Brown v State
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 781
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CACR10-484
EARMON LAMAR BROWN
APPELLANT
Opinion Delivered
December 1, 2010
APPEAL FROM THE LONOKE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR-09-158]
V.
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
HONORABLE PHILLIP
WHITEAKER, JUDGE
AFFIRMED
JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, Judge
Earmon Lamar Brown was convicted in a bench trial of possession of drugs and firearms
and possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. For these offenses, he received concurrent
120-month sentences in the Arkansas Department of Correction. On appeal, he does not
challenge his conviction for simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms. He does, however,
argue that the trial court erred in denying his directed-verdict motion with respect to the
possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. We affirm.
An appeal from a denial of a motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence. Clemons v. State, 2010 Ark. 337, ___ S.W.3d ___. In reviewing a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court determines whether the verdict was
supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence
that is forceful enough to compel a conclusion without speculation or conjecture. Id.
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 781
When we review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we affirm the conviction
if there is substantial evidence to support it, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
State. Dodson v. State, 341 Ark. 41, 14 S.W.3d 489 (2000). Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State means that we consider only the evidence that supports the verdict.
Morgan v. State, 2009 Ark. 257, 308 S.W.3d 147. In addition, the credibility of witnesses is an
issue for the trier of fact, not the appellate court. Cluck v. State, 365 Ark. 166, 226 S.W.3d 780
(2006). The fact-finder is free to believe all or part of a witness’s testimony and may resolve
questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. Id.
England Police Officer Joshua Vaughn testified that on April 16, 2009, he observed the
vehicle that Brown was driving cross the solid-white fog line several times. He made a traffic
stop. Officer Vaughn stated that Brown admitted driving on a suspended license, so he arrested
Brown for that offense. Arrangements were made to have Brown’s vehicle towed. A
subsequent search of the vehicle uncovered a nine-millimeter handgun. Next to the gun was
a black nylon containing three baggies filled with what turned out to be marijuana, three cell
phones, and a digital scale. Seven hundred seventy dollars was found on Brown’s person. Lize
Wilcox of the Arkansas State Crime Lab testified that the three baggies contained 5.2 grams,
27.9 grams, and 2 grams of marijuana, which in total is 1.2 ounces of the drug.
In Brown’s case, his mother, Tracy Brown, testified that she owned two of the baggies
of marijuana that were found in Brown’s car. Brown also testified that he owned only one of
the baggies of marijuana. He confirmed that the other baggies belonged to his mother and were
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 781
distinguishable from his narcotics because it was a higher quality. Further, he disputed Officer
Vaughn’s testimony that all three baggies were in the black nylon bag; he asserted that his
marijuana was in the car’s cup holder. Finally, Brown explained that he had $780 in cash
because his girlfriend cashed her check and gave it to him to get his car fixed so that he could
sell it. Kasey Bass, Brown’s girlfriend, also testified and confirmed that she gave Brown $750
from her recently cashed paycheck.
On appeal, Brown does not dispute that he possessed marijuana, only that he possessed
the drug with intent to deliver. He acknowledges that the aggregate total of marijuana found
in his vehicle exceeded the one-ounce threshold required to trigger the statutory presumption,
codified under Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-64-401(d)(3)(A)(vii), that he possessed the
drug with intent to deliver. However, he relies on the testimony in his case-in-chief to assert
that he successfully rebutted the presumption. This argument is not persuasive.
Under our standard of review, we do not even consider the evidence that does not
support the verdict. Morgan v. State, supra. Accordingly, the testimony from Brown and his
mother concerning ownership of the marijuana does not factor into our analysis. Therefore, in
light of the statutory presumption, the possession of 1.2 ounces is substantial evidence of intent
to deliver. Owens v. State, 325 Ark. 110, 926 S.W.2d 650 (1996). Further, the marijuana found
in Brown’s vehicle was separately packaged, which has also been held to be substantial evidence
of intent to deliver, even when the aggregate amount of the drug in question falls below the
weight required to trigger the statutory presumption. Thomason v. State, 91 Ark. App. 128, 208
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 781
S.W.3d 830 (2005).
Affirmed.
B AKER and B ROWN, JJ., agree.
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