Cleary v. Sledge Props, Inc.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 755
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
CA09-1304
No.
Opinion Delivered
ROBERT CLEARY
APPELLANT
V.
SLEDGE PROPERTIES, INC.
APPELLEE
NOVEMBER 10, 2010
APPEAL FROM THE DREW
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CV-2007-101-4]
HONORABLE DON GLOVER, JUDGE
AFFIRMED ON DIRECT APPEAL;
REVERSED AND REMANDED ON
CROSS-APPEAL
M. MICHAEL KINARD, Judge
Appellant Robert Cleary appeals from a grant of summary judgment in favor of
appellee Sledge Properties, Inc. (Sledge), on Cleary’s complaint for declaratory judgment that
he is the owner of certain real property by adverse possession. Cleary raises five points for
reversal. Sledge cross-appeals from the circuit court’s order finding that Sledge was not
entitled to any damages on its counterclaim for unlawful detainer.1 We affirm on direct appeal
and reverse and remand on cross-appeal.
In November 1989, Cleary entered into a written contract with Gardner Investments,
Inc., for the purchase of certain real property located in Drew County. According to the
1
We dismissed an earlier appeal for lack of a final order in that Sledge’s counterclaim
had not been resolved. Cleary v. Sledge Props., 2009 Ark. App. 353.
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 755
contract, Cleary was to pay the $21,000 balance of the purchase price in monthly installments
of $277.53, over a ten-year period. The contract, which was not recorded, also provided that
Cleary would pay all taxes and maintain insurance on the property. The contract also
provided that Gardner Investments would deliver a deed to Cleary when the purchase price
and all other sums due under the contract had been paid. In December 1993, Cleary reduced
the monthly payments to $175 per month. He later asserted that this was the result of
renegotiating the contract. Cleary ceased making payments altogether in April 1998. The
property was subsequently conveyed to Sledge in March 2007.2 Cleary has remained in
possession of the property since 1989.
On May 21, 2007, Cleary filed a complaint alleging that he owned the property by
adverse possession. Sledge denied the material allegations of the complaint and asserted that
Cleary had failed to pay the full purchase price for the property. Sledge also filed a
counterclaim in unlawful detainer, seeking possession of the property, judgment for $6,300,
the amount of the unpaid rent, and its attorney’s fees and costs.
Sledge subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on Cleary’s complaint,
asserting that Cleary could not prevail on his claim because he was in default on his payments
under the contract. The motion further alleged that Gardner Investments, not Cleary, had
paid the property taxes on the property, thereby negating one of the elements of a claim for
2
Gardner Investments conveyed the property to Community Radio Network, Inc.,
an entity controlled by P.Q. Gardner, the president of both companies, in 2004. Community
Radio Network conveyed the property to Sledge.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 755
adverse possession. The motion also asserted that Cleary lacked color of title, another element
of adverse possession. In response, Cleary asserted that he and Gardner Investments had
renegotiated the agreement and adjusted the sales price down. He also submitted an affidavit
from his daughter Lisa Cleary averring that Gardner Investments had paid the real-estate taxes
because the assessor would not accept payments from Cleary without the property being in
Cleary’s name.
After a hearing, the circuit court granted Sledge’s motion for summary judgment by
order entered on July 25, 2008. The court found that, under Arkansas Code Annotated
section 18-11-106, as amended by Act 776 of 1995, Cleary was required to prove that he had
paid the taxes on the real property and he submitted no proof of such payment. The court
found that section 18-11-106 also required Cleary to hold under color of title and that his
contract for sale did not constitute color of title. Finally, the court relied on the presumption
that, where the initial possession of property begins as permissive, it is presumed to continue
as permissive until notice of the hostility of the possessor’s holding is given to the owner.
After this court dismissed Cleary’s appeal from the grant of summary judgment, Cleary,
supra, the case proceeded to a bench trial on Sledge’s counterclaim. At the conclusion of the
trial, the court made findings of fact from the bench. The court found that Cleary had
breached the contract by not making the full monthly payments and by not paying the taxes.
The court awarded possession of the property to Sledge. The court further found that $175
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 755
per month was the fair rental value of the property but declined to award Sledge any damages.
Each party was to bear its own attorney’s fees. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.
For his first point, Cleary argues that the circuit court erred in denying his request that
his daughter, Lisa Cleary, be allowed to sit at counsel table and assist him in presentation of
his case because he was illiterate and was suffering from Alzheimer’s disease. As a general rule,
a trial court may control the seating arrangement in the courtroom, and unless a party suffers
some prejudice from the arrangement, seating is not a ground for reversal. Mask v. State, 314
Ark. 25, 869 S.W.2d 1 (1993); Webster v. State, 284 Ark. 206, 680 S.W.2d 906 (1984).
Cleary relies upon Arkansas Rule of Evidence 615 to support his argument. The rule
deals with exclusion of witnesses from the courtroom upon motion or upon the circuit court’s
own initiative. It makes an exception that precludes exclusion “of a person whose presence
is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of his cause.” Ark. R. Evid. 615(3). The
Rule 615(3) exception applies “to such persons as an agent who handled the transaction being
litigated or an expert needed to advise counsel in the management of the litigation.” Arkansas
Power & Light Co. v. Melkovitz, 11 Ark. App. 90, 102, 668 S.W.2d 37, 44 (1984). In order to
establish that the presence of a witness is essential to the presentation of a party’s cause, it must
be shown that the witness has such specialized expertise or intimate knowledge of the facts
of the case that the party’s attorney could not effectively function without the presence and
aid of the witnesses. Id. However, there is no such proof in the record. As the issue was raised
at the start of trial, the dispute was over whether Cleary was incompetent because of
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Alzheimer’s disease, not that Lisa Cleary had handled the transaction and, therefore, had such
intimate knowledge of the facts of the case that her presence was necessary. Lisa Cleary’s
proffered testimony addressed Cleary’s mental state and whether he was under a doctor’s care.
Rulings dealing with the exemptions from this rule are within a circuit court’s
discretion. Parker v. Holder, 315 Ark. 307, 867 S.W.2d 436 (1993). Based on this record, we
cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion in not allowing Lisa Cleary to remain
at counsel table and assist in the presentation of the case.
Cleary’s remaining four points deal with the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment
on Cleary’s adverse-possession claim. Those points are that the circuit court erred by (1)
ruling as a matter of law that Cleary’s post-breach possession of the property was not hostile;
(2) ruling that the 1995 amendment to Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-11-106 applied
to this case and that Cleary was not entitled to credit for the payment of taxes by Gardner
Investments; (3) ruling that the contract for purchase did not constitute color of title; and (4)
finding that the parties had not modified their contract. We find no error in the granting of
summary judgment to Sledge on the adverse-possession claim.
In order to establish title by adverse possession, Cleary had the burden of proving that
he had been in possession of the property continuously for more than seven years and that the
possession was visible, notorious, distinct, exclusive, hostile, and with the intent to hold
against the true owner. Robertson v. Lees, 87 Ark. App. 172, 189 S.W.3d 463 (2004). The
Arkansas General Assembly enacted certain statutory requirements for proof of adverse
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possession in Act 776 of 1995, now codified at Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-11-106.3
In order for a claimant to establish adverse possession under this law, the claimant must prove
color of title and payment of ad valorem taxes, in addition to the common-law elements of
adverse possession. Barnett v. Gomance, 2010 Ark. App. 109, ___ S.W.3d ___. The circuit
court held that Cleary failed to prove his adverse possession claim in part because he failed to
prove that his possession after he reduced his payments from the original amount was hostile
or that he paid the property taxes on the property.
In Schrader v. Schrader, 81 Ark. App. 343, 101 S.W.3d 873 (2003), we held that the
amendment to section 18-11-106 did not apply to landowners whose claims of adverse
possession had vested prior to the enactment of the amendment. Consequently, the question
here is whether Cleary’s claim ripened prior to the amendment of the statute. We hold that
it did not because there was no hostile possession until after the amendment of section 18-11106 became effective.
Adverse possession occurs where possession of specific property is inconsistent with the
true owner’s rights and is accompanied by certain acts, including hostility. See Arkansas
Commemorative Comm’n v. City of Little Rock, 227 Ark. 1085, 303 S.W.2d 569 (1957); 10
Thompson on Real Property § 87.01 at 75-76 (David Thomas ed., 2d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2009).
Running alongside that precept, however, is the tenet that a purchaser in possession of
3
(1995).
The effective date of Act 776 was July 28, 1995. See Op. Ark. Att’y Gen. No. 119
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property may not establish adverse possession against his seller under an executory contract.
Tillar v. Clayton, 76 Ark. 405, 88 S.W. 972 (1905).4 The rule is supported by numerous policy
justifications. Mainly, the purchaser under an executory contract of sale cannot establish the
“hostility” element of adverse possession because he enters into possession with the permission
of the seller. See Cleveland, supra; Annotation, Adverse Possession as against Vendor by one who
Enters Under Executory Contract, 1 A.L.R. 1329 (1919). In addition, the rule is born of concern
that a seller would otherwise have no recourse against a purchaser who reneges on payments
after entering into and remaining in possession for the installment period. See Owens v.
Bartruff, 687 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Or. 1984). Along those lines, the purchaser is presumed
subservient to the rights of his seller and thereby equitably estopped from claiming that his
possession is adverse. See Tillar, 76 Ark. at 409, 88 S.W. at 973.
In the present case, Cleary entered into the contract, and possession of the property,
in November 1989. He unilaterally reduced the amount of his payments to $175 per month
in 1993. The idea that Cleary’s unilateral reduction of the payment amount in 1993 was a
repudiation of the contract so as to start the running of the statute of limitations is inconsistent
with his argument that he renegotiated his contract with Gardner Investments in order to
4
See also Coop v. Johnson, 190 Ark. 550, 80 S.W.2d 70 (1935); Little Rock & F. S. R.
Co. v. Rankin, 107 Ark. 487, 156 S.W. 431 (1913); Cleveland v. Aldridge, 94 Ark. 51, 125
S.W. 1016 (1910); Dickson v. Sentell, 83 Ark. 385, 104 S.W. 148 (1907); Perry v. Arkadelphia
Lumber Co., 83 Ark. 374, 103 S.W. 724 (1907); 4 Herbert T. Tiffany, The Law of Real Property
§ 1183 (3d ed. 1975 & Supp. 2004) (possession by purchaser of land under an executory
contract of sale prevents adverse possession so long as the purchase price has not been paid).
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account for the building of a radio tower on the property. In the first place, a unilateral
change in the terms of a contract is not a renegotiation of that contract. Moreover, even if the
reduction of the payment amount resulted from a renegotiation of the contract, it cannot be
a repudiation of that contract as renegotiated because Cleary’s possession was still under the
contract and a recognition of the title held by Gardner Investments. Repudiation of the
contract did not occur until 1998, when Cleary ceased making his payments altogether. Tillar,
supra. Cleary argues that he finished making the payments in 1998 and he bore the burden
of proving the payment of the purchase price. Id. It is only upon the payment of the entire
purchase price that Cleary’s possession would have become adverse to Gardner Investments’
title. Cleveland, supra; Dickson v. Sentell, 83 Ark. 385, 104 S.W. 148 (1907). The amendment
to section 18-11-106 took effect in July 1995 and Cleary’s claim of adverse possession had not
yet begun to run, let alone vest. Therefore, the circuit court did not err in ruling that Cleary
was required to prove that he had paid the taxes on the property. The court specifically found
that Cleary had failed to submit any proof of payment of taxes on the property. Because
Cleary was required to prove that he paid the taxes on the property, his claim for adverse
possession must fail.5
5
As part of his third point, Cleary argues that the circuit court should have given him
credit for the payment of taxes by Gardner Investments. However, he cites no authority for
this proposition. It has long been held that the appellate courts will not address arguments
unless they are sufficiently developed and include citation to authority. Gatzke v. Weiss, 375
Ark. 207, 289 S.W.3d 455 (2008).
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 755
Because we have concluded that Cleary’s claim must fail because he did not show
proof of payment of taxes, we need not address his fourth point concerning color of title or
his fifth point concerning renegotiation of the contract for sale. Where a plaintiff cannot
establish an essential element of his claim, summary judgment is appropriate. Eady v. Lansford,
351 Ark. 249, 92 S.W.3d 57 (2002); Short v. Little Rock Dodge, Inc., 297 Ark. 104, 759 S.W.2d
553 (1988).
As its sole point on cross-appeal, Sledge argues that the circuit court erred in denying
its claim for damages in the form of back rent from Cleary. The circuit court did not explain
why Sledge’s claim was denied. Sledge’s argument is that the circuit court had no discretion
to refuse to award it damages.
Sledge’s original counterclaim was for the unlawful detainer of its property. It asked
not only for possession, but also for unpaid rent in the amount of $6,300. Arkansas Code
Annotated section 18-60-309 governs unlawful detainer actions and states in pertinent part:
(a) If upon the trial of any action brought under this subchapter the finding or
verdict is for the plaintiff, the court or jury trying it shall assess the amount to be
recovered by the plaintiff for the rent due and agreed upon at the time of the
commencement of the action and up to the time of rendering judgment or, in the
absence of an agreement, the fair rental value.
(b) In addition thereto in all cases the court shall assess the following as
liquidated damages:
(1) Where the property sought to be recovered is used for residential purposes
only, the plaintiff shall receive an amount equal to the rental value for each month, or
portion thereof, that the defendant has forcibly entered and detained or unlawfully
detained the property; and
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(2) Where the property sought to be recovered is used for commercial or mixed
residential and commercial purposes, the plaintiff shall receive liquidated damages at
the rate of three (3) times the rental value per month for the time that the defendant
has unlawfully detained the property.
Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-309(a), (b) (Supp. 2009). We have held that the use of the word
“shall” in section 18-60-309(b) mandates an award of liquidated damages to the owner in an
action for unlawful detainer. Mendez v. Aguilar, 2010 Ark. App. 268; Waterall v. Waterall, 85
Ark. App. 363, 155 S.W.3d 30 (2004). In Waterall, the trial court found that the defendant
detained the plaintiff’s property but the trial court awarded damages only in the amount of
the fair market rental value. The landowner filed a cross-appeal and this court reversed and
remanded the case to the trial court so the court could award the mandated liquidated
damages as set forth in the statute.
If the use of the word “shall” was deemed to mandate an award of liquidated damages
under section 18-60-309(b), it should logically be deemed to mandate an award of damages
for the fair market rental of the property under subsection (a). The circuit court found that
the fair-rental value of the property to be $175 per month. We reverse and remand for entry
of an order awarding Sledge judgment for the fair rental value of the property.
Affirmed on direct appeal; reversed and remanded on cross-appeal.
PITTMAN and GLADWIN, JJ., agree.
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