Murrell v. State
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Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 311
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CACR10-1025
Opinion Delivered
CHARLES KENNETH MURRELL, JR.
APPELLANT
April 27, 2011
APPEAL FROM THE BENTON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[CR-2009-874-2]
HONORABLE DAVID CLINGER,
JUDGE
V.
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
DAVID M. GLOVER, Judge
Appellant Charles Murrell, Jr. entered a conditional plea of guilty to the offense of
driving while intoxicated after the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. In this appeal
pursuant to Rule 24.3 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, he contends that the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the evidence was seized pursuant to an
unlawful traffic stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment. We affirm the trial court’s denial
of appellant’s motion.
Standard of Review
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, our appellate courts conduct
a de novo review based upon the totality of the circumstances, reversing only if the circuit
Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 311
court’s ruling is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Moss v. State, 2011 Ark.
App. 14, ___ S.W.3d ___.
Background
Officer John Alexander testified that he was on duty the evening of December 19,
2008. He explained that, at approximately 9:46 p.m., his attention was drawn to a GMC
Sonoma vehicle, which was traveling northbound on South Eighth Street in Rogers,
Arkansas. He stated that the vehicle was driving approximately ten miles below the speed limit
and that it was drifting within its lane. He testified that he learned at the law-enforcement
training academy that extremely slow driving and drifting are indications of a possibly
intoxicated driver.
Officer Alexander explained that he started to follow the vehicle and pulled up behind
it to “run” the vehicle’s tag. He stated that it came back with “no return.” He said that he
told the dispatcher that it was an Indian Nations tag from Muscogee and that the dispatcher
told him when they ran the tag out of Oklahoma, it came back with two returns, one out of
the state and one out of Indian Nations, and that there was no return from either in this case.
Officer Alexander testified that he was not able to see the decal on the tag clearly
enough to determine if it was a valid year; that he made the traffic stop and talked to appellant
about the tag; that appellant had an expired vehicle registration with him but not a current
one; that the license sticker did say 2009, showing that it was valid at the time; however,
when he tried to run the tag, he was unable to get any type of return off the tag number out
of Oklahoma. He said that appellant told him the car belonged to his father-in-law. Officer
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Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 311
Alexander acknowledged that he could see the 2009 sticker clearly in the courtroom, but
stated that he could not read it that night and that he was not familiar with the colors of
Oklahoma tags.
Following the initial hearing, the submission of briefs, and a follow-up hearing, the trial
court denied appellant’s motion to suppress, concluding that the officer had probable cause
to stop the vehicle because of an apparent invalid license tag. At a hearing on June 16, 2010,
appellant agreed with the asserted factual basis for his guilty plea, which included the
following facts: after Officer Alexander stopped the car, he noticed appellant was extremely
loud and slurring his words a little bit; he smelled of intoxicants; and he failed the fieldsobriety tests administered to him by Officer Alexander. The trial court accepted appellant’s
conditional plea, and this appeal followed.
In Reeves v. State, 20 Ark. App. 17, 21–22, 722 S.W.2d 880, 882 (1987), our court
explained:
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides that “the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” That protection extends to persons
driving down the street. If the police stop a vehicle and detain its occupants, a seizure
has occurred. Whenever practicable, the police are required to obtain advance judicial
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure. That process turns
on the question of “probable cause.” However, it has been held that, consistent with
the Fourth Amendment, the police may stop persons on the street or in their vehicles
in the absence of either a warrant or probable cause under limited circumstances. Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985); and Leopold
v. State, 15 Ark. App. 292, 692 S.W.2d 780 (1985). One of those limited
circumstances involves cases such as the present one—the investigatory stop.
In determining whether an investigatory stop has been made consistent with the
mandates of the Fourth Amendment, we balance the nature and quality of the
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Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 311
intrusion against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify that
intrusion. Van Patten v. State, 16 Ark. App. 83, 697 S.W.2d 919 (1985). Where
felonies or crimes involving a threat to public safety are concerned, the government’s
interest in solving the crime and promptly detaining the suspect outweighs the
individual’s right to be free from a brief stop and detention. That policy has been
codified in Rule 3.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure[.]
Rule 3.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Stopping and detention of person: time limit.
A law enforcement officer lawfully present in any place may, in the performance of his
duties, stop and detain any person who he reasonably suspects is committing, has
committed, or is about to commit (1) a felony, or (2) a misdemeanor involving danger
of forcible injury to persons or of appropriation of or damage to property, if such
action is reasonably necessary either to obtain or verify the identification of the person
or to determine the lawfulness of his conduct. An officer acting under this rule may
require the person to remain in or near such place in the officer’s presence for a period
of not more than fifteen (15) minutes or for such time as is reasonable under the
circumstances. At the end of such period the person detained shall be released without
further restraint, or arrested and charged with an offense.
(Emphasis added.) In Wright v. State, 327 Ark. 558, 563, 940 S.W.2d 432, 434 (1997), our
supreme court explained, “While this court has not been called upon to decide if a possible
DWI offense falls within the language of Rule 3.1, our Court of Appeals has held, and we
believe correctly, that a DWI violation carries with it the danger of forcible injury to others.”
Consequently, while “reasonable suspicion” to stop and detain under Rule 3.1 is limited to
the two listed situations—a felony or a misdemeanor involving the danger of forcible injury
to persons or appropriation of/damage to property—our courts have determined that a
possible DWI offense falls within the ambit of the rule. Id.
Here, Officer Alexander testified about appellant weaving within his lane and driving
under the speed limit and then explained how his observations of appellant’s driving fit within
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Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 311
his academy training about signs of driving while intoxicated. Even though it is clear that
weaving within one’s own lane alone will not support reasonable suspicion of DWI, Barrientos
v. State, 72 Ark. App. 376, 39 S.W.3d 17 (2001), we conclude that the officer’s testimony
went beyond that—particularly tying the weaving and the low-speed driving into his academy
DWI training. In reviewing the totality of the circumstances in this case, we hold that on the
basis of this testimony alone, the officer established a sufficient basis for concluding that he had
reasonable suspicion to believe that appellant was driving while intoxicated, thereby justifying
the stop under Rule 3.1 to further investigate. Moreover, because we determine that this
testimony from Officer Alexander is sufficient in establishing reasonable suspicion to stop
appellant’s vehicle, we find it unnecessary to address appellant’s challenges to the trial court’s
decision, which the trial court based on probable cause. We can affirm a trial court when the
right result is reached, if an alternative basis exists for the trial court’s decision. See Cain v.
State, 2010 Ark. App. 30, ___ S.W.3d ___.
Affirmed.
P ITTMAN and R OBBINS, JJ., agree.
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