Tyson Poultry, Inc. v. Narvaiz
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 842
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISIONS I AND IV
No. CA10-745
Opinion Delivered
December 15, 2010
TYSON POULTRY, INC.
APPELLANT
V.
APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
COMMISSION [NO. F710978]
FRANCISCO NARVAIZ
APPELLEE
REVERSED AND REMANDED
JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Judge
The appellee in this appeal from the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission,
who had previously been injured on the job, was terminated while on light duty after he
called his supervisor a “mother-f--king bitch.” His claim for temporary-total disability for the
remainder of his disability period was denied by the administrative law judge. The
Commission reversed on the grounds that termination for misconduct is not a sufficient basis
for a finding that the employee refused suitable employment. Appellant argues on appeal that
this is not the law. We agree, and we reverse and remand.
The Commission’s finding is based on Superior Industries v. Thomaston, 72 Ark. App.
7, 32 S.W.3d 52 (2000), where a claimant was terminated for calling coworkers “bitches.”
We held in Superior Industries that the Commission did not err in ruling that the basis for an
employee’s employment separation is irrelevant in determining eligibility for temporary-total
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 842
disability benefits. Our holding was based on the language of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-526
(Repl. 2006), which provides that:
If any injured employee refuses employment suitable to his or her
capacity offered to or procured for him or her, he or she shall not be entitled
to any compensation during the continuance of the refusal, unless in the
opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Commission, the refusal is justifiable.
Employing the doctrine of strict construction applicable to the Workers’ Compensation Act,
the Superior Industries court reasoned that the controlling fact was that the appellant in that case
did not refuse employment, but instead accepted the employment and was later terminated
not by his choice but at the option of his employer.
We think that the broad construction of the statutory language adopted in Superior
Industries, implying as it does that no act of misconduct can ever constitute a refusal of
employment, was unwarranted: were that the case, a claimant provided with light-duty work
could simply stop coming to work, assured that he would continue to receive compensation
benefits even if he were terminated. Strict construction of a statute does not mandate a literal
interpretation that leads to absurd results where an alternative interpretation better effects the
statute’s purpose. Nucor Corp. v. Kilman, 358 Ark. 107, 186 S.W.3d 720 (2004). We think that
there can be instances of nonperformance or insubordination by an employee that would
support a finding that an employee effectively refused suitable employment by engaging in
misconduct intended to provoke his termination. Consequently, we limit the holding of
Superior Industries to its facts, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 842
Reversed and remanded.
G RUBER, G LOVER, and B ROWN, JJ., agree.
H ART and B AKER, JJ., concur.
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