Christopher Wells v. A.S. Golden

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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volum es go to press. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS No. 99-SP-819 C HRISTOPHER W ELLS, A PPELLANT, v. A.S. G OLDEN, A PPELLEE. Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of C olumbia (SP1081-99) (Hon. Iraline Green Barnes, Trial Judge) (Argued January 11, 2001 Decided November 1, 2001) James E. McLeod, appointed by the cou rt, for appellan t.1 Mary L. Wilson, Assistant Corporation Counsel, with whom Robert R. Rigsby, Corporation Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, were on the brief, for appellee. Before FARRELL, R UIZ, and G LICKMAN, Associate Judges. R UIZ, Associate Judge: Christopher Wells appeals the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the District of Columbia Board of Parole 2 acted imp roperly 1 James McLeod withdrew as appellant s counsel after oral argument, and Annie R. Alexander was appointed by the court to replace him. 2 The District of Columbia Board of Parole has been replaced by the United States (contin ued...) 2 under the Youth Rehabilitation Act (YRA), D.C. Code §§ 24-901 et. seq., (2001), form erly D.C. Code §§ 24-801 et. seq., (1996), and the Board s regulations in setting a parole reconsideration ( set-off ) date for January 10, 2007, ten years after the commencement of his sentence. The trial court denied the habeas petition without a hearing, after the government responded that the Board has complete and unreviewable discretion in the matter and had com plied with its re gulations by giving reas ons for dep arting from the one ye ar setoff prescribed in 28 D CMR § 104.2 (35 D .C. Reg. 455 (198 8)).3 Although we have held that the Parole Board has broad discretion in setting such dates for adult pr isoners , see White v. Hyman, 647 A .2d 117 5, 1180 (D.C. 1994), we hold that Wells s sentence under the YRA, a statute that mandates treatment for certain offenders a judge has determined will benefit under the YRA, accordingly guides the discretion of the Parole Board. Because we have serious doubt on this record whether the Parole Board considered the YRA s twin goals of treatmen t and rehabilitation in deferring appe llant s recons ideratio n date, w e rema nd the m atter for f urther p roceed ings. 2 (...continued) Parole Com missio n. See D.C. Code § 24-1231 (a)(1) & (2) (2000 Supp.). Our discussion of the authority of the Board of Parole applies with equal force to its successor agency. 3 The government recognized that Wells had been sentenced under the YRA , but did not address whether that sentencing carried any implications for the Bo ard s parole consid eration. 3 FACTS According to the police report, Christopher Wells, who was then seventeen yea rs old, used a silver handgun to rob a man of his wallet on a street corner at approximately 4:40 a.m. on October 30, 1995 . Discover ing that the w allet containe d only $7, Wells and a companion robbed a secon d man five m inutes la ter. The two victims contacted police immediately and described the robbers. After police arrested two men matching those descriptions, the compla inants separately identified Wells and another man as their assailants. Wells pleaded not guilty, b ut was convic ted of o ne cou nt of arm ed robb ery, see D.C. Code §§ 22-2801, 4502 (2001), formerly D .C. Code §§ 22 -2901, 3202 (19 96), possession of a firearm during a crime of violence, see D.C. Code § 22-4504 (2001), formerly D.C. Code § 22-3204 (b) (1996), carryin g a pisto l witho ut a licen se, see D.C. Code § 22-4504 (2001), formerly D.C. Code § 22-3204 (a) (1996), and possession of a firearm withou t registrat ion, see D.C. Code § 7-25 02.01 ( 2001) , forme rly D.C . Code § 6-23 11 (19 95). We lls's presentence report indicated that he was raised in a chaotic home environment characterized by chronic abuse, and would benefit from placement in a structured, institutional environment and treatment under the YRA. The trial court accepted that recommendation, and sentenced him to concurrent sentences of eighteen years for robbery, fifteen years for possession of a firearm, one year for carrying a pistol without a license, and one year for possession of a firearm without registration, all to be se rved un der the Y RA. 4 YRA officials placed Wells in a course of treatment that included academic and vocational classes, counseling, and programs addressing alcohol and drug addiction, conflict resolution, and employment. They recommended that Wells be reconsidered for parole five years after his initial hearing. The Parole Board concurred in the treatment recommendations, 4 but rejected the suggested five year set-off date in favor of a ten year reconsideration period. Th e Board based its decision on the severity of his crime, explaining that Wells should serve at least five years on e ach of the tw o robberies he com mitted: S[ubject] committed 2 armed robberies w [ith]in minutes of each other. He was sentenced to (1) 18 y[ea]rs & 15 years concurrently. He should serve 5 years on each! ANAL YSIS For a writ of habeas to issue, the inmate must present an allegation and supporting facts which, if bo rne out by proof, wo uld entitle him or her to relief. Bennett v. Ridley, 633 A.2d 824, 826 (D.C. 1993) (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 292 (1948)). The court decides whether the petitioner has been deprived of his legal rights by the manner in which 4 The Board s order included the following Special Instructions for Reconsideration : Com plete Voc[ational] training; No new discip[linary] reports; Psychological counseling; Intensiv e drug p rogram . 5 the . . . hearing was conducted, in order to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion. Id. The question b efore us is w hether W ells has can c laim depr ivation of an y legal rights arising from the m anner in w hich the Pa role Board set his recon sideration da te. Prisoners sentenced outside of the YRA may be released [w]henever it shall appear to the Board of Parole that there is a rea sonable p robability tha t a prisoner w ill live and rem ain at liberty without violating the law. See D.C. Code § 24-404 (a) (2001), formerly D.C. Code § 24204 (a) (1996). 5 Because the statute and regulation vest in the Board substantial discretion in granting or denying parole, prisoners generally have no statutory or constitutional interest in a parole recons ideratio n date. White v. Hyman, 647 A.2d at 1180; see also Jones v. Braxton, 647 A.2d 1116, 1117 (D.C. 1994) (holding tha t a person sen tenced to ad ult parole 5 D.C. Code § 24-404 (a) (2001) provides: Whenever it shall appear to the Board of Parole that there is a reasonab le probability th at a prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, that his release is not incomp atible with the welfare of society, and that he has served the minimum sentence imposed or the prescribed portion of his sentence, as the ca se ma y be, the Board may a uthorize his release on parole upon such terms and conditions as the B oard shall from time to time prescribe. While on parole, a prisoner shall remain in the legal custody and under the control of the Attorney General of the United States or his authorized representative until the expiration of the maximum of the term or terms specified in his sentence without regard to good time allowance. 6 has no liberty interest to a set-off date under the Due Process Clause). [U]nless the state can be said to have placed . . . a substantive limitation on the exercise of official discretion, a failure to follow a guideline or any other non-binding guidance cannot be characterized as a depriv ation of liberty. See Hall v. Henderson, 672 A.2d 104 7, 1051 (D.C. 19 96). 6 The same guidelines found not to place a substantive limitation on the discretion of the Parole Board in the case of adult offenders also apply to youthful offenders sentenced under the YRA. The underlying statutes p ursuant to which ad ult and youthful offende rs are sentenced are different, however, in ways that affect the Board s discretion. Youthful offenders sentenced under the YRA may be released whenever approp riate. See D.C. Code § 24-904 (a) (2001 ), formerly D.C. Co de § 24-804 (a) (19 96). 7 We disagree with the government s contention that the phrase whenever appropriate in the YRA is as broad a delegation of authority as that contained in D.C. Code § 24-404 (a) (2001) 6 A statute or reg ulation t hat lim its the dis cretion o f prison officials, see Hall, 672 A.2d at 1053, m ay give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due P rocess Clause w here officials seek to im pose an atypical and significant ha rdship on th e inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), or make a determination that would inevitably affect the duration of the sentence, see id. at 487; see also Wolff v. McD onnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974) (holding that a prisoner has a right to due proces s before revoca tion of g ood tim e credits ). 7 D.C. Code § 24-904 (a) (2001) states: A comm itted youth o ffender m ay be relea sed cond itionally under supervision whenever appropriate. 7 ( whenever it appears to the Board ) fo r adult offenders. We in terpret the language of a statute in the context of related provisio ns. See Carey v. Crane Serv. Co., 457 A.2d 1102, 1108 (D.C. 1983). Under the YRA, the youthful offender is sentenced to treatment and superv ision, D.C. Code § 24-903 (b) (2001), form erly D.C. Code § 24-803 (b) (199 6),8 rather than simply incarceration . The youthful offender must be placed in a specialized facility adapted for the treatm ent, care, edu cation, voca tional training, rehabilitation, segregation, and protection of youth o ffenders. D .C. Code § 24-902 (b)(1), form erly D.C. Code § 24-802 (b)(1) (199 6).9 A person who has been sentenced under the YRA may not be removed from the program and treated in the same manner as other prisoners without a formal determination that the offender w ill derive no f urther bene fit from trea tment, subject to appe al to the s entenc ing jud ge. See D.C. Code § 24-905 (2001), form erly D.C. 8 D.C. Code § 24-903 (b) (2001) provides: If the court shall find that a convicted person is a youth offen der, and the offense is punishab le by impris onmen t under app licable provisions of law oth er than this su bsection, the court may sentence the youth offender for treatment and supervision pursuant to this chapte r up to the maximum penalty of imprisonment otherwise provided by law. The youth offender shall serve the sentence of the court unless sooner released as provided in § 24-904. 9 D.C. Co de § 24-9 02 (b)(1) (2 001) prov ides that: The Mayor shall periodically set aside and adapt facilities for the treatment, care, education, vocational training, rehabilitation, segregation, and protection of youth offenders. 8 Code § 24-805 (a) (199 6);10 Vaughn v. United States, 598 A.2d 425, 430-31 (D .C. 1991) (holding that a youth offender sentenced under the YRA has a liberty interest in all hearings related to his possible expulsion from the program). Thus, unless and until there has been a final determination pursuant to the procedures set out in the YRA that a youthful offender will derive no further benefit from the treatment under the YRA, D.C. Code § 24-905 (a), the Board s decisions are constrained by the sentencing judge s determination that the offender will derive benefit from treatment under the Act. Th ere is no comparable limitation on the B oard's d iscretion in releas ing non -YRA prisone rs. In the contex t of the YR A s em phasis on tr eatment and rehabilitation, the 10 D.C. Code § 24-905 (a) (2001) states: (a) If the Director of the Department of Corrections ( Director ) determines that a youth offender w ill derive no fu rther benefit from the treatme nt pursuan t to this chapte r, the Directo r shall notify the youth offender of this determination in a written statement that includes the following: (1) Notice that the youth o ffender may ap peal the Director s determination to the sentencing judge in writing within 30 days of the youth o ffender s rec eipt of the Director s statement required by this section; (2) Specific reasons for the Director s no further b enefit determination; and (3) Notice that an appeal by the youth offender to the sentencing judge will stay any action by the Director reg arding a ch ange in the youth offender s status until the sentencing judge makes a determin ation on the appeal. 9 appropriateness of release under D.C. Code § 24-904 (a) must depend, at least in part, on a consideration of such fa ctors. The Bo ard of Paro le is therefore o bliged to m ake its parole decisions in light of the youthf ul offender 's potential or ac tual progres s, or lack there of, in his program of treatmen t.11 We hasten to add that although treatment and rehabilitation are the cornerstones of the YRA , see Veney v. United States, 681 A.2d 428, 432 (D.C. 1996) (en banc), the YR A wa s not intende d to mak e the defen dant s pote ntial for rehabilitation a dispositive se ntencing c riterion wh ich trump s all others. Id. at 434. Incapacitation of the offender for prevention, deterrence and punishment are also appropriate con siderations in sentencing decisions under t he YR A. See id. Nevertheless, in exercising its discretion, the Parole Board must evaluate the youthful offender's rehabilitation and past and likely future progress in treatment in its decisions, even if its determin ation is ultima tely based on other considerations.12 See Palacio-Escoto v. United States, 764 A.2d 795, 796 (D.C. 2001) ( The actual duration of the treatment period is determined by the Youth Correction authorities. ) (quoting Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 455 n.1 (1974)). At least two federal courts, evaluating the duties of the parole authority under the predecessor statute to the YRA, the Federa l Youth Correc tions A ct, 18 U .S.C. §§ 5005, et. seq., repealed Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-4 73, Title II, Ch apter II, § 218 (a)(8), 98 Sta t. 2027, reached the same conclusion, 11 This includes the decision to set off reconsideration for parole. Too long a se t-off could discourag e a youthfu l offender s e fforts at rehabilitation or risk keeping the youthful offender in prison beyond when it would have been appropriate to release him. 12 The fact that Wells may petition the Board for an earlier reconsideration date under 28 DCMR § 232.1 (1987), does not absolve the Board of its responsibility to take all relevant factors in to cons ideratio n in settin g a reco nsidera tion date in the firs t instanc e. 10 holding that the parole board must consider the adjustment and rehabilitative efforts made by the you th offen der in m aking its decisio ns. See Page v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 1007, 1009 (S.D . Fla. 1977); Cook v. Ingram, 436 F. Supp. 367, 369 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (following Page). But see Barr v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 990, 994 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (holding that [t]he Youth Corrections Act should not be read as engrafting an additional requirement of an eva luative s tateme nt of the prisone r s reha bilitation efforts. ). In this case, the B oard defer red appella nt s parole reconsideration for ten years, and did so merely with the statement which it underscored that he should serve five y ears on each! of the two robberies that he committed.13 Without additional ev idence, we are left with grave uncertainty whether the Board considered appellant s rehabilitative potential, after taking into accou nt his backg round an d the recommendation of youth correction officials, when it decided his length of confinement before he wo uld be r econsi dered f or paro le. We therefore vacate the order of the Superior Court and remand for further proceedings. If the government is unable to provide any further evidence that the Board s decision took into account the YRA s rehabilitative goal, appellant s set-off date mu st be reconsidered to ensu re 13 Wells contended in oral argument that the Board erred in basing its decision on two robberies when Wells was convicted of only one. We disagree. The Board may rely on the entire record in assessing the facts of the case , cf. Wright v. United States, 262 A.2d 350, 352 (D.C. 1970) (holding that, in the context o f a revocation hear ing, t he B oard 's decision may be based on all the facts when viewed in a context free of a reasonable doubt standard and the strictures of a formal criminal trial ), and the police report plainly supports the propo sition tha t Wells comm itted two robber ies. 11 that discretion has been exercised in the manner described in this opinion.14 So ordered. 14 At oral argument, counsel for Wells indicated that he was n ot segregate d from ad ult prisoners, despite the expressed preference in the YRA for such segregation. See D.C. Code § 24-902 (b)(2) (2001), formerly D.C. Code § 24-8 03 (b)(2 ) (1996 ). As this issue was not raised in the trial court, or briefed by the parties he re, we do n ot decide w hether W ells has any right to be housed in an age segregated facility.

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