Green v. Green
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 445
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CA09-962
Opinion Delivered
CHERI GREEN
APPELLANT
V.
MARK RANDAL GREEN
May 26, 2010
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. DR-2004-2757]
HONORABLE VANN SMITH, JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Judge
This is an appeal from an order denying appellant’s prayer for her award of temporary
alimony to be modified to permanent alimony based on allegations of poor health and
declining financial circumstances. The trial judge found no change in circumstances to
warrant modification of the prior alimony award and denied her claim for relief. Appellant
argues that the trial court erred in failing to find a change of circumstances warranting
modification of the alimony award. We find no error, and we affirm.
A decision whether to modify a previously entered alimony award is a matter that lies
within the trial court’s sound discretion, and on appeal we will not reverse a trial court’s
decision absent an abuse of that discretion. Bettis v. Bettis, 100 Ark. App. 295, 267 S.W.3d
646 (2007). Alimony is intended to rectify any economic imbalance in the earning power and
standard of living of the parties in light of the particular facts of the case, id., and the primary
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 445
factors to be considered are the financial need of one spouse and the ability of the other
spouse to pay. Bracken v. Bracken, 302 Ark. 103, 787 S.W.2d 678 (1990).
The record shows that appellant asked for a similar modification of alimony based on
declining health in a complaint filed on February 6, 2008; this request was denied in an order
entered July 16, 2008. No appeal was taken from that order. The present action arose out
of a subsequent complaint filed December 23, 2008, that likewise sought modification of the
original decree to award permanent alimony based on appellant’s decline in health since the
time of the original decree. In essence, rather than appeal the adverse ruling in her first
request for modification, appellant simply filed another request for modification five months
later.
In denying appellant’s request for modification, the trial judge found that there was no
significant change in the circumstances of the parties between July 2008 and the date of the
hearing on appellant’s petition. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to
consider all circumstances that may have changed since the initial award of alimony in 2006
because appellee failed to assert the affirmative defense of res judicata in his answer to the
complaint of December 2008. In essence, she asserts that, absent a plea of res judicata, the
trial court was required to consider all changes in the circumstances of the parties following
the initial award without regard to the order denying a similar request for modification only
five months before the present petition for modification was filed. We do not agree.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 445
It is true that it is frequently said that the appellate court considers a decree for alimony
to be res judicata on the circumstances prevailing at the time of the decree. This formulation,
which originated in Boyles v. Boyles, 268 Ark. 120, 594 S.W.2d 17 (1980), does not refer to
the affirmative defense of res judicata, but instead uses the phrase in the more general sense
of “a thing adjudicated.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1336–37 (8th ed. 2004); compare definitions
1 and 2. That this is so is clear from reading the phrase in its original context:
It is true that an award of alimony is neither a final decree, in the sense that an
execution may be issued or that it becomes a lien on real estate, nor a final
determination of the rights of the parties, in the sense that it prevents review should
there be a change in the circumstances of the parties. Jones v. Jones, 204 Ark. 654, 163
S.W.2d 528. The chancery court may modify an award of alimony from time to time,
but the power is to be exercised to meet changes in the relative circumstances of the
parties. Warren v. Warren, 215 Ark. 567, 221 S.W.2d 407. If there is no change in the
situation of the parties, the court has no power to act. 2A Nelson, Divorce &
Annulment, 51 and 52, 17.07. Thus, we consider a decree for alimony to be res
judicata on the circumstances prevailing at the time of the decree.
Boyles, 268 Ark. at 126, 594 S.W.2d at 21. The focus is on the power of the court to modify
an existing decree in a continuing action, and the rule is that the court may do so only upon
a showing of a material alteration of circumstances. This doctrine, originating in Ecclesiastical
Court, was adopted by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Bauman v. Bauman, 18 Ark. 320, 331
(1857). In that same case, the court declared that modification could not be based on errors
in the original decree that were not challenged on appeal:
In so far as this bill seeks any alteration in the original decree, upon the ground
that any of the allowances therein made were meagre and inadequate; it is clear
enough that no foundation is thereby laid for any relief. Because, if there was any
ground for that complaint, the complainant ought to have appealed.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 445
Id. at 330–31. The requirement of a change in circumstances as a basis for modification of
an alimony decree is, therefore, based on considerations relating to the finality of judgments.
These considerations apply not only to original judgments, but also to subsequent orders
regarding modification: only changes in circumstances occurring after the most recent
modification order can support a further modification. Benn v. Benn, 57 Ark. App. 190, 944
S.W.2d 555 (1997).
The evidence presented in support of appellant’s December 2008 request for
modification is essentially identical to that considered in the July 2008 order denying her
previous request. Although there was additional evidence of appellant’s physical ailments, her
own witnesses admitted that all of her conditions had been known to them at the time
appellant filed her previous petition for modification of alimony in February 2008.
Furthermore, while appellant testified that the value of her investments had declined as a
result of recent economic downturns, there was no evidence to show that her losses could not
be recouped, and appellant admitted that she was not currently using those funds. After
reviewing the record, we agree that no material change in appellant’s circumstances occurred
since the entry of the most recent modification order, and hold that the trial court did not err
in denying the present motion for modification of alimony.
Affirmed.
HART and BAKER, JJ., agree.
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