense counsel replied that "the Winfield case, which is recent, Ap ril of 96, from our Cou rt of Appeals, lessens the standard that the defense formerly had . . . to meet in proving that another did the murder or did the crime." In ruling, the trial court stated: Well, Winfield as it appears in 652 Atlantic Rep orter 2 nd series . . . stand[s] for the proposition that before the defendant may present evidence that someone else may have committed the crime, there must be evidence clearly linking that other person or persons to the facts of the crime on trial. The fact that motive of others alone is not sufficient to meet the foundation for the admission. There must be a nexus between the evidence concerning some other possible person and the crime charged. ... . . . [I]t is not surprising that during the course of a person s lifetime there may be other enem ies, other than the defend ant. The evidence, which the Court thus far is aware is that some people linked Mr. Resper s c ar to the scen e and M r. Resper to the scene. Other than Mr. Eli Alexander there seems no clear linking of anyone else. An d so the Court will preclude the presentation of evidence that others had a motive. Mr. Resper maintains that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard: the clearly linked test from Winfield v. United States, 652 A.2d 608 (D.C. 1994) ("Winfield I"), instead of the reasonable possibility test adopted in Winfield v. United States, 676 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1996) (en banc) (" Winfield II"). The appellant argues that the trial court im properly excluded evidence by applying the outdated standard of Winfield I. Under the Winfield II 15 standard, appellant says, he should have been able to present evidence that others had a strong motive to kill the victim and, consequently, that there was a reasonable possibility that someone else committed the murder. The government a rgue s that the t rial c ourt's application of the superceded "clearly linked" standard was of no real consequence. because appellant 's evidence would have been excluded for the same reason under the correct standa rd since the defe nse pro ffer invo lved on ly pure conjec ture. We agree with the government and hold that the trial court would have been compelled to exclude the evidence. As a general matter, the decision to exclude evidence is a matter for the tria l court s discretio n. Gethers v. United States, 684 A.2d 1266, 1271 (D.C. 1996) (referencing Mitchell v. United States, 408 A.2d 1213, 1215 (D.C. 1979)) (other citations omitte d), cert. denied, 520 U .S. 118 0 (199 7). In this case, howev er, there wa s only one possible conclusion under the standard adopted in Winfield II; cf. Jordan v. United States, 722 A .2d 125 7, 1260 (D.C. 1 998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1029 (1999) (holding that remand for a discretionary determination wo uld be unn ecessary b ecause the facts wou ld support only one result under the Winfield II standard) (referencing Wright v. United States, 508 A .2d 915 , 920 (D .C. 198 6)). As we explained in Winfield II, this issue arises at the intersection of the d efen dant's constitutional right to an opportunity to present a comp lete defe nse, Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 90 L. Ed. 2d 636, 1 06 S. Ct. 2142 (1986), and the obligation of the trial court preliminar ily to determine the relevance of proffered evidence and weigh its probative value against the potential it creates for undue prejudice. Winfield II, supra, 676 A.2d at 2. "The Sixth Amendment guarantees to criminal defendan ts not only the right to confront and cross- 16 examine witnesses against them, but also 'the right to present evidence that someone else committed the offense for which [he] is on trial.'" Boykin v. United States, 738 A.2d 768, 773 (D.C. 1999) (quoting Elliott v. United States, 633 A.2d 27, 32 (D.C. 1993)) (other citations omitte d). Howeve r, "[a] defendant's right to pursue a particular line of cross-exam ination is circumscribed by general principles of relevance." Id. (citing Winfield II, supra, 676 A.2d at 4; Jordan, supra, 722 A.2d at 1260). "Relevant evidence is that which tends to make the existence or nonexistence of a fact more or less probable than would be the case without that eviden ce." Punch v. United States, 377 A .2d 135 3, 1358 (D.C. 1 977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978) (citation omitted). For the purposes of a third-party perpetrator defense, relevant evidence is that which "'tend[s] to indicate some reasonab le possibility that a person other than the defendant committed the charged offense.'" Winfield II, supra, 676 A.2d at 5 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 552 A.2 d 513, 51 6 (D.C. 19 89) (emp hasis in Winfield II)). But "[d]espite the rather inclusive reach of the Winfield [II] relevance standard, trial co urts should still exclude 'evidence that is too remote in time and place, completely unrelated or irrelevant to the offense charged, or too speculative with resp ect to the th ird party's gui lt.'" Boykin, supra, 738 A.2d at 773 (quoting Winfield II, supra, 676 A.2d at 5) (citations omitte d). [A] mere showing that another person possessed a motive to harm the victim as strong as the defendant's, even strong er, usually will "not [be] sufficient to meet the foundation for admissib ility . . . which requires a nexus between the proffered evidence and the charged crime." Winfield I, 652 A.2d at 608. "[A] defendant's proffer of evidence that other individuals had even stronger motives to murder the victim than the accused [is] insufficient, without more, to establish the [required] link to the offense charged . . . ." Id. at 612 (em phasis add ed). Simp le 17 proof of motivation of others to comm it the crime o rdinarily does not create a "real possibility" that any of them was the perpetrator. It follows from this, as the division recognized, that the trial judge ordinarily may exclude evidence of third-party motivation unattended by proof that the party had the practical opportun ity to comm it the crime, including at least inferential know ledge o f the vict im's wh ereabo uts. Winfield II, supra, 676 A .2d at 5 ( footno te omit ted). Here, Mr. Resper's proffer was rooted in the allegedly widespread ill will against the victim. The language of Winfield II makes clear that this is not enough. If evidence of a third party's involvement in the crim e were admissible based solely upon who had a motive or ill will against the victim at the time of its comm ission, undo ubtedly, a d efendant c ould point to many such individuals for a victim who associates with a criminal element." Id. at 5 n.5. By the same token, a defendant may often be able to point to many such persons who imaginab ly could have had access to the crime scene had they wan ted to commit the crime. The fact that others with reason to seek revenge may have been present in a neighboring state, in the District, or, perhaps, even in a nea rby neighborh ood, does not, without more, satisfy the requirem ent of "practical oppor tunity." 11 We thin k that "coun sel was m erely trying to throw something out there for the jury to speculate about." Gethers, supra, 684 A.2d at 1272 (citation omitted). Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm Mr. Resper's convictions for second-degree murder while armed, possession of a firearm during th e comm ission of a 11 The defe nse d id m ake r eference to the rea sons for M r. Tu rner 's presence in the area that day. Such evidence could indeed have been relevant to the case . The vagueness o f def ense 's prelim inary sh owing , howe ver, did not m eet our f ounda tional re quirem ents. 18 crime of violence, and carrying a pistol without a license. So ordered.
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