Czajka v. Director, Dep't of Workforce Servs.
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Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 374
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. E10-23
GUY D. CZAJKA
Opinion Delivered
MAY 25, 2011
APPELLANT
V.
APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
BOARD OF REVIEW, [BR-2009-1551]
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF
WORKFORCE SERVICES
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
LARRY D. VAUGHT, Chief Judge
This is a pro se appeal from a decision of the Arkansas Board of Review that denied
appellant Guy D. Czajka’s claim for extended unemployment benefits. Czajka alleges that the
Board erred in its denial of his claim based on a misapprehension of both state and federal law,
a reliance on precedent from this court that was wrongly decided, and its consideration of
“deceptive and misleading language.” After a thorough review of the record, we see no error
and affirm the Board’s decision in its entirety.
On October 20, 2006, Czajka filed a claim for regular unemployment compensation
benefits, but he was disqualified from receiving benefits “for eight (8) weeks of
unemployment,” as defined in Arkansas Code Annotated section 11–10–512 (Repl. 2002),
based on a finding that he was discharged from his last work for misconduct in connection
with the work. Under the provisions of Ark. Code Ann. § 11–10–512(b) (Repl. 2002), a
week of disqualification “shall be satisfied” by either a week of unemployment or by a week
Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 374
of employment during which the employee has “earnings in an amount equal to his weekly
benefit amount.” At the hearing it was established that Czajka had reported earnings during
three weeks of his disqualification period. The earnings were from self-employment work that
he had performed, cutting grass and doing cleanup and remodeling jobs. No unemployment
taxes were paid on the earnings.
Extended benefits are governed by Arkansas Code Annotated sections 11–10–534
through 544 (Repl. 2002). A provision of these extended benefit sections provides as follows:
An individual shall not be eligible to receive extended benefits with respect to any
week of unemployment in his eligibility period if the individual has been disqualified
for regular benefits under this law because he voluntarily left work, was discharged for
misconduct, or refused an offer of suitable work unless the disqualification imposed for
such reasons was satisfied with employment.
In Walker v. Director, Employment Sec. Dep’t, 40 Ark. App. 12, 13–14, 840 S.W.2d 200, 201
(1992), we reaffirmed that under Arkansas’s statutory scheme one who is disqualified by
misconduct (with certain enumerated exceptions) from receiving regular benefits for a certain
period may satisfy the disqualification by working for the required period or, if unable to find
work, by forfeiting the benefits for that period to which the individual would otherwise be
entitled. But, we further held, such a worker can satisfy the penalty disqualification for
extended benefits only by employment for the required period and amount.
Unfortunately for Czajka, although he had work and earnings for three weeks of the
eight-week disqualification period, it was self-employment. According to the limited
definition of “employment” contained in Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-210 (Repl.
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Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 374
2002), self-employment of the nature performed by Czajka does not meet the statutory
definition of employment under our governing law.
When a decision of the Board is appealed to us, our standard of review directs that the
findings of the Board are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence, and we must affirm
the decision of the Board if it could have reasonably reached its decision based upon the
evidence before it. Perdrix-Wang v. Director, Employment Sec. Dep’t, 42 Ark. App. 21, 856
S.W.2d 636 (1993). Here, there is more than substantial evidence to support the Board’s
determination. Therefore, we affirm its decision.
Affirmed.
P ITTMAN and W YNNE, JJ., agree.
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