Shafer v. Estate of Shafer
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 743
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
CA 10-294
No.
Opinion Delivered November
ROBERT O. SHAFER, JR.
APPELLANT
3, 2010
APPEAL FROM THE WHITE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. PR-08-105-3]
V.
HONORABLE CRAIG HANNAH,
JUDGE
ESTATE OF ROBERT O. SHAFER, SR.
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
COURTNEY HUDSON HENRY, Judge
Appellant Robert O. Shafer, Jr., appeals an order entered by the Circuit Court of
White County finding him in contempt and requiring him to pay $2,500 in administrative
costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees to appellee, the Estate of Robert O. Shafer, Sr. In holding
appellant in contempt, the circuit court found that appellant willfully disobeyed an order
commanding him to deliver a plow to the executor of the estate. For reversal, appellant asserts
that the contempt order must be reversed because the directives of the circuit court’s previous
order were not clear. We affirm.
The record reflects that Robert O. Shafer, Sr., died testate on May 26, 2007, leaving
his three children, appellant, Karl Shafer, and Roberta Payne, as his heirs. Tension within the
family caused the circuit court to appoint Robert Hudgins, an attorney and certified public
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 743
accountant, to serve as the executor of the estate, even though the will nominated appellant
and Karl as co-executors. This measure did not assuage the discord among the children. At
a contempt hearing held on June 24, 2009, testimony revealed that Karl, with the assistance
of law enforcement, transported to appellant’s home a flat-bed trailer loaded with property
that had belonged to their father. Appellant testified that the property remained on the trailer
and that it was located on his father’s home place that had since been purchased by his
brother-in-law. According to the sheriff’s report, dated August 14, 2007, the property on the
trailer included two plows and a breaking plow. In a letter written to Hudgins, appellant’s
attorney acknowledged that one plow was an asset of the estate but claimed that appellant was
entitled to the other plow and the breaking plow. At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit
court ordered appellant to deliver the flat-bed trailer and one of the plows sitting on the trailer
to Hudgins in ten days. In its written order filed on October 28, 2009,1 the court stated:
The court finds that a certain sixteen foot long trailer, two Masonic rings and
one of the plows currently on the trailer are property of the estate; and Robert
O. Shafer, Jr., is ordered to deliver the trailer, the rings, and a plow of his
choice, from those on the trailer, to a location designated in writing by the
personal representative within ten days.
On December 9, 2009, Hudgins filed a petition for contempt alleging that appellant had
violated the order by not delivering one of the two plows that was on the trailer. The circuit
1
The circuit court also found appellant in contempt for violating a previous order
directing him to deliver the trailer to Hudgins. Appellant appealed the contempt finding, but
we dismissed the appeal for the lack of a final order because the circuit court had not yet
imposed sanctions against appellant. Shafer v. Estate of Robert O. Shafer, Sr., 2010 Ark. App.
476.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 743
court conducted a hearing on this matter on December 22, 2009. Karl testified that appellant
delivered the trailer and that a solitary plow shank was attached to the trailer with bailing wire
at delivery. Karl produced the rusted shank in open court and testified that the shank was the
“part that goes into the dirt that digs the dirt up.” Karl said that the shank could not be used
for plowing without being attached to another piece of equipment and that the shank did not
even have a hitch to mount behind a tractor. He testified that, by itself, the shank was useless.
The circuit court admitted into evidence three photographs of the trailer with the shank tied
onto it.
Karl further testified in reference to photographs that he said represented the
equipment he delivered to appellant on the trailer in August 2007. From the photographs, he
described a beam with a three-point hitch with disks on either end, a middle buster with a
v-shaped plow, and the breaking plow that appellant claimed as his own. Karl testified that
the shank was not one of those items and that the shank was not on the trailer when he
delivered it to appellant.
Melvin Peters, who had been the deceased’s neighbor, testified that he helped Karl load
the trailer in 2007. He also personally observed the shank that was tied onto the trailer that
was delivered to Karl by appellant. Peters testified that the shank was not among the items that
he helped Karl load onto the trailer.
Appellant testified that the item he delivered to Karl was a plow and that it could be
used to plow ground. He said, “You can get ahold of it and you can drag it right through the
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 743
ground and plow ground with it just like you can use a hoe.” Appellant stated that he was
given a choice of plows, that he delivered that one because it was his father’s plow, and that
the plow he delivered was one of the two plows that was on the trailer. In rebuttal, Karl said
that it was possible that the shank was on the trailer. However, he testified that he did not
think that it was and that he was “almost sure that it was not.”
In its remarks from the bench, the circuit court found the testimony of Karl and Peters
to be highly credible. The court stated that appellant was “playing games” with the court and
that it had ordered a complete plow to be delivered, not merely “one little piece of metal.”
The circuit court found appellant in contempt and ordered appellant to pay the estate $2,500
in administrative costs, fees, and expenses. In addition, the court permitted appellant to choose
from the photographs that had been introduced into evidence which plow he wanted and
directed appellant to deliver it to Hudgins within ten days. Appellant has brought this appeal
from the court’s order memorializing its findings.
In urging reversal of the circuit court’s decision, appellant contends that the October
2009 order was not definite in its terms as to which plow he was to deliver and that he
accomplished what he believed was required of him by returning a plow of his choice. The
willful disobedience of a valid court order is contemptuous behavior. Ark. Dep’t of Human
Servs. v. Briley, 366 Ark. 496, 237 S.W.3d 7 (2006). However, before one can be held in
contempt for violating a court’s order, the order must be definite in its terms, clear as to what
duties it imposes, and express in its commands. Doss v. Miller, 2010 Ark. App. 95, ___ S.W.3d
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 743
___. As a general rule, judgments are construed like any other instruments; the determinative
factor is the intention of the court, as gathered from the judgment itself and the record. Terry
v. White, 373 Ark. 366, 288 S.W.3d 194 (2008).
Contempt is divided into criminal contempt and civil contempt. Holifield v. Mullenax
Fin. & Tax Advisory Group, 2009 Ark. App. 280, 307 S.W.3d 608. Criminal contempt
preserves the power of the court, vindicates its dignity, and punishes those who disobey its
orders. Id. Civil contempt protects the rights of private parties by compelling compliance with
orders of the court made for the benefit of private parties. Id. The focus is on the character
of the relief rather than the nature of the proceeding. Id. A contempt fine for willful
disobedience which is payable to the complainant is remedial and therefore constitutes a fine
for civil contempt. Omni Holding and Dev. Corp. v. 3D.S.A., Inc., 356 Ark. 440, 156 S.W.3d
228 (2004). However, if the fine is payable to the court, it is punitive and constitutes a fine
for criminal contempt. Id. Here, the court ordered appellant to pay $2,500 of the estate’s
expenses and attorney’s fees it incurred as a result of appellant’s behavior. Being remedial in
nature and payable to the complainant, we conclude that it is civil contempt. Id. See also
Briley, supra (holding that requiring payment of the complainant’s out-of-pocket expenses
constitutes civil contempt). We will not reverse a circuit court’s finding of civil contempt
unless that finding is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Henderson v. Teague,
2009 Ark. App. 456.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 743
The record of the hearing that produced the October 2008 order reflects that the trailer
had three plows on it. One was noted to be a breaking plow that appellant claimed, and the
circuit court allowed him to keep it. The court directed appellant to return one of the
remaining two plows on the trailer. As we view the matter, the circuit court’s order was
crystal clear in its directive. Instead of abiding by the court’s order, appellant delivered a shank
but not either one of the plows that was loaded on the trailer. We hold that the October 2009
order suffered no infirmity and that the circuit court’s finding of contempt is not clearly
against the preponderance of the evidence.
Affirmed.
A BRAMSON and B ROWN, JJ., agree.
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