Gilbert v. State
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 857
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISIONS III & IV
No. CACR10-674
TALVIS MARTEL GILBERT
APPELLANT
Opinion Delivered
December 15, 2010
APPEAL FROM THE SALINE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR-09-5-3]
V.
HONORABLE GRISHAM PHILLIPS,
JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
Talvis Gilbert was the back-seat passenger of a vehicle that officers from the Alexander
Police Department stopped as part of a roadblock around 10 p.m. one evening. The driver
of the vehicle could not provide a valid driver’s license, so officers directed him to a nearby
parking lot so that they could determine whether the driver did indeed have this necessity.
The front-seat passenger said he did not have any identification either. Upon pulling into the
parking lot, officers asked the driver and the front-seat passenger to exit the vehicle so that
the officers could speak with them. None of the men could give a clear answer regarding the
group’s starting point of travel or final destination.
At some point, officer Jeremy Brown noticed Gilbert still sitting in the back seat of
the vehicle. The vehicle’s windows were dark, so officer Brown opened the door and asked
Gilbert for identification, which Gilbert did not have. Officer Brown then asked Gilbert to
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 857
step out of the vehicle. Officer Brown did not immediately notice any weapons, see any
suspicious bulges, or have any indication that Gilbert had committed a crime. But when
officer Brown inquired whether Gilbert had anything illegal or a weapon on him, Gilbert did
not give a direct answer and “fumbled around for 30 seconds or so” before responding that
he did not. Officer Brown thought that Gilbert’s body language indicated he was
lying—Gilbert had shrugged shoulders, would not look officer Brown in the eyes, and
seemed to “tighten up” in denial. Wanting to protect his and the other officers’ safety, officer
Brown asked Gilbert if he could frisk him, and Gilbert complied. During the frisk, officer
Brown felt a gun in Gilbert’s waistband. Another officer came to assist officer Brown and
recovered a loaded gun from Gilbert’s waistband.
The police arrested Gilbert for possession of a weapon. After running Gilbert’s
information through the system, the officers discovered that Gilbert was a parolee. Gilbert
was searched, and officers discovered a large sum of money in Gilbert’s pocket. An officer
eventually took Gilbert to the Saline County Jail, where another search of Gilbert’s person
revealed two plastic baggies of cocaine. Gilbert was charged with possession of cocaine,
simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms, and possession of firearms by a certain person.
Pretrial, Gilbert moved to suppress the gun and the cocaine. After a hearing, the court
denied Gilbert’s motion to suppress. Gilbert then entered a conditional guilty plea to the
charges of possession of cocaine and possession of a firearm by a certain person (the charge
for simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms was nolle prossed). The court sentenced him
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to fifteen years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Gilbert challenges the circuit court’s denial of his
motion to suppress. We affirm.
In reviewing the circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we make an
independent determination based on the totality of the circumstances. Reeves v. State, 80 Ark.
App. 61, 63, 91 S.W.3d 97, 99 (2002). In doing so, we defer to the circuit court’s credibility
and weight-of-the-evidence determinations. Id. We reverse only if the circuit court’s
decision is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Shaver v. State, 332 Ark. 13, 16,
963 S.W.2d 598, 600 (1998).
Gilbert first argues that he was illegally seized when officer Brown ordered him to exit
the vehicle. But in Maryland v. Wilson, the United States Supreme Court held that “an officer
making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the
stop.” 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997); see also Wimbley v. State, 68 Ark. App. 56, 59–60, 3 S.W.3d
709, 711 (1999). Gilbert does not challenge the legality of the roadblock or the initial stop.
And officer Brown testified that when he asked Gilbert to exit the vehicle, other officers
were still speaking with the driver and the front-seat passenger. Thus, ordering Gilbert out
of the vehicle during the pendency of the valid traffic stop was not an illegal seizure.
Gilbert next challenges whether officer Brown, as a predicate to frisking Gilbert, had
reasonable suspicion that he was carrying a weapon. Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.4 provides,
If a law enforcement officer who has detained a person under Rule 3.1
reasonably suspects that the person is armed and presently dangerous to the
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officer or others, the officer or someone designated by him may search the
outer clothing of such person and the immediate surroundings for, and seize,
any weapon or other dangerous thing which may be used against the officer
or others. In no event shall this search be more extensive than is reasonably
necessary to ensure the safety of the officer or others.
Reasonable suspicion is “a suspicion based on facts or circumstances which of themselves do
not give rise to the probable cause requisite to justify a lawful arrest, but which give rise to
more than a bare suspicion; that is, a suspicion that is reasonable as opposed to an imaginary
or purely conjectural suspicion.” Ark. R. Crim. P. 2.1. “The test is whether a reasonably
prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of
others was in danger.” Reeves, 80 Ark. App. at 66, 91 S.W.3d at 101. “The officer’s
reasonable belief that the suspect is dangerous must be based on specific and articulable facts.”
Id.
Our legislature has laid out certain factors for the circuit court to consider in
determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to perform a search of this kind. See
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-81-203 (Repl. 2005). The factors include: (1) the demeanor of the
suspect; (2) the gait and manner of the suspect; (3) any knowledge the officer may have of
the suspect’s background or character; (4) whether the suspect is carrying anything, and what
he or she is carrying; (5) the manner in which the suspect is dressed, including bulges in
clothing, when considered in light of all of the other factors; (6) the time of the day or night
the suspect is observed; (7) any overheard conversation of the suspect; (8) the particular
streets and areas involved; (9) any information received from third persons, whether they are
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known or unknown; (10) whether the suspect is consorting with others whose conduct is
reasonably suspect; (11) the suspect’s proximity to known criminal conduct; (12) the
incidence of crime in the immediate neighborhood; (13) the suspect’s apparent effort to
conceal an article; and (14) the apparent effort of the suspect to avoid identification or
confrontation by a law enforcement officer. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-81-203.
Again, Gilbert does not challenge the legality of the roadblock or the initial stop. And,
as we just concluded, no illegal seizure occurred when officer Brown ordered Gilbert to exit
the vehicle. Further, the initial stop was ongoing during officer Brown’s encounter with
Gilbert—officers were still talking to the driver and the front-seat passenger. Thus, the only
question for us to answer on appeal is whether Brown had reasonable suspicion that Gilbert
was armed and presently dangerous when he decided to frisk him.
To reiterate the pertinent facts, the traffic stop occurred around 10 p.m. And when
officer Brown asked Gilbert whether he had any weapons or anything illegal on him, Gilbert
did not answer directly and fumbled around for about thirty seconds before responding that
he did not. Officer Brown testified that Gilbert’s body language—shrugged shoulders, no eye
contact, tightening up—indicated to him that Gilbert was lying. Further, no one traveling
in the vehicle could provide identification or say with certainty where the group was coming
from or where they were going.
Looking at the totality of the circumstances and giving due deference to the circuit
court’s credibility and weight-of-the-evidence determinations, we agree with the circuit
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court. Officer Brown had reasonable suspicion that Gilbert was carrying a weapon and,
therefore, his frisk of Gilbert was not an illegal search. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 351 Ark. 406,
94 S.W.3d 892 (2003); Muhammad v. State, 337 Ark. 291, 988 S.W.2d 17 (1999); State v.
Barter, 310 Ark. 94, 833 S.W.2d 372 (1992).
Gilbert points strongly to the somewhat conflicting testimony and reports of assistant
police chief Thomas Leath and part-time patrolman Jerry Rapier. Assistant police chief Leath
testified that it was standard operating procedure at the roadblock to frisk anyone asked to
step out of a vehicle for weapons. But officer Brown testified that he asked Gilbert if he
could search him after Gilbert’s delayed, fumbling response to Brown’s question about
whether Gilbert had anything illegal or any weapons on him. Officer Brown said that the
purpose of his search was to protect his and the other officers’ safety. Again, it was up to the
circuit court to resolve any credibility and weight-of-the-evidence questions. Reeves, 80 Ark.
App. at 63, 91 S.W.3d at 99. In sum, the circuit court’s denial of Gilbert’s motion to suppress
is not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.
Affirmed.
PITTMAN , KINARD, and GRUBER, JJ., agree.
G LADWIN and R OBBINS, JJ., dissent.
JOHN B. R OBBINS, Judge, dissenting. I believe that Gilbert has demonstrated clear
error in the denial of his motion to suppress. I do not take issue with the initial removal of
Gilbert from the vehicle. But, as a preliminary matter, I seriously question whether detention
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of Gilbert was appropriate under Ark. R. Crim. P. 3.1. The officer frankly stated that he had
no basis to suspect Gilbert of a crime. Even so, the more fundamental problem I have with
this appeal is my disagreement with the majority opinion that there were objective, articulable
facts to support the officer Terry-frisking Gilbert.
Our court is to conduct an independent determination based upon the totality of
circumstances, reviewing findings of historical fact for clear error, giving due weight to
inferences of the trial court. Blount v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 219, at 3–4. We begin with the
presumption that searches conducted without the benefit of a warrant are per se unreasonable.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.4, a weapons-search, if warranted,
must follow a proper Rule 3.1 encounter. Assuming for the moment that the continued
detention was proper, the State failed to present specific, articulable facts that would support
a reasonable officer’s belief that Gilbert was presently armed and dangerous when the frisk
took place. The test is an objective one. Pettigrew v. State, 64 Ark. App. 339, 984 S.W.2d 72
(1998).
The police set up this roadblock at night, circumstances under the government’s
control. The objective, articulable facts that are satisfactory to the judges of the majority
opinion are: (1) the lack of a cohesive story of where the men were coming from or going,
and (2) the nervous, slow negative response to the question of whether he had “anything
illegal or weapons.” The officer did not observe any suspicious bulges in Gilbert’s clothing,
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and his personal belief that Gilbert was lying was not an objective fact. Nervousness is
commonplace when confronted by law enforcement. Sims v. State, 356 Ark. 507, 157 S.W.3d
530 (2004). There was no dispute that it was part of the police department’s routine to pat
down people encountered as a result of these roadblocks.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-81-203 gives a laundry list of reasons why an
officer might “reasonably suspect.” They include the time of day, area of town, efforts to
conceal identity, suspicious cohorts, etcetera. While these factors might lend themselves to
continued detention in this case, the objective, articulable facts do not support a reasonable
suspicion that Gilbert was presently armed and dangerous.
I disagree with the majority opinion that Muhammad v. State, 337 Ark. 291, 988
S.W.2d 17 (1999), supports denial of the motion to suppress. There, the officer became
increasingly concerned for his own safety after learning that Muhammad had a criminal record
including aggravated robbery. Likewise, in State v. Barter, 310 Ark. 94, 833 S.W.2d 372
(1992), the officer had noticed a bulge in Barter’s clothing and reasonably suspected him of
being involved in drug dealing.
In Pettigrew v. State, supra, the appellant was taken out of a vehicle he was not driving,
and officers searched his person. In reversing the denial of suppression we held there to be no
reasonable basis for a pat-down search of Mr. Pettigrew. Our court quoted from Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S.40 (1968):
Before [an officer] places a hand on the person of a citizen in search of anything, he
must have constitutionally adequate reasonable grounds for doing so. In the case of the
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self-protective search for weapons, he must be able to point to particular facts from
which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous.
Because there lacked such objective, particular facts, I dissent.
G LADWIN, J., joins.
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