Watkins v. ADHS
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 467
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CA 10-156
Opinion Delivered
LASANDRA WATKINS
APPELLANT
V.
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES
APPELLEE
JUNE 2, 2010
APPEAL FROM THE CRAIGHEAD
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. JV2008-8]
HONORABLE CINDY THYER,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED; MOTION TO BE
RELIEVED GRANTED
JOHN B. ROBBINS, Judge
Appellant LaSandra Watkins appeals the termination of her parental rights to her son,
DG, born on December 10, 2008. The order terminating her rights was entered on
December 8, 2009. In accordance with Linker-Flores v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 359 Ark.
131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004) and Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(i)(2010), her attorney filed a no-merit
brief and a motion to withdraw contending that there are no issues of arguable merit to
support an appeal. The clerk of this court provided a copy of the brief and motion to
appellant, but she did not file any pro se response. We have reviewed the brief and motion
for any adverse rulings, and we agree that there is no basis upon which to advance a
meritorious argument for reversal. We therefore affirm the termination order and grant her
attorney’s motion to be relieved.
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 467
We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Dinkins v. Ark. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 344 Ark. 207, 40 S.W.3d 286 (2001). Termination of parental rights is an
extreme remedy and in derogation of the natural rights of parents, but parental rights will not
be enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health and well-being of the child. Id.
Grounds for termination of parental rights must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
M.T. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 58 Ark. App. 302, 952 S.W.2d 177 (1997). Clear and
convincing evidence is that degree of proof that will produce in the fact finder a firm
conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Anderson v. Douglas, 310 Ark. 633,
839 S.W.2d 196 (1992). The appellate inquiry is whether the trial court’s finding that the
disputed fact was proven by clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. J.T. v. Ark.
Dep’t of Human Servs., 329 Ark. 243, 947 S.W.2d 761 (1997). We give due regard to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. Where there are
inconsistences in the testimony presented at a termination hearing, the resolution of those
inconsistencies is best left to the trial judge, who heard and observed these witnesses
first-hand. Dinkins, supra. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence
to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
The goal of Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341 is to provide permanency in
a minor child’s life in circumstances in which returning the child to the family home is
contrary to the minor’s health, safety, or welfare and the evidence demonstrates that a return
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 467
to the home cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from the minor
child’s perspective. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(3). Parental rights may be terminated if
clear and convincing evidence shows that it is in the child’s best interest. Ark. Code Ann.
§ 9-27-341(b)(3). Additionally, one or more grounds must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence. Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(2)(A) provides the grounds upon
which a termination of parental rights may be established.
With these legal principles in mind, we examine the course of events in this case. The
Department of Human Services (DHS) had maintained an open case for Watkins and her
family dating back to November 2006, in large measure due to Watkins’s history of cocaine
addiction. Watkins had four children older than DG who ultimately ended up out of
Watkins’s custody, but they are not part of this appeal.
DG was removed from her custody at his birth because he tested positive for cocaine.
After the probable cause hearing on December 31, 2008, Watkins was ordered to complete
inpatient drug treatment and parenting classes, obtain stable housing and employment,
become and remain drug-free, cooperate with DHS, and resolve any pending criminal
matters. These remained the primary requirements of her case plan for the entirety of this
case.
DHS made referrals for a psychiatric evaluation and for inpatient drug treatment, but
Watkins never submitted to the psychiatric evaluation and stayed in drug treatment no more
than three days. Watkins did not attend parenting classes, she did not maintain regular contact
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with DHS, nor did she obtain stable employment or any adequate income to support herself
and her child. On the few occasions when DHS was able to make contact with Watkins, she
tested positive for drugs. Watkins was required to complete inpatient drug treatment in order
to be allowed to visit DG, but that never happened.
Due to the mother’s utter failure to participate in any meaningful way toward
rectifying the reasons for her son’s removal, DHS moved to be relieved of providing
reunification services to Watkins, which was granted in June 2009. Thereafter, DHS moved
to terminate her parental rights in August 2009. DHS alleged that Watkins was a long-time
drug abuser and addict, that she was totally uncooperative, that she had abandoned her child,
that she had manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy the issues or rehabilitate her
circumstances preventing return of the child, and that she had subjected her child to
aggravated circumstances.
At the termination hearing conducted on November 24, 2009, Watkins was tardy by
approximately two hours and she was disruptive in court. Watkins testified that she had
moved from Arkansas to Marietta, Georgia, in October to get away from the bad influences
in Jonesboro, where her drug problems originated. She said she had held a job at a fast-food
chicken restaurant in Marietta since October 31, 2009. Watkins stated that she had attended
two evening outpatient drug-treatment sessions, and she would be moving to her own HUD
apartment when she garnered enough money for utilities. Although Watkins tested positive
for cocaine on the day of this hearing, she claimed that she only smoked marijuana the night
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 467
before, not cocaine. She claimed that when she was in Georgia, she did not even think about
drugs, and it was only the environment in Jonesboro that tempted her. Watkins said she
wanted DG returned to her because she did not carry him for nine months just to give him
away.
A Jonesboro police officer also attended the hearing, and he intended to arrest Watkins
that day for seventeen outstanding criminal warrants, failure to pay over $3500 in fines, and
failure to complete public service. Watkins responded to his testimony, “ain’t that a bitch.”
The trial judge admonished Watkins not to make outbursts.
A DHS caseworker testified to the positive drug screen that day and to Watkins’s
failure to complete nearly every case-plan requirement. The caseworker also described that
eleven-month-old DG was very adoptable with potential adoptive parents already identified.
The caseworker stated that although Watkins would have been able to visit her son if she
completed inpatient drug treatment, she did not do so and had not seen her son since he was
born. The caseworker urged that her parental rights be terminated. The attorney ad litem
agreed. Watkins’s attorney argued against termination, stating that Watkins cooperated “to
a certain extent” and she was making progress in Georgia with a job, some drug treatment,
and a decrease in her drug use.
The trial judge announced her findings at the conclusion of the termination hearing.
She found Watkins to be an admitted long-term cocaine addict, using during pregnancy and
through the date of the hearing. The trial judge found that Watkins was non-compliant and
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 467
not credible about her drug use, and that DG would be subjected to potential harm if
returned to his drug-addicted parent. The trial judge praised Watkins for having found a job
in Georgia, but noted that Watkins still was unable to provide housing and would be
indefinitely detained for her outstanding criminal issues. Watkins was tearful and upset as she
listened to the judge recite her findings. The termination order was filed, and a timely notice
of appeal followed.
The only adverse ruling was the termination itself. There could be no issue of arguable
merit advanced on appeal to support reversal. The trial court considered the best interest of
the child, including the likelihood of adoption and the potential harm if DG were returned
to his mother. The trial judge found that Watkins had manifested the indifference or
incapacity to remedy the conditions as outlined in Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii).
All of these findings were found by clear and convincing evidence.
Indeed, the
overwhelming proof was that Watkins was an addict who could not or would not participate
in her recovery in a meaningful way or within a time frame consistent with being a parent.
Moreover, even if she had done so, she was going to be detained criminally for an
indeterminate period of time, inconsistent with parenting.
Because there is no issue of arguable merit for reversal, we hold that this brief is
compliant with the requirements of Linker-Flores v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., supra, and the
Rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court. We affirm the termination of appellant’s parental
rights to DG, and we grant appellant’s attorney’s request to be relieved as counsel.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 467
GRUBER and HENRY, JJ., agree.
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