Hogan v. State
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 434
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CACR 09-1020
Opinion Delivered
LAQUINCE HOGAN
APPELLANT
V.
STATE OF ARKANSAS
MAY 19, 2010
APPEAL FROM THE LITTLE RIVER
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. CR-2008-54-1]
HONORABLE TOM COOPER,
JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
JOHN B. ROBBINS, Judge
Appellant Laquince Hogan was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine with
intent to deliver and possession of marijuana. Mr. Hogan was sentenced as a habitual offender
to 125 years in prison, to be served concurrently with a one-year jail sentence. On appeal,
Mr. Hogan argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdicts because the
State failed to prove that he resided at the house where the search warrant was executed. In
addition, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for
mistrial. We affirm.
The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is
supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Bowker v. State, 363 Ark. 345, 214
S.W.3d 243 (2005). Evidence is substantial if it is of sufficient force and character to compel
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 434
reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. Id. On
appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, considering only that
evidence that supports the verdict. Id.
Officer Doyle Crouch of the Ashdown Police Department was involved with a search
warrant executed at 210 East Cowling Street on August 5, 2008. When Officer Crouch
arrived, Mr. Hogan was sitting under a tree on the corner of the property, about twenty-five
feet from the house. Officer Crouch testified that there were eight to ten people with
Mr. Hogan near the tree, and that they scattered when the police arrived. According to
Officer Crouch, when the police served the search warrant Mr. Hogan asked, “why did we
come there and search his house.” Officer Crouch testified that Mr. Hogan’s personal
property was in the house, his wife was in the house, and that Mr. Hogan indicated that he
lived there.
During the search of the house, the police found numerous items of contraband in the
kitchen cabinets. There was a bag containing marijuana, a set of digital scales, and several
bags containing cocaine. The crime-lab analysis showed that approximately 37 grams of
powder cocaine and 29 grams of crack cocaine were seized from the residence.
Mr. Hogan was searched at the scene, and the police removed rolls of money from
two pants pockets. The cash seized from Mr. Hogan’s person totaled $4085.00.
Officer Tommy Stuard also assisted in the search. He testified that the cocaine was
wrapped for sale, and that he has never arrested a drug user (as opposed to a drug dealer) who
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 434
possessed that much cocaine or money. Officer Stuard stated that he had never seen that
much crack cocaine in one place.
Officer Robert Gentry transported the seized items to the crime lab. Officer Gentry
testified that the drug interdiction program averages about 325 cases per year and that he is
involved in about ninety percent of them. He stated that during his several years of
experience, he had never seen as much crack cocaine at one time as that seized in this case.
Roy Staggs keeps the records for the Ashdown Water Department. According to their
records, the water bill for 210 East Cowling Street is assigned to Laquince Hogan. Mr. Staggs
said that the water bill was initiated at that address under that name on February 15, 2008, and
that it remained in Mr. Hogan’s name through at least August 5, 2008. The State introduced
records from the water department showing that the account was in Mr. Hogan’s name.
Mr. Hogan’s first argument on appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the
basis that the State failed to prove that he resided at the location subject to the search warrant.
Mr. Hogan asserts that when the police arrived he was not inside the house, but was sitting
outside surrounded by eight to ten other people. While Officer Crouch testified that Mr.
Hogan lived in the residence, Mr. Hogan submits that Officer Crouch never attempted to
verify that fact and could not identify a specific item of Mr. Hogan’s personal property as
proof that he lived there. And while Mr. Staggs said that the water bill was assigned to
Mr. Hogan, appellant asserts that Mr. Staggs did not testify that Mr. Hogan physically lived
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 434
there, nor did the officers involved in the search. Mr. Hogan argues that because there was
insufficient evidence that he lived in the house, his drug convictions must be reversed.
The State does not have to establish actual physical possession of a controlled
substance. Champlin v. State, 98 Ark. App. 305, 254 S.W.3d 780 (2007). It may prove
constructive possession, which is the control or right to control the contraband. Id. This
control can be inferred from the circumstances, such as the proximity of the contraband to
the accused and the ownership of the property where the contraband is found. Id.
Mr. Hogan’s sufficiency argument is limited to a challenge of the State’s proof as to
his residency in the house. We hold that there was substantial evidence that Mr. Hogan lived
in the house, and therefore that he constructively possessed the contraband.
Officer Crouch testified that he knew where Mr. Hogan lived and that his address was
210 East Cowling Street, where the search warrant was executed. Mr. Hogan acknowledged
as much when he asked the police why they were searching his house. There was evidence
that Mr. Hogan’s wife was inside the house when the search began, and he was sitting outside
on the property in possession of $4085.00 in cash. The water department records showed the
water bill to be in Mr. Hogan’s name on the day of the search. Viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State, there was substantial evidence that Mr. Hogan lived there
and was in control of the marijuana, scales, and large quantities of cocaine.
Mr. Hogan’s remaining argument is that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his motion for mistrial. Mr. Hogan’s argument is premised on what he asserts was improper
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 434
testimony by the State’s witnesses relating to the amount of cocaine seized and their
comparisons of this case to prior drug cases.
During Detective Crouch’s testimony, he stated that anytime someone has a large
amount of narcotics, particularly individually wrapped cocaine, it is almost always for
distribution and sale. Officer Crouch further testified that people involved in the sale of
narcotics will have digital scales. In Officer Stuard’s testimony about the drug raid he said that
he had never before seen that much crack cocaine in one place. Officer Gentry also testified
that he had not seen that much crack cocaine at one time, and further testified that scales are
used regularly at drug dealers’ houses.
During the subsequent testimony of the crime lab chemist, Madison Kniskern, the
State asked whether she had examined a larger amount of crack cocaine than that submitted
in this case, and Ms. Kniskern responded that she had. Then the State asked whether the
amount in this case would be a substantial amount or a small amount, and Mr. Hogan
objected. The trial court sustained appellant’s objection, and stated:
You can’t ask that. You’ve done it all along. You have an objection—what these
guys do with other cases has no bearing on this. You know, I mean to ask a witness
is this the largest amount you’ve ever busted, you can object, but I think you’re way
out of line going there.
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hogan made his motion for mistrial, wherein his attorney stated,
“Your honor, after discussion with my client about the amounts, large amounts that the three
agents talked about, he asked me to go ahead and make a record, make a motion for mistrial.”
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The trial court denied appellant’s motion on the basis that Mr. Hogan failed to object to the
earlier testimony of the police officers.
Mr. Hogan now contends that the testimony elicited by the prosecutor showed a
pattern of deliberately inducing prejudicial responses from the witnesses. He maintains that
the prosecution bolstered its case with testimony designed to compare this case with other
cases the police were involved with, and argues that the trial court erred in denying his
mistrial motion when the prosecution repeatedly induced prejudicial responses.
The law is well settled that to preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant must object at
the first opportunity. Pyle v. State, 340 Ark. 53, 8 S.W.3d 491 (2000). Similarly, motions for
mistrial must be made at the first opportunity. Ferguson v. State, 343 Ark. 159, 33 S.W.3d 115
(2000). The policy reason behind this rule is that a trial court should be given an opportunity
to correct any error early in the trial, perhaps before any prejudice occurs. Id.
We hold that Mr. Hogan’s motion for mistrial was not timely, and therefore this issue
is not preserved for review. Mr. Hogan did not object to any of the alleged improper
testimony of Officers Crouch, Stuard, and Gentry, nor did he move for a mistrial during
examination of those witnesses. In fact, during his cross-examination of Officer Gentry,
appellant himself asked whether in his nine years’ experience Officer Gentry had been
involved in a drug bust where this amount of crack cocaine had been found.
During the State’s examination of the chemist, Ms. Kniskern, the prosecutor asked
whether the amount seized was substantial, and for the first time appellant objected to this line
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 434
of questioning. The objection was sustained, so Ms. Kniskern gave no prejudicial testimony
in this regard. After Ms. Kniskern finished her testimony and appellant announced he had
no cross-examination for her, Mr. Hogan made his motion for mistrial. The motion came
too late. The purpose of requiring a timely mistrial motion is to give the trial court an
opportunity to correct any error early in the trial before prejudice occurs. Ferguson, supra.
In the present case, Mr. Hogan failed to comply with this requirement and therefore we need
not address the merits of his argument on appeal.
Affirmed.
GRUBER and HENRY, JJ., agree.
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