Townsell v. State
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 754
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CACR 10-205
Opinion Delivered
LOUIS CORTIS TOWNSELL
APPELLANT
V.
November 10, 2010
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
SEVENTH DIVISION
[NO. CR-2009-1103]
HONORABLE BARRY SIMS, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
M. MICHAEL KINARD, Judge
Louis Cortis Townsell appeals following his conviction for second-degree attempted
murder, arson, and second-degree domestic battery. Specifically, he argues that the trial court
erred by refusing to instruct the jury as to the lesser-included offense of attempted extremeemotional-disturbance manslaughter. We affirm.
Facts
The State initially charged appellant with attempted capital murder, rape, arson, and
second-degree domestic battery. At the jury trial, the victim testified that, between the end
of 2007 and the beginning of 2009, she and appellant had a nonexclusive romantic
relationship. She stated that she and appellant had been intimate, that appellant would stay at
her home occasionally, but that appellant wanted the relationship to be more serious than she
wanted it to be.
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 754
The victim testified that appellant stayed with her at her apartment on the nights of
January 14, 15, and 16, 2009. On January 17, she and appellant got into a verbal altercation
about the status of their relationship, and she left the apartment around noon. When she
returned at approximately 6:00 p.m., appellant was still at the apartment. Appellant asked her
for something to eat, and when she refused, appellant proceeded to attack her. The victim
stated that appellant stabbed her in her left breast with a knife, poured rubbing alcohol all over
her, lit a small pillow on fire from the gas burner on her stove, and using the pillow, threw
fire all over her and the contents of her apartment. She also testified that appellant stabbed her
twice more in her thigh and raped her. Afterward, and while the apartment was still burning,
appellant choked her and threw part of her stereo at her. The victim sustained burns to her
scalp and leg and a broken elbow as a result of the attack.
The victim’s downstairs neighbor and friend, John Davis, testified that on January 17,
2009, he heard a commotion upstairs and began to smell smoke. He stated that he heard the
victim pounding on her floor upstairs and telling him to call the police. Davis also stated that
he heard appellant say, “I’m going to kill you. I’m going to kill you.” Davis then called the
police and ran outside. From outside the apartment, he could see appellant upstairs, waving
around a flaming pillow and setting various things on fire inside the victim’s apartment. Davis
stated that appellant exited the apartment and was visibly angry. Afterward, the victim
tumbled down the stairs naked. Appellant then went inside Davis’s apartment and tore up
Davis’s TV and stereo.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 754
The victim’s landlord, Finney Harris, also testified that he heard a commotion and saw
appellant slinging fire around the victim’s apartment. Harris stated that he saw the victim
tumble down the stairs naked. He also saw appellant enter Davis’s apartment.
During appellant’s case, Detective Damon Whitener testified that he took a
photograph of an injury on appellant’s left leg that appeared to be an old laceration
approximately half an inch long. The photograph was taken on February 4, 2009, after
appellant’s arrest.
Appellant testified that he had stayed with the victim the nights of January 15 and 16,
2009, and that on the night of January 16, he and the victim got into a verbal altercation
because he had called her by his ex-girlfriend’s name. The following morning, according to
appellant, the victim went downstairs to John Davis’s apartment, where appellant heard them
“getting romantic.” When she returned to her apartment, appellant asked her what was going
on, and she told him she was mad at him. Appellant stated that the victim then went back
downstairs and did not return until approximately 6:30 p.m. When she returned, appellant
asked her if she had brought him something to eat, and that made the victim angry. Appellant
admitted that he grabbed a pillow, lit it on fire, and used the pillow to set the curtains on fire.
According to appellant, he and the victim “tussled.” Appellant stated that he was angry with
her because of John Davis and because she had not brought him any food, but he denied
threatening her or stabbing her with a knife. Instead, appellant stated, the victim grabbed the
knife from underneath the mattress and used it to stab him in the leg.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 754
After all of the evidence had been presented, appellant proffered jury instructions for
attempted first-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, and attempted
manslaughter, among others. The proffered instruction for attempted manslaughter read as
follows:
CRIMINAL ATTEMPT TO COMMIT MANSLAUGHTER
Louis Townsell is charged with the offense of attempted manslaughter. A person
commits the offense of manslaughter if the person causes the death of another person
under circumstances that would be murder, except that he causes the death under the
influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable excuse. To
sustain the charge of attempted manslaughter, the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt:
First: That Louis Townsell intended to commit the offense of manslaughter;
Second: That Louis Townsell purposely engaged in conduct that was a substantial step
in a course of conduct intended to culminate in the commission of manslaughter;
and
Third: That Louis Townsell’s conduct was strongly corroborative of the criminal
purpose.
Definition
“Purposely” — A person acts purposely with respect to his conduct when it is his
conscious object to engage in the conduct.
The State objected to the instruction regarding attempted manslaughter, arguing that
attempted manslaughter was not a lesser-included offense of attempted capital murder.
Appellant argued that the offense was a lesser-included offense of attempted capital murder
and that the instruction for attempted manslaughter was appropriate because the evidence
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 754
demonstrated extreme emotional disturbance. The trial court denied the request to instruct
on attempted manslaughter.1
After deliberating, the jury found appellant guilty of attempted second-degree murder,
arson, and second-degree domestic battery. The trial court sentenced appellant to fifteen years
in the Arkansas Department of Correction for attempted second-degree murder, twelve years
and a $10,000 fine for arson, and twenty years and a $10,000 fine for second-degree domestic
battery, to be served consecutively. The judgment and commitment order was entered on
November 10, 2009, and appellant timely filed his notice of appeal on December 4, 2009.
Standard of Review and Controlling Law
We will not reverse a trial court’s refusal to instruct a jury on a particular point of law
absent an abuse of discretion. Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 318, 107 S.W.3d 136, 150 (2003).
An instruction should be excluded when there is no rational basis for giving it. Id. A party is
entitled to an instruction on a defense or a lesser-included offense if there is sufficient
evidence to raise a question of fact or if there is any supporting evidence for the instruction.
Norris v. State, 2010 Ark. 174, at 8, ___ S.W.3d ___.
A person commits manslaughter if he causes the death of another person under
circumstances that would be murder except that he causes the death under the influence of
1
The trial court did not articulate its reasons for rejecting the attempted-manslaughter
instruction. In its brief, the State points out that the proffered instruction lacked some of the
relevant statutory language for manslaughter. However, because there is no indication that
the trial court rejected the instruction for that reason, and because the issue was not raised
below, we do not address the matter here.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 754
extreme emotional disturbance for which he has reasonable excuse. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10104(a)(1)(A) (Repl. 2006). The reasonableness of the excuse should be determined from the
viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as the actor believed
them to be. Id. § 5-10-104(a)(1)(B). When causing a particular result—such as death—is an
element of an offense, a person commits the offense of criminal attempt if, acting with the
required culpable mental state of the target offense, he purposely engages in conduct that
constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended or known to cause the particular
result. Id. § 5-3-201(b) (Repl. 2006). In order to be considered a “substantial step,” conduct
must be strongly corroborative of the person’s criminal intent. Id. § 5-3-201(c).
In order for a jury to be instructed on extreme-emotional-disturbance
manslaughter—or its attempt—there must be evidence of provocation, such as physical
fighting, a threat, or a brandished weapon, resulting in an extreme emotional disturbance.
Jackson v. State, 375 Ark. 321, 342–43, 290 S.W.3d 574, 589 (2009). Anger alone is not
enough to show an extreme emotional disturbance. Spann v. State, 328 Ark. 509, 515, 944
S.W.2d 537, 540 (1997). When deciding whether a certain instruction should be given, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. Davis v. State, 97 Ark. App.
6, 10–11, 242 S.W.3d 630, 634 (2006). However, where the only basis for an instruction is
the defendant’s self-serving statements or testimony, contradicted by other witnesses, the trial
court’s refusal to submit the instruction should be affirmed. See Pollard v. State, 2009 Ark. 434,
at 7, ___ S.W.3d ___.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 754
Discussion
Appellant argues that, because the jury found him guilty of the least serious form of
attempted homicide for which they were instructed, the jury might have found him guilty
of an even less serious form—attempted manslaughter—if given the opportunity. He argues
that there was a rational basis for instructing the jury as to attempted extreme-emotionaldisturbance manslaughter based on his testimony that the victim provoked him by coming at
him with a knife after he set her apartment on fire. However, this self-serving testimony was
the only evidence of provocation presented, and it was contradicted by other evidence and
the testimony of other witnesses. In particular, the victim testified that appellant stabbed her
with the knife—which appellant denied—and her injuries corroborated her testimony. Also,
John Davis testified that he heard appellant threatening to kill the victim and the victim
calling for help. Because the only basis for giving the requested instruction was appellant’s
refuted testimony, the trial court was not obligated to grant the request.
For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err by refusing the proffered jury
instruction on attempted manslaughter.
Affirmed.
GLADWIN, J., agrees.
PITTMAN, J., concurs without opinion.
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