Borland v Travis
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 461
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
CA09-1392
No.
DAVID BORLAND
Opinion Delivered
APPELLANT
V.
TOM TRAVIS
APPELLEE
June 2, 2010
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CV-07-11163]
HONORABLE JAMES MOODY, JR.,
JUDGE
REVERSED AND REMANDED
JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, Judge
David Borland appeals from an order of the Pulaski County Circuit Court granting a
judgment in favor of Tom Travis on a promissory note. On appeal, Borland argues that the
trial court erred in entering the judgment because Travis admitted that the promissory note
was not supported by consideration and that the note was meant to obligate Borland to a
preexisting debt of the law firm that Borland and Travis had created. We reverse and remand.
In the mid-1990s, law-school friends Travis and Borland formed a law firm, Travis &
Borland, P.A., specializing in collections.
The professional association existed for
approximately three years before Borland decided to leave. After Borland’s departure, Travis
continued to practice law in the same physical location, retaining all the office equipment,
fixtures, and staff.
The law firm was not a financial success. It is not disputed that during the life of the
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 461
partnership, Travis infused at least $150,000 into the firm’s coffers. Nor is it disputed that,
at the time he infused the cash, there was no formal agreement regarding repayment—Travis
merely expected to be reimbursed by the law firm. However, that reimbursement never
occurred. It is also not disputed that during its existence, the firm incurred debt to the
Internal Revenue Service totaling $44,619.28, which Borland eventually paid.
Before Borland left the firm, on May 22, 1998, he signed the promissory note1 that is
1
The instrument reads as follows:
PROMISSORY NOTE
For value received, the undersigned maker hereby promises to pay to the order of
Tom Travis, the sum of $75,000.00 and other such sum as is determined by any court or
governmental agency to be owed by Travis & Borland, P.A. or by the officers in their
individual capacity.
The entire obligation evidenced hereby may be accelerated at the option of the
holder, in the event of insolvency, or if bankruptcy or receivership proceedings are
initiated by or against the maker, death, dissolution or termination of the maker.
This Note is intended as a contract under, and shall be construed and enforceable
in accordance with the laws of the State of Arkansas and the applicable laws of the
United States of America.
Maker hereby waives and renounces for itself, its successors and assigns, any and
all endorsers, guarantors and sureties, all rights to the benefits of any statute of
limitations and any moratorium, reinstatement, marshaling, forbearance, valuation, stay,
extension, redemption, appraisement, exemption and homestead now provided, or which
may hereafter be provided, by the Constitution and Laws of the United States of America
or the State of Arkansas.
Payments are acceptable.
The undersigned acknowledges receipt of a fully completed copy of this instrument.
DATED this 22nd day of May, 1998.
(Signed)
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the subject of this appeal. The parties dispute the circumstances under which Borland
executed the document. Borland insists that he signed it out of friendship to Travis to placate
Travis’s wife, who was concerned about the money Travis had borrowed to infuse into the
firm. Travis disputed that claim, asserting that the note secured Borland’s portion of the
$150,000 in financing that Travis had personally secured to keep the law firm financially
viable.
Travis made no effort to enforce the promissory note for more than nine years.
However, on August 30, 2007, Travis filed a complaint seeking judgment on the note.
Borland timely answered. He admitted signing the note, but denied that the document had
“legal effect” or was “enforceable.” Among others, Borland asserted the affirmative defense
of “failure or want of consideration.” Borland also counterclaimed to recover half of the
money that he had paid to the IRS on behalf of the law firm.
Borland served Travis with requests for admission in accordance with Rule 36 of the
Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. They stated as follows:
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.1: Admit that David L. Borland
received no consideration in exchange for signing the promissory note which is the
subject of the Complaint you filed against him.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 2: Admit that you have no proof that
David L. Borland was provided consideration in exchange for executing the
promissory note upon which you have filed legal action.
Travis never answered these requests for admission.
David L. Borland
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Borland moved for summary judgment, asserting that when Travis failed to answer the
requests for admission, pursuant to Arkansas Civil Procedure Rule 36, they were deemed
admitted. The motion was denied. Borland filed a motion for the court to reconsider its
decision, which was also denied.
At the trial, Travis admitted that he had simply failed to respond to the requests for
admission and offered no excuse. Borland denied receiving any consideration for the
purported agreement to pay Travis $75,000.
Travis testified that there was no prior
agreement that Borland would be obligated to pay half of the $150,000 that Travis had
infused into the law firm, but nonetheless contended that Borland was obligated to pay the
$75,000 as recited in the note. Borland moved for dismissal, again citing Travis’s failure to
respond to the requests for admission. The trial court denied the dismissal motion and found
in favor of Travis. It also granted Borland’s counterclaim, setting off $22,309.64 against the
$75,000 judgment. Travis did not appeal the judgment on the counterclaim.
On appeal, Borland first argues that the trial court erred in entering the judgment
because Travis admitted that the promissory note was not supported by consideration.
Borland asserts that the note, like any contract, must be supported by legal consideration to
be valid and enforceable. Further, citing Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Kesterson, 288 Ark.
611, 708 S.W.2d 606 (1986), among other cases, he contends that the supreme court has
strictly enforced Rule 36 and the deemed admitted sanction contained therein. We find merit
in this argument.
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First, it is settled law that, despite the strictures of the parol-evidence rule, lack of
consideration is a defense to a promissory note. Ozark Diamond Mines Corp. v. Townes &
Garanflo, 117 Ark. 552, 174 S.W. 151 (1915). This fact makes the issue of consideration
pivotal in this case. It is therefore not remarkable that the issue of consideration was the focus
of Borland’s requests for admission. As noted above, requests for admission are governed by
Rule 36 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. In pertinent part, Rule 36 provides:
(a) Request for Admission. A party may serve upon any other party a written
request for the admission, for purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any
matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth in the request that relate to statements
or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact. . . . The matter is admitted
unless, within thirty (30) days after service of the request, or within such shorter or
longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the request is directed serves
upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the
matter, signed by the party or by the party’s attorney, but, unless the court shortens the
time, a defendant shall not be required to serve answers or objections before the
expiration of forty-five (45) days after service of the summons and complaint upon that
defendant. . . .
(b) Effect of Admission. Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established
unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.
Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amendment of a pretrial order, the
court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the presentation of the merits of
the action will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to
satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice that party in maintaining
the action or defense on the merits.
This case turns on Travis’s failure to answer Borland’s requests for admission. It is not
disputed that Travis was given ample opportunity to respond to the requests for admission or
to otherwise request relief from the trial court. Travis did neither. Accordingly, the case at
bar is controlled by Kesterson, supra, where the supreme court reversed the denial of a motion
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for summary judgment that was predicated upon a party failing to answer requests for
admission.
In Kesterson, the supreme court noted that it was its “policy” to require
compliance with the rule governing requests for admission. We therefore reverse and remand
to the trial court for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.2 Because we reverse and
remand on this point, we need not address Borland’s second point regarding the invalidity of
the note due to its intention to obligate Borland to a preexisting debt of the law firm that
Borland and Travis had created.
Reversed and remanded.
VAUGHT, C.J., and ROBBINS, J., agree.
2
We decline to simply reverse and dismiss because there is a portion of the trial court’s
order that also grants Borland’s counterclaim, from which Travis has not appealed.
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