Hayden v. Director
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 298
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
No. E09-120
Opinion Delivered
BRENDA C. HAYDEN
V.
APPELLANT
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF
WORKFORCE SERVICES AND
CMC STEEL FABRICATORS
APPELLEES
April 7, 2010
APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
BOARD OF REVIEW
[2009-BR-00446]
AFFIRMED
DAVID M. GLOVER, JUDGE
At the agency level, appellant, Brenda Hayden, an accounts-payable clerk, was initially
denied unemployment benefits on the bases that she was discharged for misconduct in
connection with the work and that she was not available for suitable work. The denial of
benefits was upheld by both the Appeal Tribunal and the Board of Review. On appeal,
Hayden argues that there is not substantial evidence to support the Board of Review’s findings
under either provision. We affirm the Board of Review’s denial of benefits on both bases.
In Lewis v. Director, 90 Ark. App. 219, 221, 205 S.W.3d 161, 162 (2005), this court set
forth the standard of review employed in unemployment cases when the issues are ones of
sufficiency of the evidence:
On appeal, the findings of the Board of Review are conclusive if they are supported
by substantial evidence. Walls v. Director, 74 Ark. App. 424, 49 S.W.3d 670 (2001).
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 298
support a conclusion. George’s, Inc. v. Director, 50 Ark. App. 77, 900 S.W.2d 590
(1995). We review the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in
the light most favorable to the Board’s findings. Id. Issues of credibility of witnesses
and weight to be afforded their testimony are matters for the Board of Review to
determine. Bradford v. Director, 83 Ark. App. 332, 128 S.W.3d 20 (2003). Even when
there is evidence upon which the Board might have reached a different decision, the
scope of judicial review is limited to a determination of whether the Board could
reasonably reach its decision upon the evidence before it. Id.
The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded testimony are matters to be
resolved by the Board of Review. Williams v. Director, 79 Ark. App. 407, 88 S.W.3d 427
(2002).
Hayden first challenges the Board’s finding that she was discharged for misconduct in
connection with the work. A person will be disqualified for unemployment benefits if it is
found that she was discharged from her employment on the basis of misconduct in connection
with the work. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-514(a)(1) (Repl. 2002). In Johnson v. Director, 84
Ark. App. 349, 351–52, 141 S.W.3d 1, 2–3 (2004), this court set forth the definition of
“misconduct”:
“Misconduct,” for purposes of unemployment compensation, involves: (1) disregard
of the employer’s interest; (2) violation of the employer’s rules; (3) disregard of the
standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect; and (4) disregard of
the employee’s duties and obligations to his employer. Rossini v. Director, 81 Ark. App.
286, 101 S.W.3d 266 (2003). To constitute misconduct, however, the definitions
require more than mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good
performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies, ordinary negligence
in isolated instances, or good-faith errors in judgment or discretion. Id. Instead, there
is an element of intent associated with a determination of misconduct. Blackford v.
Director, 55 Ark. App. 418, 935 S.W.2d 311 (1996). There must be an intentional and
deliberate violation, a willful and wanton disregard, or carelessness or negligence of
such a degree or recurrence as to manifest wrongful intent or evil design. Rossini v.
Director, supra. Misconduct contemplates a willful or wanton disregard of an employer’s
interest as is manifested in the deliberate violation or disregard of those standards of
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 298
behavior which the employer has a right to expect from its employees. Blackford v.
Director, supra.
Whether an employee’s actions constitute misconduct in connection with the work
sufficient to deny unemployment benefits is a question of fact for the Board. Thomas
v. Director, 55 Ark. App. 101, 931 S.W.2d 146 (1996).
Hayden argues that the finding of misconduct cannot stand because her former
employer did not participate before the Appeal Tribunal in the telephone hearing; that
because the employer did not participate in the telephone hearing, it failed on its burden of
proof. She cites Grigsby v. Everett, 8 Ark. App. 188, 649 S.W.2d 404 (1983), for the
proposition that it is the employer’s burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that at least one instance of misconduct occurred. In Grigsby, the evidence before
the Appeal Tribunal was conflicting; here, the only evidence provided at the Appeal Tribunal
hearing was from Hayden. But unlike Grigsby, Hayden’s testimony before the Appeal
Tribunal and the information she had already provided at the agency level on her claimantstatement forms provide substantial evidence to support the Board of Review’s denial of her
claim.
Hayden argues that at no point in the record is there any indication that her conduct
was deliberate, intentional, or amounted to anything more than ordinary negligence; that the
alleged misconduct began after the death of her son and the doubling of her workload; and
that she had no evil design in falling behind in her work. However, her own words on her
“Discharge Insubordination - Claimant Statement” belie these assertions. First, she stated on
this form that she was suspended from January 7, 2009, until January 9, 2009, which was the
date she was discharged from work. In response to the question, “What was the final incident
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 298
that caused the discharge,” she responded, “Delinquent in paying bills after I had been
forewarned several times; not answering e-mails and phone in a timely manner and
insubordination.” When asked on the form what specific instructions she had failed to follow,
she replied, “all of them,” and when asked her reason for not following the instructions, she
replied, “none at all.” She further acknowledged on the form that she had been verbally
warned to “get herself together.”
At the telephone hearing, Hayden testified that she had “gotten behind” on some of
the bills due to a heavy workload because of cutbacks in personnel and because her son had
suddenly passed away. She admitted that she had allowed one accounts-payable balance to
grow to $32,000, and that there were some other vendors that had been inquiring about the
status of their accounts. Hayden said that there was only one other account that she could
think of that was delinquent, but that it was not as much as the other account. She also
admitted that she was slow in answering her e-mails and phone calls. Hayden said that she
was suspended for two days; when she came back, she was told that her employer had
reviewed the accounts and that she was terminated.
Based on our standard of review, we hold that there is substantial evidence to support
the Board’s denial of benefits for misconduct. Hayden admitted that she had been warned
previously about paying the accounts payable in a timely manner and that she was eventually
suspended for failing to do so before she was terminated. The issue of misconduct is a
question of fact for the Board of Review; we must affirm the decision if it is supported by
substantial evidence and if the Board could reasonably reach its decision based upon the
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 298
evidence before it, even if there was evidence on which the Board might have reached a
different decision. Kimble v. Director, 60 Ark. App. 36, 959 S.W.2d 66 (1997).
Hayden next challenges the Board’s finding that she was not available for suitable work
pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-507(3)(A) (Supp. 2009). This statutory
provision provides that an insured worker will be eligible to receive benefits for any week if
it is determined that “[t]he worker is unemployed, is physically and mentally able to perform
suitable work, and is available for such work. Mere registration and reporting at a local
employment office shall not be conclusive evidence of ability to work, availability for work,
or willingness to accept work unless the individual is doing those things which a reasonably
prudent individual would be expected to do to secure work.” Arkansas law requires that
claimants be available for work during the entire week for which they claim benefits in order
to be eligible for unemployment benefits that week. Lanoy v. Daniels, 271 Ark. 922, 611
S.W.2d 524 (1981).
Here, Hayden returned to school after she was terminated. Hayden argues that she
was available for work “a couple of hours a day,” even though she reported that she would
rather focus on school than look for work. However, at the agency level, on her Department
of Workforce Services “Able and Available - Claimant Statement,” Hayden had marked that
she was not able and available for work from January 19, 2009, and she then left the ending
date open, writing in “until.” She also marked that she was still not able and available for
work, and the reason she gave was “attending school full time.” Then, at the telephone
hearing, Hayden again testified that she was not looking for work because she was devoting
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all of her time to school. She said that it would be difficult to work and go to school, but that
others had done it and she had done it before, but that she could only work “just a couple of
hours a day.” Therefore, Hayden’s own statements and testimony undermine her present
contentions that she is now available for work. The Board of Review’s denial of benefits on
this basis is supported by substantial evidence, and we affirm on this point as well.
Affirmed.
GLADWIN and KINARD, JJ., agree.
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