Po-Boy Land Co. v. Mullins
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 709
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CA10-85
PO-BOY LAND COMPANY, INC.;
F. KRAMER DARRAGH III; GARY
FUTRELL; JOHN HEARNSBERGER;
DENNIS HUFFMAN; EMON
MAHONEY; BEN O’DELL; RANDY
WILBOURN; JULIA P. MOBLEY; and
WOODY FUTRELL
APPELLANTS
V.
Opinion Delivered
OCTOBER 27, 2010
APPEAL FROM THE HEMPSTEAD
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. CV2006-74-1]
HONORABLE JOHN S.
PATTERSON, JUDGE
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
KENNETH R. MULLINS; JAMES F.
STINSON; and SAM TYSON
APPELLEES
JOHN B. ROBBINS, Judge
Po-Boy Land Company, Inc., a hunting club in Hempstead County, and several of its
officers, directors, and shareholders appeal from an order of partial summary judgment. They
contend that the circuit court erred in dissolving the club and in ruling that the club
wrongfully terminated the memberships of appellees Kenneth Mullins, James Stinson, and
Sam Tyson. As explained below, we dismiss the appeal without prejudice.
The Po-Boy Land Company was incorporated in 1993 as a hunting club. Appellees
Mullins, Stinson, and Tyson bought shares in the corporation in the mid-1990s and became
members. In 2004, Stinson and Tyson notified the club that they had each received an outside
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 709
offer to purchase one share of the club’s stock for $212,000. The club’s board of directors
exercised a right of first refusal and decided to buy each man’s share at the stated price. The
board then voted to finance the purchase by levying an assessment on the other outstanding
shares. Mullins, who owned a single share, and Stinson, who owned two shares in addition
to the one he was selling, objected that the club had no authority to impose the assessment.
Thereafter, Mullins and Stinson refused to pay the assessment, and Tyson changed his
mind about selling his share. The club consequently terminated their memberships and offered
them $93,100 for each of their shares, citing Mullins’s and Stinson’s failure to pay the
assessment and all three appellees’ alleged conduct unbecoming a member. This led to
appellees’ suing the club and its remaining directors and shareholders for, among other things,
compensatory and punitive damages and dissolution of the corporation. The club and the
other defendants counterclaimed against Mullins for breach of fiduciary duty.
Both sides filed motions for summary judgment. On October 1, 2009, the court
entered a partial-summary-judgment order, ruling that the club’s assessment was improper;
that appellees’ memberships were wrongfully terminated; and that the club’s board of directors
had acted in an oppressive manner, necessitating the dissolution of the corporation and the
appointment of a receiver to sell its assets. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 4-27-1430 and 1432 (Repl.
2001). The court also dismissed the club’s counterclaim against Mullins but did not rule on
appellees’ claim for damages.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 709
It is from this order of partial summary judgment that appellants appeal. The order,
however, disposes of fewer than all claims as to all parties. It therefore lacks finality and is not
an appealable order. See Brasfield v. Murray, 96 Ark. App. 207, 239 S.W.3d 551 (2006). Such
an order may be rendered appealable, however, if a circuit court makes an express
determination, supported by specific factual findings, that there is no just reason for delaying
the appeal. Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b)(1) (2010). The circuit court in this case, apparently realizing
that all causes of action had not been resolved, attached the following Rule 54(b) certificate
to its order:
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment, this Court finds that
there is no genuine issue of material fact, and in connection therewith makes the
following findings:
That the assessments made by Po-Boy Land Company, Inc., were improper; that the
expulsion of plaintiffs Kenneth R. Mullins and James Stinson as directors and
stockholders of the corporation for failure to pay assessments and for improper conduct
were improper and of no effect as a matter of law; that the actions of the defendants
against the plaintiffs were oppressive as a matter of law within the meaning of ACA
4-26-1108 [sic]. Don Worthey is appointed receiver to liquidate the corporation. PoBoy Land Company, Inc., is hereby dissolved and its assets sold by the receiver for cash
in keeping with the provisions hereinabove.
The Second Amended Counterclaim, filed herein by the defendant[s],
counterclaimants against the plaintiff, counterdefendant Kenneth R. Mullins[,] is
dismissed.
Unfortunately, the certificate does not comply with Rule 54(b)(1). It addresses the
factual basis of the court’s partial-summary-judgment ruling but does not contain specific
factual findings as to why there is no just reason to delay the appeal. The certificate is
therefore insufficient to confer jurisdiction on this court. See Carter v. Simmons First Nat’l
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 709
Corp., 2010 Ark. App. 576; Rutledge v. Christ Is The Answer Fellowship, Inc., 82 Ark. App. 221,
105 S.W.3d 816 (2003); Stouffer v. Kralicek Realty Co., 81 Ark. App. 89, 98 S.W.3d 475
(2003).
Neither does Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 2(a)(7) (2010), which permits an interlocutory
appeal from an order appointing a receiver, confer appellate jurisdiction in this case. An appeal
taken pursuant to appellate Rules 2(a)(6) or (7) requires the appellant to file its record within
thirty days from the entry of the order appointing the receiver. Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 5(a)
(2010); Murphy v. Michelle Smith Designs, 100 Ark. App. 384, 269 S.W.3d 390 (2007); Johnson
v. Langley, 93 Ark. App. 214, 218 S.W.3d 363 (2005). That was not done here.
We therefore dismiss the appeal without prejudice. We also take this opportunity to
mention a defect in appellants’ addendum. The parties’ motions for summary judgment
incorporated excerpts from several depositions, and appellants placed those excerpts in their
addendum. Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-2(a)(8)(A)(i) (2010) provides that, if a transcript
of a deposition is an exhibit to a motion, the material parts of the transcript shall be abstracted
and not included in the addendum. If appellants decide to refile their appeal, they must
abstract the deposition excerpts rather than placing them in the addendum. We also suggest
that appellants, in the event they refile a notice of appeal, read the revised Ark. R. App.
P.–Civ. 3(e) governing the content of notices of appeal, effective July 1, 2010. See In re:
Arkansas Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals; Rules of Appellate Procedure–Civil; and
Rules of Civil Procedure, 2010 Ark. 288 (per curiam).
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 709
Dismissed without prejudice.
HART and GRUBER, JJ., agree.
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