Smith v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 666
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CA10-499
MARK SMITH
Opinion Delivered
OCTOBER 6, 2010
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE SALINE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. JV 2008-211]
V.
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES and MINOR
CHILDREN
APPELLEES
HONORABLE GARY ARNOLD,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
M. MICHAEL KINARD, Judge
Mark Smith appeals from the order of the circuit court terminating his parental rights
in his children, H.S. and M.S. On appeal, Smith argues that the circuit court’s decision to
terminate his parental rights is clearly erroneous. We affirm the order of the circuit court.
In 2007, appellant was imprisoned after being convicted of first-degree battery, seconddegree domestic battery, false imprisonment, and first-degree terroristic threatening. At the
time appellant began serving his sentence, H.S., born in 2005, and M.S., born in 2006, were
in the custody of their mother, who was not married to appellant. On November 5, 2008,
the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) exercised an emergency hold on the
children.
On November 7, 2008, DHS filed a petition for emergency custody and
dependency-neglect. In the affidavit that accompanied the petition, DHS stated that it took
custody of the children because the mother, children, and an unrelated adult male were found
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 666
in a home with an inactive meth lab, and the mother and adult male were arrested. On
November 7, 2008, the circuit court entered an order granting custody of the children to
DHS.
On November 24, 2008, the circuit court entered an order finding probable cause to
believe that the children were dependent-neglected and continuing custody of the children
with DHS. In the order, appellant was ordered to submit to DNA testing to establish
paternity. On January 9, 2009, the circuit court entered an order adjudicating the children
dependent-neglected. The circuit court entered a judgment of paternity that appellant was
the biological and legal father of the children. Following a review hearing on April 17, 2009,
the circuit court continued custody of the children with DHS. On May 22, 2009, the circuit
court entered a permanency planning order changing the goal of the case from reunification
to termination of parental rights and adoption. On June 29, 2009, DHS filed a petition to
terminate appellant’s and the mother’s parental rights. The scheduled termination hearing was
postponed as to appellant and went forward as to the mother, whose parental rights were
terminated following the hearing. The mother is not a party to this appeal.
The termination hearing pertaining to appellant’s parental rights was conducted on
January 15, 2010. Appellant testified at the termination hearing that he was living with a man
named S.A. Potter, in whose home he had lived prior to being incarcerated. During the time
he lived in that home with the children and their mother prior to his incarceration, the
mother would leave the home, use drugs and return to the home. Appellant would watch
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 666
the children during those times. Appellant testified that the last time he saw his children was
approximately eighteen months before his termination hearing. Appellant also testified that
he was self-employed as a business partner with S.A. Potter. Appellant stated that he planned
to live with Potter until Potter died. At the time of the hearing, appellant had been out of
prison for less than a month. Appellant testified that he did not contact DHS following his
release from prison. While he was incarcerated, appellant took a parenting class, a substanceabuse class, and received his GED. Appellant stated that a DHS caseworker told him that his
current home was appropriate for the children.
Ebony Mance, the family-service worker assigned to the case, testified that DHS was
recommending that appellant’s parental rights be terminated because of the length of time the
children had been in foster care, the lack of involvement from appellant, and the fact that the
children did not know appellant. Mance testified that she had no contact with appellant prior
to the termination hearing except for two prior court dates. Mance further testified that the
only contact she had with appellant’s mother was one occasion on which appellant’s mother
asked her what needed to be done to get a home study. Mance stated that the children have
improved since they have been in foster care. Mance stated that she did not have much
information regarding appellant’s living arrangement and that she believed there was a
possibility of harm to the children if they were returned to appellant due to appellant’s history
of aggression and domestic abuse. Mance gave an opinion that the children would be harmed
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 666
by waiting longer for permanency. Rebecca Kincannon, an adoption specialist, testified that
the children were adoptable.
S.A. Potter testified that appellant’s financial arrangement with him was going to
continue into the future. Kathryn Davidson, the children’s initial foster mother, testified that
the children lived with her from November 2008 until September 2009 and that the children
never asked about their father during that time. Appellant did not call or send letters to the
children while they lived with Davidson.
The circuit court terminated appellant’s parental rights in an order entered on February
26, 2010. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on March 5, 2010.
An order forever terminating parental rights must be based on clear and convincing
evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A)
(Repl. 2009). Additionally, DHS must prove at least one statutory ground for termination
by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B). Our statute
provides, as a ground for termination, that the child has lived outside the home of the parent
for a period of twelve months, and the parent has willfully failed to provide significant
material support in accordance with the parent’s means or to maintain meaningful contact
with the juvenile. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ii)(a). In order to find willful failure
to maintain meaningful contact, it must be shown that the parent was not prevented from
visiting or having contact with the juvenile by the juvenile’s custodian or any other person,
taking into consideration the distance of the juvenile’s placement from the parent’s home.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 666
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ii)(b). We do not reverse a termination order unless the
circuit court’s findings were clearly erroneous. Meriweather v. Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 98 Ark. App. 328, 255 S.W.3d 505 (2007).
Appellant’s argument on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to support the
grounds for termination of appellant’s parental rights. The circuit court’s termination order
lists several grounds, including failure to provide support or maintain meaningful contact. The
termination order can be affirmed upon this ground. In his brief, appellant faults DHS for not
providing services while he was incarcerated or giving him more information regarding what
was expected of him in order to get his children back. Appellant further argues that his
imprisonment was not grounds for termination.
The supreme court has held that
imprisonment of a parent is not conclusive on the issue of termination of parental rights. See
Crawford v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 330 Ark. 152, 951 S.W.2d 310 (1997). However,
appellant’s parental rights were not terminated because he was in prison. His parental rights
were terminated because the children were in foster care for over a year, and the circuit court
found that he failed to maintain meaningful contact with the children. The evidence at the
termination hearing showed that appellant made no effort to contact the children or be
involved in their lives for approximately eighteen months prior to his termination hearing.
Further, there was no evidence introduced at the hearing to indicate that appellant was
impeded from having contact of some kind with his children while he was in prison. While
appellant’s efforts at self-improvement while in prison are admirable, the evidence from the
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 666
termination hearing establishes that he made no effort to have any contact with his children
or to do even the limited amount he could while incarcerated to be a part of their lives.
While appellant is correct in stating that the circuit court’s order lists other grounds for
termination that were not developed by DHS before the circuit court, DHS is only required
to prove one statutory ground for termination. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B) (Repl.
2009).
The circuit court’s finding that DHS proved that appellant failed to maintain
meaningful contact with his children for over a year is not clearly erroneous.
The circuit court also determined, after hearing the evidence, that appellant’s living and
work situations were less than stable, and that the children would potentially be subjected to
harm if they were returned to the father’s care. The evidence at the hearing indicated that
appellant is dependent upon S.A. Potter for both his employment and his living arrangements.
We find that the circuit court’s finding on the issue is not clearly erroneous. The order of the
circuit court terminating appellant’s parental rights is affirmed.
Affirmed.
R OBBINS and B ROWN, JJ., agree.
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