Torrence v. State
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 225
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
CACR09-679
No.
Opinion Delivered
DUSTIN C. TORRENCE
APPELLANT
V.
STATE OF ARKANSAS
March 10, 2010
APPEAL FROM THE CLEVELAND
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR-08-30-5]
HONORABLE LARRY W.
CHANDLER, JUDGE
APPELLEE
REVERSED AND REMANDED
JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Judge
Appellant was convicted of arson and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. On
appeal, he argues that the trial court erred, inter alia, in refusing to submit his proffered AMI
Crim. 2d 403 instruction to the jury so as to allow the jury to decide the accomplice status
of State’s witness Michael Pennington. Appellant is correct, the error is prejudicial, and
therefore we reverse and remand for retrial.
An accomplice is a person who could himself be convicted of the crime charged
against the defendant, either as principal or accomplice. Havens v. State, 217 Ark. 153, 228
S.W.2d 1003 (1950). A person cannot be convicted of a felony based upon the testimony of
an accomplice unless that testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the
defendant with the commission of the offense. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-111(e)(1) (Repl.
2005). An appellant bears the burden of proving that a witness is an accomplice whose
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 225
testimony must be corroborated. Price v. State, 365 Ark. 25, 223 S.W.3d 817 (2006).
Whether a witness is an accomplice is ordinarily a mixed question of law and fact to be
submitted to the jury. Odom v. State, 259 Ark. 429, 533 S.W.2d 514 (1976). The court
should not instruct the jury that a certain witness is an accomplice if there is any dispute in
the testimony upon that point. Id. The corroborating evidence need not be sufficient
standing alone to sustain the conviction, but it must, independent from that of the
accomplice, tend to a substantial degree to connect the defendant with the commission of the
crime; the test is whether, if the testimony of the accomplice were completely eliminated
from the case, the other evidence independently establishes the crime and tends to connect
the accused with its commission. Gibson v. State, 41 Ark. App. 154, 852 S.W.2d 326 (1993).
Fire destroyed the Kingsland school on May 24-25, 2003. Appellant was a volunteer
firefighter at Kingsland at the time of the fire and for some time thereafter. Appellant was
friends with Chris Jones and Michael Pennington. Captain Young of the Cleveland County
Sheriff’s Office testified that his investigation revealed that appellant, Pennington, and Jones
were involved in more than a dozen arson fires committed in the vicinity of Kingsland over
a period of years. According to Captain Young, all three of these men were motivated by the
desire to fight the fires. Jones and Pennington aspired to be members of the fire department.
Not all of the fires were set by all three men acting in concert, but there was evidence that
every fire involved at least two of them.
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The proof of appellant’s participation in the Kingsland school arson that was the
subject of this trial consisted of the testimony of Pennington and Jones. Pennington’s
testimony was the sole corroboration of the testimony of Jones, who was an accomplice to
the Kingsland school arson.
At trial, appellant asserted that Pennington was also an
accomplice and moved at the appropriate times for a directed verdict on the ground that the
testimony of one accomplice cannot provide corroboration for that of another. See Olles v.
State, 260 Ark. 571, 542 S.W.2d 755 (1976). The trial court denied the motions, ruling that
Pennington was not an accomplice as a matter of law. At the close of the evidence, appellant
proffered a jury instruction based on AMI Crim. 2d 403, which would have had the jury
decide as a factual matter whether Pennington was an accomplice whose testimony had to be
corroborated and, if so, whether sufficient corroboration had been proved. The trial court
refused to give the requested instruction.
We find no merit in appellant’s assertion that the trial court erred in refusing to declare
Pennington to be an accomplice as a matter of law. Such a declaration is proper only where
the facts show conclusively that the witness was an accomplice. McGehee v. State, 348 Ark.
395, 72 S.W.3d 867 (2002). We do, however, agree that the trial court erred in refusing to
submit the proffered instruction to the jury. There was clearly a fact question as to
Pennington’s accomplice status: Pennington admitted that he himself had told some people
that he started the fire. Even though Pennington later claimed to investigators that he was
“only kidding,” we think that Pennington’s admission of making a statement against his own
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penal interest is more than sufficient to raise a jury question as to whether he was an
accomplice. Even where the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we will reverse
where a witness’s testimony raises a question as to his accomplice status and the trial court
refuses to give a correct instruction permitting the jury to decide the question. King v. State,
323 Ark. 671, 916 S.W.2d 732 (1996). We reverse and remand on this ground.
Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of evidence
of his prior arson convictions before he took the stand to testify, asserting that he did not open
the door to such testimony by questioning Captain Young regarding the convictions of
Pennington and Jones for arson committed in 2005.1 We do not reach this issue because it
is not sufficiently developed to show that appellant was prejudiced by any error that may have
occurred. Appellant concedes that he admitted his prior arson convictions in his own trial
testimony, but offers only a conclusory argument, unsupported by authority, asserting that he
was nevertheless prejudiced because he was compelled to testify in order to deny testimony
by Jones and Pennington that he was involved in setting other fires with them in 2003.
There are several legal theories that might be applicable to this argument—see Isbell v. State,
326 Ark. 17, 931 S.W.2d 74 (1996); but cf. Towe v. State, 304 Ark. 239, 801 S.W.2d 42
(1990), and Pool v. State, 29 Ark. App. 234, 780 S.W.2d 350 (1989)—but appellant invokes
none of them specifically. The Arkansas case law is less than clear, and appellant’s argument
1
We note that appellant also advances an argument under this point based on modus
operandi, but we cannot address it because it has been raised for the first time on appeal.
See Stokes v. State, 359 Ark. 94, 194 S.W.3d 762 (2004).
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on this point is unsupported by convincing argument or authority; we therefore decline to
address it. See Swint v. State, 356 Ark. 361, 152 S.W.3d 226 (2004).
Finally, appellant maintains that the trial court erred on hearsay grounds in allowing
introduction of a letter from the Kingsland school’s insurer demonstrating the extent of the
financial loss. However, even assuming arguendo that the letter was not admissible as a record
of a regularly conducted business activity under Ark. R. Evid. 806(3) because it was not
created at or near the time of the fire loss, appellant suffered no prejudice because copies of
the cancelled checks constituting the loss payment to the school were also introduced, and
the dates inscribed on these checks were contemporaneous to the fire and insurance claim.
Reversed and remanded.
VAUGHT, C.J., and ROBBINS, J., agree.
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